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Prologue 
Greece‘s relation with the West during the Cold War era has constantly attracted the 
attention of Greek and international scholarship. In this relationship, continuities and 
breaks become evident. The postwar era was marked by the continuation of the 
agonizing Greek effort to integrate in the West. Thus, there was an effort to bring 
relations with the major Western European states (Britain, France, West Germany, 
Italy) back to a kind of normalcy. This, as could be expected, was a particularly 
demanding endeavour, especially regarding the former Axis powers, against which 
Greece had fought during the Second World War. The Cold War provided a context 
or a medium which facilitated the rebuilding of bilateral contacts.  
There also were breaks, or at least novelties, pointing to the ascent of a new 
era of international relations. The US-Greek special relationship, forged during the 
difficult years of the Greek civil war but also burdened by the memories of US 
penetration in Greek policy-making in 1947-52, was a salient novel element. Greece‘s 
participation in NATO was an unprecedented event: this was the first time that the 
country allied formally with the major powers of the West. Last but not least, 
Athens‘s ambition to participate in supranational European integration resulted in the 
1961 Association Agreement with the European Economic Community, and opened 
new roads for Greece‘s internal development and international relations.  
This volume presents archival material from the West German, French, Italian, 
British and US national archives, as well as from the NATO Archives, addressing 
important aspects of this historical phenomenon. This multi-archival research was 
undertaken by a large number of scholars, in the context of the Thalis project on 
Greece and the Cold War, coordinated by the University of Macedonia: Konstantina 
E. Botsiou, Dionysios Chourchoulis, Christos Christidis, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou,
Vaios Kalogrias, Periklis-Stelios Karavis, Manolis Koumas, Sofia Papastamkou, and
Ioannis Sakkas. All researchers also suggested documents for possible publication,
thus creating a large pool of archival material. The editors then made the final
selection and prepared this volume.
This volume cannot, of course, tell the whole story of Greece‘s relationship 
with the West in the postwar era. It aims to highlight important landmarks or 
perspectives, as seen by the other Western capitals. It is hoped, however, that it will 
contribute to a widening of the debate on one of the most important aspects of 
contemporary Greek history. 
The editors 
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Introduction 
Greece‘s relationship with the West during the Cold War is one of the most hotly-
debated issues of contemporary Greek history. Although much remains to be done, 
there is an extensive and growing bibliography on this subject, from the Greek civil 
war until the country‘s accession to the EEC in the late 1970s. Recently, attempts are 
also being made to expand the discussion in the Greek 1980s. Needless to say, this 
bibliography has evolved through time. Initially, the focus was on the role of the 
Great Powers (the title of the book by Stephen G. Xydis in 1963
1
), and the conceptual
approach was compatible with the ―orthodox‖ school of thought, prevalent at that 
time in the West. Later on, new approaches rose. The Greek ―revisionism‖ in the late 
1960s and early 1970s focused on the alleged role of the United States in the 
imposition of the Colonels‘ dictatorship, and thus again reproduced the omnipresent, 
in Greek debates, concept of a small country, suffering the interventions of the 
infamous ―foreign factor‖ (or, more amusingly in the Greek language, ―foreign 
finger‖ – μέλνο δάθηπινο).2 The Junta caused a huge setback for Greek historical
perceptions and culture. The hopeful efforts of other scholars – seeking to interpret 
developments as processes rather than as instances of imposition, and bring into the 
equation the role of the Greeks or the regional, mostly Balkan, actors themselves – 
were largely sidelined.
3
 It was only later, with the advent of new generations of
historians during the 1990s and later, that this more functional approach was revived 
and to some extent expanded. We are now in a new era, in which the role of the Great 
Powers is being acknowledged, but the importance of Greek or regional actors is also 
underlined; developments are being interpreted as dynamic interactions rather than as 
static incidents; and the international perspective – the wider picture – allows scholars 
to advance more balanced assessments regarding Greece‘s Cold War experience. 
The Greek attitudes towards diplomatic (or, even more ominously, ―secret‖) 
documents could not but reflect these dispositions. In the past, lacking access to 
Greek archival sources, but also firmly believing in the omnipotence of the ―foreign 
factor‖, many Greek analysts tended to view foreign diplomatic documents as 
opportunities for the ―revelation‖ of sinful contacts and of the sinister role of the 
1
Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947, Institute for Balkan Studies, 
Thessaloniki, 1963. 
2
 Andreas G. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, Garden City, New York, 1970; 
Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969; John A. Katris, 
Eyewitness in Greece: the Colonels Come to Power, New Critics Press, St. Louis, 1971. 
3
Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Institute for Balkan Studies, 
Thessaloniki, 1964; Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO 
Influences, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1966; John O. Iatrides, Balkan Triangle: 
Birth and Decline of an Alliance across Ideological Boundaries, Mouton, The Hague-Paris, 1968; John 
O. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens: the Greek Communist “Second round”, 1944-1945, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1972.
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Great Powers. The security classification ―secret‖ or ―top secret‖ on a foreign 
document could create nervous breakdowns in a Greek public debate which did not 
always fully comprehend the nature of these sources. Admittedly, there was also a 
tendency to try to look at the ―dirty laundry‖ of the West in order to point to its 
sinister deeds against the unsuspecting Greeks. Publications proudly declared in their 
titles that ―the secret documents of the Foreign Office reveal‖ various secrets (real or, 
more often, imagined), and each December, at the time of the declassification of new 
British documents, the Greek media used to send journalists to the (then) Public 
Record Office in London, seeking to find sensational details about what the 
―foreigners‖ were saying about ―us‖ thirty years earlier or about what Greek 
politicians were saying to the aforementioned foreigners. I was doing research for my 
Ph.D. in December 1989, when the 1959 British documents (thus including the ones 
on the Cyprus agreements) were about to be released; the mass arrival of eager Greek 
journalists, including a Greek television crew, rather surprised the staff of the PRO, 
who, for a few strange days, found themselves in the unenviable position of innocent 
bystanders at their own work stations. Needless to say, these thirty year-old records 
were being read according to the perceived needs of the Greek political debates of the 
time of their declassification, and not in their own historical context: witness, for 
example, the significantly stronger interest for documents referring to the role of 
politicians who were alive and active at the time of declassification, but not of 
politicians who had a larger role thirty years ago, but who had since either died or 
withdrawn from public life. The search for ―sell outs‖, which could be ―proved‖ 
through foreign ―secret‖ documents, was dominant, and in these situations the greatest 
danger is that one will find what one seeks, whether or not it is there. The researcher 
was seen as something between a Sherlock Holmes and an Attorney General, ready to 
announce who ―did it‖ and pass a sentence on the guilty. These attitudes reflected a 
rather static perception of international affairs, by a small nation who had indeed 
suffered foreign intervention in the past, and tended to view itself as the victim of 
successive impositions by the Great Powers. It was a tangible manifestation of what 
James Miller (the editor of the valuable Foreign Relations of the United States 
volumes on Greece) described as the ―underdog mentality‖ of modern Greeks 
regarding their perception of their own history and the role of the Great Powers.
4
Since then, much water has flown under the bridges of the Thames or the 
Potomac. The economic and social development of Greece – described by one of the 
leading historians of all times in a magnificent book which, tellingly, was not 
translated into Greek
5
 – formed a basic background which allowed for a gradual, if
incomplete, maturing of attitudes. Moreover, in international scholarly debates on the 
Cold War, post-revisionism (followed by the new historiography on the Cold War) 
settled the disputes over methodology: research in primary sources is indispensable 
4
 James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. History and Power, 
1950-1974, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2009. 
5
 William Η. McNeill, The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1978. 
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and indeed multi-archival research is now considered as absolutely necessary; 
moreover it is important for the scholar to be able to view his/her sources critically, to 
question and cross-check them, and to advance convincing interpretations of a Cold 
War world which was becoming increasingly complicated and interdependent.  
The increasing availability of Greek archival sources also aided an evolution 
of mental attitudes. The publication of the 12-volume series of the Karamanlis 
Archive in 1997 made available a large quantity of material, and proved a turning 
point. Researchers could also consult the Karamanlis archive itself, which naturally 
includes much more material than the 1997 publication. After 2000, other personal 
archives became available, including the papers of Nikolaos Plastiras, Sophocles 
Venizelos, Evangelos Averoff, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, Constantinos Tsatsos and 
others. In the second half of that decade, the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the 
Greek Foreign Ministry became accessible (it is now open up until 1967), while the 
archive of the Greek Palace can be consulted at the General Archives of the State. As 
usually happens, the availability of Greek documents allowed for a more healthy 
relationship with the foreign archives, which were no longer our only, desperately 
sought sources. It is no coincidence that the boom of Greek bibliography on the Cold 
War took place exactly then, after the late 1990s. The effects of the recent financial 
crisis have caused, admittedly, a setback in this process of maturing towards 
reassessing the Greek past, but – at least in academic debates – have not reversed it. 
Contemporary scholars are thus able to have a more balanced attitude towards 
the archival sources, especially the Western ones. The present volume, edited by a 
group of members of this younger generation of scholars, is an indication of this 
evolution of our attitudes. The documents presented here do not focus on specific 
―major‖ events either of the Cold War or of the Cyprus question (although the latter is 
also prominent in the wider analysis). Most are comprehensive reports about postwar 
Greece, and tend to reflect the attitudes (often conflicting) of the Western powers 
towards their Southeast European ally. The documents deal both with Greek foreign 
policy options and with internal and social developments and attitudes, which formed 
the background of the foreign policy options. They point to the role of Greece‘s allies 
as perceptive observers of the Greek scene, rather than as imaginary back-seat drivers. 
The volume, therefore, is a tangible indication of the tendency to go beyond the 
previous, rather flat perception of the sources, and to trace the interactive character of 
the early postwar world. 
Multi-archival research always poses important conceptual challenges. It 
mostly points to the different perspectives adopted even by like-minded officials of 
different states or organizations. Marc Trachtenberg has provided a telling example, 
examining the Soviet, American, British and French records of the Potsdam discussions, 
and showing that, while these records describe the same deliberations, their accounts 
are at least partially different.
6
 This is, to some extent, the case of the material
6
 Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, 
148-151.
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presented in this volume as well. The documents from the various national archives 
reflect the national perspectives and interests of their authors, who were officials in 
their national administrations. The reader can trace the divergences, which can 
sometimes appear quite sharp. Thus, British documents of 1956-7 reflect the growing 
hostility between Athens and London at the time of the Cyprus dispute, as well as the 
personal hostility of the Ambassador, Sir Charles Peake, and the Councellor, Anthony 
Lambert, towards the Karamanlis government. It is notable that Peake and Lambert 
also appear quite critical towards the Americans, whom they accuse of failing to 
provide ―leadership‖ to the Greeks.  
The two reports by the American Councellor, James Penfield, in November 
1957 and April 1958 discuss the same subject – Greek foreign policy – and the same 
problems from a different angle. Penfield produced an admirable analysis of the 
trends of Greek public perceptions and foreign policy, but was mostly concerned with 
the rise of neutralism in the country and sought ways to arrest it, rather than to block 
the Greek claim for Cypriot self-determination. He tended to see the development of a 
more independent Greek policy as a healthy phenomenon, but his remarks of 
November 1957 were leaked and misinterpreted by Greek opposition politicians and 
contributed to the collapse of the Karamanlis government in February 1958. 
Penfield‘s second report of April 1958 was much more carefully worded, although it 
reached roughly similar conclusions regarding the dynamics of Greek foreign policy. 
Another American document, reporting the analysis of the Greek Foreign Minister, 
Evangelos Averoff, regarding the bases of Greek foreign policy, presents the Greek 
perspective in this debate.  
The West German perspective was that of a country which had a similar 
geopolitical position as Greece – both were frontline states of the West – and was 
deeply concerned over the prospect of a Greek drift from NATO. West Germany, 
which was not a UN member at that time, and thus had not voted against the Greek 
appeals over Cyprus, played a crucial role in stabilizing Greece in the West during the 
difficult era of the Cyprus question, especially in the agonizing hours of autumn 1958, 
when Karamanlis‘ visit to Bonn proved decisive in this endeavour.7 Although gravely
weakened by the Second World War, France was a European leader and a laboratory 
of European ideological developments. The French documents describe bilateral 
relations and the special importance of French cultural (soft) power; the deep social 
cleavages of civil war Greece; the dilemmas of decolonization which led the two 
countries to adopt conflicting positions in the pivotal problems of Cyprus and Algeria. 
At the same time, the French reports provide interesting insights regarding Greece‘s 
attitude towards the movement of European integration which emerged, under French 
leadership, during that same period. They also point to the impact in Greece of 
Charles de Gaulle, one of the leading European statesmen of the Cold War period. 
Last but not least, the Italian documents reflect the attitudes of a major Western state 
7
 See, among others, Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949-
1974, Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen, 2006. 
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which had a special geopolitical position vis-à-vis Greece. Italy is Greece‘s Western 
neighbour, while the two countries had found themselves in opposing camps during 
the Second World War. The Italian documents present Rome‘s vivid interest in the 
internal situation of Greece during the civil war in the late 1940s, as well as in the 
course of military operations. They also point to the Italian interest in regional 
developments in the aftermath of the civil war – including the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement and the entry of the two countries in NATO – and in the normalization 
of Greek-Italian relations after 1952. 
All these countries were leaders of the West, and had converging interests 
especially towards the Soviet bloc; but their perspectives differed, partially but in a 
crucial manner. It is also interesting to see the change in British attitudes, which 
becomes more pronounced if one compares Peake‘s valedictory dispatch and Sir 
Roger Allen‘s ―first impressions of Greece‖ (both documents of 1957), with the 
latter‘s valedictory dispatch of 1961. By the early 1960s, the solution of the Cyprus 
question, the normalization of Greece‘s position within NATO, and the country‘s 
association with the EEC had given rise to a different picture of stability, although the 
uncertainties of the internal Greek political situation were hotly debated in the 
Embassies of the allies.  
This volume also presents, for the first time, NATO archival material on 
Greece. This is a qualitatively different source, since NATO documents were agreed 
between the member-states. Thus, they do not represent the point of view of another 
national actor, but the common denominator of the alliance members regarding the 
situation of the Greek armed forces and finance. These documents also can become 
the pivot to understand the workings of the Western alliance in connection with 
Greece, one of its smaller and more exposed members, as well as the role of Greece 
within NATO. The annual reviews of the Greek armed forces provide a very 
interesting, almost complete, picture both of the state of the Greek defence effort, but 
also of the difficulties of the country in keeping up with the demands of alliance 
military planning during an era when rapid technological developments were calling 
for a constant readjustment. NATO analysis of the relationship between Greek 
defence potential and the state of the Greek economy point to the complicated 
realities – economic, financial, societal, technological – during the ―long haul‖ of the 
Cold War. It is also a subject for debate whether the Greek public service had the 
know-how to engage in such an elaborate analysis. Arguably, on this level (as well as 
on others) NATO played the role of a catalyst in the transfer of governmental know-
how to its smaller members, including Greece. At the same time, the Greek 
perspective is evident in Athens‘ submissions to the alliance on various subjects, 
including the burning issue of aid to the Greek defence effort and the Greek economy. 
The NATO perspective is now slowly being integrated in Greek historiography, and 
there are many subjects which wait for a detailed study and assessment. 
It goes without saying that the present volume is not a ―history‖ or even an 
account of Greece‘s relations with the West during the early Cold War. It aims to 
contribute to the scholarly debate by pointing to the complexity and the dynamic 
14 
nature of relations between Greece and its Western partners. The volume shows the 
multiple perspectives of archival sources, and invites a widening of the debate on the 
perennial question of Greece‘s relation with the West. This is a well-researched 
subject, but the historian‘s work is far from being complete. We have gone beyond the 
initial, somehow simplistic, approaches of previous eras, but there is a lot more to be 
done. 
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
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PA AA, B 10, 250 
Eindrücke von einem mehrwöchigen Besuch in Griechenland 
Berlin, den 21 April 1950 
Der Abend 
Eine Zeitung für Berlin 
Redaktion 
Hans Schumacher 
Ressort-Leiter für Außenpolitik 
Berlin, den 21 April 1950 
Aufzeichnung 
für den Herrn Bundeskanzler 
Dr. Konrad Adenauer 
Betrifft: Eindrücke von einem mehrwöchigen Besuch in Griechenland 
Am 4. März, einen Tag vor den griechischen Parlamentswahlen, empfing mich der 
mehrfache Ministerpräsident und Außenminister Tsaldaris, Vorsitzender der 
rechtsgerichteten Volkspartei, in seiner Athener Wohnung. Er begrüßte mich in 
deutscher Sprache und zeigte sich an den Deutschland-Problemen außerordentlich 
interessiert. In einer beinahe eineinhalbstündigen Aussprache erklärte er mir unter 
anderem: 
In der durch die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kommunismus bestimmten 
gegenwärtigen Weltlage stelle die Deutsche Bundesrepublik einen bedeutenden 
Faktor dar. Auf Grund seiner eigenen schmerzlicher Erfahrungen seit Dezember 1944 
wisse Griechenland Deutschlands Rolle und Aufgabe verständnisvoll zu würdigen. 
Berlins Abwehrkampf während der Zeit der Sowjetblockade habe die alten 
Sympathien breiter griechischer Kreise für das deutsche Volk neu belebt. 
Tsaldaris deutete mehrfach an, daß er nicht nur den politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch einen militärischen Beitrag der Bundesrepublik zur 
europäischen Verteidigung als unerläßlich betrachte. Zunächst hoffe er, daß die 
Bundesrepublik bald im Europa-Rat an der europäischen Einigung mitwirken werde. 
Dafür habe er sich in Straßburg mit Nachdruck eingesetzt. 
Ich lenkte das Gespräch in vorsichtiger Form auf die Frage der Souveränität. 
Dabei wies ich auf die im Grundgesetz verankerte Bereitschaft der Bundesrepublik 
hin, zu Gunsten einer Europa-Föderation selbst auf wichtige Hoheitsrechte zu 
verzichten. Allerdings, interpretierte ich, könne dies nur in dem gleichen Maße 
geschehen, in dem auch die anderen beteiligten Staaten sich dazu bereitfänden. 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
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Ich halte es für sicher, erwiderte Tsaldaris, daß die Bundesregierung in naher 
Zukunft fortschreitend volle Hoheitsrechte erlange. 
Griechenland, sagte er sodann zur Frage der griechisch-deutschen 
Beziehungen, wünsche lebhaft die schnelle Wiederbelebung der alten 
Handelsrelationen. Hellas brauche für seinen Wiederaufbau und zur Durchführung 
seines Industrialisierungsprogramms deutsche Maschinen und Industriegüter. 
Andererseits sei es stark daran interessiert, wieder im früheren Ausmaß Tabak und 
andere spezifisch griechische Agrarprodukte nach Deutschland ausführen zu können. 
Auch die früher so engen kulturellen Beziehungen sollten wiederaufleben. 
Wiederholt gab Tsaldaris in sehr herzlicher Weise seiner Freude darüber 
Ausdruck, zum ersten Mal seit Kriegsende wieder einen deutschen Journalisten in 
Athen begrüßen zu können. 
Trotz ihrer Stimmenverluste bei den Wahlen vom 5. März und des 
Überraschungserfolges der neuen „Nationalen Fortschrittspartei der Mitte― von 
General Plastiras bleiben die Populisten als stärkste Partei des Landes ein bedeutender 
politischer Faktor. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, daß Tsaldaris nur vorübergehend in den 
Hintergrund getreten ist. Auf dem Kamin seines Arbeitszimmers steht ein Bild von 
Präsident Truman mit einer langen persönlichen Widmung. 
Unmittelbar nach den Wahlen empfing mich der inzwischen an die Regierung 
gelangte neue Ministerpräsident und Außenminister Plastiras. 
Griechenland brauche enge Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Deutschland und 
messe diesen erstrangige Bedeutung bei, versicherte mir der General. Er hoffe, daß 
der Handel zwischen den beiden Ländern schon in nächster Zeit stärker als bisher 
wiederaufleben und zum gegenseitigen Besten eine wesentliche Ausweitung erfahren 
werde. 
Ein Zusammengehen mit der stark linksgerichteten „Demokratischen Front― 
von Sophianopoulos komme nicht in Betracht. Allerdings befürworte er eine 
politische Amnestie. Die Herstellung freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien 
sei ein wichtiges Ziel der griechischen Außenpolitik. Die griechisch-türkische 
Freundschaft sei unerlässlich zur Wahrung der Stabilität im östlichen Mittelmeer und 
müsse weiter vertieft werden. 
Der Wunsch, nach Beendigung des griechischen Bürgerkriegs Jugoslawien auf 
dem Weg über die Wiederannäherung zwischen Athen und Belgrad allmählich stärker 
an den Westen zu binden, hat zweifellos den amerikanischen Druck zu Gunsten eines 
Koalitionskabinetts unter Plastiras mitbestimmt. Ob dieser die Erwartungen der USA 
erfüllen kann, bleibt abzuwarten. Einmal verfügt die Dreierkoalition zwischen der 
Plastiras-Partei, den Liberalen (Venizelos) und Papandreou (Sozialdemokraten) auch 
nur über eine Parlamentsmehrheit von elf Sitzen. Dann sind auch die beiden 
letztgenannten Parteien nicht frei von Mißtrauen gegenüber dem neuen Premier. 
Gehen sie auch nicht so weit wie die Rechtskreise, die mit Besorgnis vermerkten, daß 
der sowjetische Rundfunk die griechischen Wähler in den ländlichen Wahlbezirken 
zur Stimmabgabe für den General aufforderte, halten sie diesen doch nicht für eine im 
eigentlichen Sinne politische Persönlichkeit mit wirklich klar umrissener Konzeption. 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
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Sie fürchten den Einfluss anonymer Ratgeber in der Umgebung des Generals und sind 
nicht sicher, ob nicht der linke Flügel seiner Partei Entscheidungen durchsetzt, die 
sich ungünstig auf die Entwicklung der inneren Lage des Landes auswirken könnten. 
Sehr starke Bedenken äußern die Rechtskreise gegen die Amnestierung der 
Kommunisten. Nach ihrer Ansicht würde eine derartige Maßnahme Griechenlands 
innere Sicherheit von neuem gefährden. Sie bezweifeln zwar nicht die Ehrenhaftigkeit 
und die guten Absichten des neuen Premiers und seinen ehrlichen Wunsch, den 
inneren Ausgleich zu fördern, befürchten jedoch, daß ihm das Heft aus der Hand 
gleiten könnte. 
Das Problem Monarchie-Republik besteht in Griechenland nicht mehr. Früher 
entschiedener Anhänger der republikanischen Staatsform, hat sich Plastiras ebenso 
wie Venizelos und Papandreou schon in den Jahren des Bürgerkriegs klar für die 
„gekrönte Demokratie― ausgesprochen. 
Unter dem Druck der öffentlichen Meinung dürfte auch Plastiras die 
Annäherung an Jugoslawien nur dann durchführen können, wenn Belgrad eindeutig 
auf seine Aspirationen auf Griechisch-Mazedonien verzichtet und die 12 000 nach 
Jugoslawien verschleppten griechischen Kinder entläßt. 
Einen überaus starken Eindruck hinterließ bei mir die über einstündige Begegnung 
mit Herrn Pipinellis, Außenminister des Zwischenkabinetts Theotokis. Pipinellis 
erwarb sich vor allem durch sein Auftreten in den UN internationalen Ruf. Neben 
Marschall Papagos und dem Parteiführer Maniadakis ist er der engste 
Vertrauensmann des Königs. Selbst manche seiner Gegner bezeichnen ihn als den 
bedeutendsten lebenden griechischen Staatsmann und Politiker. 
„Wir wissen, daß Deutschland geschichtlich einen wichtigen Faktor Europas 
darstellt―, erklärte mir Pipinellis im offiziellen Teil unserer Unterredung für die von 
mir vertretene Zeitung. „Dieser Faktor muß auf der Grundlage der Demokratie zum 
gemeinsamen Wohle Europas wieder aktiviert werden―. Pipinellis gab der Zuversicht 
Ausdruck, daß die gemeinsame antikommunistische Abwehrbereitschaft 
Deutschlands und Griechenlands zur Vertiefung der wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen 
Beziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern führen werde. 
Weit wichtiger war jedoch das, was mir der Minister vertraulich sagte, „für 
Ihre Regierung gewissermaßen―. Auf meine Frage, ob er mich ermächtige, seine 
Ausführungen dem Herrn Bundeskanzler zu übermitteln, falls ich Gelegenheit dazu 
haben sollte, antwortete er mit sehr betonter Zustimmung. Nach seinen Worten darf 
ich annehmen, daß die Weitergabe seiner Erklärungen ausdrücklich von ihm 
beabsichtigt war. 
Zunächst bekannte sich Pipinellis mit außerordentlichem Nachdruck zum 
Gedanken einer wirklichen europäischen Föderation. Die Zeit dränge, wenn man 
Europa retten wolle. Durch die große Zahl seiner Bevölkerung, deren Fleiß und 
Fähigkeiten und durch sein hohe  Wirtschaftspotential sei Deutschland, wenn es die 
alten Hegemonieträume aufgebe und sich aufrichtig der Demokratie zuwende, zu 
einer Führungsrolle im europäischen Einigungswerk berufen. 
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Gewiss gab es in Griechenland noch schmerzliche Erinnerungen an die 
Kriegsjahre. Vor allem habe kein Grieche verstanden, warum Deutschland Bulgariens 
Ansprüche auf Thrazien unterstützt habe. Mehr als alles andere habe diese Frage in 
der griechischen Öffentlichkeit Erbitterung ausgelöst. 
Heute müsse man jedoch vorwärts sehen. Die gemeinsame Gefahr, die 
Europas demokratische Staatswesen und Nationen bedrohe, lasse die  Schatten der 
Vergangenheit verblassen. Griechenland glaube, daß Europa nicht ohne Deutschland 
gerettet werden könne. Es wünsche und hoffe, daß politisch, wirtschaftlich und 
militärisch ein möglichst starker Schutzwall gegen Osten aufgerichtet werde. Dabei 
sei Deutschlands Mitwirkung nicht zu entbehren. 
„Wir verfolgen mit Interesse und Sympathie den Wiederaufbau 
Westdeutschlands―, betonte Pipinellis mehrfach. 
Auch meine übrigen Begegnungen und Gespräche, so meine Unterredungen mit dem 
Präsidenten des Obersten Wirtschaftsrates, Gounarakis, dem Staatsrechtler und 
Vertreter Griechenlands auf zahlreichen internationalen Konferenzen, Professor 
Daskalakis, dem früheren Minister Ailianos, Vertretern des Griechischen 
Generalstabs, des Außen- und des Wiederaufbauministeriums, der örtlichen 
Verwaltungen, der Wirtschaft und der Presse, aber auch vielen Menschen aus allen 
Volksschichten bestätigen im wesentlichen die auf den Vorseiten wiedergegebenen 
Eindrücke. 
Wiederholt fragte man mich, wann wieder diplomatische oder zumindest 
konsularische Vertreter Deutschlands, das heißt der Bundesrepublik, in Griechenland 
erscheinen, und wann die alten deutschen Kulturinstitute wieder errichtet würden. 
Man bedauerte, daß es in Griechenland noch nicht wieder deutsche Bücher, Zeitungen 
und Filme gebe. 
Auch in den Kreisen der zu den Wahlen nach Athen gekommenen 
prominenten Auslandsjournalisten aus beinahe allen Teilen der Welt galt es 
durchweg, wenngleich mit Nuancierungen, als ausgemacht, daß die Bundesrepublik in 
naher Zukunft größere Handlungsfreiheit erhalten müsse. Während griechische 
politische Kreise Ihre Vorschläge an Frankreich als einen staatsmännischen Akt von 
außergewöhnlicher Bedeutung bezeichneten, war das Echo unter den 
Auslandsjournalisten nicht einheitlich. Der verständnisvollen Würdigung eines großen 
Teiles der Pressevertreter aus neutralen Ländern und der zumeist sehr wohlmeinenden 
türkischen Journalisten standen gerade bei manchen Franzosen Mißtrauen und 
Zweifel an Ihren Beweggründen gegenüber. Andere französische Journalisten 
äußerten dagegen in sehr überzeugter und überzeugender Weise ihre Zustimmung. 
„Welches Glück für unsere Nationen und für die Welt, vor allem jedoch für Europa, 
wenn wir Landsleute würden!― sagte mir einer von ihnen. Herr Rasmussen von 
„Politiken― (Kopenhagen) bemängelte, Ihre Vorschläge seien nicht genügend konkret. 
Der Zeitpunkt (Auriols Anwesenheit in London) sei unglücklich gewählt und gebe zu 
Mißdeutungen Anlaß. Die praktische Durchführung Ihrer Vorschläge werde auf 
beinahe unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten stoßen. „Wenn Frankreich diese Geste 
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ablehnt, setzt es sich vor allem Menschen guten Willens im Unrecht!― betonte 
dagegen Herr Roccanas, Sekretär im Griechischen Außenministerium. 
Ein Versuch, Griechenlands gegenwärtige Situation auch nur annähernd zu umreißen, 
müßte den Rahmen einer gedrängten Aufzeichnung sprengen. Ich beschränke mich 
auf einige kurze Anmerkungen. 
Armee, Luftwaffe und Marine machen einen sehr guten Eindruck. Sie 
verkörpern nicht nur symbolisch das stärkste Element der Stabilität. Auch nach 
Auffassung ausländischer Beobachter ist die griechische Wehrmacht heute in der 
Lage, jedes etwaige Wiederaufleben der kommunistischen Unruhetätigkeit schnell zu 
ersticken. 
Nach allgemeiner Ansicht könnte nur ein Einfall von außen eine erneute 
Kampftätigkeit auslösen. Wie die Dinge liegen, stünde eine derartige Aktion allenfalls 
von Bulgarien aus zu erwarten. Denn nur dort befinden sich noch größere Reste der 
Partisanenverbände. Der griechische Generalstab ist jedoch davon überzeugt, jeden 
derartigen Versuch rasch vereiteln zu können. Daß er überhaupt unternommen wird, 
gilt nicht als wahrscheinlich. Dagegen hält man es weiterhin nicht für ausgeschlossen, 
daß von den Kominformstaaten aus bewaffnete Aktionen gegen Jugoslawien 
unternommen werden. 
Die Neigung zu militärischer Zusammenarbeit mit Belgrad ist in Athen 
gering. Allerdings schloß Marschall Papagos in einem Interview diese Möglichkeit 
nicht rundweg aus. Größeres Interesse besteht an einem militärischen Bündnis mit der 
Türkei, dem sich möglicherweise Italien anschließen könnte.  
Ausländische Beobachter bezeichnen die griechische Wehrmacht auch nach 
ihrer Bewaffnung als den bedeutendsten militärischen Faktor auf der Balkanhalbinsel. 
An den großen Linien der griechischen Politik dürfte sich auch unter General Plastiras 
nichts ändern. Dies nicht nur, weil die anderen Parteien Plastiras gewissermaßen 
beaufsichtigen, sondern auch deshalb, weil Plastiras, selbst, wenn er wollte, nicht auf 
die amerikanische Wirtschaftshilfe verzichten kann. 
Das griechische Verkehrsnetz ist wiederhergestellt. Handel und Wandel 
vollziehen sich regelmäßig. Überall im Lande kann man sicher und ungestört reisen. 
Äußerlich sind die Spuren des Bürgerkriegs im wesentlichen nur noch in den 
Kampfgebieten selbst bemerkbar. Das Vertrauen zur Drachme wächst wieder, obwohl 
die Geschäftswelt bei ihren Kalkulationen und Abschlüssen immer noch in 
Goldpfunden rechnet. Die Versorgung ist ausreichend. Zum ersten Mal seit 1941 
haben die Bauern allenthalben wieder ihre Felder bestellt. 
Griechenland kann jedoch seine Wirtschaftsprobleme nicht allein von der 
Landwirtschaft her lösen. Nur 25% der Gesamtoberfläche eignen sich zur 
landwirtschaftlichen Nutzung. Schon immer mußte es auf Auslandsanleihen und die 
„unsichtbaren Einkünfte― der Zahlungsbilanz zurückgreifen, um das Defizit seiner 
Handelsbilanz ausgleichen zu können. 
Der Zweite Weltkrieg und der Bürgerkrieg gegen die Kommunisten mit allen 
ihren Folgen haben diese Probleme noch verschärft. Griechenland will daher die 
USA-Hilfe nicht nur dazu benutzen, die unmittelbaren Schäden zu heilen, die Frage 
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der 750 000 Flüchtlinge zu lösen und allgemeine soziale Reformen zu verwirklichen. 
Es will durchgreifende Veränderungen der ganzen Wirtschaftsstruktur in Richtung auf 
die Nutzung der Wasserkräfte und Bodenschätze (Lignit, Eisenerz, Bauxit, Blei, Zink, 
Antimon, Chrom, Magnesit, Mangan und Nickel), also auf eine stärkere 
Industrialisierung, durchführen. 
Herrn Kambalouris, der den Chef der Griechischen Militärmission in Berlin und 
früheren Botschafter in Moskau, Herrn General Diamantopoulos, bei der 
Bundesregierung vertreten soll, sofern dieser nicht selbst nach Bonn kommen kann, 
lernte ich in Athen kennen. Nach wiederholten, eingehenden Unterredungen mit 
Herrn Kambalouris glaube ich sagen zu dürfen, daß dieser den Deutschlandproblemen 
sehr verständnisvoll gegenübersteht und nicht weniger wohlgesinnt ist als der 
Missionschef selbst. Herr Kambalouris soll Herrn Pipinellis nahegestanden haben. In 
unseren Unterhaltungen vertrat er sehr überzeugend die gleichen Ansichten, die mir 
der Minister, aber auch General Diamantopoulos in Berlin, darlegten. 
Hans Schumacher 
Ressortleiter für Außenpolitik 
________________________________ 
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Die Erfahrungen Griechenlands mit dem Kommunismus im Dezemberaufstand 
1944 in Athen und im Krieg gegen die kommunistischen Banden 1946-1949 haben im 
Bewusstsein des griechischen Volkes tiefe Eindrücke hinterlassen. 
1. Innere Abwehrmaßnahmen:
Bis auf eine ganz kleine Minderheit linksstehender Ideologen ist die griechische
Nation von der Notwendigkeit der Wachsamkeit gegenüber der sowjet-
kommunistischen Gefahr fest überzeugt. 
Aus diesem Grunde billigt das griechische Volk auch heutigen Tages noch 
Abwehrmaßnahmen, wie das System der administrativen Verschickung, das aber 
immerhin Rechtsgarantien und einen Berufungsrechtszug kennt. Nach Inkrafttreten 
des Befriedungsgesetzes vom 18.4.1952, dass das Ziel der Sonderung der 
Unbelehrbaren und die Staatssicherheit Gefährdenden von missleiteten, der 
Wiedereingliederung in die Nation jedoch würdigen Elementen verfolgt, befinden 
sich nur noch bolschewistische Fanatiker, die sich weigern, eine Loyalitätserklärung 
gegenüber dem Staat abzugeben, in Zwangsverschickung. Die Zwangsverschickten 
können sich jedoch auf den Inseln, die ihnen zum Zwangsaufenthalt angewiesen sind, 
am Tage frei bewegen. Die Brüsseler Commission Internationale Contre le Régime 
Concentrationnaire hat 1952 festgestellt, dass der Zwangsaufenthalt in durchaus 
humaner Form gehandhabt wird. Gegenwärtig ist die Zahl der Verschickten nur noch 
gering. Es handelte sich am 30.5.52 noch um 1 565 Männer auf der Insel Agios 
Evstratiou und 114 Frauen auf der Insel Trikkeri bei Volos. Seither sind diese Zahlen 
weiterhin, wenn auch geringfügig, zurückgegangen. 
Hervorragend sind die Leistungen der griechischen Polizei in der Aufdeckung und 
Bekämpfung des unterirdischen Kommunismus. Ihr ist es zu verdanken, dass die 
Spitzenkommunisten Bellojanis und Ploumbidis verhaftet, ihr Agentennetz 
zerschlagen und ein Sabotagering in der griechischen Luftwaffe unschädlich gemacht 
werden konnte. 
II. Griechische Reaktion auf den Ausbruch des Koreakrieges
Nach dem Ausbruch des Korea-Krieges am 25.6.1950 hat Griechenland den
Vereinigten Nationen sofort eine Brigade für den Kampf in Korea angeboten. Es kam 
jedoch nur zur Entsendung eines Bataillons, weil das Oberkommando der Vereinigten 
Nationen einen griechischen Beitrag in Bataillonsstärke für ausreichend hielt. Nach 
Abschluss des Waffenstillstandes in Korea ist ein weiteres griechisches Bataillon nach 
Korea in Marsch gesetzt worden. 
III. Normalisierung der Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion und den Satellitenstaaten
Im Bewusstsein des festen Standorts Griechenlands als Eckpfeiler der freien Welt,
der durch UN-Zugehörigkeit, Teilnahme am Nordatlantik- und Ankara-Pakt, sowie 
durch Abschluss des USA-griechischen Stationierungsabkommens und nicht zuletzt 
durch Unterhaltung einer Armee von 10 Divisionen gekennzeichnet wird, hat die 
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Griechische Regierung sich nach dem Tode Stalins dem Ansuchen der 
Sowjetregierung auf „Normalisierung― der Beziehungen mit Griechenland nicht 
versagt. An der Entschlossenheit der Athener Regierung, in ihrem Verhältnis zur 
Sowjetunion nicht über eine kühle Distanzierung hinauszugehen, kann, vor allem 
auch nach den letzten Kundgebungen von Marschall Papagos auf seiner Reise in die 
westeuropäischen Hauptstädte, nicht gezweifelt werden. Wenn Griechenland seine 
Bereitschaft erklärt hat, die Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zu 
Bulgarien, dem alten griechischen Erbfeind nicht von vorneherein abzulehnen, so sind 
drei Gründe hierfür massgebend gewesen: 
1. Die Hoffnung auf Rückkehr von 3 000 im Bandenkrieg gefangen
genommenen regulären griechischen Soldaten,
2. die Hoffnung auf Rückkehr wenigstens eines Teiles der Zivilverschleppten,
insbesondere der Kinder und
3. die Hoffnung auf Verwirklichung des im Friedensvertrag Griechenland
zuerkannten Reparationsanspruches von 45 Millionen Dollar gegen Bulgarien.
Der Gefahr, dass mit der Zulassung von weiteren diplomatischen Vertretungen der 
Ostblockstaaten in Athen neue Zentralen der kommunistischen Subversionstätigkeit 
entstehen, ist sich die Griechische Regierung bewusst. Sie glaubt aber, mit Hilfe ihres 
ausgezeichneten Überwachungsapparates die Tätigkeit dieser Vertretungen unter 
Kontrolle halten zu können. 
Anerkannt werden muss, dass die Griechische Regierung mit Nachdruck betont 
hat, sie werde etwaigen Anträgen der Sowjetischen Besatzungszonenregierung, 
zweiseitige Verträge zu schliessen oder die Errichtung einer Handelsvertretung in 
Athen zu gestatten, mit Rücksicht auf ihr Verhältnis zur Bundesregierung 
entgegentreten. 
IV. Ost-West Handel
Durch Ausfall des deutschen Marktes in den unmittelbaren Nachkriegsjahren
1945-1948 ist Griechenland hinsichtlich des Absatzes seines Tabaks in eine sehr 
schwierige Lage geraten. Mit dem wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung in der 
Bundesrepublik und der allmählichen Abkehr von Virginia-Zigarette in 
Westdeutschland besserte sich der Absatz der laufenden Ernten mit dem Ergebnis, 
dass die Ernte des Jahres 1953 restlos abgesetzt worden wird. Dagegen sind die 
Tabake der älteren Ernten im Westen nicht mehr absetzbar. Ihre Lagerung Beleihung, 
die zu 80 % aus staatlichen Mitteln finanziert wird, bindet ausserordentlich hohe 
Beiträge. Dieser Tatbestand macht er erklärlich, dass die Griechische Regierung 
Ausschau nach neuen Märkten gehalten hat. So wie die Dinge nun einmal liegen, 
kamen als zusätzliche Märkte für Griechenland nur noch Länder hinter dem Eisernen 
Vorhang in Betracht. Durch den Abschluss von Handelsabkommen mit Organen der 
Ostblockländer scheinen die Aussichten auf Absatz von Tabaken älterer Ernte 
tatsächlich besser geworden zu sein. Griechischerseits ist Vorsorge getroffen, dass in 
Übereinstimmung mit der US-Battle-Act nur nicht-strategische Güter hinter dem 
Eisernen Vorhang geliefert werden. Im Übrigen hat Griechenland den Bestimmungen 
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dieses Gesetzes durch ein Verbot des Anlaufens der nordkoreanischen und 
kontinentalchinesischen Häfen durch griechische Schiffe Rechnung getragen. 
Was die Handelsbeziehungen mit der Sowjetunion selbst anbelangt, so hat sich 
der griechischen Handelskreise eine starke Enttäuschung darüber bemächtigt, dass 
nach Durchführung der griechischen Lieferungen aufgrund des Handelsvertrages vom 
28.7.1953 die Sowjetunion mit der Durchführung der Gegenlieferungen im Verzuge 
ist. 
V. Schlussfolgerung
Abschliessend kann das Urteil dahin zusammengefasst werden, dass trotz einer
ausserordentlichen Aktivität der Sowjetbotschaft, die hier eher abstösst, in Athen 
ernstliche Anzeichen für eine gelungene Unterminierung des griechischen 
Abwehrwillens im Kampf gegen den Sowjetkommunismus nicht ersichtlich sind. 
Gez. Cordt 
________________________________ 
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Betr.: Haltung Griechenlands gegenüber dem Ostblock 
 Die griechische Regierung und der größte Teil der Opposition verfolgen nach wie 
vor eine eindeutig prowestliche Politik, deren Fundament Griechenlands aktive 
Mitgliedschaft in der NATO ist. Die Erinnerung an die Erfahrungen, die das tapfere 
Land während des Bürgerkrieges 1945-1949 mit dem Kommunismus gemacht hat und 
die freiheitliche Grundeinstellung der überwältigenden Mehrheit des Volkes sind bis 
heute lebendig geblieben. Die Kommunistische Partei ist verboten, ihre Nachfolge- 
und Tarnorganisationen unterliegen strenger Kontrolle. 
 Der Zypern-Konflikt hat zwar zu einer starken Entfremdung von Großbritannien 
und der Türkei, jedoch niemals zu einer Abwendung vom Freien Westen insgesamt 
oder gar zu einer irgendwie gearteten Hinwendung zum Ostblock – auch nicht in der 
Form des Neutralismus – geführt, obwohl sich gerade die Sowjets und ihre Satelliten 
bis in die jüngste Zeit hinein mehrfach solidarisch mit Griechenlands Zypernanliegen 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
  
25 
 
erklärt haben. Auch Erzbischof Makarios hat eine Moskauer Einladung zu einer 
orthodoxen Kirchenkonferenz nicht mehr als freundlich registriert. Daß Moskau seine 
progriechische Haltung nicht als unabdingbare Treue zu völkerrechtlichen Prinzipien, 
sondern als Mittel zur Durchsetzung seiner Politik ansieht, haben den Griechen die 
kürzlichen griechisch-sowjetischen Verhandlungen über die Gewährung einer 
Aeroflot-Konzession auf dem Athener Flughafen wieder gezeigt, bei denen Moskau 
mit der Androhung einer Änderung seiner Zypernpolitik Athen zu erpressen 
versuchte. Auf die Durchsetzung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts glaubt Athen 
gleichwohl nicht verzichten zu können und scheut sich nicht, angesichts der britischen 
Haltung auf einer Behandlung vor dem Forum der VereintenNationen zu bestehen. 
Die griechische Regierung – ebenso wie Makarios – ist jetzt allerdings bereit, sich mit 
einer Regelung abzufinden, die eine Übergangslösung mit interner Selbstverwaltung 
und einer zeitlich befristeten Hinausschiebung der Gewährung des vollen 
Selbstbestimmungsrechts vorsieht. – Wohl nicht ohne Zutun Athens hat die EOKA 
seit der Freilassung Makarios‘ (März 1957) alle Terrorakte eingestellt. Die 
griechischen Streitkräfte nehmen seitdem auch wieder an den NATO-Manövern im 
Mittelmeer in vollem Umfang teil. Da die Zypernfrage von jeher ein nationales 
Anliegen des ganzen griechischen Volkes war und die Regierung unter dem Druck 
der öffentlichen Meinung sowie der nationalen Opposition im Parlament steht, wird 
Griechenland wohl nie von seiner Zypernforderung abgehen. Es sieht darin keine 
antiwestliche Haltung, sondern das konsequente Beharren auf dem liberalen Prinzip 
des Selbstbestimmungsrechts, dessen Realisierung nur eine moralische, politische und 
militärische Kräftigung der westlichen Gemeinschaft bedeuten können. 
 Zum Beweis für seinen Wunsch, mit den Türken wieder ins Reine zu kommen, hat 
Athen kürzlich als Botschafter nach Ankara einen alten Freund Atatürks und Bayars 
entsandt sowie der türkischen Minderheit in Thrazien erneut Vergünstigungen 
gewährt – trotz der gegen die Griechen Instanbuls gerichteten türkischen 
Ausschreitungen („Kristallnacht―) vom September 1955. Während die türkische 
Solidarität mit dem Westen in erster Linie auf den nationalen strategischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Interessen sowie auf der traditionell anti-russischen (nicht spezifisch 
antikommunistischen) Einstellung des Landes beruht, sind die Grundlagen der 
griechischen Haltung das Bewußtsein der Zugehörigkeit zum christlich-europäischen 
Kulturkreis, der oft bewiesene nationale und individuelle Freiheitswille der Griechen 
sowie – wenigstens bisher – die wirtschaftliche Interessenlage. 
 In der Wiedervereinigungsfrage steht die griechische Regierung ebenso wie die 
öffentliche Meinung nach wie vor auf unserem Standpunkt. Nach der Unterzeichnung 
der Berliner Erklärung hat Außenminister Averoff spontan in einer brieflichen 
Botschaft an den Herrn Bundesminister erklärt, Griechenland sei bereit, die 
Auffassung der Bundesregierung, die es als alleinige völkerrechtlich legitimierte 
Vertreterin Deutschlands anerkennt, in der Wiedervereinigungsfrage kulturell, 
politisch und militärisch zu unterstützen. – Das Wahlergebnis vom 15. September 
wurde in Griechenland aufrichtig begrüßt. 
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 Der Vorschlag des rumänischen Ministerpräsidenten Stoios auf Einberufung einer 
Konferenz der 6 Balkanstaaten Rumänien, Albanien, Bulgarien, Jugoslawien, Türkei 
und Griechenland hat Athen abgelehnt. 
 Besonders offenkundig ist die  prowestliche und entschieden antisowjetische 
Politik Griechenlands in seiner Stellungnahme zu den jüngsten Nahostereignissen, die 
in ihrer Bedeutung angesichts des griechischen Ansehens in der arabischen Welt nicht 
zu unterschätzen ist. Nachdem es die Eden‘sche Nahost-Politik nach der 
Nationalisierung des Suezkanals als den eigentlichen, d.h. langfristigen westlichen 
Interessen entgegengesetzt abgelehnt und mit Rücksicht auf die guten griechisch-
ägyptischen Beziehungen nicht an der Londoner Konferenz teilgenommen hatte, hat 
Griechenland, ohne von den USA aufgefordert zu sein, die Eisenhower-Doktrin in 
vollem Umfange bejaht. Die griechische Regierung hat die amerikanische Regierung 
sogar von sich aus gebeten, Griechenland in den Kreis der von der Eisenhower-
Doktrin erfaßten Länder mit einzubeziehen, ohne daß sie – zum Erstaunen der USA – 
wirtschaftliche Gegenleistungen dafür verlangte. 
 Für die griechische Jugoslawienpolitik waren und sind ähnliche Gründe 
maßgebend wie für die Jugoslawienpolitik z.B. der Bundesrepublik: Kräftigung des 
(für Griechenland lebenswichtigen) nicht-sowjetischen Balkanraumes; Förderung 
jedes Nationalkommunismus als desintegrierendes Element des Sowjetblocks; 
Isolierung Albaniens, des nördlichen Nachbarn Griechenlands. 
Wirtschaft 
Die klare griechische Außenpolitik wird belastet durch die 
Wirtschaftsprobleme des Landes, das 35 bis 40 % seines Staatshaushaltes der 
Verteidigung opfert. Das größte soziale Problem ist die Arbeitslosigkeit und 
Unterbeschäftigung der Landbevölkerung. 
Bisher war die USA-Wirtschaftshilfe eine wichtige Stütze der griechischen 
Wirtschaft. Die USA liefern jedoch seit einiger Zeit ihre Überschußgüter, 
insbesondere Baumwolle, an europäische Staaten und schmälern in gleichem 
Umfange die griechischen Lieferungen dorthin, so daß die Wirtschaftshilfe an 
Griechenland, das ärmste und unterentwickeltste Land der NATO, durch die 
Schädigung des griechischen Außenhandels kompensiert wird. Dagegen drängt der 
Ostblock immer stärker auf den griechischen Markt. In dem letzten griechisch-
sowjetischen Warenabkommen wurde das Volumen gegenüber 1956 verdreifacht. Die 
Sowjetunion erfüllt ihre Abnahmeverpflichtungen bereits im ersten Vierteljahr zu 80 
%. Sie ist damit zum größten Käufer griechischer Früchte geworden und spielt auch 
auf dem griechischen Tabakmarkt eine wesentliche Rolle. Darüber hinaus haben die 
Sowjets den Griechen die Errichtung einer Aluminiumfabrik angeboten. Griechenland 
ist jedoch auf diese Angebote im Interesse seiner wirtschaftlichen und politischen 
Beziehungen zum Westen und seiner Unabhängigkeit nicht eingegangen. Besonders 
in den letzten Monaten versucht der Ostblock, bei Gütern wie Land-, Werkzeug- und 
Baumaschinen, bei Näh- und Schreibmaschinen, Glas und Keramik sowie Textilien 
durch starke Preisunterbietungen und durch günstigere Liefer- und 
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Zahlungsbedingungen die westliche Konkurrenz vom griechischen Markt zu 
verdrängen. Der Verlauf der Messe von Saloniki im September 1957, auf dem die 
Bundesrepublik zum großen Bedauern der Griechen nur mit einem Informationsstand 
vertreten war, hat gezeigt, daß die Staaten des Ostblocks auf dem griechischen Markt 
unaufhaltsam vordringen. 
Die sehr deutsch-freundliche Regierung ist z.Z. gegen die Bundesregierung 
erbittert, weil Griechenland trotz der guten bilateralen Beziehungen, trotz 
entschiedener NATO-Treue, trotz Mäßigung in der Zypernfrage (im Gegensatz zu der 
von England in das Problem verwickelten Türkei) und trotz schwerster Kriegsverluste 
von uns nicht das wirtschaftliche Entgegenkommen gefunden hat, mit dem Athen 
rechnen zu können glaubte, und mit dem im reichsten Maße seine türkischen und 
jugoslawischen Nachbarn bedacht wurden. (Vgl. Die Erklärungen des 
Handelsministers gegenüber unserem Geschäftsträger: „Müssen wir denn säumige 
Schuldner oder Kommunisten werden, um in Deutschland Verständnis für unsere 
Situation zu finden?― – Drahtbericht Athen vom 21.5.57).  – Dank der weitgehenden 
Liberalisierung des griechischen Außenhandels hat der deutsche Export an der 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Griechenlands stark profitiert. 
Die Bundesregierung muß aus politischen Erwägungen an einer gesunden 
Wirtschaft Griechenlands ein besonderes Interesse haben; dabei kann die politische 
und militärische Bedeutung dieses und des türkischen Verbündeten mit der der 
übrigen Entwicklungsländer nicht verglichen werden. 
Es sollte deshalb geprüft werden, wie unser bewährtet politischer Grundsatz, die 
Freundschaftsbeweise gegenüber den griechischen und türkischen Verbündeten 
gerade wegen des derzeitigen schweren Zerwürfnisses zwischen Athen und Ankara 
mit gleichen Gewichten zu verteilen, auch auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet wieder 
verwirklicht werden kann. Die einseitig großzügige Behandlung Jugoslawiens und der 
Türkei droht die für den ganzen Westen wichtigen deutschen politischen 
Einflußmöglichkeiten in Athen zu vermindern. Hinzu kommt die Gefahr, daß die 
Sowjetunion als großzügiger Wirtschaftspartner zwangsweise auch stärkeres Gewicht 
als außenpolitischer Partner Griechenlands gewinnt, selbst wenn Regierung und 
öffentliche Meinung innenpolitisch eindeutig antikommunistisch bleiben. Jedenfalls 
wird Griechenlandvoraussichtlich weiterhin in erhöhtem Maße sowjetischen 
Bemühungen ausgesetzt sein, die am Ende darauf abzielen, seine Haltung gegenüber 
dem Westen, insbesondere seine Stellung in der NATO aufzuweichen. Es wäre 
sinnvoll, wenn von unserer Seite erst dann mit praktischem Verständnis für Athen 
reagiert wird, nachdem die Sowjets entscheidende Erfolge erzielt haben. 
Hiermit 
Über Herrn Dg 30 
Herrn D 3 
weisungsgemäß vorgelegt. 
_________________________________ 
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PA AA, B 26, 65 
Athen, den 7. November 1958 
 
Der Botschafter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Athen, den 7. November 1958 
 
Lieber Herr Müller-Roschach, 
Bei verschiedenen Empfängen in den letzten Tagen bin ich immer wieder auf den 
bevorstehenden Deutschlandbesuch von Karamanlis angesprochen worden. Es kam 
dabei sehr deutlich zum Ausdruck, wieviel man sich hier in den breitesten Kreisen 
von diesem Besuch verspricht. Ich glaube, dass er richtig ist, dem Amt noch vor dem 
Eintreffen von Ministerpräsident Karamanlis aus diesen verschiedenen Gesprächen 
die folgenden Punkte zur Sprache zu bringen. Da ein Bericht nicht mehr rechtzeitig 
eintreffen würde, richte ich diesen Brief an Sie und lasse gleichzeitig einen 
Durchdruck an Herrn von Mirbach gehen. 
 
1. Gefühl über die Isolierung – Enttäuschung über die NATO 
 Wie auch schon in der Berichterstattung der Botschaft immer wieder 
hervorgehoben wurde, hat die Behandlung der Cypernfrage in weiten Kreisen 
Griechenlands ein Gefühl ausgesprochener Isolierung entstehen lassen. Dieses Gefühl 
hat man nicht nur gegenüber Grossbritannien und der Türkei, sondern – wegen der 
engen Verbindung zwischen den beiden angelsächsischen Mächten und der de-facto-
Unterstützung des britischen Standpunktes durch die amerikanische Aussenpolitik – 
in zunehmendem Masse auch gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten. Dieses Gefühl des 
Isoliertseins geht jedoch noch weiter und bezieht sich in gewissem Masse auf die 
NATO als solche. Immer wieder hört man: Die ganze westliche Welt hat uns in 
unserem Cypernkampf für Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Stich gelassen. In diesem 
Zusammenhang wirddann immer wieder gesagt – wobei ich mir völlig darüber im 
Klaren bin, dass man hier nicht alles auf die Goldwaage legen kann – allein zu Euch 
Deutschen kann man noch volles Vertrauen haben. 
 Der über 70 Jahre alte ehemalige Ministerpräsident Tsaldaris, der mit der 
früheren Frau Schliemanns verheiratet ist und immer in sehr engen Beziehungen zu 
Deutschland gestanden hat, machte in diesem Zusammenhang eine interessante 
Bemerkung, indem er die griechische Einstellung zu Großbritannien der zu 
Deutschland gegenüberstellte: Einem wirklich alten Freunde wie Großbritannien, der 
einen immer wieder im Stich lässt (1. Weltkrieg, Kleinasienunternehmen 1922, 2. 
Weltkrieg, Bürgerkrieg, Cypernfrage), können wir – so leid es uns tut – nicht mehr 
trauen. Unser Verhältnis zu Deutschland ist ganz anders. Zwar haben wir einmal im 
Krieg miteinander gestanden. Aber dies war ein ehrlicher Kampf, wenn auch manches 
wenig Erfreuliche geschehen ist. Aber mit einem ehrlichen Gegner kann man sich 
dann wieder vertrauensvoll an einen Tisch setzen und eng mit ihm zusammenarbeiten. 
Dies ist der Wunsch des ganzen griechischen Volkes. 
 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
29 
2. Vorhandensein eines Vakuums und dadurch grosse Möglichkeiten für
Deutschland
In engem Zusammenhang mit Ziffer 1) steht ein anderer Gedankengang, der mir 
gegenüber in den letzten Tagen auch verschiedentlich geäussert wurde: Durch die 
Behandlung, die Griechenland in den letzten Jahren durch die „grossen Westmächte― 
erfahren hat und die dadurch hier erzeugten gleichsam „antikolonialistischem 
Gefühle― ist in Griechenland geradezu ein Vakuum entstanden. Da man in 
Griechenland seit jeher das Bedürfnis hatte, sich an einen „Grösseren― anzulehnen, 
England hierfür überhaupt zur Zeit nicht in Frage kommt, die Gefühle gegenüber den 
Vereinigten Staaten einigermassen abgekühlt sind, und man mit Frankreich nicht 
mehr sehr rechnet, ist – nach diesen immer wiederkehrenden Äusserungen – 
nurDeutschland in der Lage, dieses Vakuum auszufüllen. 
Wir sollten uns hierbei bewusst sein, dass wir diese Aufgabe nicht nur im 
Interesse einer weiteren Vertiefung der deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen sehen und 
erfüllen müssen; alles, was Deutschland in dieser Richtung unternimmt, geschieht in 
einem höheren, weit über die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen hinausgehenden 
Interesse für die gesamte NATO-Gemeinschaft und den Westen schlechthin. In 
diesem Zusammenhang wurde von griechischer Seite etwa geäussert: Ihr Deutschen 
seid im Augenblick die einzigen, die uns wieder das Gefühl geben können, dass wir in 
der westlichen Gemeinschaft voll verstanden und unterstützt werden. 
Wie stark dieses „Vakuum― in weitesten Schichten der griechischen 
Bevölkerung empfunden wird, kommt beispielsweise auch in dem grossen Bedürfnis 
zur Erlernung der deutschen Sprache zum Ausdruck, dem die vorhandenen 
Einrichtungen gar nicht mehr nachkommen können. In diesem Zusammenhang darf 
ich auf die Anlage zu meinem Bericht Nr. 1058 vom 30.10.1958 verweisen. 
3. Zwangslage der Griechischen Regierung
In den Unterhaltungen der letzten Tage wurde mir weiter immer wieder gesagt, die
Freunde Griechenlands müssten zu verstehen versuchen, in welcher ausgesprochenen 
Zwangslage sich die Griechische Regierung zur Zeit befinde. Einerseits sehe sich 
Griechenland einem starken Druck von aussen und in den westlichen Ländern einem 
zunehmenden Mangel an Verständnis für die Situation der Griechischen Regierung 
gegenüber. Andererseits habe die Tatsache, dass die immer neuen griechischen 
Konzessionen zu keinem entsprechenden Einlenken der anderen Seite geführt hätten, 
einen von Tag zu Tag zunehmenden innerpolitischen Druck auf die Regierung 
erzeugt, der der Vorwurf gemacht werde, das nationale Anliegen der Cypernsache 
nicht entschieden genug zu vertreten. 
In diesem Zusammenhang wiederholten meine Gesprächspartner immer 
wieder: Allem Anschein nach sei man sich fast in allen westlichen Hauptstädten der 
besonderen […]die sich hierbei aus den spezifischen Eigenschaften des leicht 
erregbaren griechischen Volkscharakters und der griechischen Mentalität ergäben, 
nicht hinreichend bewusst. Wenn das griechische Volk das Gefühl habe, dass ihm 
Unrecht geschehe und es keinen anderen Ausweg sehe, komme es leicht dahin, dass 
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es nicht mehr der „ratio―, sondern – ohne noch an die Folgen zu denken – nur noch 
seinen Gefühlen gehorche. Schon der Ausgang der Parlamentswahlen vom 11.5.d.j. 
mit einem Anwachsen des kommunistischen Stimmenanteils von 10 auf beinahe 25% 
habe gezeigt, welche Gefahren hier bestünden. 
 
4. Die Einstellung des Mannes auf der Straße 
In einem Gespräch, das ich mit dem früheren Chef der griechischen Luftwaffe, 
General a.D. Potamianos, hatte, der ein enger Freund des Königs und Mitarbeiter des 
Industriellen Bodossakis (des griechischen Krupp) ist, kam ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt 
zum Ausdruck, der mir erwähnenswert scheint. Herr Potamianos sagte etwa 
folgendes: In den Wirtschaftsverhandlungen, die jetzt zwischen beiden Ländern 
geführt werden, geht es um die Gewährung einer Anleihe, um die Eröffnung von 
Kreditmöglichkeiten, die Lieferung von Maschinen und ganzen Fabriken usw. Alle 
diese Verhandlungen werden von Regierung zu Regierung geführt. Der einfache 
Grieche wird durch diese Regierungsabkommen nur sehr wenig angesprochen. Er 
betrachtet die Regierung und den Staat schlechthin – wohl ein Residuum aus der 
Türkenzeit – immer noch als etwas ihm Fremdes und Entgegengesetztes. Er sagt 
daher, das ist ja alles sehr schön, was Griechenland in dieser Weise von Deutschland 
bekommt, aber was habe ich davon? Mein Gesprächspartner meinte, dass der einfache 
Mann auf der Strasse hier nicht ohne weiteres die Schlussfolgerung ziehe, dass durch 
alle diese Massnahmen ja der wirtschaftliche Aufbau seines Vaterlandes gefördert 
werde und dies letzten Endes auch der ganzen Bevölkerung zugute komme. Seiner 
Ansicht nach wäre es für die Vertiefung der deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen sehr 
wichtig, auch den Mann auf der Strasse dadurch ganz positiv anzusprechen, dass man 
ihm sagt: all dies geschieht, damit die rund eine Million Menschen, die in 
Griechenland an Arbeitslosigkeit oder Unterbeschäftigung leiden, Arbeit bekommen. 
Herr Potamianos, den ich als einen sehr klugen Beobachter der griechischen 
Mentalität und der sozialen Verhältnisse dieses Landes kenne, meinte, dass man keine 
Möglichkeit unausgenutzt lassen sollte, in diesem Sinne auch breitere Schichten ganz 
konkret auf die Bedeutung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden 
Ländern anzusprechen. Ich könnte mir denken, dass sich dafür u.U. bei der Abfassung 
des Kommuniqués eine Gelegenheit bietet. 
 
Mit den besten Grüßen 
Ihr 
 
________________________________
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PA AA, Β 26, 131 
Griechenlands Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ostblock. Griechisch-sowjetische 
Beziehungen 
Athen, den 17. April 1959 
Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Athen, den 17. April 1959 
An das Auswärtige Amt, Bonn 
206-83/94.08 Ber.-Nr. 567/59
Betr.: Griechenlands Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kommunismus; Griechisch-
sowjetische Beziehungen 
Bezug: Bericht vom 12.2.1959 – 206-83 Nr. 233/59 – Drahtberichte vom 6.4.1959 Nr. 
103 und 6.4.1959 Nr. 106 
Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kommunismus, die Griechenland in den Jahren 
1944-1949 in einen blutigen wirtschaftlich verhängnisvollen Bürgerkrieg gestürzt hat, 
ist auch späterhin in anderen Formen weitergegangen. Wenn auch die schrecklichen 
Auswirkungen des Bürgerkrieges im griechischen Volk unvergessen sind, so bleibt 
infolge der schlechten sozialen Lage weiter Volksschichten der Kommunismus eine 
latente Gefahr in Griechenland. Bei den Parlamentswahlen im Mai 1958 ist es der 
kommunistischen Tarnpartei EDA gelungen, mit 25% Stimmenanteil einen 
beachtlichen Erfolg zu erringen. In Erkenntnis dieser Lage unterlässt es die 
sowjetische Propaganda nicht, mit allen denkbaren publizistischen, wirtschaftlichen 
und politischen Mitteln den Kommunismus in Griechenland zu fördern und vor allem 
auch Verbindungen zu Sowjetrussland zu stärken. 
In ihrem Feldzug hat die kommunistische Propaganda sich der Masseverbreitung 
periodischer Druckschriften der Athener Sowjetbotschaft und anderer 
Ostblockvertretungen bedient. In diesem Monat sollte eine Filmfestwoche der 
sowjetzonalen DEFA der kommunistischen Kulturpropaganda dienen. Der 
Sowjetbotschafter legt besonderes Gewicht darauf, bei seinen Reisen durchs Land mit 
der Bevölkerung persönlich Fühlung zu nehmen und sich durch kleine Geschenke an 
die Kinder beliebt zu machen. 
Wirtschaftlich haben die Sowjetunion und ihre Sattelitenstaaten bei den 
Absatzschwierigkeiten Griechenlands für seine agrarischen Produkte und 
insbesondere für Tabak ideale Ansatzpunkte, um durch günstige bilaterale Angebote 
die Bedeutung des östlichen Marktes darzutun. Der Sowjetbotschafter scheute sich 
nicht, am 11.d.M. vor griechischen Pressevertretern die Wirtschaftspolitik der 
Griechischen Regierung öffentlich anzugreifen und seine Verwunderung darüber zum 
Ausdruck zu bringen, dass „Griechenland seine Handelsbeziehungen zu den Ländern 
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des Ostblocks nicht weiter fördert―. „Wir bieten―, fuhr er fort, „Erzeugnisse im 
Austausch mit den Ihrigen an, ohne dass Sie Devisen aufwenden müssten. Es gibt 
sowjetische Produkte, wie landwirtschaftliche Geräte, Erdölerzeugnisse und 
Rohmaterialien aber auch noch viele andere, zu weit niedrigeren Preisen als jene der 
anderen Länder. Es genügt, die Tatsache zu verzeichnen, dass die anderen Länder ihre 
Preise sofort auf die Hälfte reduzierten, als unser Land dem Ausland Erdölprodukte 
anbot―. Was die Ausfuhr griechischer Citrusfrüchte nach der Sowjetunion anlange, 
werde sie sich bereits in nächster Zukunft weiter steigern. Dann forderte der 
sowjetische Botschafter, dass der Fremdenverkehr zwischen den beiden Ländern 
dadurch gefördert werde, dass griechische Touristen künftig ungehindert nach der 
Sowjetunion reisen könnten, „die ihre Tore weit offen halte―. „Im Mai werden 
übrigens 600 Sowjettouristen ihr Land besuchen―. 
Das sowjetische Ziel hinsichtlich der griechischen Innenpolitik ist die 
Schaffung einer Volksfront. Unter dem Eindruck der Ergebnisse der Gemeindewahlen 
vom 5. April d.J., die der kommunistischen EDA zusammen mit der linksbürgerlichen 
Opposition einen beachtlichen Rückschlag gebracht haben, hat Sowjetbotschafter 
Sergeew am 8. April den Vorsitzenden der Liberalen Partei, S. Venizelos, und den 
ehemaligen Koordinationsminister und Vorsitzenden der „Fortschrittlichen―, 
Markezinis, aufgesucht, um sicherem Vernehmen nach bei beiden Politikern 
Stimmung für diese Volksfrontpolitik zu machen und die Bedenken der bürgerlichen 
Oppositionsgruppen gegen den kommunistischen Partner zu zerstreuen. Wie ich 
hierzu von einem gewöhnlich gut unterrichteten Gewährsmann erfahre, hat Sergeew 
hierbei die „Notwendigkeit― eines Zusammenschlusses der Opposition u.a. auch mit 
dem Hinweis begründet, das „willkürliche Verbot― der für die Zeit vom 6. bis 12. 
April geplanten Filmwoche der (sowjetzonalen) DEFA in Athen durch die 
Griechische Regierung habe erneut gezeigt, „wohin die Dinge trieben―. 
Bei der gleichen Gelegenheit hat Sergeew dem Vorsitzenden der Fortschrittlichen 
Partei, Markezinis, eine Einladung des stellvertretenden sowjetischen 
Ministerpräsidenten Mikojan zu einem Besuch der Sowjetunion überbracht. 
Markezinis hat diese Einladung angenommen und wird am 20.d.Mts. nach Moskau 
abreisen, wo er auch mit Mikojan selbst zusammentreffen wird. Mit dieser Reise von 
Markezinis fällt „zufällig― Venizelos´ Teilnahme an einer „touristischen Exkursion― 
zusammen, die ihn – ebenfalls gegen Ende des Monats – nach Odessa, Yalta und 
Batum führen wird. 
Aussenpolitisch versuchte die kommunistische Tarnpartei EDA der 
griechischen Regierung in der Cypernfrage möglichst Schwierigkeiten durch scharfe 
nationalistische Forderungen zu bereiten und die Regierung von den für eine 
Kompromisslösung notwendigen Konzessionen durch heftige Angriffe abzuhalten. 
Bis zuletzt versuchte die EDA – allerdings vergeblich – sich zum Alleinverfechter der 
„verratenen nationalen Belange― aufzuwerten. 
Mit Karamanlis an der Spitze reagierte die Griechische Regierung gegen diese 
sowjetischen Machenschaften konsequent und energisch. In Erkenntnis der 
Anfälligkeit einer wirtschaftlich schwachen Bevölkerung für die Ideen des 
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Kommunismus hat Karamanlis seine Bemühungen um die Verbesserung der 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse intensiviert und verbreitert. Zur Abwehr 
der kommunistischen Umtriebe wurde nach der heilsamen Schockwirkung, die der 
Erfolg der kommunistischen EDA bei den Parlamentsneuwahlen im Mai v.J. 
ausgelöst hatte, der tatkräftige Staatssekretär im Innenministerium, Kalantzis, 
eingesetzt. Dieser verschärfte die Überwachung und ahndete alle 
Gesetzesverletzungen durch entschiedenes Eingreifen der zuständigen Staatsorgane. 
Die kommunistische Massenpropaganda der Sowjetbotschaft wurde verboten. Die 
Regierung scheute sich nicht den Sowjetbotschafter wegen seiner öffentlichen 
Erklärungen bei seinen Reisen innerhalb des Landes zurechtzuweisen, wie sie das 
auch diesmal wegen seiner Äusserungen gegen die Wirtschaftspolitik der Regierung 
nachdrücklich getan hat. Ein Sprecher des griechischen Aussenministeriums betonte 
am 14.d.M., dass eine derartige Kritik mit den traditionellen Regeln, wiesie für 
ausländische Diplomaten gegenüber dem Gastland verbindlich seien, nicht in 
Einklang zu bringen sei. 
Aussenpolitisch hat sich Griechenland in jeder Weise in der grossen Ost-West-
Auseinandersetzung zu einer harten Politik gegenüber der Sowjetunion bekannt. Ich 
darf dabei auf die Ausführungen von Ministerpräsident Karamanlis mir gegenüber 
hinweisen. Auch Vizeministerpräsident Kanellopoulos hat bei der NATO-Tagung in 
New York Anfang d.Mts. erneut diese Einstellung Griechenlands bekundet. 
Schliesslich hat Griechenland nicht zuletzt um der NATO willen in der 
Cypernfrage bedeutende Konzessionen gemacht in Erkenntnis der andrängenden 
russisch-kommunistischen Gefahr. Die regierungsparteiliche KATHIMERINI 
unterstrich erst in diesen Tagen im Hinblick auf den bevorstehenden Besuch von 
Ministerpräsident Karamanlis und Aussenminister Averoff in Ankara die 
„gemeinsamen Verteidigungsinteressen Griechenlands und der Türkei― sehr 
nachdrücklich. 
Trotz aller Bemühungen Sowjetrusslands um ein erneutes stärkeres Eindringen 
in Griechenland, haben die Gemeindewahlen vom 5. April mit ihrer Zurückdrängung 
der kommunistischen EDA gezeigt, dass die konsequente und gegenüber dem 
Kommunismus harte Politik von Karamanlis von der überwiegenden Mehrheit des 
griechischen Volkes gebilligt wird. Soll aber dieser Erfolg stabilisiert werden, so ist es 
unerlässlich, dass die griechische Regierung Hilfe von auswärts bekommt. Die 
Regierung Karamanlis ist nicht zuletzt Deutschland deshalb so dankbar, weil sie sich 
von uns in dem gemeinsamen Abwehrkampf gegen Sowjetrussland verstanden glaubt 
und die wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Zusagen vom November v.J. als einen 
echten, aber auch notwendigen Beitrag empfindet, um die latent gefährdete Lage 
Griechenlands zu halten. 
_________________________________ 
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PA AA, B 26, 130 
Die Bedeutung Griechenlands für die Verteidigung des Westens 
Bonn, den 3. März 1960 
Referat 301 
301-94.08/270/60
(LR Dr. Dietrich) 
Bonn, den 3. März 1960 
An die Abteilung 2/Referat 206 
Betr.: Direktorenbesprechung über Griechenland am 9. März 1960 
hier:  Die Bedeutung Griechenlands für die Verteidigung des Westens 
Bezug: Dortige Zuschrift vom 19.2.1960 – 206-83.00/1422/60- 
1. Dank seiner geographischen Lage nimmt Griechenland eine wichtige
Riegelstellung im Verteidigungssystem des Westens gegenüber dem Ostblock ein.
Die entschlossene und mutige anti-kommunistische Einstellung der griechischen 
Regierung hatte das Land trotz der Armut seiner Bevölkerung zu einem zuverlässigen 
Partner in dem Verteidigungsbündnis der NATO gemacht. 
2. Angelehnt an das Balkangebiet seines östlichen NATO-Partners Türkei riegelt
Griechenland mit seiner rd. 850 km langen Grenze gegenüber seinen
kommunistischen Nachbarn im Norden den Ostblockstaat Bulgarien vom Mittelmeer
ab. Zusammen mit Italien beherrscht es zugleich den Ausgang der Adria zum
eigentlichen Mittelmeer, der für Jugoslawien und insbesondere für Albanien mit
seinen sowjetischen U-Bootsbasen von großer strategischer Bedeutung ist. Nach der
Türkei ist Griechenland der wichtigste NATO-Partner, um den für die Oelversorgung
Westeuropas benutzten Seeweg im Mittelmeer zu sichern.
Schon eine Neutralität Griechenlands würde zu einer weitgehenden strategischen 
Isolierung der Türkei führen und das gesamte Verteidigungssystem des Westens im 
Mittelmeerraum, dem „weichen Unterleib Europas―, erheblich schwächen. Zugleich 
würde ein für die Freie Welt gefährlicher politischer Erdrutsch im Nahen Osten und 
auch in Afrika zugunsten des sowjetischen Imperialismus ausgelöst werden. 
Im engeren militärischen Bereich würde eine Neutralität Griechenlands dazu 
führen, daß die Kette der westlichen Radarstationen vom Nordkap bis Persien und 
Pakistan in einem wichtigen Abschnitt Südosteuropas unterbrochen wird. Diese 
Unterbrechung der Radarkette und das Fehlen einer Flugabwehr über dem 
griechischen Raum ließe insbesondere die 6. Amerikanische Flotte im Mittelmeer mit 
ihren atomar-bewaffneten Trägerflugzeugen gegen Überraschungsangriffe 
ungeschützt. Schließlich könnte der Sowjetblock seine durch Griechenland nicht mehr 
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gebundenen Truppen dazu verwenden, den Druck z.B. gegenüber der Türkei zu 
verstärken. 
3. Die im Parlament über keine sehr starke Mehrheit verfügende griechische
Regierung muss Wert darauf legen, der zu einem Entgegenkommen gegenüber dem
Ostblock bereiten Opposition keinen Anlaß zu Angriffen zu geben. Dies hat z.B. –
neben anderen Gründen – dazu geführt, daß sich die Regierung in der Frage der
Errichtung von Raketenbasen gegenwärtig zurückhalten muß. Eine Verstärkung des
kommunistischen Einflusses in Griechenland muß daher auch im Interesse der
Verteidigung des Westens verhindert werden.
_______________________________ 
PA AA, Β 26, 68 
Griechenlands Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarländern 
Athen, den 14. März 1960 
Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Athen, den 14. März 1960 
Streng vertraulich 
An das Auswärtige Amt 
Bonn 
206-83/94.08-Bericht Nr. 354/60
Betr.: Griechenlands Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarländern
Anlässlich des Besuchs von Bundesverteidigungsminister Strauss gab der griechische 
Aussenminister Averoff am 11. März im Aussenministerium in kleinstem Kreise eine 
Übersicht über die Beziehungen Griechenlands zu seinen Nachbarländern, die er mit 
folgenden allgemeinen Betrachtungen einleitete: 
Griechenland sei einem zunehmenden Druck der Sowjets ausgesetzt, der 
parallel mit den sich verstärkenden Redensarten über eine Détente auf dem Balkan 
liefe. Jeden Tag sei Griechenland neuen Druckmitteln im Wechsel mit 
Versprechungen ausgesetzt. So würden jetzt die Sowjets die Rückkehr der früheren 
griechischen Guerilla-Krieger betreiben, die man auf 70 000 Personen schätze. 
Griechenland werde eine Rückkehr ablehnen, da es keine ausgebildeten Kommunisten 
zurückhaben wolle, von denen allein 600 militärische Schulen vollendet hätten. 
Früher habe die griechische Regierung geglaubt, der Sowjetdruck diene vor allem 
dazu, um Griechenland daran zu hindern, Atombasen anzulegen; nunmehr hätten 
Italien und die Türkei sich hierzu entschlossen, während Griechenland seine 
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Entscheidung aufgeschoben habe. Der Sowjetdruck auf Griechenland sei aber nicht 
nur geblieben, sondern hätte sich sogar noch verstärkt. 
Hinsichtlich der einzelnen Länder nahm Aussenminister Averoff wie folgt 
Stellung: 
1. Türkei
Die Periode der Feindschaft sei beendet. Die Türkei und Griechenland arbeiteten
auf allen Gebieten zusammen. Die Cypern-Frage werde wohl bis zum Beginn des 
Sommers geregelt sein. Alle weiteren Probleme mit der Türkei, wie z.B. die 
Minderheiten-Frage, seien unbedeutend und könnten gelöst werden. Die türkischen 
Staatsmänner hätten eben eingesehen, dass beide Länder in einer gemeinsamen 
Gefahr seien, da sowohl Griechenland wie die Türkei den Slawen die Pforten zum 
Mittelmeer schlössen und ihrem Druck in gleicher Weise ausgesetzt seien. 
2. Jugoslawien
Hinsichtlich der jugoslawischen Haltung habe die griechische Regierung klare und
sichere Vorstellungen: Jugoslawien verfolge eine völlig unabhängige Politik. Es wolle 
auf alle Fälle neutral bleiben und nur kämpfen, wenn es gezwungen werde, seine 
Unabhängigkeit zu verteidigen. Die griechische Auffassung gründe sich nicht auf 
Annahmen, sondern auf viele Tatsachen, die sich im Laufe der langjährigen 
Freundschaft ergeben hätten.  
Z,B, habe die griechische Regierung vor ca. 3 Jahren General Tsakalotos als 
Botschafter nach Belgrad senden wollen, der sich bei der Bekämpfung der 
kommunistischen Guerilla-Krieger besonders hervorgetan habe. Man habe nun bei der 
jugoslawischen Regierung angefragt, ob seine Person nicht-genehm, gleichgültig oder 
genehm sei und habe hinzugefügt, dass er in den ersten beiden Fällen nicht entsandt 
werde. Die Antwort der Jugoslawen war, dass er durchaus genehm sei. General 
Tsakalotos halte nicht sehr viel von der jugoslawischen Armee, dagegen sei er sehr 
beeindruckt gewesen von der Organisation der Guerillas, die aber rein defensiv sei. In 
griechischem Interesse liege es, die guten Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien zu pflegen, 
vor allem auch aus militärischen Gründen. Es erhebe sich nun die Frage, wie lange 
diese Politik in Jugoslawien noch durchgeführt werden könne. Darauf müsse man 
antworten: so lange Tito am Leben bleibe. Die weitere Gestaltung hänge von seinem 
Nachfolger ab; als solcher kämen Kardelj, Rankovic oder Todorovic in Frage. 
Die Anerkennung der Sowjetzone durch Tito erklärte Averoff wie folgt: Tito 
sei der Feind Nr. 1 von Sowjetrussland, da er bewiesen habe, dass man als 
unabhängiger Kommunist auch die Gegnerschaft Sowjetrusslands überleben könne. 
Um sich aber als Kommunist zu beweisen, müsse Tito manchmal solche 
Zugeständnisse wie die Anerkennung der Sowjetzone machen.  
3. Albanien
Mit Albanien bestünde schlechte Beziehungen, keinerlei Grenzverkehr, keine
diplomatischen Beziehungen. Albanien habe eine gewisse militärisch-strategische 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
  
37 
 
Bedeutung. Es verfüge über 4 Haupt- und 8 Hilfsflugplätze; am Golf von Valona 
besässe Sowjetrussland einen Marinestützpunkt, in dem sich mindestens 8 
Unterseeboote und verschiedene kleinere Schiffseinheiten befänden. Die albanische 
Bevölkerung sei nicht zufrieden mit dem Regime; Die soziale Lage der Masse sei 
schlecht. Averoff glaubt nicht an eine Wiederherstellung der diplomatischen 
Beziehungen wegen des brennenden Problems des Nordepirus. Griechenland könne 
die dort geschehenen Verbrechen gegen die griechische Minderheit nicht durch eine 
Anerkennung Albaniens sanktionieren. 
 
4. Bulgarien 
Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Bulgarien seien sehr schlecht, 
denn Bulgarien habe in einem Menschenalter Griechenland 4 mal überfallen, nämlich 
1913, 1916, 1941 und während des Guerillakrieges 1944-1949. Interessanterweise 
habe der bulgarische Ministerpräsident Yogoff in seiner Rede vor einigen Tagen auf 
die Notwendigkeit bulgarischer Häfen im Ägäischen Meer hingewiesen, deren 
natürliches Hinterland Bulgarien sei. Bulgarien sei schwer gerüstet, insbesondere sei 
hinsichtlich der Zahl der Tanks und Artillerie viel stärker als Griechenland, dessen 
schwächster militärischer Punkt Thrazien sei, denn dort müssten die Griechen ggf. mit 
dem Rücken gegen das Meer kämpfen, während die Bulgaren von den Bergen herab 
vorstossen könnten. Wegen der Bedeutung des Ägäischen Meeres als Zugang zu den 
Dardanellen drückten die Sowjets sehr auf Griechenland, um es aus der NATO zu 
lösen. 
 
5. Italien 
Die Beziehungen zu Italien seien sehr gut; die Erinnerung an den Krieg sei 
vergessen. 
 
6. Ägypten 
Griechenland habe schon aus dem einen Grund ein besonderes Interesse an guten 
Beziehungen zu Ägypten, weil dort etwa 100 000 Griechen lebten. Die Zeit der 
grossen Gewinne sei allerdings vorbei; die Geschäfte blühten nicht mehr wie früher, 
aber die griechische Kolonie in Ägypten lebe jedenfalls besser, wie irgendeine andere 
ausländische Kolonie in Ägypten. Die Griechen in Ägypten seien griechische Bürger 
und verstünden sich durchaus mit den Ägyptern, da sie nicht snobistisch seien. 
 Griechenland pflege die Beziehungen zu Ägypten nicht bloss aus materiellen 
Interessen, sondern vor allem, weil es die richtige Politik zu sein scheine. Nasser sei 
durch die Politik der Westmächte zu sehr zu den Sowjets hingedrängt worden. Wäre 
dies nicht der Fall gewesen, dann stünde Nasser jetzt stärker im westlichen Lager. Es 
sei jetzt allerdings unmöglich, Nasser auf die westliche Seite zu ziehen. Dies sei aber 
auch gar nicht nötig; es genüge, wenn man ihn neutral halte. Mit einer guten Politik 
sei dies möglich. Als Folge dieser guten griechisch-ägyptischen Beziehungen werde 
Nasser am 1. Juni einen Staatsbesuch in Griechenland machen, der nach dem Besuch 
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in Jugoslawien der erste Besuch Nassers in einem westeuropäischen Staate sei. Man 
habe die Absicht, diesen Besuch gross aufzuziehen. 
Gerade weil die Beziehungen der griechischen Regierung zu Nasser so gut 
seien, könne sie mit Nasser ganz offen sprechen und ihm auch einige Wahrheiten 
sagen, so wie man bei dem Treffen in Brioni im Juli 58 ganz offen über die Israel-
Frage diskutiert habe. 
Averoff glaubt, dass das Israel-Problem durchaus gelöst werden könne, wenn 
die Grossmächte mit mehr Realismus an die Frage herangingen. Die Abneigung der 
Ägypter gegen Israel habe zu mehr als 50% folgenden Grund: Israel müsse eine 
kontrollierte Einwanderung haben. Zur Zeit zähle die Bevölkerung schon 2 Millionen, 
die keinen Platz hätten. Wenn durch eine unlimitierte Einwanderung diese Zahl 
schliesslich auf 5 Millionen ansteige, benötige Israel auch mehr Land und das bedeute 
Krieg. Nasser habe über dieses Problem in Brioni dreimal gesprochen. Die 
griechische Regierung gebe ihm hinsichtlich der Notwendigkeit eines Verbots der 
Einwanderung bzw. einer kontrollierten, beschränkten Einwanderung recht. 
Ausserdem bestünde noch die Möglichkeit, vielleicht in Afrika ein zweites Israel zu 
schaffen. Die Grenzen könnten durch eine internationale Garantie der Grossmächte 
gesichert werden. Jedenfalls bleibe der Nahe Osten, so lange die Israel-Frage nicht 
gelöst sei, ein Vulkan. 
Die Übersicht des griechischen Aussenministers zeigt, über welch wertvolle 
Beziehungen besonderer Art Griechenland verfügt, die bei der derzeitigen grossen 
deutsch-griechischen Freundschaft sich auch für uns als wertvoll erweisen können. 
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MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1944-1949, 64 
Direction d'Europe 
Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères à S. E. Monsieur de Vaux Saint-Cyr, 
Ambassadeur de France à Athènes 
3 novembre 1945 
Au moment où vous arriverez dans votre poste, vous trouverez en Grèce une situation 
politique des plus confuses.  
L'anarchie, la guerre civile et l'intervention étrangère ont bouleversé le pays de votre 
résidence depuis la libération du territoire hellénique jusqu'à la signature de l'accord 
dit de Varkiza, le 12 février 1945, et y ont malheureusement laissé des traces 
sanglantes et profondes. L'opposition violente des partis, la haine qui dresse en 
particulier la droite monarchique contre la gauche communiste ont rendu impossible 
toute stabilité gouvernementale. Après M. Papandreou, le général Plastiras et l'amiral 
Voulgaris n'ont pu se maintenir longtemps au pouvoir et Mgr Damaskinos auquel le 
Roi Georges II a confié la Régence s'est vu contraint récemment, devant 
l'impossibilité de trouver un nouveau Ministère, d'assurer lui-même la présidence du 
Gouvernement. Celui-ci bornera vraisemblablement son ambition et son activité à 
assurer, tant bien que mal, l'administration du pays jusqu'aux prochaines élections 
dont la date est fixée au 20 janvier 1946.  
Ainsi que vous le savez, le Gouvernement français a accepté l'offre qui lui a été faire 
par les gouvernements britannique et américain de participer à la Commission de 
Contrôle qui s'efforcera de veiller à ce que les volontés du peuple grec puissent 
s'exprimer en toute liberté. La responsabilité que nous avons assumée de ce fait et que 
le Gouvernement soviétique a, quant à lui, refusé de partager apparaît lourde.  
L'atmosphère de la consultation populaire qui se déroulera bientôt dans ce pays 
durement éprouvé par la guerre, en proie à des passions politiques déchaînées et en 
plein chaos économique risque fort, en effet, d'être dépourvue de sérénité. La tâche de 
la mission française dont la direction sera sans doute confiée au Colonel Laparra qui, 
pour la circonstance, serait nommé général à titre provisoire, ne s'en trouvera pas 
facilitée.  
Quels que doivent être les résultats des élections, il importe pourtant au plus haut 
point, et il vous appartiendra d'y veiller, qu'on ne puisse nous reprocher de nous être 
immiscés dans la politique intérieure grecque et d'avoir fait preuve de partialité à 
l'égard d'une faction quelconque. L'unique désir du Gouvernement de la République 
est que le peuple hellène puisse désigner librement le régime et le gouvernement 
auquel il entendra confier ses destinées. Le gouvernement français ne veut pas 
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intervenir, si peu que ce soit, pour orienter ou pour influencer ce choix. C'est dire que 
le rôle de la mission française devra être strictement limité à l'observation des faits et 
du contrôle des élections. La plus grande circonspection est de rigueur à cet égard car 
il n'est pas certain que les missions américaine et britannique seront animées d'un 
désintéressement égal au nôtre. Si leur attitude doit susciter des critiques, il convient 
que celles-ci ne puissent pas nous être adressées et la neutralité des représentants 
français demeure constamment au-dessus de tout soupçon.  
La politique étrangère du gouvernement grec rendra également délicat l'exercice de 
votre mission.  
Le peuple hellénique qui a conscience d'avoir apporté à la victoire des nations unies 
une contribution efficace et héroïque ressent une profonde amertume de l'attitude 
adoptée à son égard par ses grands alliés. Il se plaint vivement, non sans 
quelqu'apparence de raison, d'avoir été tenu à l'écart de la négociation du traité de 
paix avec l'Italie dont il ne peut oublier la perfide et brutale agression. Il constate avec 
irritation que ses plus légitimes revendications ne sont pas encore satisfaites et il 
souffre impatiemment l'indulgence que les Anglo-saxons témoignent à l'Italie aussi 
bien que celle dont les soviets font preuve à l'égard de la Bulgarie.  
Les relations avec celle-ci sont empreintes d'une inimitié non déguisée. Les Grecs ne 
peuvent pardonner aux Bulgares les atrocités et les destructions qu'ils ont commises 
durant l'occupation. La haine séculaire qui oppose ces voisins ennemis s'aggrave de 
leurs convoitises réciproques. Si Sofia n'a pas renoncé à l'espoir d'obtenir, au 
détriment de la Grèce, un accès à la mer Égée, Athènes souhaite, de son côté, une 
rectification de frontière qui lui donnerait certaines crêtes des Monts Rhodopes 
indispensables, estime-t-elle, à sa sécurité. Elle réclame aussi de la Bulgarie six cent 
millions de dollars à titre de réparations.  
Les rapports avec Belgrade sont également entachés de méfiance et d'hostilité, chaque 
gouvernement accusant l'autre de maltraiter ses ressortissants. Les Grecs reprochent 
en outre aux Yougoslaves de soutenir contre eux les Albanais en Épire du Nord.  
Les relations gréco-soviétiques sont des plus froides. On craint en effet à Athènes que 
le Kremlin ne soit décidé à appuyer les projets d'extension territoriale de la Bulgarie 
et l'accroissement de la Macédoine en direction de Salonique. Dans certains milieux, 
on nourrit en outre de sérieuses appréhensions sur le succès de la propagande 
communiste secrètement encouragée par Moscou. Ces préoccupations expliquent que 
bien qu'une partie de l'opinion publique demeure hostile à l'occupation britannique 
l'alliance avec l'Angleterre soit soit considérée comme indispensable par la majorité 
des Grecs, également favorables, pour les mêmes raisons, à l'amitié des États-Unis. 
Les démocraties anglo-saxonnes ne sont-elles pas du reste seules susceptibles d'aider 
la Grèce à sortir de la très grave crise économique dont elle souffre et à obtenir que 
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ses revendications envers l'Italie et la Bulgarie ainsi que ses demandes de réparations 
à l'Allemagne, à l'Italie et  à la Bulgarie reçoivent satisfaction.  
Ce rapide tableau de la politique extérieure hellénique donne un aperçu de la 
complexité et de la difficulté des problèmes avec lesquels le gouvernement auprès 
duquel vous êtes accrédité se trouve confronté. Du moins aucun de ces problèmes 
n'intéresse-t-il directement la France. Vous bénéficierez, de ce fait, d'une situation 
privilégiée puisque vous ne serez saisi d'aucune réclamation pressante et qu'étranger 
aux débats, vos avis et vos conseils seront certainement sollicités.  
Votre expérience vous permettra certainement de faire d'utiles suggestions aux 
dirigeants du pays de votre résidence et je ne doute pas que vous ne vous attiriez ainsi 
leur gratitude. Vous serez naturellement le meilleur juge de ce qu'il conviendra de dire 
à vos interlocuteurs sans perdre de vue l'intérêt de ne pas vous départir de la neutralité 
souhaitable lorsque vous serez consulté sur des questions intéressant à la fois nos amis 
anglais et nos alliés soviétiques. La rivalité et la lutte d'influence auxquelles se livrent 
en Grèce les uns et les autres vous placeront peut-être dans une position 
embarrassante. Il est évident par exemple que si nous pouvons soutenir sans arrière-
pensée, ni inconvénient sérieux, les revendications grecques sur le Dodécanèse 
Italien, il n'en vas pas de même des prétentions helléniques sur les Rhodopes, l‘Épire 
du Nord et sur Chypre.  
Par contre, il nous est plus facile d'appuyer, au moins dans le principe, le point de vue 
grec au sujet des réparations. Dans certains cas sans doute vos bons offices seront 
requis. Il vous appartiendra d'estimer s'il est plus opportun d'accepter ou de repousser 
de telles propositions.  
L'attitude amicale que vous adopterez à l'égard de la régence devrait incliner celle-ci à 
réserver à nos demandes légitimes un accueil favorable.  
Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler l'importance de nos intérêts culturels. Vous vous 
heurterez sur ce point à la concurrence croissante des Anglo-saxons et à la volonté des 
autorités locales de réserver une part de plus en plus grande à l'enseignement de la 
langue grecque. Une adaptation est sans doute nécessaire mais elle ne doit pas nuire à 
une étroite et efficace collaboration franco-hellénique.  
Nos intérêts économiques ont subi, depuis la libération, un préjudice considérable. Je 
cite pour mémoire la situation faite à la maison française Tekvorian et à la Compagnie 
franco-hellénique des Chemins de Fer. Le Chef du Gouvernement provisoire de la 
République a appelé récemment sur l'ensemble de ces affaires l'attention de Mgr. 
Damaskinos. Celui-ci a promis au Général de Gaulle de les examiner dans un esprit 
favorable. Vous voudrez bien veiller à ce que cette promesse soit tenue et intervenir 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
  
43 
 
avec toute la fermeté nécessaire en vue d'un règlement équitable des questions qui 
nous intéressent.  
 
Signé : Dejean              
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1944-1949,  23  
Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes au Ministre des Affaires 
étrangères 
5 février 1946 
 
Au nom de la Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes, nous nous 
permettons d'attirer votre attention sur la situation des femmes de la résistance en 
Grèce qui, ayant été arrêtés après la libération du pays se trouvent toujours en prison.  
Nous nous permettons, Monsieur le Ministre, de vous transmettre la copie de la lettre 
des femmes de la Résistance en Grèce, ainsi que la copie de la lettre que nous 
envoyons aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Grec par l'intermédiaire de Monsieur le 
Ministre de Grèce à Paris.  
 
Nous vous demandons, Monsieur le Ministre, d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement 
Grec dans le but d'accélérer l'enquête et la libération de toutes celles qui pendant des 
années ont lutté pour l'indépendance de leur pays et pour la paix du monde.  
 
Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous adressons la même demande aux 
Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, des États-Unis, de Chine et de l'Union 
soviétique.  
 
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de notre haute considération.  
Pour la Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes,  
 
La présidente E. Cotton 
La Secrétaire générale Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier 
 
________________________________ 
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MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1944-1949, 23 
Confédération générale du travail [à] Monsieur Robert Schumann, Ministre des 
affaires étrangères 
1
er
 mars 1949 
 
Monsieur le Ministre,  
Le Bureau de la Confédération Générale du Travail a été profondément ému et 
indigné par l'annonce de l'assassinat de Dimitri Paparigas, Secrétaire général de la 
Confédération Générale du Travail de Grèce.  
Nous élevons une véhémente protestation contre ce nouvel attentat aux droits 
démocratiques et humains.  
Nous vous prions d'intervenir auprès de la Représentation, à Paris, du Gouvernement 
grec pour souligner l'émotion des travailleurs devant l'assassinat de ce héros, tombé 
dans la lutte pour la défense de l'indépendance de son pays et des droits des Peuples.  
Nous vous demandons d'agir énergiquement auprès du Gouvernement grec pour que 
soit écartée la menace de mort qui pèse sur des centaines et des milliers de patriotes 
grecs, qui tous ont été des héros de la lutte contre les barbares nazis.  
Nous vous prions de bien vouloir nous informer de la suite donnée par le 
Gouvernement français à notre demande et de la réponse faite par le Gouvernement 
grec.  
Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Ministre, à l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.  
 
Pour le Bureau confédéral,  
L'un des Secrétaires Généraux,  
 
A. Le Leap    
 
________________________________ 
 
 
MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 114 
Télégramme 405/406, Vaux Saint Cyr 
12 mai 1950 
 
Les commentaires succincts de la presse donnent une image très imparfaite de l'intérêt 
qu'a suscité à Athènes la proposition de Votre Excellence.  
 
J'ai recueilli dans les 48 heures de nombreux témoignages de la satisfaction 
qu'éprouvent aujourd'hui dans tous les partis politiques ceux qui, conscients de 
l'importance que présente pour la Grèce l'organisation de l'Europe, craignaient que 
l'état des relations franco-allemandes ne s'opposât au succès de tout projet constructif.  
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Le Président du Conseil notamment, que j'ai vu hier soir au Palais, a tenu à me dire 
qu'il se félicitait de voir fait par la France le premier pas pour la création d'une Europe 
unie, seule capable d'assurer la défense de la civilisation occidentale contre les 
dangers qui la menacent de l'Orient.  
________________________________ 
MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 114 
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire : Note pour le Directeur Général de la 
Sûreté Nationale ; no 10001 
28 octobre 1952 
Objet : Compte-rendu de mission en Grèce 
J'ai l'honneur de vous exposer ci-dessous les résultats de la mission que je viens 
d'effectuer du 14 au 18 octobre à Athènes en exécution de l'ordre de mission 
ministériel du 3 octobre 1952.  
BUT DE LA MISSION : 
Elle avait pour objet d'envisager et si possible de mettre sur pied une liaison étroite et 
rapide entre la D.S.T. et et les services correspondants de la Police Hellénique pour la 
lutte commune contre les entreprises du Kominform. Il était apparu en effet, dans le 
courant de l'année, qu'une liaison effective et directe aurait permis de traiter beaucoup 
plus efficacement et complètement, aussi bien en France qu'en Grèce, des affaires 
communes aux deux pays.  
DÉROULEMENT DES CONVERSATIONS : 
A mon arrivée à Athènes, où j'ai été accueilli par le premier Secrétaire de notre 
Ambassade et par les représentants du Directeur Général de la police et Directeur des 
Étrangers (Service qui a le plus de points communs avec la D.S.T.) entouré de ses 
adjoints, et en réunions d'informations avec les Directeurs MM. Kokkinos, Karabetsos 
et Rakitzis.  
Elles se sont conclues par un accord complet sur le principe d'une liaison étroite entre 
nos services sur les bases du mémorandum ci-joint que j'avais soumis et qui a été 
entièrement accepté.  
En conséquence les autorités grecques et françaises échangeront directement des 
informations sur les agissements, déplacements et d'une manière générale toutes 
entreprises visant leur pays d'agents des services de renseignements des pays 
d'obédience communiste ou d'agitateurs du Kominform.  
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MODALITÉS DE LA LIAISON : 
1.  Dans l'immédiat les notes entre les deux services seront transmises 
indifféremment par le canal des deux valises diplomatiques étant donné la 
fréquence insuffisante de la valise française ; 
2. Il est prévu l'établissement d'une liaison radiotélégraphique en code, entre les 
deux services pour les renseignements à caractère urgent. Dans ce but un 
spécialiste de la radio et du chiffre de la sûreté grecque doit venir sous peu à 
Paris pour mettre au point les détails techniques de cette liaison ; 
3. Le principe du détachement à l'Ambassade de Grèce à Paris d'un fonctionnaire 
de la police grecque a enfin été retenu. Il s'agira vraisemblablement du 
Commissaire Divisionnaire Kelenis, déjà venu en liaison à Paris. Toutefois il 
ne pourra pas venir avant un mois et demi environ, des élections étant proches 
en Grèce et le gouvernement se bornant à expédier les affaires courantes sans 
engager de nouvelles dépenses.  
 
La police grecque ayant dans ses attributions la recherche du renseignement à 
l'étranger j'ai évidemment demandé que ce fonctionnaire s'abstienne de toute activité 
de cet ordre, désir auquel M. Vlastaris a aussitôt accédé. 
 
La liaison D.S.T. - Sûreté grecque devant surtout être profitable à la Grèce, étant 
donné qu'il y a en France des ressortissants grecs ayant des activités au profit du 
Kominform nuisibles à leur pays et que l'inverse n'existe pas, il n'est pas nécessaire 
d'envisager le détachement d'un policier français à notre ambassade d'Athènes.  
M. Baelen auquel j'ai exposé les résultats de nos conversations et suggéré qu'un 
membre de notre Ambassade puisse éventuellement discuter avec la sûreté grecque 
certaines questions nous intéressant plus spécialement a été tout à fait d'accord sur ce 
point et a pensé à charger M. Laporte, conseiller de cette tâche. Ce dernier qui était 
absent d'Athènes et que je viens de voir à Paris est tout à fait disposé à s'en charger. 
 
CONCLUSION :  
Si les modalités pratiques de cette liaison ne soulèvent, en ce qui le concerne, aucune 
objection de la part du Quai d'Orsay, elle doit pouvoir fonctionner sans délai dans de 
bonnes conditions et être intéressante.  
 
Toutefois pour les raisons que j'ai indiquées plus haut, elle sera sans doute plus 
profitable à la Grèce qu'à nous-mêmes. De plus, ce pays sort pratiquement de la 
guerre et l'organisation de ses services de sûreté et plus particulièrement de contre-
espionnage semble assez confuse. Les autorités grecques avaient à faire face à une 
tâche immédiate qui ne leur a sans doute pas laissé le loisir de mettre sur pied un 
service suffisamment centralisé, condition première du contre-espionnage de la non-
ingérence, et à liaisons intérieures rapides.  
Toutefois l'exposé succinct que j'ai fait de notre organisation a vivement intéressé M. 
Vlastaris qui a aussitôt réalisé l'importance d'une centralisation effective et d'une 
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exploitation rationnelle du renseignement, et décidé de créer un bureau plus 
spécialement chargé de ces tâches.  
 
Roger Wybot, Directeur de la Surveillance du Territoire 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
MAE Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 154 
Note de la Sous-direction d'Europe méridionale 
31 janvier 1955  
 
Pays de la Démocratie, où naquit l'éloquence, la Grèce est aussi la terre d'élection des 
dissensions internes et des interventions étrangères.  
 
A sa libération le pays se trouvait dans une situation proprement chaotique ; gangrené 
par le communisme, il a été gouverné successivement par des coalitions de royalistes, 
de conservateurs et de libéraux qui ne s'entendaient pas, puis à partir de 1950 par des 
gouvernements composés de deux parts dont le principal trait d'union consistait en 
une démagogie ruineuse. À cette désunion, l'institution successive d'une régence, puis 
d'une monarchie, l'organisation progressive d'élections libres n'apportèrent que de 
faibles remèdes.  
 
C'est au Maréchal Papagos, fort de ses victoires militaires et de l'appui des Alliés, que 
revient le mérite d'avoir tenté le premier effort réel en vue de mettre fin aux désordres 
et aux frais des régimes précédents. Son plan de quatre ans a permis l'épuration et la 
réforme de l'administration et la mise en route de l'économie par l'exécution de grands 
travaux d'équipement, la stabilité politique nécessaire étant assurée par la création 
« du rassemblement hellénique ».  
 
Au moment où vous êtes appelé à prendre vos fonctions, ce gouvernement semble 
déjà avoir perdu beaucoup de sa cohésion ; en avril 1954, M. Markezinis, Ministre de 
la Coordination, qui en était la cheville ouvrière, était contraint de donner sa 
démission, suivie en décembre de la même année de celle de ses principaux séides. 
 
Enfin, les dernières élections ne semblent pas avoir été un succès pour le Maréchal, à 
qui l'opinion reprochait la hausse du coût de la vie et la dureté de la législature 
sociale.  
Actuellement l'impuissance de l'opposition n'est due qu'à son incapacité de se 
regrouper et l'avenir du gouvernement paraît incertain.  
 
Ce climat dissolvant est à l'origine du fait que la politique grecque, depuis la dernière 
guerre mondiale, subit profondément l'influence des puissances étrangères : à la 
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libération, les 4/5 du pays se trouvent sous l'obédience soviétique et le premier 
gouvernement Papandreou, qui contrôle péniblement le reste du territoire, n'est qu'un 
fantoche aux mains des Britanniques. Dès l'année 1947, les États-Unis se substituent à 
l'Angleterre dans la prise en charge de la Grèce, les missions américaines s'installent 
dans le pays et le plan Marshall commence à fonctionner.  
Jusqu'en 1952 la tutelle américaine est totale et saute aux yeux des moins avertis. Elle 
est, aujourd'hui, moins visible mais vous noterez entre autres faits que l'Ambassadeur 
de USA qui assiste aux réunions du Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale est 
parvenu à imposer, malgré l'opposition des Britanniques, le Chef d‘État-major aérien 
de son choix. Jusqu'aux plus bas échelons, l'armée grecque est noyautée par des 
instructeurs américains. L'Allemagne elle-même, grâce à sa puissance politique 
économique, joue son rôle et c'est en partie à la suite d'une petite trahison de 
l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que M. Markezinis a été contraint de donner sa 
démission.  
Les rapports franco-grecs 
En présence de tels rivaux, il peut paraître difficile à un Ambassadeur de France de 
jouer un rôle de premier plan. Vous disposez pourtant pour le succès de votre mission 
d'atouts qui ne sont pas négligeables ; en premier lieu les sacrifices consentis parla 
France dans le domaine économique peuvent être inscrits dans son actif.  
1. Relations économiques franco-grecques
Depuis 1945, deux préoccupations essentielles ont inspiré nos relations commerciales
et financières avec la Grèce : aider un pays ami, économiquement pauvre, à relever les
ruines accumulées par la guerre étrangères, puis la guerre civile, permettre à nos
industries exportatrices de retrouver sur le marché grec des débouchés intéressants.
Cette politique nous a conduits à développer considérablement nos achats de tabac, 
principal produit grec d'exportation, achats qui sont passés de 400 tonnes en 1938 à 
5000 tonnes par an depuis 1946.  
Depuis 1949 nos exportations vers la Grèce ont dépassé nos importations en 
provenance de ce pays, mais l'excédent de nos exportations sur nos importations est 
en nette décroissance depuis 1951, phénomène malheureusement accompagné d'une 
légère régression des échanges. Celle-ci est due à la reprise de relations commerciales 
très active entre la Grèce et l'Allemagne, et, d'autre part, à la libération de la quasi-
totalité des importations décidée par le Gouvernement d'Athènes en avril 1954, 
libération qui a mis l'industrie française en compétition sur le marché grec avec des 
concurrents étrangers dont les prix sont souvent inférieurs aux siens au moment où les 
crédits bancaires accordés aux importateurs grecs étaient considérablement réduits.  
Depuis près de dix-huit mois, les efforts de la délégation française chargée de 
négocier les accords commerciaux ont donc spécialement tendu à obtenir l'attribution 
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de contingents accrus pour les rares produits restant soumis à licence en Grèce et à 
faire attribuer des contrats à l'industrie française dans un pays où les adjudications ne 
sont pas automatiquement données au moins offrant.  
 
Dans le domaine économique votre mission consistera essentiellement à appuyer de 
votre haute autorité les démarches que votre conseiller commercial sera chargé 
d'effectuer auprès des services helléniques en faveur de nos exportations.  
En octobre 1953, un accord de collaboration économique et technique a été signé 
entre la France et la Grèce aux termes duquel la France s'engageait à donner à la 
Grèce des facilités d'assurance-crédit pour un montant de 5 milliards et demi de francs 
sur sept ans. Ces facilités ont été portées ultérieurement à 6 milliards et demi et à 8 
ans. Elles doivent permettre à l'industrie française de participer à l'équipement 
électrique de la Grèce (change-over et construction de la centrale de Megdova). 
Depuis le départ de M. Markezinis du Ministère de la Coordination, la mise à 
exécution de cet accord semble assez laborieuse. Il conviendra que vous informiez 
très exactement le Département de la passation des commandes afférent à ce 
programme.  
 
2. Action culturelle de la France en Grèce 
Si, par la force des choses, nous ne reprenons que lentement sur le plan économique 
(et aussi politique) la place traditionnelle que nous occupions avant la guerre dans ce 
pays, nous avons largement réussi à la reprendre sur le plan spirituel et nos efforts 
dans le domaine culturel ont abouti à des résultats encourageants :  
 
1. Enseignement 
Notre action culturelle repose essentiellement, en Grèce, sur trois éléments, l'Institut 
Français d'Athènes, le Lycée de la Mission Laïque à Salonique et les Écoles 
Religieuses.  
 
L'Institut Français d'Athènes donne, comme la plupart de nos Instituts, des cours de 
littérature et de civilisation françaises du niveau des classes terminales de 
l'Enseignement Secondaire ou de la préparation à certains certificats de licence, ainsi 
que des cours supérieurs destinés à la formation des professeurs grecs de français 
(« Cours Spécial ») ; il se charge également des cours de langue qui en d'autres pays 
incombent à l'Alliance Française. Il atteint de la sorte une dizaine de milliers d'élèves 
et dispose, grâce aux « Écoles annexes », d'un puissant moyen d'action dans les villes 
de province.  
Le Lycée Français de Salonique s'efforce de jouer en Grèce du Nord un rôle analogue, 
tout en étant un établissement d'enseignement comme ceux de Londres ou de Vienne 
ou ceux qu'administre la Missions Laïque au Proche-Orient. Il donne essentiellement 
des cours de littérature et civilisation françaises.  
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Les Écoles Religieuses sont en fait, depuis une vingtaine d'années, des gymnases 
grecs, préparant à l'Apolytirion grec, mais où le français joue un rôle plus important 
que dans les autres établissements secondaires publics ou privés du territoire 
hellénique.  
L'action de l'Institut Français est considérable, les effectifs du Lycée Français de 
Salonique s'accroissent et ceux des écoles religieuses se maintiennent dans l'ensemble. 
Il est toutefois impossible de se dissimuler que ces divers établissement ne peuvent, à 
eux seuls, maintenir et accroître l'influence française en Grèce ; et qu'il convient d'agir 
de plus en plus dans les établissements du pays, et par l'intermédiaire des 
Administrations helléniques ; telle est depuis trois ans la préoccupation constante de 
l'Ambassade et du Département. Tandis que le Directeur du Lycée Français de 
Salonique, M. Ehret, était nommé titulaire de la chaire de littérature française de 
l'Université voisine et jetait les bases d'un enseignement français méthodique au sein 
de cette Université, des négociations se poursuivaient à Athènes en vue de conférer 
une valeur officielle au diplôme de professeur de français délivré aux élèves du Cours 
Spécial de l'Institut. Ces négociations ont abouti à la fin de l'année 1954 ; en fait ce 
sera l'Université d'Athènes qui formera au sein d'une section spécialisée, les futurs 
professeurs de français, mais avec la collaboration des professeurs de l'Institut et sous 
la direction de deux titulaires de chaire venus des universités françaises.   
Ainsi notre action se trouvera, dans le domaine de l'enseignement, adaptée aux 
conditions nouvelles de la vie universitaire et culturelle hellénique.  
2. Diffusion des moyens d'action culturelle
En ce qui concerne la diffusion de nos moyens d'action culturelle, livres, périodiques, 
films et articles, les résultats ne répondent pas encore à l'effort poursuivi :  
Pour la diffusion commerciale du livre et des périodiques, la Grèce n'arrive 
respectivement qu'au 19ème et 18ème rang des pays importateurs (après l‘Égypte, le 
Liban, les Pays-Bas, la Turquie, l'Espagne et le Portugal) avec 347 quintaux métriques 
de livres français importés en 1954 (contre 408 en 1953). Il y a donc une régression 
marquée qui tient essentiellement au prix de vente trop élevé fixé par les libraires 
locaux. Il n'est pas douteux que si les vendeurs resserraient leurs marges bénéficiaires, 
le volume des ventes en bénéficierait aussitôt.  
En vue de favoriser le plus largement possible la diffusion de nos livres et périodiques 
en Grèce, un effort tout particulier a été fait et sera poursuivi par le Département, qui 
vient d'adresser à l'Institut Français d'Athènes 2000 volumes pour l'ouverture de sa 
bibliothèque de prêts et qui aliment de façon substantielle les bibliothèques du lycée 
français et de l'Ambassade en nouveautés.  
Dans le domaine des expositions, divers projets sont en cours de réalisation ou 
d'étude : l'Exposition du Palais de la Découverte sera présentée par M. Leveille soit à 
la fin du printemps, soit au début de l'automne prochain. Cette exposition sera 
acheminée du Caire et restera plusieurs semaines à Athènes.  
Une exposition photographique sur Anna de Noailles sera également montée au cours 
de l'année par le Département pour répondre à la demande des autorités grecques et 
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notamment de M. Argyropoulos, ancien Ambassadeur de Grèce à Paris et cousin 
germain d'Anna de Noailles.  
Par ailleurs la direction des Relations culturelles étudie le projet d'une exposition des 
« Écrivains et artistes français philhellènes » dont l'organisation a été également 
suggérée par les autorités grecques.  
La place du film français sur le marché grec reste stationnaire malgré les efforts 
déployés par Unifrance Film avec le concours de son délégué local. Le Ministère des 
Affaires étrangères attacherait le plus grand prix à être tenu informé des raisons 
psychologiques et économiques qui semblent freiner la diffusion de la production 
filmée française.  
Enfin il convient de noter que le matériel photographique et informatif (bulletin et 
articles EXTINFOR) adressé par le Département à l'Ambassade pour diffusion dans la 
presse grecque tant à Athènes qu'à Salonique, n'a pas connu jusqu'à ce jour une 
grande faveur auprès de la presse, et qu'un effort tout particulier devra être fait dans 
ce domaine.  
Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères vous serait donc reconnaissant de toutes les 
suggestions que vous pourrez présenter au Département pour intensifier notre action 
sur le plan de la diffusion, et elle s'efforcera de mettre à votre disposition, dans toute 
la mesure du possible, les moyens qui paraîtraient nécessaires pour atteindre ce but.  
Relations politiques 
Sentimentalement et traditionnellement, les relations franco-grecques se reposent sur 
de solides affinités. Vous serez à même de constater à quel point y contribuent la 
bonne situation de la colonie française en Grèce, de la colonie grecque à Paris, et les 
liens noués dans tout le Moyen-Orient entre Grecs et Français émigrés. Une partie de 
l'élite et des milieux politique helléniques est de formation française et ne l'oublie pas.  
Cette atmosphère a été réchauffée encore par le généreux secours accordé par la 
France aux sinistrés des Îles Ioniennes, et surtout par les relations entretenues entre les 
Chefs d‘État. Visites de MM. Georges Bidault et Edgar Faure, excellent accueil 
réservé à Paris au Maréchal Papagos et à M. Markezinis.  
Mais avant tout, la Grèce, qui se relève à peine de l'emprise communiste et qui ressent 
encore celle-ci à sa frontière nord, se sent étroitement solidaire de la défense de 
l'Occident. Pour combattre le péril communiste on compte à Athènes non seulement 
sur les USA et sur la Grande-Bretagne, mais aussi sur la France. S'il n'est pas étonnant 
que le rejet de la CED ait causé un certain malaise à Athènes vis-à-vis de notre pays, 
l'on paraît maintenant rassuré sur notre attitude, et c'est plutôt du côté de la 
République Fédérale que viennent aujourd'hui les inquiétudes. Votre mission s'en 
trouvera facilitée.  
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LA GRÈCE ET LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES 
La Grèce et l'OTAN 
Depuis le 18 février 1952, date de son entrée à l'OTAN, la Grèce considère l'alliance 
atlantique comme le fondement de sa politique étrangère. Elle n'y joue pourtant pas 
un rôle particulièrement important. Une de ses rares initiatives a consisté, en 1955, à 
proposer que la propagande de l'OTAN soit intensifiée et développée dans les pays de 
l'Est. Il faut signaler d'autre part que, lors de la dernière session ministérielle de 
l'OTAN, M. Stephanopoulos, mettant à profit ses fonctions du Président, a proposé 
que la prochaine session ministérielle se réunisse en avril 1955 à Athènes.  
Niveau de forces et effort militaire 
En mars 1953, l'armée grecque compte 145000 hommes d'actifs. En novembre 1954, 
les forces aériennes étaient portées à 156 chasseurs à réaction, 31 avions de transport 
et les appareils d'entraînement.  
En avril 1954, le Gouvernement grec a décidé de réduire de 20 à 25% les effectifs de 
l'armée de terre et d'affecter les crédits ainsi dégagés au perfectionnement de 
l'infrastructure et de la défense anti-aérienne, ainsi qu'à l'instruction des réserves.  
Pour 1955, le Gouvernement grec a prévu la constitution de deux escadrilles 
supplémentaires et d'une division blindée.Toutes ces forces sont soumises au 
commandement OTAN Sud-Europe. Dans l'ensemble, les forces grecques sont de 
valeur inégale. Elles auraient vraisemblablement de grandes difficultés à soutenir le 
choc d'armées modernes, puissamment organisées et équipées.  
L'aide américaine a conduit à donner aux États-Unis en Grèce ainsi que je l'ai indiqué 
ci-dessus, une position prééminente qui a peu à peu supplanté l'influence britannique.
Les principales étapes de ce changement sont les suivantes:
 8 octobre 1953 : Le Gouvernement grec met fin à l'activité de la mission
navale britannique
 12 octobre 1953 : signature d'un accord gréco-américain au sujet des bases
aériennes mises à la disposition des forces américaines, en Crète (rade de la
Sude et aérodrome de La Canée), dans l'île de Leros, à Eleusis. Ces bases
comportent des installations de ravitaillement pour les avions embarqués de la
6ème Flotte américaine.
 Septembre 1954 : la Grèce porte devant l'ONU son différend avec la Grande-
Bretagne au sujet de Chypre.
 Janvier 1955 : le Gouvernement grec nomme Chef d‘État-major des forces
aériennes le Brigadier général Margaritis, de formation américaine, en
éliminant deux lieutenants-généraux ; donc de grade plus élevé, formés par la
RAF.
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Les rapports de la France et de la Grèce au sein de l'OTAN sont cordiaux et confiants. 
Aucune difficulté sérieuse n'a jamais surgi entre les deux pays à propos des problèmes 
atlantiques.  
Sur le plan militaire, les relations entre les deux pays se limitent à l'accueil d'un 
officier grec dans chaque promotion d‘École de Guerre française.  
La Grèce et le Pacte balkanique 
L'alliance atlantique ne peut apporter à la Grèce une garantie complète tant que la 
Yougoslavie reste à l'écart du système. Une défense efficace de la Grèce ne peut être 
assurée en effet qu'avec une couverture de sa frontière du nord-ouest, ce qui n'est 
réalisable que grâce à une étroite collaboration gréco-yougoslave. C'est pourquoi la 
Pacte balkanique est essentiellement fondé, du point de vue stratégique, sur la 
coopération militaire gréco-yougoslave. Dès la signature de l'accord d'amitié 
d'Ankara, le 28 février 1953, la Grèce a considéré cet instrument comme une étape 
vers la constitution d'une alliance militaire à laquelle il fallait s'efforcer d'obtenir 
l'adhésion de l'Italie.  
Bien que le Pacte balkanique de Bled constitue, pour la Grèce, le complément de la 
garantie que lui assure l'OTAN, ce pays a toujours désiré éviter une liaison formelle 
entre les deux organisations, par crainte que l'extension des obligations de l'OTAN ne 
soit désapprouvée par certains de ses partenaires atlantiques.  
La double appartenance de la Grèce au Pacte balkanique et à l'OTAN lui fait souhaiter 
que les engagements qui peuvent découler de ces deux systèmes ne soient pas 
contradictoires. Elle attache donc une grande importance à ce que soit résolu le 
problème de la coordination des plans balkaniques et des plans OTAN, c'est-à-dire, en 
fait des liaisons à établir entre la Yougoslavie et l'OTAN. Le refus du Maréchal Tito 
d'entrer dans l'OTAN ne pouvant faire de doute, le Gouvernement grec désire que 
soient établis, le plus tôt possible, des liens de fait. À ce sujet, le Gouvernement 
d'Athènes estime, en conformité avec le Gouvernement américain, que le but à 
atteindre est la présence permanente d'officiers yougoslaves à l‘État-major du 
Commandement Sud-Europe.  
Néanmoins, le Gouvernement ne dissimule pas que cet objectif est lointain. Il 
éprouve, en particulier, la crainte qu'une demande prématurée, ou trop précise, faite 
au Gouvernement de Belgrade de se lier formellement à l'OTAN, ne provoque une 
réaction anti-occidentale du Maréchal Tito qui risquerait de compromettre toute 
chance d'accord ultérieur.  
Tout ce qui peut renforcer le Pacte balkanique, facteur de stabilité dans la 
Méditerranée orientale, et faciliter après l'affaire de Chypre une réconciliation gréco-
turque, constitue un avantage pour la politique française dans cette partie de la 
Méditerranée.  
__________________ 
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Pour ce qui est de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale, certains milieux grecs ont accueilli 
favorablement la candidature de la Turquie à l'Organisation, et ils ont espéré que la 
Grèce adopterait la même attitude et entraînerait la Yougoslavie. Le Gouvernement 
grec quant à lui est demeuré sur la réserve. Il n'a pas demandé à entrer à l'UEO, et a 
même critiqué l'initiative turque. Pour lui, en effet l'UEO doit rester un groupement 
des intérêts purement occidentaux, de même que le Pacte balkanique groupe les 
intérêts spécifiques du Sud-Est européen.  
 
Enfin, en ce qui concerne la défense du Moyen-Orient, il est possible, si cette défense 
s'organise, que la Grèce demande à y participer. La question s'était posée, en 1952, 
lors des projets d'installation à Chypre d'une Organisation de Défense du Moyen-
Orient. La France avait alors soutenu la revendication grecque. Il n'est pas impossible 
que cette question, actuellement en suspens, se repose à l'avenir.  
_____________________ 
 
Depuis la deuxième partie de l'année 1954, quelques inquiétudes et un malaise assez 
grave se sont glissés dans les relations franco-grecques :  
1. Les liens assez étroits entretenus par la République fédérale allemande avec 
certains hommes d‘État grecs (entre autres M. Markezinis), l'intervention 
économique exceptionnellement active de l'Allemagne dans la vie 
commerciale, financière et industrielle de la Grèce, ont fréquemment attiré 
l'attention du Département, et vous vous efforcerez de noter avec précision les 
développements de cette influence qui, pour n'être pas critiquable, ne saurait 
pourtant pas être ignorée. 
2. Peu après sa visite à Paris au début de 1954, le Maréchal Papagos décidait de 
se rendre en Espagne. Cette rencontre n'eut pas lieu avant le mois d'octobre, le 
Gouvernement espagnol entendait probablement en profiter pour sonder son 
interlocuteur sur l'idée d'un accord méditerranéen qui aurait réuni l'Espagne, la 
Grèce, la Turquie et divers États arabes. En fait ce voyage n'a eu qu'un 
caractère fort modeste et peu spectaculaire ; entre temps, en effet, le 
Gouvernement de Londres inquiet d'une collusion possible de la politique 
espagnole et de la politique grecque dans les affaires de Gibraltar et de 
Chypre, avait adressé au Cabinet d'Athènes des avertissements à vrai dire 
comminatoires.  
 
 Toutefois, il est naturellement impossible de savoir avec certitude ce que les 
deux chefs de gouvernement se sont dits au cours de leur tête à tête. On peut craindre 
une certaine interférence des deux politiques, dont l'éventualité devra retenir votre 
attention, particulièrement en raison de l'évolution de la politique grecque depuis 
l'affaire de Chypre.  
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L'AFFAIRE DE CHYPRE 
Le 20 août 1954, le gouvernement grec demandait au Secrétaire Général des Nations 
Unies l'inscription de la question de Chypre à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale, 
sous le titre « application à l'égard de la population de l'île de Chypre, sous les 
auspices des Nations Unies, du principe de l'égalité de droitsdes peuples et de leur 
droit à disposer d'eux-mêmes ». 
 
Cette démarche, dont nous redoutions les conséquences, non seulement parce qu'elle 
portait devant les Nations Unies un différend entre deux puissances alliées au sein de 
l'Organisation des Traités de l'Atlantique nord, mais encore parce qu'une fois de plus, 
elle allait livrer à la démagogie de l'Assemblée une question d'ordre « colonial » dont 
les développements et la solution risquaient d'avoir leurs répercussions sur les 
problèmes du Maroc et de la Tunisie et sur ceux des territoires non autonomes en 
général, a été faite dans des circonstances sur lesquelles vous trouverez toutes les 
indications de nature à vous intéresser dans les archives du poste.  
 
De même, les correspondances échangées avec le Département, New York, Londres 
et Ankara sur le sujet ont été régulièrement communiquées à Athènes, ainsi que les 
documents des Nations Unies concernant, dans ses aspects techniques, l'affaire qui 
s'est terminée, vous le savez, par une motion d'ajournement adoptée le 17 décembre 
par 50 vois contre 0 (avec l'abstention de l'Australie, du Chili, de l'Union sud-
africaine et des 5 pays soviétiques). Vous pourrez utilement vous reporter à ces 
communications pour connaître dans leur détail les développements de la question.  
 
Il importe seulement, ici, de souligner les incidences qu'elle pourrait avoir sur les 
relations franco-grecques, si, dans l'avenir, la délégation de la Grèce à l'Assemblée 
devait persister dans l'attitude adoptée à la dernière session par M. Kyrou, qui, déçu 
par la tournure prise dès l'origine par la question de Chypre, s'est laissé aller à une 
surenchère telle qu'il a dépassé dans la passion anti-colonialiste les représentants 
arabo-asiatiques traditionnellement les plus virulents ; il a été jusqu'à faire des 
déclarations directement dirigées contre les intérêts français dans des termes fort 
désobligeants.  
 
La Grande-Bretagne avait décidé de dénier la compétence de l'Assemblée en 
s'appuyant sur l'article 2, paragraphe 7 de la Charte qui interdit aux Nations Unies 
d'intervenir dans les affaires « qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale 
d'un État ». Si la question était néanmoins inscrite, sa délégation devait s'abstenir de 
participer aux débats. Cette position était identique à celle que nous avions adoptée 
dans les questions tunisienne et marocaine. Dans ces affaires d'ailleurs, le délégué 
britannique nous avait apporté le concours le plus précieux, alors qu'au contraire, 
l'attitude de la délégation grecque procédant essentiellement du souci de ménager les 
Arabes, nous était devenue, d'année en année, plus défavorable. Ces raisons auraient à 
elles seules suffi pour nous déterminer à donner notre appui à la Grande-Bretagne. Il 
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s'y ajoutait, à nos yeux d'alliés, les motifs d'ordre stratégique que l'Angleterre à de 
tenir au maintien de sa souveraineté à Chypre, à l'heure où elle retirerait ses troupes et 
garnison le long du canal de Suez. Enfin, la Turquie avait fait savoir qu'elle était 
absolument opposée à une modification du statut de l'île.  
Nous avions informé les Grecs de la position que nous serions inévitablement amenés 
à adopter, et nous leur avions exprimé l'espoir qu'ils comprendraient nos raisons, 
comme nous avions nous-mêmes cherché à comprendre tout en les regrettant les 
motifs qui dictaient leur conduite dans les affaires marocaine et tunisienne. Nous 
pensions que, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la divergence des vues dans ces 
problèmes particuliers n'altérerait pas les bonnes relations qui existent entre les deux 
pays. Nous avons, dans ces conditions, été surpris de la violence des réactions de M. 
Kyrou à la suite des votes négatifs émis par la France aux côtés du Royaume-Uni dans 
le scrutin relatif à l'inscription de la question à l'ordre du jour.  
M. Kyrou – sans qu'il ait été véritablement établi s'il s'agissait de son propre gré ou
sur instruction, encore que son départ du poste de directeur politique peu après son
retour en Grèce permette d'incliner pour la première hypothèse – s'est associé pour
embarrasser les puissances administrant des territoires non autonomes, et en premier
lieu la France et l'Angleterre, aux projets qui nous étaient les plus défavorables, et a
prononcé le discours qualifié par notre représentant permanent au Conseil de Tutelle,
de « discours le plus agressif de toute la session ».
Il est difficile de prévoir dès maintenant si la Grèce, après l'échec de l'année dernière, 
s'obstinera à vouloir faire discuter par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies la 
question de Chypre. Il est vraisemblable que cette détermination dépendra du 
gouvernement qui sera au pouvoir l'automne 1955. Il est évidemment souhaitable, de 
notre point de vue, que la Grèce s'abstienne de persévérer, et c'est naturellement le 
sens que vous devrez donner aux conversations que vous serez amené à avoir sur ce 
sujet. Vous pourrez faire valoir qu'une certaine lassitude paraît se manifester au sein 
de l'Assemblée devant ce genre de questions, comme l'ont montré les ajournements 
qu'elle a décidés aussi bien en ce qui concerne le Maroc et la Tunisie ou sans doute 
elle a tenu compte des pourparlers en cours, que dans la question de Chypre elle-
même et dans celle de la Nouvelle-Guinée, pourtant nouvellement inscrites à son 
ordre du jour.  
Si la Grèce devait néanmoins s'obstiner, il conviendrait en tout cas, de lui faire 
comprendre que son attitude dans les questions dites coloniales est peu compatible 
avec son appartenance au Pacte atlantique et avec sa position naturelle de puissance 
méditerranéenne de civilisation occidentale. Que la Grèce, obligée de ménager 
certains intérêts qui lui sont propres, ne puisse nous soutenir ouvertement, nous 
pouvons nous l'expliquer ; ce que nous ne pouvons pas admettre, c'est le véritable 
chantage que sa délégation a cru habile d'exercer dans le domaine des territoires non 
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autonomes. Une telle attitude ne pourrait manquer de finir par peser sur les rapports 
généraux entre les deux pays.  
Ce serait d'autant plus regrettable que tout nous conduit à entretenir avec la Grèce des 
relations de confiance et d'amitié.   
_________________________________ 
MAE, Grèce, 1949-1955, 115 
Note de la Direction générale politique, au sujet : Rapports franco-grecs 
1er décembre 1955 
Quel que soit son désir d'apaisement, le gouvernement Karamanlis se trouve dans 
l'incapacité d'agir sur une opinion publique qui, encouragée par le précédent 
gouvernement du Maréchal Papagos, a fait de la question de Chypre le facteur 
dominant de la politique grecque. Au risque de compromettre les liens qui l'unissent 
aux puissances occidentales, la Grèce n'a pas hésité à rejoindre le camp afro-asiatique 
et, pour bénéficier de l'appui de celui-ci, à se poser en accusatrice de la France lorsque 
le problème de l'avenir de nos territoires d'Afrique du Nord a été évoqué devant les 
Nations Unies.  
L'attitude adoptée à New York par les puissances communistes, qui avec le bloc 
musulman soutiennent paradoxalement les thèses de la guerre anti-communiste et 
chrétienne, a valu à l'Union soviétique un renouveau de crédit. L'opposition grecque 
ne manque pas, en effet, de chercher querelle au Gouvernement partout où cela est 
possible et notamment sur la politique étrangère, en raison de l'aspect passionnel de 
cette politique. Le résultat se traduit par un renforcement du clan neutraliste et il n'est 
pas exclu que les élections d'avril prochain ne portent au pouvoir des hommes 
favorables à une politique d'amitié « égale pour l'Est et pour l'Ouest ».  
En présence de cette menace que soulignent les avances faites par les pays satellites 
pour renouer avec la Grèce, l'Occident ne peut rester passif. Sans doute la Grèce n'est-
elle qu'un maillon de la chaîne de défense de l'OTAN, mais du jour où elle aura quitté 
le camp des Nations libres pour lier son sort à un axe neutraliste allant du Danube à 
l‘Égypte, la position stratégique des puissances atlantiques en Méditerranée serait 
sérieusement compromise.  
Il appartient donc aux Occidentaux de tenter de reprendre le contrôle de l'opinion 
hellénique. Si les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni en ont les moyens, les premiers, en 
accroissant le montant de leur aide, tant économique que militaire, le second en 
tentant un ultime effort à propos de Chypre, il apparaît singulièrement plus difficile 
d'améliorer notre position aussi longtemps que les problèmes d'Afrique du Nord 
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resteront en suspens. Tout au plus pourrions-nous témoigner à la Grèce des 
prévenances auxquelles elle se montrerait sensible. Encore ce champ d'action se 
trouverait-il limité du fait de la détérioration progressive de nos positions 
économiques depuis que l'Allemagne s'impose de nouveau sur le marché grec.  
En revanche, il peut nous appartenir d'utiliser le cadre des institutions atlantiques et 
européennes existantes pour tenter de ramener la Grèce à une plus juste 
compréhension de ce que doit être la solidarité occidentale. Le caractère transitoire du 
Gouvernement grec actuel n'est pas pour faciliter ces efforts qui, au demeurant, ne 
paraissent pouvoir aboutir que s'ils reçoivent l'appui de nos alliés anglo-saxons.   
________________________________ 
MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1961-1970, 252 
Télégramme 700-713, Charbonnières (Athènes) 
23 mai 1963 
Avant de vous rendre compte des impressions laissées ici parla visite officielle du 
Président de la République, j'ai jugé préférable d'attendre quelques jours afin de 
pouvoir recueillir directement ou indirectement un aussi grand nombre d'indications 
que possible en provenance des milieux les plus divers, je crois être en mesure de 
vous communiquer aujourd'hui un certain nombre de conclusions.  
Comme le général de Gaulle, Votre Excellence, et tous les membres de leur suite ont 
pu le constater au jour le jour, la visite a constitué un très grand succès. Cela avait été 
prévu depuis qu'il en avait été question et je n'avais pas moi-même cessé de 
l'annoncer. Quelques précisions ne s'en imposent pas moins.  
On s'attendait généralement à un très grand élan populaire provoqué à la fois par les 
sentiments d'amitié que la France inspire dans l'ensemble de ce pays et par la 
prestigieuse personnalité du Chef de l‘État. Cet élan s'est bien produit, encore qu'il ait 
été à Athènes même et surtout le premier jour freiné par les extraordinaires mesures 
policières prises par les autorités helléniques en vue d'assurer la sécurité du Président. 
On a délibérément cherché à empêcher la foule à l'exception des enfants des écoles – 
de se masser sur le parcours, des policiers en uniforme et en civil obligeant les 
badauds à « circuler ». Chacun a pu constater qu'à Salonique où les précautions 
policières avaient été bien moindres, l'accueil de la population a été plus libre et, de ce 
fait, plus chaleureux.  
Ce n'est donc pas sur ce plan que la réussite de la visite s'est manifestée au delà de 
toutes les prévisions. C'est auprès de tous ceux qui ont eu la possibilité d'approcher le 
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général de Gaulle, de causer avec lui, d'entendre ses allocutions, etc... Ceux-là ont 
tous été conquis.  
Si toutes les pensées de la famille royale ont été, depuis dimanche matin, accaparées 
par la maladie du souverain, j'avais déjà pu noter chez certains de ses membres 
pendant la visite et j'ai eu l'occasion de vérifier depuis lors auprès des hauts 
fonctionnaires de la Cour que le Président et Mme de Gaulle avaient vivement séduit 
leurs hôtes. Ce n'est pas en effet sans une certaine timidité que le Roi et même la 
Reine attendaient le général. Son affabilité, sa bonne grâce, ainsi que le charme de 
Mme de Gaulle les ont d'emblée mis à leur aise et tous les contacts avec eux se sont 
révélés de bout en bout aussi faciles qu'agréables.  
Je crois devoir mentionner ici l'impression extrêmement vive qu'a produite la 
réception des chefs de missions diplomatiques par le Président. La bienveillance avec 
laquelle il s'est adressé à chacun, son art à trouver les sujets et les mots appropriés au 
représentant de chaque pays ont d'autant plus frappé les assistants qu'il s'agissait de 
quelque chose de tout à fait inhabituel, les chefs d‘États venus ici en dernier lieu 
s'étant bornés à de muettes poignées de mains. Cela s'étant immédiatement colporté, 
une excellente atmosphère a ainsi été créée et, lors de toutes les réceptions suivantes, 
on a cherché à approcher le général afin de recueillir quelques paroles de lui.  
Dans les milieux dirigeants et plus spécialement au sein du gouvernement il y a eu 
lieu, me semble-t-il, de noter deux points :  
Tout d'abord le même effet que celui que je viens de signaler, c'est-à-dire la séduction 
exercée par le Président de la République auprès de tous et l'extrême admiration 
suscitée par lui. Que ce soit lors de courtes conversations avec tel ou tel ou par les 
allocutions qu'il a prononcées publiquement, le général de Gaulle est apparu à tout ce 
monde comme une personnalité encore plus remarquable et plus forte qu'on ne 
l'imaginait. Il est absolument certain que son prestige a été encore très 
considérablement accru par sa visite.  
En second lieu le contenu des discours présidentiels a provoqué la plus grande 
satisfaction. En exaltant ce que la civilisation occidentale doit à la Grèce antique, le 
courage déployé en toutes circonstances par les forces armées helléniques, les progrès 
accomplis dans le domaine économique par ce pays, tout cela étant dit à l'aide de 
formules nouvelles et frappantes, le général de Gaulle a su faire plaisir à tous. Les 
tenants du gouvernement ont été heureux d'autre part de relever dans ses discours des 
éloges pour l‘œuvre réalisé par M. Caramanlis mais ses éloges ont été exprimés de 
telle sorte qu'ils n'ont pas froissé l'opposition. Il est de fait, en tout cas, que, sauf le 
quotidien communiste « Avghi » aucun journal n'a trouvé quoi que ce soit à redire aux 
diverses déclarations du Président de la République et que, comme j'en rends compte 
ailleurs, la presse a été unanime dans ses louanges et se approbations.  
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Ce qui, dans les discours du général, a non seulement satisfait mais on pourrait même 
dire soulagé les milieux dirigeants est que ceux-ci n'y ont pas trouvé un mot pouvant 
les placer en posture délicate vis-à-vis d'un quelconque des alliés, voire des amis de la 
Grèce. Certains craignaient que le Président de la République ne manifestât quelque 
tiédeur envers l'alliance atlantique ou n'exprimât à l'égard de tel ou tel sujet 
controversé d'actualité des vues contraires à celles d'autres gouvernements avec 
lesquels la Grèce entend entretenir de bons rapports ou encore définît, par exemple, à 
l'intention des puissances méditerranéennes, une politique de nature à susciter des 
inquiétudes. Que les rumeurs que l'on avait fait circuler à ce sujet se soient révélées 
fausses et que le général de Gaulle ait au contraire pris des positions en tous points 
conformes à celles de la Grèce elle-même, a littéralement ravi les membres du 
gouvernement et les hauts fonctionnaires de ce pays.  
Peut-être existe-t-il chez certains d'entre eux quelque déception de ce que les bruits 
qui avaient couru d'une importante aide financière à la Grèce n'aient pas trouvé, à 
l'occasion de la visite, leur confirmation. Mais ils se consolent en se disant qu'il n'est 
pas d'usage que pareille question soit réglée entre chefs d‘États et en espérant que 
l'octroi d'une telle aide constituera d'ici peu l'une des concrétisations du succès de la 
visite. 
Que ce soit, par conséquent, auprès de la famille royale, auprès des milieux politiques 
ou auprès du grand public, cette visite, qui a été sans doute la plus remarquable de 
toutes celles qui se sont produites ici depuis la guerre, a à la fois encore grandi le 
personnage déjà presque légendaire du général de Gaulle et puissamment servi la 
cause française dans ce pays. La position de la France qui s'était beaucoup améliorée 
au cours des dernières années est maintenant aussi bonne que possible et il y aurait 
lieu, selon moi, d'en profiter sans tarder pour asseoir plus solidement notre influence 
aussi bien dans le domaine économique que dans le domaine culturel. 
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ASMAE,  Telespresso N. 729/286, (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri)  
Oggeto: Inglesi e americani in Grecia 
Atene, 1° maggio 1947 
Il 29 Aprile è tornato ad Atene l‘Ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti, MacVeagh. 
Ha avuto un‘accoglienza trionfale, quale si conviene al personaggio più influente 
della Grecia. Già ieri si è incontrato in un primo lungo colloquio con Tsaldaris, a 
seguito del quale è stato diramato un comunicato che constata ―completa identità di 
vedute‖ sulle seguenti questioni: a) assistenza economica in luogo e vece del soccorso 
sinora fornito dall‘UNRRA; b) aiuto immediato; c) necessità future. 
Mancano sinora altri particolari. E in realtà si ha l‘impressione che, se non il 
piano generale, l‘esecuzione pratica dell‘azione americana in Grecia si trovi ancora in 
una fase di studio e di preparazione. La relazione Porter, che è stata pubblicata in 
questi giorni in America e riportata con grande rilievo, ma in breve sunto, dalla 
stampa di Atene, fornisce qualche indicazione interessante soprattutto per quanto 
riguarda la parte finanziaria. Si terrà presente a questo proposito che il messaggio 
Truman ha preceduto, non seguito, le conclusioni di Porter; e che perciò non è il 
rapporto di questo che ha ispirato il messaggio del Presidente (come sarebbe stato 
logico se l‘iniziativa americana fosse stata motivata da considerazioni puramente 
tecniche), bensì l‘inverso. Ragione di più per ritenere che la relazione Porter, oltre a 
tener conto degli umori prevalenti nel Congresso, rispecchi le intenzioni reali e attuali 
del Governo Americano. 
Ciò premesso, ne riassumo i punti principali: 1) il Governo Americano 
dovrebbe fornire alla Grecia i mezzi necessari per supplire alle spese militari, alle 
necessità correnti, e a quelle della ricostruzione, sino al 30 giugno 1948. L‘importo 
che si suggerisce è di 300 milioni di dollari, cifra che coincide naturalmente, a 
posteriori, con quella indicata da Truman nel suo messaggio. 
2) se si vuol assicurare il futuro della Grecia, occorre però anche un programma a
lunga scadenza. Si propone un piano quinquennale, il cui costo viene stimato in 335
milioni di dollari. Di questa somma, afferma Porter con molto ottimismo, soltanto 148
milioni dovrebbero essere forniti dall‘estero; ma osserva anche che condizione
indispensabile del successo di questo piano, sarebbe la ―tranquillità interna e un
Governo greco più stabile e più efficiente‖.
3) una piccola missione americana, composta di non più che 50 persone e guidata da
un unico capo, dovrebbe controllare, con poteri ampissimi, l‘impiego dei fondi.
Inoltre esperti stranieri dovrebbero essere collocati nelle posizioni chiave
dell‘amministrazione greca perchè, osserva giustamente Porter, un funzionario greco
si troverebbe in molti casi nell‘impossibilità di resistere alle pressioni locali
nell‘adempimento dei doveri prescrittigli dal programma di ricostruzione. La missione
avrebbe il potere di interrompere l‘elargizione dei fondi non solo in generale, ma
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anche per ogni singolo capitolo di spesa qualora, a suo giudizio, questo o quell‘ufficio 
greco si mostrasse riluttante a eseguire le istruzioni ricevute. 
4) si suggeriscono inoltre molte riforme, tutte necessarie, indubbiamente, ma una più
difficile dell‘altra ad attuarsi: compressione delle spese militari, forti riduzioni negli
organici della burocrazia, aumento del 50% nelle imposte sugli importatori e i
commercianti.
5) un invito alla collaborazione viene rivolto ―a quegli elementi politici di opposizione
interessati a mantenere l‘indipendenza del Paese‖. Questo accenno, assieme ad altri
indizi che erano stati notati negli ultimi tempi, ha rafforzato la convinzione generale
che i liberali di Sofulis, l‘unico partito rappresentato in Parlamento che sia sinora
rimasto fuori dal Governo, entreranno, in una forma o nell‘altra, nella composizione
ministeriale. Il cerchio verrebbe così chiuso, e si potrebbe presentare all‘opinione
pubblica internazionale un fronte politico greco compatto e chiuso soltanto ai
comunisti.
E‘ evidente che la missione economica inglese che sinora ha guidato, con 
buone intenzioni ma con mezzi insufficienti, l‘economia greca, sarà completamente e 
in breve tempo sostituita dagli americani. Alcuni dei suoi componenti sono già partiti 
e gli uffici si preparano a smobilitare. Per quanto riguarda la missione militare 
britannica, che contava circa 1.000 persone, si è detto in un primo tempo che avrebbe 
continuato ad occuparsi dell‘istruzione delle truppe, mentre la nuova missione 
americana si sarebbe limitata a fornire l‘armamento e sorvegliarne la distribuzione. 
Ma successivamente è stato annunciato che la missione inglese verrà ridotta 
progressivamente ad un piccolo gruppo di circa 40 ufficiali. 
Le prospettive si presentavano più liete per la missione navale inglese. Si è 
ritenuto infatti che i legami tradizionali tra le due marine, il fatto che quasi tutti i 
bastimenti da guerra greci sono stati costruiti in Inghilterra e dipendono perciò dai 
cantieri e arsenali inglesi per i pezzi di ricambio e per le munizioni, avrebbe reso 
indispensabile la permanenza della missione. E, dal lato puramente tecnico e 
operativo, ciò può essere anche esatto. Ma si tratterebbe in ogni caso di compiti 
limitati all‘addestramento degli equipaggi e alla manutezione delle navi. La parte 
direttiva passa rapidamente in mani americane. Si conferma anzi il giudizio espresso 
nel rapposto no 502/218 del 5 aprile. L‘interesse americano in Grecia è 
prevalentemente aereo-navale. Non è stata ancora costituita una vera e propria 
missione, e quella inglese mantiene apparentemente intatte tutte le sue prerogative. 
Ma come addetto navale americano è stato già destinato ad Atene il Contrammiraglio 
Snackenberg, uno specialista di problemi aero-navali. E‘ accompagnato da ufficiali 
superiori che hanno la qualifica di addetti navali aggiunti, e alcuni dei quali 
provengono dal Supply Corps e dai Marines; due specialità che non figurano 
normalmente nell‘ufficio di un Addetto Navale, ma che sono invece indispensabili 
qualora si vogliono prendere in esame problemi di basi navali. Infine anche la 
missione di polizia inglese, si annuncia, non resterà in Grecia oltre la fine dell‘anno in 
corso. 
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 Il processo di sostituzione dell‘influenza americana a quella inglese è dunque 
generale e inarrestabile, come già avevo previsto sin dal 15 marzo col mio rapporto no 
321/157. E‘ naturale che non si svolga senza frizioni, contrasti, tentativi di resistenza. 
A un ricevimento offerto dall‘Ambasciata d‘America, alla fine di marzo scorso, a 
tutto il Governo e il Corpo diplomatico, e che per l‘autorità e magnificenza degli 
anfitrioni, l‘affluenza e l‘ossequio degli ospiti indigeni, poteva ben paragonarsi al 
ricevimento di un Proconsole Romano in qualche provincia del Medio Oriente nel 1° 
Secolo d. C., tutta l‘Ambasciata Inglese, al completo, si è fatta notare per la sua 
assenza. Ma, a parte queste manifestazioni di risentimento personale che non debbono 
essere valutate oltre il segno del modesto pettegolezzo, si notano da parte inglese 
tentativi di affermare le vecchie posizioni in Grecia. 
 Se ne è avuto un curioso esempio in occasione della festa del 1° maggio. 
Come ho riferito a suo tempo, gli inglesi si erano giustamente preoccupati dello stato 
caotico ed illegale nel quale si trovano i sindacati operai di questo Paese; e a mezzo 
dell‘Addetto del Lavoro inglese a Roma avevano concluso con il Governo (che allora 
era presieduto da Tsaldaris) un compromesso che porta appunto il nome di accordo 
Braine-Tsaldaris. Il Governo greco ha trovato poi il modo di non rispettare gli 
impegni assunti, o quanto meno di ritardarne l‘esecuzione; e in occasione del 1° 
maggio era giunto sino a proibire, non solo ogni manifestazione, ma anche la 
sospensione del lavoro – una misura che aveva profondamente irritato sinanco le 
organizzazioni operaie di destra. L‘Ambasciata d‘Inghilterra è intervenuta all‘ultimo 
momento con molta energia, e ha imposto al Governo di ritirare la sua decisione. Il 1° 
maggio è stato perciò festeggiato regolarmente. 
Ma, nonostante questi tentativi sporadici, l‘usura, se non la liquidazione, delle 
posizioni inglesi in un Paese ove il prestigio e il denaro contano sovra ogli altra cosa, 
procede rapida e fatale. 
 
Gastone Guidotti 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
ASMAE, Telespresso N. 33294, (Ministero degli Affari Esteri - Ambasciata 
d’Italia)  
 
Oggetto: Situazione interna in Grecia 
Roma, 4 Ottobre 1948 
 
 Si trascrive qui appresso, quanto ha riferito la Missione italiana in Atene, in 
data 13 settembre u.s., sull‘argomento in oggetto: 
 ―Premesso che in Grecia, più ancora che altrove, la situazione politica interna 
è in funzione di quella internazionale, mi propongo di esaminare brevemente l‘una e 
l‘altra in relazione agli avvenimenti che si maturano in Macedonia. In questa regione, 
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fatale alla pace dei Balcani, si concentra attualmente una lotta il cui esito, in ultima 
analisi, potrebbe decidere ugualmente del regime interno della Grecia e della sua 
posizione come Stato nell‘ordine delle Potenze. 
Poiché la lotta si svolge, per ora e sinora, in quella forma moderna e ambigua 
che viene chiamata ―guerra dei nervi‖, chi si ponga a tale esame deve anzitutto 
sceverare i fatti dalle voci sparse ad arte. Le ultime settimane sono state 
particolarmente fertili in fantastiche dicerie. E‘ stato affermato ad esempio che la 
settimana scorsa fosse imminente un colpo di mano: le bande comuniste dell‘ELAS, e 
dietro ad esse gli jugoslavi (e nell‘ombra la Russia) stavano per scendere dalle 
montagne, varcare le frontiere, occupare il porto e la città di Salonicco, e assicurare 
così al maggiore interessato quello sbocco all‘Egeo che è la posta finale di tutta la 
partita. Le Potenze occidentali, informate della minaccia, avrebbero fatto pervenire un 
chiaro avvertimento alla Russia, e per renderlo ancora più persuasivo lo avrebbero 
sottolineato con le note dimostrazioni navali; squadra americana con la grande 
portaerei ―Franklin Roosvelt‖, annunciata visita della flotta inglese del Mediterraneo. 
Dopo ripetute e discrete indagini credo di poter affermare con quasi assoluta 
certezza che la voce era falsa, una delle molte che nascono con tanta facilità al bar del 
Grande Bretagne. Resta naturalmente, in tutta la sua massiccia portata, il fatto della 
dimostrazione navale: una chiara e diretta indicazione delle forze che si affrontano 
ancora latenti in questo settore. 
Nella stessa categoria di fantasmi deve porsi la voce dei razzi, o proiettili 
volanti, che sarebbero stati scorti nel cielo macedone, una voce di cui si è fatto 
autorevole ma incauto propagatore lo stesso Tsaldaris a Parigi. Poiché a un certo 
momento si invocava la testimonianza dei comandi inglesi, è giunta da questi una 
recisa smentita. Nella più onesta delle ipotesi si può ammettere che i segnali luminosi 
che usano scambiarsi le numerose bande annidate della regione dell‘Olimpo siano 
stati presi per proiettili a razzo. 
Ma non tutto ciò che avviene in Macedonia può essere qualificato fantasia o 
menzogna. Gli animi e le forze in contrasto vi sono da lungo tempo in fermento; nelle 
ultime settimane la tensione è degenerata in crisi, e la crisi minaccia ora di tradursi in 
conflitto aperto. Per intendere la precisa natura e i termini di quanto avviene occorre 
riassumere brevemente i precedenti. La rivolta comunista del dicembre 1944, 
soffocata con la forza nelle grandi città e nei centri abitati, si è trasformata nelle 
campagne in guerra civile permanente. Soprattutto nel Nord, ove la scarsità di 
comunicazioni, la natura spesso impervia del terreno circostante e, sovra ogni altra 
cosa, la prossimità delle frontiere mal guardate con la Jugoslavia, hanno favorito la 
formazione e l‘attività di grosse bande comuniste. Che queste ricevano aiuti e soccorsi 
di ogni genere dalle formazioni militari jugoslave ammassate lungo la frontiera non è 
posto seriamente in dubbio da nessuno. A provarlo, del resto, basterebbe non soltanto 
l‘ampiezza dei mezzi militari di cui dispongono le bande, ma anche e soprattutto 
l‘obbiettivo cui mira la loro attività, la coincidenza di questa attività con programmi 
apertamente sostenuti oltre frontiera. E‘ facile indicare i punti più salienti di queste 
analogie. Mentre a Parigi e innanzi al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell‘UNO l‘attuale 
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regime greco viene definito come illegale, nato da elezioni fatte con la violenza, 
confermato da un plebiscito popolare viziato dal terrore, mentre queste accuse 
vengono sottolineate ―in loco‖ con il ritiro del Ministro di Jugoslavia ad Atene e la 
―partenza‖ dell‘Ambasciatore di Russia, l‘EAM che non disconosce l‘affiliazione con 
le bande dei ―patrioti‖ e ―democratici‖ operanti nel Nord, ripete le stesse accuse 
all‘interno del Paese, sulla stampa sua, e le formula anche pubblicamente con indirizzi 
e proteste rivolte ai ―popoli e governi‖ delle grandi potenze. Infine l‘EAM fa risalire 
all‘atteggiamento ―violentemente antirusso‖ del Governo greco la responsabilità di 
quanto avviene in Macedonia; e dichiara che un governo veramente democratico, cioé 
di fatto controllato dall‘EAM, non avrebbe nessuna difficoltà ad intendersi e 
accordarsi amichevolmente con gli Stati democratici vicini. Non precisa tuttavia in 
che modo e a quali condizioni. 
Si noti che nel riferire obbiettivamente questi dati di fatto non si vuole 
esprimere un giudizio, morale o politico, sul merito di essi. La tesi principale 
sostenuta dall‘EAM, che cioé è antinazionale e antistorico per la Grecia di seguire, 
unico stato balcanico, una politica antirussa, e che questa politica potrebbe un giorno 
degenerare in disastro, è un argomento solido che viene presentato e sviluppato con 
molta tenacia e abilità. Qui preme rilevare soltanto l‘identità di condotta e di metodo 
tra la politica del gruppo di Potenze slave e quella dell‘EAM. 
Ciò che, semmai, può sorprendere l‘osservatore straniero, ma è d‘altra parte la 
conseguenza naturale di molte circostanze locali concomitanti, è che l‘EAM, e i partiti 
che la compongono abbiano osato mettersi in così aperto contrasto con la politica 
ufficiale dello Stato, e abbiano potuto a lungo mantenersi legalmente in tale posizione. 
Mentre in tutti gli Stati i partiti di estrema sinistra hanno preferito seguire, nelle 
questioni che riguardano il territorio nazionale e l‘interesse generale del Paese, una 
linea comune a quella degli altri grandi partiti, l‘EAM, in Grecia, ha potuto sinora 
sostenere apertamente una linea diametralmente opposta. Ciò è dovuto 
principalmente: all‘influenza inglese che per molto tempo ha creduto alla possibilità 
di una conciliazione delle fazioni; al desiderio greco di non sfidare la Russia; infine 
nel peculiare carattere costituzionale del regime che, nato da un incerto e contestato 
mandato, è vissuto per mesi nell‘attesa della convalida popolare del referendum 
indetto per il 1° settembre. 
Comunque sia, gli avvenimenti hanno preso ora una nuova e più decisa piega. 
Le bande dell‘EAM hanno ricorso improvvisamente ad una nuova tattica: quella di 
minare le strade che portano dal sud al nord, in modo particolare l‘arteria vitale di 
Larissa. Non è chi non veda la gravità della minaccia. Nell‘ultimo mese 25 persone, 
agenti di UNRRA, gendarmi greci, conducenti militari inglesi, sono stati uccisi, e i 
loro veicoli sono saltati in aria. Mi è stato assicurato che, in pratica, le comunicazioni 
terrestri dal Nord al Sud sono cessate. Le formazioni militari greche e inglesi che 
presidiano la Macedonia, una regione – si badi – apertamente minacciata, possono 
essere rifornite unicamente per via marittima ed aerea. Se si pensa che il porto di 
Salonicco sarebbe certamente il primo, e non difficilmente raggiungibile, obbiettivo di 
un‘azione diretta contro la Macedonia (sia in forma di offensiva nemica, sia nella nota 
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versione larvata di moto interno del tipo Azerbaigian), il carattere e la portata della 
nuova tattica dell‘EAM appaiono chiare. Qui essa viene generalmente interpretata, 
non solo come il tentativo attuale di isolare strategicamente una regione contesa, o 
quanto meno anemizzarne le forze di difesa, ma anche come la prova generale di 
quanto potrebbe essere fatto in caso di conflitto aperto. E si noti bene: tentativo e 
prova generale sono in funzione di un attacco che, in forma larvata od aperta, 
dovrebbe venire sferrato dall‘esterno contro una parte integrante del territorio 
nazionale. 
E‘ chiaro che nessun governo al potere, qualunque sia il suo titolo per esservi, 
potrebbe a lungo tollerare un simile stato di cose. Potrebbe cioé tollerare che un 
raggruppamento politico, legalmente riconosciuto e funzionante, continui ad 
appoggiare una simile azione. D‘altra parte, i vari motivi e circostanze che si citavano 
più sopra, e che sinora hanno permesso il sussistere di tale anomalia, hanno cessato di 
operare, o la loro forza si è attenuata: le speranze inglesi di una riconciliazione sono 
svanite, l‘antagonismo con la Russia si è fatto aperto e irrimediabile, il regime si sente 
forte della convalida popolare ottenuta il 1° Settembre. 
E di fatto il Governo è passato risolutamente alla controffensiva. Non solo 
sono stati ristabiliti i tribunali militari, con poteri eccezionali e vastissimi, la cui 
competenza era stata temporaneamente sospesa nell‘imminenza del plebiscito; ma la 
loro funzione, che prima era limitata alle regioni del Nord, è stata ora estesa a tutto il 
Paese. Si annunciano ora misure assai più gravi e più radicali. Si parla già 
apertamente dello scioglimento dell‘EAM, e del partito comunista che ne costituisce il 
nerbo, e dell‘arresto dei suoi capi. E‘ evidente che il Governo giudica il momento 
favorevole per sfruttare gli errori e le intemperanze degli avversari e disfarsi di essi. 
Al raggiungimento di questo scopo tutti i mezzi sono buoni, anche i colpi di 
mano e i proiettili volanti. Resta da vedere se il Governo greco oserà giungere sino 
alla soppressione del partito comunista, una misura che nessun Governo europeo del 
dopoguerra ha sinora sognato di prendere. Resta soprattutto da vedere se le Potenze 
occidentali, che, volenti o nolenti, sono venute a trovarsi nella posizione di avallanti 
dell‘attuale regime greco, vorranno incoraggiarlo nel suo stato di presente euforia‖. 
__________________________________ 
ASMAE, Telespresso 2224/748, (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri)  
Oggetto: Operazioni GRAMMOS 
Atene, addì 16 Agosto 1948 
Con il prossimo felice concludersi della battaglia pel Grammos sta per calare il 
sipario sulla fase unicamente militare della ribellione politica. Ma non per questo 
l‘azione militare è chiusa e conclusa e sotto un diverso aspetto s‘inizia ora la necessità 
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d‘una serie di operazioni complementari – sempre di carattere militare – sulle quali mi 
propongo gettare un po‘ di luce. 
Il Presidente del Consiglio, rientrando dal Fronte (mentre sull‘uscio dell‘Aula 
delle sedute veniva da Lui fatto affiggere l‘inaspettato ordine di chiusura del 
Parlamento greco), ha detto chiaramente che la battaglia del Grammos è virtualmente 
vinta e che la sua preoccupazione maggiore consiste ora nel predisporre il 
rastrellamento dei ribelli che infestano il Peloponneso. 
Come da me previsto (mio telespresso n. 2084/690 del 3 agosto 1948), le forze 
nazionali ammontanti a circa otto Divisioni raggrupate in due Corpi d‘Armata, partite 
dai due versanti della dorsale Grammos – Smolika, subito dopo la definitiva conquista 
dello Smolika, hanno operato la loro giunzione alla fine dello scorso mese di luglio. 
Costituito così l‘agognato fronte unico, lo sforzo principale dell‘esercito 
ellenico è stato – come si prevedeva – subito diretto sulle due ali estreme dello 
schieramento. 
L‘ala sinistra, raggiunto il confine albanese, ha cominciato ad avanzare – 
lungo di questo – in direzione Nord – Est verso il massiccio del Grammos, 
conquistando recentemente il gruppo del Kamenik. Quella di destra, ha espugnato 
Alevitsa incuneandosi così fra il gruppo principale partigiano posto a difesa del 
Grammos e quello – composto da tre Brigate – operante sul Vitsi ed assicurando la 
protezione del fianco destro dello schieramento ellenico contro qualsiasi sorpresa da 
parte di questo gruppo. 
Esse sono ora in condizione di effettuare un attacco frontale e sui fianchi del 
grosso delle forze di Markos che, ridotte in una zona selvaggiamente montuosa di 
circa 500 chilometri quadrati, si apprestano a sostenerne l‘urto dietro la protezione di 
tutta una serie di difese, in parte naturali, in parte appartenenti all‘antica linea 
Metaxas, in parte, infine, da loro stesse predisposte. 
Si tratta però, ormai, di una questione di tempo, forse anche di pochissimo 
tempo, poichè è da ritenersi, con il massimo di certezza che è consentito in materia di 
operazioni militari, che prima dell‘apparire della cattiva stagione sulle montagne, 
l‘operazione possa essere felicemente conclusa. 
Con ciò potrà dirsi terminato un capitolo della tormentata storia ellenica di 
questo dopoguerra. 
Ma altri problemi – non meno ardui, non meno difficili – già urgono alle porte 
e qui di seguito mi riprometto di esaminare brevemente quelli che rivestono un 
carattere militare. 
Essi sono essenzialmente due e, precisamente, quello del mantenimento delle 
posizioni così faticosamente raggiunte e quello della liquidazione del banditismo 
organizzato nel rimanente territorio greco. 
Conquistato il Grammos sarà necessario servirsene non solo a scopo 
puramente negativo – cioè togliendo ai guerriglieri la possibilità di usare delle sue 
gole come di un comodo rifugio – ma, anche, per fare di esso un primo bastione per 
controllare l‘intera frontiera albanese. 
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Ciò richiederà delle forze, molte forze (a meno che sopravvengano dei fatti 
politici tali da dare garanzie su di un mutato atteggiamento del blocco slavo, il che, 
per ora, non è il caso di pensare) e non è da stupirsi se già fin d‘ora Governo e Stato 
Maggiore ellenico si oppongono ad una qualsiasi riduzione negli effettivi 
dell‘esercito. 
Ma, specialmente, altre forze saranno richieste per le grandi operazioni di 
rastrellamento che sono ancora da compiere sul territorio ellenico. 
Non è, infatti, da escludere che una certa aliquota delle formazioni partigiane, 
ora sul Grammos, riesca a sfuggire alla cattura infiltrandosi fra le colonne elleniche e 
raggiungendo le bande operanti più a sud; è, anzi, questa un‘ipotesi da ritenersi 
piuttosto verosimile, tanto più che, secondo quanto risulta in base a tutti gli elementi 
finora in possesso, mentre Markos si sarebbe già rifugiato in territorio albanese, il 
grosso delle sue forze si appresta a resistere sul Grammos sino alle ultime possibilità. 
In ogni modo, una recentissima comunicazione dello Stato Maggiore Ellenico 
ha fornito precisazioni, finora mantenute gelosamente riservate, in merito all‘entità ed 
alle dislocazioni attuali delle formazioni partigiane: tali elementi sono stati riportati 
nella carta e nell‘elenco allegati dai quali ci si può formare un‘idea di quale sia 
l‘attuale situazione del banditismo organizzato sul territorio ellenico. 
Cossichè la conquista del Grammos – se può ritenersi un grosso passo in 
avanti sulla via della liquidazione del banditismo – anzi la conditio sine qua non per 
ottenere tale risultato – lascia dietro di sè la necessità di condurre tutta una serie di 
operazioni militari complementari vere e proprie di rilevante entità. 
Il primo problema da risolvere – e lo ha già accennato il Presidente del 
Consiglio – sarà quello del rastrellamento delle formazioni partigiane del 
Peloponneso. Queste hanno operato, in questi ultimi mesi, praticamente indisturbate e 
hanno avuto il tempo sufficiente per fortificarsi sulle montagne e costituire, a loro 
protezione, tutta una rete di spionaggio e di favoreggiamento – spontaneo o coatto che 
sia. Per di più, anzicchè caratterizare la loro azione con il terrore esse, che non 
possedevano vere e proprie basi di appoggio, si sono guardate bene dall‘infierire sulle 
popolazioni rurali limitandosi a prelevare, pagando, quanto loro abbisognasse, 
svolgendo fra di esse opera di propaganda e persuasione e minacciando rappresaglie 
soltanto nel caso in cui venissero tradite. 
L‘aspetto di questa nuova fase di banditismo darà non poca tribolazione. Ho 
infatti detto le bande agirono in questo tempo indisturbate, ma devo spiegare che la 
parola indisturbate dev‘essere letta nel senso che i 2.500 banditi non sono affatto 
imbrigliati dai 18.000 regolari opposti loro e sin‘oggi non potuti aumentare a causa 
dello sforzo decisivo che richiedeva l‘impiego totale delle forze armate al Nord. 
Si tratta dunque di operazioni difficilissime per le quali evidentemente 
l‘azione del solo esercito non è più necessaria e sufficiente ma complementare e va 
inquadrata in un programma più vasto di carattere politico. 
Infatti la situazione nel Peloponneso si complica perchè al focolaio di 
banditismo militarizzato politico si sommano le varie altre speci di banditismo che per 
meglio distinguere indicherò con la parola ―istituzionale‖. Voglio cioè dire il 
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banditismo ordinario abituale in quella regione in cui s‘interpone oggi quello 
partigiano degli Xites (partigiani di destra o così detti partigiani di Zervas) e quello 
dei partiti locali che in quel Paese sono in eterna lotta fra loro. 
 Le complicazioni sono perciò su questo terreno di spiccata natura interna ma 
non per questo meno gravi a trattare e possono ben illustrare e giustificare la frase del 
Signor Sofulis circa la sua ―preoccupazione‖ per le operazioni nel Peloponneso (mio 
telegramma n. 217 del 14 agosto 1948) e per il rastrellamento definitivo del 
banditismo militarizzato in tutta la Grecia. 
 Ma la tela che cala sulla scena del Grammos non annuncia soltanto questo 
nuovo atto di natura puramente militare della vita ellenica; qualcosa di ben più grave 
si profila all‘orizzonte della scena politica della Nazione, qualcosa che dà certamente 
adito a ben maggiori preoccupazioni al Signor Sofulis e di cui riferisco in altro 
rapporto. 
 
Sidney Ricotti 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
ASMAE, N. 79/19 – Riservato (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri)  
Atene, 8 Gennaio 1952 
 
Sua Eccellenza 
l‘Onorevole Alcide DE GASPERI 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
Ministro degli Affari Esteri 
ROMA  
 
Signor Ministro, 
 Nel primo rapporto riassuntivo della situazione politica ellenica, (da me) 
inviato (all‘Eccellenza Vostra) esattamente un anno fa (N. 97/35 dell‘11 Gennaio 
1951), cercavo di rilevare i riposti motivi che tale situazione rendono, ad occhi 
stranieri, tanto complessa e così singolare. E credevo individuarli nel peso preminente 
che, su ogni aspetto della vita di questo Paese, esercitano talune forze estranee 
all‘amministrazione, al Parlamento ed agli stessi esponenti dei vari partiti: i notabili, 
le Ambasciate anglo-sassoni ed il Re. 
 Gli avvenimenti del 1951 non hanno fatto, mi sembra, che confermare 
l‘attendibilità di questo modo di vedere; e se anche, ad un certo momento, una figura 
è sembrata campeggiare sulla scena ed imporsi, quella del Maresciallo Papagos, 
all‘ora della resa dei conti si è dovuto riconoscere quanto le sue possibilità reali di 
azione fossero circoscritte e dipendenti dall‘altrui arcano volere. 
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L‘episodio Papagos è stato in Grecia senza dubbio il più saliente fra gli 
avvenimenti politici dell‘anno trascorso: sicché, dalla modesta portata del suo 
sostanziale valore è dato giudicare quanto tutto il resto non abbia avuto che ben scarso 
interesse. 
Sullo scorcio del 1950, il frantumarsi del partito populista in vari gruppi 
contrastanti fra loro ed infine l‘uscita del capo di esso Tsaldaris dal governo tripartito, 
avevano pericolosamente isolato il gabinetto Venizelos-Papandreu, arbitro dei cui 
destini diventava inopinatamente il generale Plastiras col proprio gruppo di sinistra 
moderata, l‘E.P.E.K. 
Rendendosi conto di tale situazione, e del declinante prestigio del suo collega 
Papandreu; di fronte alla crescente impazienza degli Americani per l‘instabilità 
governativa in un rovinoso quadro economico, Venizelos si vide costretto ad 
avvicinarsi decisamente a Plastiras ed a stabilire con lui le premesse di una nuova 
coalizione. 
Il Generale respinse la proposta di entrare a far parte del Governo ma offerse 
l‘appoggio del proprio partito a condizione che subito fossero indette le elezioni 
amministrative e, nel corso dell‘anno, avessero luogo quelle politiche. Venizelos 
dovette inchinarsi a tali pretese. 
I risultati delle elezioni amministrative, le prime a svolgersi in Grecia dal 
1934, palesarono un orientamento così anticomunista nonché tale sfiducia per i partiti 
di centro, che Venizelos si sentì meglio incoraggiato ad annunciare lo scioglimento 
della Camera per la fine di giugno e, per il mese di settembre, le nuove elezioni. 
In quella – 30 Maggio – scoppiò la crisi Papagos. 
2.- La figura di questo vecchio soldato era circondata in Grecia da una specie 
di alone di leggenda. 
Anima della resistenza nel 1940, vincitore della guerriglia contro i comunisti, 
organizzatore capace, di rare e specchiate virtù civili e familiari, sdegnoso di intrighi, 
indifferente agli onori della vita pubblica, godeva fra le Forze Armate di un enorme 
prestigio e di grandissima considerazione in ogni classe sociale: forse perché in lui 
sembrava scorgersi una singolare eccezione al comune carattere greco. Ma poiché, 
tale carattere non può concepire personalità se non in funzione della vita pubblica, 
tutti, plaudendo a Papagos, auspicavano di vederlo prendere le redini del potere: senza 
curarsi di sapere se egli, dell‘uomo politico, possedesse le qualità necessarie. 
Malgrado la fermissima fede monarchica del Maresciallo, questa sua 
popolarità non andava troppo a genio a Re Paolo ed in particolare alla Regina, i quali 
temevano di vedere un giorno in lui un Primo Ministro con atteggiamenti dittatoriali. I 
Sovrani prestarono pertanto troppo compiacentemente l‘orecchio e lasciarono un po‘ 
troppo allentate le briglie a taluni funzionari della Corte, di abbastanza dubbia 
moralità che, per avere provato quanto fosse incorruttibile e severo il Papagos, gli 
andavano muovendo una guerra di mormorazioni e di intrighi. Costoro naturalmente 
avevano trovato alleati presso l‘Ambasciata Britannica, ostile al Maresciallo da 
vecchia data, e presso non pochi esponenti politici i quali, dopo avere invano cercato 
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di arruolar Papagos fra le proprie fila per farsene un comodo paravento, paventavano 
una sua candidatura alle future elezioni. 
 Più volte il Maresciallo si era lagnato col Re per la sorda campagna che 
sentiva organizzarsi alle spalle: non aveva ottenuto che vaghe e generiche 
assicurazioni. Mentre egli stava compiendo un viaggio di ispezione alle frontiere 
settentrionali, alcuni giornali lo accusarono apertamente di ambizioni politiche e di 
tramare un colpo di stato. Papagos scoperse gli autori della campagna e ne identificò 
gli ispiratori: tutta gente del gabinetto politico del Re od alti Ufficiali addetti alla sua 
persona. Si recò dal Sovrano e ne chiese l‘allontanamento. Di fronte ad un netto 
rifiuto del Re, presentò seduta stante le sue dimissioni da Capo di Stato Maggiore 
Generale. 
 Re Paolo ed il Governo mostrarono una eccessiva precipitazione ad accettare 
ed a sanzionare la decisione del Maresciallo, nonché a manovrar in modo da rendere 
una riconciliazione impossibile. Senoché l‘annuncio dell‘avvenimento inatteso 
sollevò in tutto il Paese una ondata di riprovazione e di sdegno: il Re, la Corte ed i 
Ministri furono unanimamente accusati di ingratitudine e di insipienza, mentre la 
popolarità di Papagos, in cui si vedeva la vittima innocente di un intrigo, saliva alle 
stelle. 
 Il più pericoloso contraccolpo si ebbe però nell‘esercito, ove alcune unità, 
guidate da Ufficiali appartenenti all‘Associazione Militare ―IDEA‖ e devotissimi al 
Maresciallo, tentarono, nella notte sul 31 Maggio, un pronunciamento tosto sedato, 
per fortuna senza spargimento di sangue (oggi essi sono sotto Consiglio di guerra per 
volere del Re e malgrado i tentativi di questo Ambasciatore d‘America di far 
sospendere il processo a loro carico). 
 3.- Al momento di liquidare Papagos, i capi dei vari partiti avevano trovato 
modo di fargli dichiarar formalmente che egli si sarebbe astenuto da qualsiasi attività 
politica e, soprattutto, non si sarebbe presentato alle future elezioni. 
 Rassicurati su questo punto che tutti preoccupava e senza gran che curarsi 
della profonda crisi morale che stava ancora attraversando il Paese, Venizelos, 
Plastiras e Tsaldaris si accordarono su ciò che maggiormente stava loro a cuore: 
assicurarsi un agevole, e per ciascuno di essi equo, successo alla prossima 
consultazione. Decisero pertanto di far approvare una legge elettorale il cui 
meccanismo, detto della ―proporzionale rinforzata‖ avrebbe automaticamente messo 
in vantaggio i partiti più numerosi. Il loro collega Papandreu, non ammesso 
all‘intrigo, appena accortosi di essere stato giocato, diede le dimissioni. 
Al Governo fu giocoforza dimettersi. Il Re lanciò un ennesimo proclama 
ingiungendo ai capi partito di formare un gabinetto di unione nazionale: proclama che 
naturalmente rimase senza alcun seguito. 
Venizelos da solo costituì un governo, forte ormai dell‘appoggio del generale 
Plastiras. Subito ebbe ad affrontare una dura prova: quella dello sciopero generale dei 
Funzionari Statali che durante 15 giorni paralizzò completamente la vita del Paese. 
Fortemente appoggiato dall‘Ambasciatore d‘America, il Presidente del Consiglio 
seppe resistere e non cedette ad alcuna delle richieste degli scioperanti. Ottenne, è 
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vero, un successo politico ma con questo non fu certo risolto uno degli aspetti più 
gravi della crisi che travaglia la Grecia. 
Votata appena la legge elettorale, il 30 Luglio la Camera fu sciolta e le 
elezioni indette per il 9 Settembre. La sera stessa si verificò un inatteso colpo di 
scena: il Maresciallo Papagos annunciò la decisione di presentare la propria 
candidatura. 
4.- La notizia giunta pressoché inaspettata suscitò effervescenza generale. 
 Fra il pubblico in genere la prima reazione fu favorevolissima ed una 
schiacciante vittoria del Maresciallo senz‘altro scontata. 
 Per i parlamentari professionisti la candidatura Papagos rappresentava senza 
dubbio un grossissimo guaio: turbava la loro routine introducendo nel gioco un 
elemento nuovo, ricco di popolarità e di prestigio. Un grosso successo del Maresciallo 
avrebbe rischiato di scuotere troppe clientele, troppi interessi e troppo comode 
posizioni perché fra gruppi differenti ed anche rivali non sorgesse subito una specie di 
solidarietà difensiva volta a combattere il concorrente poco gradito nel corso della 
battaglia elettorale ed a stabilire le premesse per rendergli difficile l‘azione in caso di 
conquista del potere. 
 Messi da parte problemi, programmi e dottrine, la campagna adunque si 
imperniò unicamente sulla questione Papagos. Fu una lotta accanita, un carosello 
rabbioso cui, senza alcun apparente timore di compromettersi, la Corona prese 
attivissima parte. E‘ lecito anzi affermare che due soli furono i protagonisti: Papagos 
ed il Re, al quale ultimo tenevano dietro tutti gli altri partiti e, per vero dire, in tono, 
questi ultimi, alquanto minore. 
 Il Sovrano non perdette occasione per manifestare apertamente i suoi 
sentimenti di ostilità al Maresciallo: rifiutò di riceverlo, gli impartì secche lezioni di 
diritto costituzionale attraverso pubblici comunicati, si espresse assai duramente nei 
suoi confronti in varie interviste, autorizzò, lui, Capo Supremo delle Forze Armate, la 
divulgazione di notizie circa l‘esistenza di società segrete in seno dell‘esercito per 
accusare Papagos di averle create. 
 Dal canto suo il Maresciallo, se sostenne gli attacchi degli avversari, ed in 
primo luogo del Re, con pazienza e moderazione esemplari, si rivelò in pari tempo 
lottatore non sufficientemente preparato alla battaglia politica come è qui concepita. 
 Apparve in primo luogo l‘inesistenza di un suo vero e proprio programma. I 
Greci volevano Papagos al governo soprattutto perché egli rappresentava un nome 
nuovo, estraneo ai partiti su cui era interessante puntare. Egli aveva accettato la 
designazione ma adesso era palese il suo impaccio, non sapendo cosa promettere e 
soprattutto essendo incapace di proclamarlo in termini efficaci e vistosi: trascurando 
di ricordare che, per questo pubblico, non ha interesse tanto la sincera volontà di 
essere onesti quanto il modo brillante di saperla affermare. 
 In secondo luogo egli si trovò subito assai mal circondato. Non aveva un 
partito sulla cui organizzazione appoggiarsi ed il suo nome servì da bandiera ad altri 
isolati, ad ambiziosi e malcontenti, a perpetui dissidenti di ogni raggruppamento ed a 
estremisti pericolosi, che accorrendo fra le sue fila ed associandosi sotto il nome 
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generico di ―Raggruppamento Ellenico‖ non espressero alcuna idea precisa mentre 
richiamarono l‘attenzione sui loro trascorsi non sempre puliti. 
Da ultimo, la reazione di Papagos alla campagna sferratagli contro non 
piacque. Si aspettava un suo contrattacco, si desiderava che egli rispondesse alle 
offese con atti  di accusa, alle calunnie con diffamazioni. Egli taceva sdegnoso ed il 
pubblico ne era spazientito: come di un lottatore che ci si attende aggressivo e che si 
dimostra invece eccessivamente disposto ad incassare colpi dall‘avversario. 
Il carosello durò tutto il mese di Agosto e si sarebbe detto di assistere, in 
un‘atmosfera di caldo asfissiante, ad un combattimento fra due soli campioni: 
desiderosi, l‘uno di abbattere l‘altro e questi di vincere ai punti. 
Di tanta e non edificantissima giostra faceva il moderatore, piuttosto che 
l‘arbitro, l‘Ambasciatore d‘America, il quale, parteggiando in cuor suo per Papagos 
ma come stordito dalla incongruenza della zuffa, interveniva di quanto in quanto per 
placarne qualche aspetto violento e più spropositato. 
Si votò il 9 Settembre senza che si verificassero incidenti ed i risultati della 
consultazione dimostrarono che la battaglia, lungi dal trascinare, non aveva convinto 
nessuno. 
Papagos, che avrebbe dovuto trionfare, usciva sì vincitore ma senza ottenere la 
maggioranza assoluta (72 deputati saliti poi a 110 per il gioco dei resti). 
Plastiras - il cui partito rappresentava senza dubbio una forza reale 
corrispondente alle difficili condizioni di vita ellenica del momento – si assicurava un 
successo rilevante (40 seggi al primo turno e 72 in tutto). I Liberali di Venizelos 
riuscivano abbastanza stentamente a piazzarsi terzi (25 seggi saliti alla fine a 56). 
Tutti gli altri partiti uscivano dalle elezioni letteralmente polverizzati: il che 
non era certo un gran male. 
5.- Si trattava ora di formare un governo: l‘impresa si rivelò lunga e tutt‘altro 
che facile. 
Un gabinetto di coalizione avrebbe rappresentato la formula migliore e, dati i 
risultati delle elezioni, la più logica. Venizelos e Plastiras per parte loro si 
dichiararono pronti a parteciparvi. Papagos invece ricusò la proposta: voleva 
governare da solo, riformare la legge elettorale, e bandir subito nuove elezioni nella 
speranza di assicurarsi più solide basi. 
A norma delle consuetudini parlamentari, il Maresciallo, detenendo la 
maggioranza relativa, avrebbe dovuto almeno ricevere l‘incarico di tentar la 
composizione del Governo. Il Sovrano non glielo affidò riuscendo ad imporre un 
gabinetto Plastiras – Venizelos che disponeva di un‘insignificante maggioranza (4 
voti). 
E‘ il governo attualmente al potere: di tendenza centrista, composto di 
personalità non monarchiche per opinione od origine ma ora strettamente legate alla 
Corona per meglio difendersi contro Papagos. Il timore di vederlo Primo Ministro, 
infatti, tiene unita questa singolare amministrazione procurandole l‘appoggio del 
gruppo socialista che non ne fa parte. 
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Programma del Governo – ispirato da Plastiras – è quello di giungere alla 
pacificazione nazionale mediante lo smantellamento delle misure eccezionali prese 
durante la guerra civile e l‘applicazione di provvedimenti di clemenza. E‘ un 
programma necessario ma che solleva non poche critiche talché la sua elaborazione 
non ha ancora avuto inizio. 
Ciò che invece il Gabinetto è riuscito a portar a termine, con impensata 
rapidità, è la discussione della nuova Costituzione che dopo quasi trent‘anni 
d‘incertezze viene a dare alla fine un fondamento giuridico alle istituzioni statali. 
Approvata in Parlamento il 31 Dicembre la Costituzione è stata sanzionata dal 
Re il 1° Gennaio 1952 e subito è entrata in funzione. 
6.- Dall‘insieme degli avvenimenti sopra esposti è lecito trarre anzitutto una 
constatazione, e cioé, che arbitro della vita politica ellenica è stato, nel 1951, il 
Sovrano. Egli ha osato affrontare di petto la situazione che andava creandosi a causa 
della crescente popolarità del Maresciallo Papagos; non ha esitato a mettersi in 
battaglia contro di lui, a contrastargli la vittoria alle elezioni ed a rifiutargli alla fine 
l‘incarico di formare il Governo che, a rigor di termini, gli sarebbe spettato. 
Dal punto di vista dei risultati immediati che egli si proponeva raggiungere, la 
partita si è senza dubbio chiusa, per Re Paolo, all‘attivo: Papagos non è andato al 
Governo, la sua posizione è men salda di prima, mentre tutto il vecchio mondo 
parlamentare, per combatterlo, va raccogliendosi sotto il vessillo della Monarchia. Ma 
in quanto al valore effettivo di questi successi, sono indotto a giudicarlo assai scarso. 
A parte il fatto che in questa lotta il Sovrano ha alienato non poco della 
propria popolarità, egli mi sembra aver troppo esposto la Corona ed averle fatto 
perdere alquanto prestigio per una causa che, se personalmente poteva stargli a cuore, 
in realtà non usciva, come non esce, dal quadro delle vicende interne più meschine, 
senza aver alcun importante riflesso nei confronti dei gravi problemi dell‘ora. Ha 
agito insomma con maggior cocciutaggine e furberia che non con saggezza e larga 
visione dei superiori interessi del suo Paese. 
Le vicende che ho riassunte, le bizze della Regina, i furori del Re, gli intrighi 
della Corte, le schermaglie di Plastiras e di Venizelos, i gesti del Maresciallo Papagos: 
tutto ciò non è che cronaca, piccola cronaca di avvenimenti di tipo prettamente 
balcanico, che sarebbero divertenti, più che interessanti, se il Paese fosse prospero e 
l‘atmosfera serena. 
Il che proprio, per la Grecia, non è. 
Nel corso del 1951 la crisi che l‘Europa Occidentale attraversa – economica, 
morale e politica – si è andata aggravando qui assai più che altrove poiché il corpo su 
cui tale crisi agisce è più di ogni altro povero di linfa e debole di struttura. Lo scarso 
patrimonio nazionale, già gravemente intaccato, e gli aiuti americani, fortemente 
ridotti, servono appena a far vivere giorno per giorno ed a mantenere in piedi pletorici 
e praticamente inutili organismi burocratici. Si assiste quindi ad un preoccupante 
fenomeno di impoverimento, al quale la classe politica è incapace di porre rimedio 
anche perché troppo legata ai canoni di vecchie dottrine e per di più tarata dal 
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congenito individualismo, dal costume dell‘intrigare e dal vizio di troppo comprare e 
di lasciarsi corrompere. 
Non sono, credo, da temere movimenti interni né azioni dirette di marca 
comunista: l‘orrore per i rossi, derivante dagli ancor freschi ricordi della guerra civile 
è pressoché unanime e certo ha profonde radici. Ma il terreno appare d‘altra parte 
troppo fecondo perché i comunisti non cerchino di approfittarne accelerando e 
aggravando subdolamente la carenza degli organismi amministrativi e la confusione 
economica, nonché premendo su quel tasto nazionalista cui i Greci sono tanto 
sensibili. Il nazionalismo è il miglior strumento di cui dispongono gli estremisti di 
sinistra là dove non possono legalmente operare. E così si assiste al ripetersi di 
fastidiosi incidenti con i turchi, mentre si eccitano incongrue campagne irredentiste 
per Cipro e l‘Epiro, utili per esaltare le folle e per creare imbarazzi al governo, ma 
non certo fatte per rinsaldare l‘amicizia di questo popolo con i suoi vicini. 
Rimane di abbastanza saldo l‘esercito, che non ha risentito troppo della crisi 
Papagos ma tuttavia è ben lungi dal possedere quella forza che non soltanto da parte 
greca sembra volerglisi attribuire. Come ho già riferito, esso è infatti un buon nucleo 
di 140 mila uomini ben addestrati ma scarsissimo di artiglieria, appoggiato a un 
sistema di servizi ben studiato ed efficiente in tempo di pace ma assai vulnerabile in 
caso di ostilità. Il tutto isolato in un settore pericoloso e dipendente, per vivere e per 
combattere, dal pronto affluire di soccorsi alleati. 
In conclusione, nel corso degli scorsi dodici mesi le condizioni interne della 
Grecia sono notevolmente, ed anche visibilmente, peggiorate. Le perplessità che si 
manifestano da parte degli osservatori stranieri sulla solidità strutturale di questo 
paese, sulla sua vitalità economica e sulla sua reale efficienza sembrano pertanto 
essere oggi giustificate. 
Mi consenta tuttavia l‘Eccellenza Vostra di esprimere ancora una volta, ad un 
anno di distanza e malgrado gli aspetti negativi della situazione interna greca, un 
ragionato convincimento: quello della necessità di aiutare e di sostenere questo paese, 
la cui posizione, considerata nel quadro dello schieramento occidentale, è appunto 
tanto più importnante quanto più vulnerabile. 
Ciò bene intendono gli Americani, ogni giorno più esasperati dalle carenze, 
dalle astuzie e dalle miserie greche, ma forzatamente convinti della necessità di non 
lasciar spezzare questo malferno anello della catena che deve sbarrare ad est le difese 
del mondo occidentale. 
Voglia gradire, Signor Ministro, gli atti del mio profondo ossequio. 
 
Adolfo Alessandrini 
 
_________________________________ 
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ASMAE, Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
 
Oggeto: Visita Venizelos ad Ankara 
Roma, 18 Febbraio 1952 
 
 L‘Ambasciata ad Ankara in data 1° corr. Ha comunicato quanto appresso: 
―Ho fatto visita ieri al Vice Presidente del Consiglio ellenico Sig. Sofokles Venizelos 
nell‘Ambasciata di Grecia e sono stato da lui trattenuto in cordiale conversazione oltre 
un‘ora. Poichè è probabile che su taluni degli argomenti da lui toccati nel colloquio di 
ieri egli si soffermerà nelle prossime conversazioni con Vostra Eccellenza a Roma 
ritengo opportuno riassumerli qui appresso. 
1. Il Sig. Venizelos ha messo in rilievo, con parole di viva simpatia, l‘intimità dei 
rapporti che si è ristabilita tra i due Paesi, grazie, mi ha detto, alla grande 
comprensione e alla sincera volontà, dimostrate dal Governo di Vostra 
Eccellenza, di risolvere con spirito di amicizia i problemi pendenti tra i due 
paesi e soprattutto quello, così delicato, delle riparazioni, nel quale, egli ha 
detto, se si è avuto qualche ritardo esso non è dovuto all‘Italia, bensì alla 
lentezza e talvolta alle materiali difficoltà della Grecia di fornire le materie 
prime o di dare tempestive risposte. 
A questo riavvicinamento ha contribuito in misura determinante (ripeto le sue 
stesse parole) l‘azione chiarificatrice, dinamica, amichevole dell‘Ambasciatore 
Alessandrini. Un elemento che contribuì, negli anni della guerra, a non portare 
all‘estrema tensione l‘ostilità del popolo greco, è stato il contegno umano delle 
nostre truppe, così diverso da quello dei comandi e dei militari germanici. Molti 
soldati italiani, al momento dell‘armistizio, furono sottratti alle rappresaglie 
tedesche dalla popolazione che si adoperò a nasconderli e ad assisterli con spirito 
di simpatia e di riconoscenza. Tutti questi fattori, mi ha detto il Sig. Venizelos, 
hanno concorso a far dimenticare il passato e a far nuovamente fiorire una 
cordiale, fiduciosa amicizia che sarà suggellata dal prossimo incontro di Roma. 
2. A rafforzare ancor più questa collaborazione concorrerà la comune politica 
che Grecia e Italia perseguiranno, insieme alla Turchia, per la difesa del 
Mediterraneo Orientale. I tre paesi  si troveranno a far parte di una stessa 
organizzazione difensiva, a seguito dell‘inquadramento della Turchia e della 
Grecia nel Comando di Eisenhower, anzi, come si spera, sotto il comune 
comando dell‘Ammiraglio Carney. Quest‘ultima è infatti la soluzione, mi ha 
confermato Venizelos, che Grecia e Turchia appoggiano senza esitazioni, 
consapevoli della necessità di costituire un blocco di forze della maggiore 
possibile entità. 
Con il Governo e coi Comandi Militari turchi è stato preso in considerazione, 
durante questa visita, il problema della difesa dei Balcani, benchè, a quanto mi è 
sembrato di comprendere, il problema non sia stato approfondito come i greci 
avrebbero desiderato. Venizelos mi ha accennato che il Presidente della Repubblica 
turca, Sig. Celal Bayar, col quale ha parlato dell‘argomento, è stato assai esplicito nel 
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sostenere la necessità di organizzare la difesa balcanica giacchè il pericolo maggiore 
per la Turchia e la Grecia è costituito da invasioni provenienti dal Danubio. Il Signor 
Venizelos mi ha detto che l‘inserimento della Turchia nel SHAPE, in contrasto con le 
pretese britanniche di inquadrarla nel SACKE, era assolutamente indispensabile per 
imbastire un primo piano difensivo balcanico come pure per indurre la Jugoslavia a 
collaborare a tale piano con prospettiva di successo. Venizelos ha molto insistito sulla 
necessità di ottenere la collaborazione militare della Jugoslavia. Egli mi ha 
tratteggiato le difficoltà che presenta la difesa della Tracia e della Macedonia, data la 
debolezza della frontiera, così ravvicinata al mare che non permette una densità 
sufficiente di apprestamenti e di forze. E‘ perciò convinto della necessità, non appena 
si determinasse un conflitto, di migliorare tale situazione spingendo rapidamente 
verso il nord il fronte balcanico. Su questo punto mi ha ripetuto quanto altre volte egli 
ha dichiarato sia all‘Ambasciatore Alessandrini sia in interviste alla stampa che 
occorre fare dei territori greci e turchi una base di lancio per arrivare, quando le 
circostanze lo consentano, al Danubio. E‘ questa evidentemente una delle idee su cui 
più volentieri si sofferma. 
3. Per connessione di argomento siamo venuti a parlare della Jugoslavia.
Venizelos ha cominciato col rilevare che essa è un paese comunista e che fino
a qualche tempo fa la situazione interna jugoslava non aveva mancato di
destare in lui qualche preoccupazione; da qualche tempo tuttavia aveva
l‘impressione che tale situazione fosse migliorata. Dal punto di vista del
potenziale militare la Jugoslavia – mi ha detto – non rappresenta ogni gran
cosa. Ma gli americani intendono rafforzarla con forniture militari, dietro la
garanzia di un‘assistenza e di controlli che la Jugoslavia ha accettato. Occorre
ora procedere al coordinamento degli sforzi. Venizelos mi ha riferito che
l‘Addetto Militare Jugoslavo ad Ankara gli ha dichiarato, alla presenza del
Ministro degli Esteri Koprulu, che la Jugoslavia in caso di guerra marcierà
senza alcuna esitazione a fianco della Grecia e della Turchia. Anche a me, del
resto, questo Ambasciatore jugoslavo mi ha assicurato, con il tono di chi
riferisce una notizia precisa o indiscussa, che la collaborazione del suo paese
alle Potenze occidentali è cosa sicura, ancorchè la Jugoslavia non intenda far
parte dell‘organizzazione atlantica.
Sono accenni, ancora vaghi e non precisi, ma non perciò meno importanti e 
meritevoli di attenzione, della possibilità di un nuovo blocco balcanico: questione che 
c‘interessa direttamente e vitalmente. Il fatto ch‘esso possa prender forma nell‘ambito 
del comando mediterraneo dell‘Ammiraglio Carney ci offre la possibilità di seguirne 
gli sviluppi e considerare la possibilità e i modi di una nostra collaborazione. 
4. Dalla situazione della Jugoslavia il Sig. Venizelos è passato a parlare della
situazione dei paesi balcanici oltre la cortina di ferro. Tutte le notizie in suo
possesso concordano nel far risaltare l‘avversione crescente di quei paesi al
regime comunista e alla Russia. Venizelos ne trae la conseguenza che in caso
di conflitto questa avversione potrebbe assumere forza maggiore e più preciso
rilievo in modo di indebolire notevolmente lo sforzo militare dei paesi satelliti.
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5. Infine Venizelos mi ha accennato all‘assoluta necessità di associare la
Germania alla difesa dell‘Europa occidentale. Senza di essa si avrebbe il vuoto
nel centro d‘Europa e vi sarebbe per lo meno da dubitare che la Francia,
trovandosi a sostenere, fin del primo momento, tutto l‘urto dell‘offensiva
sovietica, sarebbe in grado di resistervi, data anche l‘attuale situazione dello
spirito pubblico francese. D‘altro canto l‘assenza della Germania importerebbe
la necessità di arretrare il fronte occidentale al Reno con grave pericolo dei
Balcani e dell‘Italia che resterebbero scoperti.
6. Il Signor Venizelos è convinto assertore della necessità dell‘Unione Europea
che troverà la prima base nell‘unificazione, non solo delle forze armate, bensì
della politica cui queste forze dovranno obbedire. I piccoli e medi paesi, mi ha
detto, non hanno più ormai alcuna possibilità di difendersi isolatamente. Egli è
convinto che la formula federale consentirebbe di salvare le posizioni europee
in Africa portando i rapporti coi paesi africani, che oggi lottano per la loro
autonomia, dal piano di subordinazione a una singola potenza su quello della
collaborazione con tutti i paesi europei. Occorre, cioè, secondo l‘uomo di stato
greco, uscire dalle vecchie tradizioni coloniali e imperialiste per mettersi sulle
vie nuove rispondenti all‘evoluzione delle idee e della struttura politica
mondiale. Solo in tal modo potrà salvarsi quell‘unione dell‘Africa all‘Europa
che consentirà a quest‘ultima di riprendere, con larghezza di spazi e di risorse,
una nuova funzione nel mondo e riservare l‘empito delle sue energie,
compresse in territori nazionali troppo angusti, in un continente immenso e
quasi completamente vuoto.
Su tutte le questioni discusse ho avuto l‘impressione di trovarmi in presenza di 
una personalità dalle vedute ampie, equilibrate, aperte alle esigenze dei tempi, buon 
conoscitore dell‘Italia, di cui parla molto bene la lingua‖. 
In data 4 corrente ha comunicato: 
―Il Vice Presidente del Consiglio greco e Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Signor Sofokles 
Venizelos, si è trattenuto in visita ufficiale, da mercoledì 30 gennaio a sabato 2 
febbraio, ad Ankara dove è stato ricevuto con manifestazioni di speciale solennità. Il 
Governo turco ha tenuto a mancare, con la cordialità delle accoglienze, l‘importanza 
che annette a una solidarietà sempre più intima e operante tra i due paesi, mettendo in 
luce i motivi di collaborazione e prestandosi a ricercare, insieme all‘ospite e ai suoi 
consiglieri politici, nuovi capi di collaborazione suscettibili di allargare e rafforzare i 
vincoli di unione. Alludo specialmente al progetto, di iniziativa del Bakkalbasci, di 
promuovere un‘unione doganale tra i due paesi, al quale i turchi sembrano prestare, in 
linea di principio, una favorevole attenzione. 
1. In una parola questo Governo ha tenuto a ostentare un‘intimità di rapporti che,
in un certo senso, è un fatto nuovo, dato che fino ad ora tutte le ―avances‖
della Grecia aveva risposto con una freddezza che quasi rasentava il
disinteresse. Così la Turchia non aveva sentito la necessità di associare la
Grecia ai suoi reiterati passi a Washington per essere inclusa nel Patto
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Atlantico, nè aveva aderito all‘invito greco di studiare a fondo i problemi della 
comune difesa, nè risposto al desiderio greco di procedere all‘integrazione, o 
di precisare la portata degli accordi politici e di collaborazione militare che 
legano i due paesi, nè la stampa turca aveva risparmiato, anche in tono 
virulento, talvolta persino sprezzante, gli attachi alla Grecia per le sue pretese 
su Cipro, nè le autorità turche si erano astenute dal procedere con mano 
pesante contro i pescatori greci che dalle isole dell‘Egeo sconfinano nelle 
acque territoriali dell‘Anatolia. Si era così creata un‘atmosfera che mal 
rispondeva alla facciata ufficiale di cordialità politica tra i due Paesi. 
Da questo punto di vista l‘incontro di Ankara contribuirà indubbiamente a dare 
alle relazioni tra i due paesi un carattere più di accentuata amicizia. E‘ questo un 
primo risultato della visita di cui non va sottovalutata l‘importanza. 
2. Ne sarà altresì rafforzata la collaborazione tra i due paesi, negli organi del
NATO, in vista delle decisioni che dovranno essere prese dal Consiglio
Atlantico a Lisbona, specialmente per quanto riguarda le modalità
d‘inquadramento della Grecia e della Turchia nel fronte europeo sotto il
comando di Eisenhower. Ho già accennato che i due Governi sono d‘accordo
nel respingere il criterio d‘un sotto comitato dell‘Egeo sostenuto
dall‘Inghilterra, e nell‘insistere per entrare a far parte del Comando
mediterraneo dell‘Ammiraglio Carney. Su questo punto, di vitale interesse per
i due paesi, la visita di Venizelos ha permesso di precisare le idee che
verranno sostenute a Lisbona specialmente per quanto riguarda la pretesa di
far dipendere i comandi nazionali delle loro forze terrestri direttamente
dall‘Ammiraglio Carney. E‘ questa, come è chiaro, una questione che ci
interessa direttamente. Gli accenni fatti da Venizelos in una conferenza stampa
sulle intese corse a questo riguardo sono stati assai vaghi. ―Io spero – egli ha
detto – che la partecipazione dei due paesi al Patto Atlantico costituirà un
nuovo fattore di pace e di stabilità. Noi ci proponiamo, dopo di aver aderito al
Patto Atlantico, di lavorare con la Turchia a mantenere la pace in generale e ad
assicurare in particolare la salvaguardia della pace nella regione mediterranea,
questione che è di interesse primordiale per i nostri due paesi‖. Come
giustamente rileva la stampa, questa necessità di concordare la linea da seguire
a Lisbona è stata lo scopo principale delle conversazioni e non v‘è dubbio che
su questo punto l‘intesa sia stata completa.
3. Il comunicato ufficiale, pubblicato al termine della visita, accenna alle
conversazioni che hanno avuto luogo su questioni di carattere militare. ―E‘
stato anche deciso – vi è detto – che i contatti tra i rappresentanti qualificati
dalle forze armate dei due paesi saranno resi più frequenti‖. E l‘Istanbul
afferma: ―Si crede di sapere che le conversazioni tra personalità militari hanno
fatto dei grandi progressi‖.
Viceversa, se le mie informazioni avute parlando sia con Venizelos che con 
l‘Ambasciatore Contoumas sono esatte, e comunque mi riservo di controllarle, i 
Turchi avrebbero mostrato al riguardo una certa riservatezza. La mia impressione è 
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che il Governo turco procederà assai cauto su questo terreno a seguito della reazione 
opposta dai Soviet alla partecipazione della Turchia al Patto Atlantico. Si è perciò 
voluto evitare, a mio avviso, di dare alle conversazioni di Ankara il carattere di un‘ 
intesa a scopi militare o di preparazione di piani. Si è notato ad esempio che il 
generale Egheli, che aveva presieduto la missione militare turca inviata qualche mese 
fà ad Atene, è partito proprio in questi giorni ad Ankara per assumere il comando del 
V corpo d‘Armata a Balikesir e in tal modo non è stato fatto partecipare all‘incontro. 
Si è preferito, cioè, che i problemi militari siano esaminati in sordina dagli Stati 
Maggiori dei due Paesi, in forma meno appariscente di quella costituita dall‘invio di 
missioni speciali, bensì con l‘invio di ufficiali e con lo scambio d‘informazioni e in 
ogni modo attraverso contatti discreti e continuativi. 
4. Uno degli obbiettivi più importanti, perseguiti dal Signor Venizelos in questa
visita, è stato di sondare le vedute turche sul problema dei Balcani e
specialmente sulla necessità di promuovere una stretta collaborazione con la
Jugoslavia, considerata da Venizelos come un elemento indispensabile alla
difesa di quel settore. Ho riferito, nel mio rapporto sulla visita da me fatta a
Venizelos, le idee espressemi da quest‘ultimo. E‘ stata notata altresì una lunga
conversazione da lui avuta con l‘Ambasciatore jugoslavo Sig. Radovanovic.
Ai giornalisti che lo hanno interrogato su tale conversazione Venizelos ha
risposto che era evidente la necessità di rafforzare le relazioni tra i due paesi;
Grecia, Turchia e Jugoslavia. Mi riservo di accertare quale è stata la reazione
turca a queste vedute, ancorchè sia lecito supporre che esse siano state ritenute
conformi alle idee e agli interessi turchi.
5. Sembra che nelle conversazioni predette siano stati passati in rassegna anche i
problemi del Medio Oriente, sotto la forma di uno scambio di vedute
puramente informativo, in considerazione dell‘interesse che la Grecia annette,
quale paese mediterraneo, a quanto avviene o è oggetto di decisione in
quell‘importante settore.
6. Speciale importanza è stata data alle discussioni sui problemi economici. Il
comunicato finale insiste principalmente su di essi, pur senza specificarli. Si
tratta, oltrechè del progetto proposto dai Greci di un‘azione doganale, di
addivenire a un‘azione concertata per l‘esportazione di prodotti comuni ai due
paesi, per i quali questi ultimi potrebbero farsi una dannosa concorrenza, quali
il tabacco, la frutta secca e simili. E‘ stato anche discusso il regolamento della
questione della pesca, per la quale vorrebbe tenersi conto degli accordi
intervenuti tra noi e la Jugoslavia, nonchè l‘abolizione dei visti sui passaporti
sull‘esempio dell‘accordo italo-turco, od altre minori del genere. Per lo studio
di tali questioni è stato deciso ―di creare, senza indugio, una commissione
mista, incaricata di procedere nel modo più costruttivo e più rapido‖. ―Questa
commissione – è detto nel comunicato – redigerà un rapporto particolareggiato
e, se del caso, dei progetti di accordo che saranno sottoposti all‘apprezzamento
dei due Governi‖.
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7. Merita speciale cenno la proposta dell‘unione doganale. E‘ evidente che una
proposta del genere non ha soltanto una portata economica. E‘ noto che da
lungo tempo i Greci vagheggiano la possibilità di un più intimo collegamento
con la Turchia che, secondo alcuni di essi, potrebbe anche assumere la forma
di un vincolo federativo. Quale risultato la Grecia si attende da questa più
intima associazione con la Turchia non è difficile scorgere: essa mira
logicamente a rafforzare la sua posizione ed eventualmente ad averne
appoggio per quelle rivendicazioni nei Balcani e alle quali non ha mai
rinunciato. La Turchia ha sempre declinato fino ad oggi di prendere in
considerazione possibilità del genere, delle quali la stampa turca non ha
mancato in addietro di far qualche accenno. Questa volta invece, secondo
quanto mi è stato confermato da questo Ministero degli Esteri, la proposta
dell‘unione doganale è stata considerata con un certo interesse. A dire il vero
la stampa non manca dell‘esprimere qualche dubbio, accennando alle
―numerose difficoltà concrete che non potrebbero essere risolte se non
attraverso lunghe discussioni tecniche‖. I fatti soltanto permetteranno di
vedere chiaro nell‘atteggiamento dei Turchi e di accertare se il rinvio a una
commissione di studio è stato, come si propende a credere in questi ambienti
diplomatici, un cortese modo per insabbiare la questione.
8. A quanto pare nelle conversazioni di questi giorni si è evitato ogni accenno a
una questione, come quella di Cipro, che tanto emotivamente interessa le
opinioni pubbliche dei due paesi. Ma se gli uomini politici non ne hanno
parlato, vi ha fatto insistenti e precisi riferimenti la stampa turca, la quale con
molto buon senso ha fatto presente che tutte le manifestazioni e le
dichiarazioni di amicizia non servono a nulla se non viene sgombrato il terreno
da questa scottante questione, che minaccia di compromettere la fiduciosa
collaborazione tra i due paesi. Sarebbe troppo lungo riferire tutti i commenti al
riguardo. Basti dire che questa stampa è stata unanime nell‘insistervi ed è stato
questo una specie di richiamo alla realtà nella solita retorica dei brindisi e
delle dichiarazioni ufficiali che sempre imperversa in incontri di questo
genere.
In conclusione, nei rapporti greco-turchi esistono motivi di unione e motivi di 
contrasto. Si tratta di vedere se i primi, che sono i più sostanziali e rispondenti ai 
fondamentali interessi dei due popoli, riusciranno a prevalere sui secondi più 
appariscenti e che fanno appello purtroppo alla passionalità delle masse‖. 
[Luca Pietromarchi] 
________________________________
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ASMAE, Telespresso n. 1299/434, (Ambasciata d’Italia-Ministero degli Affari 
Esteri)  
Oggetto: Rapporti economici italo-greci 
Atene, 28 Aprile 1952 
Ho preso conoscenza con vivo interesse delle comunicazioni dell‘Ambasciata 
in Washington e del telespresso di Vostra Eccellenza citato in riferimento, relativi allo 
sviluppo futuro delle relazioni economiche italo-greche. 
Il quadro della situazione economica ellenica ed i risultati 
dell‘Amministrazione americana corrispondono, in linea generale, a quanto ho potuto 
constatare in loco. Sono invece meno sicuro che l‘America, in considerazione dei 
risultati spesso nettamente insoddisfacenti, si prepari a ritirarsi da questo Paese o ad 
alleggerire comunque i suoi controlli. 
Gli insuccessi dell‘Amministrazione americana possono da alcuni essere 
attribuiti all‘incapacità amministrativa dei dirigenti americani. Altri però, ed in primo 
luogo naturalmente gli americani qui residenti, li attribuiscono alla scarsa 
collaborazione dell‘elemento locale ed alle sue resistenze ai suggerimenti e consigli 
della Missione americana. E‘ probabile che la colpa sia da attribuire un po‘ alle due 
cause. Effettivamente gli americani hanno qui inviato troppi funzionari per un piccolo 
Paese ad economia semplice come l‘ellenica, e non tutti all‘altezza del compito, 
sicché essi sono stati spesso, troppo spesso, giocati dalla ben nota abilità ellenica. 
Gli ambienti americani locali riconoscono la necessità di smobilitare una parte 
notevole della loro barbatura amministrativa. Sembra infatti che circa la metà dei 
funzionari americani attualmente residenti ad Atene verrà rimpatriata nel corso 
dell‘estate, in relazione anche alla riduzione degli aiuti economici diretti. Ma per 
contro si sostiene specialmente da parte degli esponenti americani in loco la necessità 
di rafforzare il controllo economico e politico sul Paese per evitare che le misere 
condizioni di vita della popolazione servano allo sviluppo del comunismo, come 
sempre avviene in simili casi. E se, da parte di tali esponenti, si accetta, in relazione 
alle nuove direttive della politica americana, la necessità di ridurre il numero dei 
funzionari americani, in considerazione soprattutto del fatto che lo stesso sviluppo 
economico del Paese deve essere temporaneamente sospeso, si insiste nel fare 
presente a Washington l‘opportunità di intensificare maggiormente la direzione 
amministrativa del Paese e di aumentare i poteri dei funzionari americani distaccati 
presso tutte le branche dell‘Amministrazione statale e parastatale ellenica. 
E‘ in questi giorni qui giunta, in evidente ispezione ed al fine di fornire a 
Washington opportuni elementi di giudizio sulla condotta da adottare nei riguardi 
della Grecia, una Commissione diretta dal Signor Weldon, accompagnato dal Signor 
Sullam. Non so se le conclusioni di tale Commissione saranno interamente favorevoli 
alle concezioni dei locali ambienti americani, ma si può prevedere che comunque la 
politica americana in Grecia non si differenzierà sostanzialmente da quella adottata 
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negli altri Paesi Europei e che essa sarà intesa a raggiungere anzitutto, qui come 
altrove, due precisi obbiettivi: 
1) l‘aumento del potenziale di difesa;
2) la lotta contro l‘inflazione.
Le spese elleniche per la difesa sono già elevatissime, e proporzionalmente più
alte che in qualsiasi altro Paese europeo: non si può ragionevolmente chiedere alla 
Grecia di fare di più. Per il passato tali spese erano in gran parte coperte dagli aiuti 
economici ECA e da ciò il ritardo nello sviluppo economico del Paese. Con la 
riduzione degli aiuti economici, e dovendosi lottare contro l‘inflazione, non resta altra 
soluzione che una ulteriore compressione dei consumi civili, compressione che si 
spera di poter attenuare con una più oculata amministrazione. 
In tale situazione le prospettive di uno sviluppo della collaborazione italo-ellenica 
non sembrano propriamente rosee. 
Come è noto, finora le relazioni economiche fra i due Paesi si sono basate quasi 
esclusivamente sull‘Accordo di Collaborazione Economica, che ci ha consentito non 
solo di compiere importanti lavori, quali gli impianti idro-elettrici o forniture 
d‘investimento quali navi, materiale ferroviario, ecc. ma anche di collocare un 
discreto quantitativo di beni di consumo corrente. Per contro l‘Accordo Commerciale, 
stipulato nell‘aprile 1949, prima cioé dell‘Accordo di Collaborazione, e mai da allora 
aggiornato, non ha praticamente funzionato anche per la situazione fortemente 
creditizia dell‘Italia e fortemente debitrice della Grecia nell‘Unione dei Pagamenti 
Europei. 
L‘Accordo di Collaborazione Economica può ormai considerarsi giunto a 
termine, dato che non restano da fornire alla Grecia, nei prossimi due anni, che circa 5 
milioni di dollari di merci in conto riparazioni. Effettivamente l‘ammontare delle 
nostre esportazioni sarà più elevato per l‘espletamento delle forniture in corso, ma 
soltanto per forza di inerzia. 
Le possibilità di potenziare l‘Accordo Commerciale normale sembrano molto 
scarse per i due seguenti motivi: 
1) la già ricordata, inversa posizione nell‘Unione Pagamenti Europei;
2) i prezzi delle merci italiane esportabili in Grecia.
Salvo trascurabili eccezioni l‘Italia non può pensare, in vista del preannunciato
intensificarsi del regime di restrizioni dei consumi, di poter collocare su questo 
mercato i propri prodotti agricoli e tessili tradizionali, che sono localmente prodotti in 
quantità sufficiente. 
Le maggiori correnti di importazione in Grecia resteranno dunque i prodotti 
meccanici e chimici e per tali merci siamo generalmente in posizione di inferiorità 
rispetto alla concorrenza mondiale e a quella germanica in specie, la quale ultima 
gode di una posizione preferenziale, essendo essa la principale acquirente di tabacchi 
ellenici. 
In considerazione della situazione sopra esposta ritengo che per non ridurre i 
nostri rapporti economici con la Grecia le uniche possibilità debbano essere ricercate 
nei due settori seguenti: 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
  
85 
 
1) forniture in relazione alla difesa; 
2) interessamento del capitale italiano allo sviluppo dell‘economia ellenica. 
 
I) FORNITURE IN RELAZIONE ALLA DIFESA – Ho già ricordato che la Grecia 
compie da anni uno sforzo notevole per il mantenimento delle sue forze armate. Di 
più la Grecia non può fornire né come effettivi, né come armamento. 
 Il rafforzamento dell‘ala meridionale dello schieramento atlantico dovrà 
quindi essere fornito tramite il NATO e mirare all‘armamento pesante, alle 
infrastrutture ed all‘equipaggiamento. 
 Trascurando il settore armamento, la nostra collaborazione potrebbe utilmente 
essere fornita nel campo dell‘assistenza tecnica e delle forniture di materiale per i 
lavori delle infrastrutture, quali le costruzioni stradali; la sistemazione di porti e degli 
aeroporti; le comunicazioni tele e radio telegrafiche; telefoniche ecc. Per quanto 
riguarda l‘equipaggiamento la nostra industria potrebbe fornire, oltre i mezzi di 
trasporto (soprattutto se le nostre vetture jeep potranno essere fornite a prezzi non 
troppo discordanti da quelli mondiali), anche prodotti alimentari conservati ed altri. 
 Tali forniture dovranno essere decise ed effettuate dal NATO ed in tale sede le 
nostre possibilità potrebbero essere valorizzate. 
 
II) INTERESSAMENTO DEL CAPITALE ITALIANO ALLO SVILUPPO 
ECONOMICO DELLA GRECIA 
 Se nel momento attuale gli Americani si oppongono a che le scarse risorse 
elleniche vengano utilizzate in investimenti a lungo termine, per timore che esse non 
siano sufficienti, senza pericolo di inflazione, alle spese per la difesa, essi non si 
oppongono invece ad iniziative che siano finanziate con mezzi che sfuggono al loro 
controllo, cioé mediante apporto di capitali dall‘estero, siano essi di proprietà greca o 
straniera. 
 L‘ambizione ellenica, stimolata dalle prospettive che erano state fatte 
balenare, spesso con incredibile faciloneria, dei presunti tecnici della Missione ECA, 
è in materia illimitata. Un apporto di capitali, anche modesto, sarebbe certamente il 
benvenuto da parte degli uomini politici ellenici, ai quali servirebbe di piattaforma 
elettorale, non fosse altro per dimostrare all‘opinione pubblica di essere riusciti a 
passare sopra ai divieti americani. 
 Se investimenti del genere fossero senz‘altro proficui, una parte degli ingenti 
capitali ellenici attualmente investiti all‘estero comincerebbe forse a rimpatriare. Tali 
capitali però possono considerarsi esposti, una volta rimpatriati, al rischio di 
manomissione da parte del Fisco ed il loro astensionismo può quindi trovare una 
giustificazione. Non così, invece, per i capitali di altri Paesi, ed in primo luogo 
americani. Se la situazione fosse effettivamente stata quale l‘avevano prospettata nei 
primi tempi i tecnici della Missione ECA, non sarebbero mancati gruppi finanziari 
americani per sfruttare una situazione che per il capitale americano doveva sembrare 
particolarmente privilegiata. E viaggi esplorativi di uomini d‘affari infatti non sono 
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mancati. Ma i finanziamenti non sono venuti: né dalla Banca per la Ricostruzione, né 
dalla Import-Export Bank, né tanto meno da privati. 
In verità la situazione economica e finanziaria della Grecia è lungi dal potersi 
considerare di tutto riposo. A parte l‘instabilità finanziaria, sempre preoccupante 
malgrado la lotta anti-inflazionista, non esiste alcuna garanzia per i capitali esteri che 
intendessero piazzarsi nell‘economia ellenica. Nonostante le pressioni americane, un 
progetto di legge tendente a fovorire, mediante opportune garanzie ed esenzioni 
fiscali, l‘afflusso di capitale estero, non è ancora stato varato. La causa di tale ritardo 
va probabilmente ricercata nella sorda, ma potente, opposizione degli industriali 
locali, i quali temono, se venisse aperta la porta al capitale estero, di perdere la loro 
posizione di monopolio. Questa presa di posizione degli uomini d‘affari ellenici va 
tenuta in evidenza perché i capitalisti ellenici costituiscono un‘oligarchia ben più 
potente di quelle analoghe degli altri Paesi occidentali. 
Nelle attuali circostanze, riterrei quindi di dover escludere l‘eventualità di 
finanziamenti di Stato a Stato, che non potrebbero fruire dei previsti privilegi fiscali e 
non potrebbero ottenere garanzie di rimborso se non a lungo termine. Operazioni del 
genere possono essere giustificate solo da preponderanti ragioni politiche (non è 
escluso vi ricorra l‘Inghilterra nella sua affannosa ricerca di riacquistare in Grecia il 
passato prestigio). 
La scarsa, per non dire totalmente mancata, industrializzazione del Paese, 
congiunta alla prevista necessità di risparmiare a qualsiasi costo, almeno per un certo 
periodo, la valuta estera, può presentare allettanti prospettive per il capitale privato. 
Tali prospettive sono però limitate da vari fattori e principalmente: 
a) altezza dei costi di produzione, per cui in molti casi il prodotto importato,
nonostante la protezione doganale, resta più conveniente e difficoltà, per non
dire impossibilità, di allargare il ristretto mercato interno con esportazioni. Ciò
che rende aleatori gli investimenti;
b) esasperato nazionalismo ellenico per cui un‘impresa straniera, che prendesse
favorevole sviluppo, sarebbe esposta agli assalti, senza limitazione di mezzi di
lotta da parte degli elementi locali;
c) impossibilità di prevedere non dico il rimpatrio dei capitali, ma anche il
trasferimento degli utili.
Fra le ricchezze non sfruttate della Grecia sono stati giustamente ricordati i 
minerali. Anche in tale campo però occorre sfatare molte leggende. I giacimenti 
minerari ellenici sono indubbiamente numerosi, ma tutti quelli ancora da sfruttare 
sono di limitata entità. Le necessarie spese di impianto ne rendono quindi non 
conveniente lo sfruttamento in congiuntura economica normale. 
Uno dei campi in cui si presentano favorevoli prospettive è quello dell‘industria 
dell‘alluminio. I giacimenti di bauxite sono abbastanza numerosi e di non difficile 
accesso. Solo la mancanza di energia elettrica ne ha reso finora impossibile lo 
sfruttamento. Se la centrale elettrica dell‘Acheloos venisse costruita, sarebbero 
realizzate le premesse per un‘attività che dovrebbe essere meno esposta alle incognite 
proprie di qualsiasi iniziativa in Grecia. 
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Condizione indispensabile è però la proprietà della fonte di energia. L‘industria 
dell‘alluminio dovrebbe cioé possedere la centrale elettrica. Se attualmente un gruppo 
italiano fosse disposto a fare proposte concrete in proposito potrebbe certamente 
ottenere favorevoli condizioni compresa quella di poter esportare una parte di 
alluminio franco valuta in modo da assicurarsi un ammortamento degli investimenti. 
Se invece l‘impianto elettrico dell‘Acheloos venisse realizzato dal Governo ellenico 
dovremmo ancora, per l‘istituenda industria dell‘alluminio, superare la concorrenza 
germanica, ed il risultato apparirebbe almeno dubbio. 
Possono esistere altre possibilità soprattutto nel campo dell‘industria chimica, la 
più elementare, per la cui attività non sono necessari forti immobilizzi, ma soprattutto 
apporti tecnici. 
In conclusione le possibilità di continuare la collaborazione economica italo-
ellenica sono piuttosto scarse, ma non inesistenti. 
Le occasioni migliori sono certamente quelle che potrebbe offrirci il NATO, 
anche perché non esposte a rischi. 
I finanziamenti diretti sono invece esposti ad alee ed a pericolo che il Governo 
può aiutare ed attenuare, ma che sarebbe illusione pensare di eliminare. 
Per parte mia non mancherò di segnalare le occasioni che potranno presentarsi, ma 
indubbiamente l‘Ambasciata non potrà sostituirsi all‘iniziativa privata, alla quale deve 
rivenire il compito di rintracciare le buone occasioni. Sarà tuttavia cura di questa 
Ambasciata il facilitare la realizzazione dei progetti, il consigliare circa le forme più 
opportune da dare ad ogni iniziativa ed il ricercare infine le garanzie che possano 
ridurre al minimo possibile i rischi, in modo che la nostra presenza in questo Paese 
abbia a realizzarsi, con prudenza, su basi sufficientemente fondate e sicure. 
 
Adolfo Alessandrini 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
ASMAE, Telespresso N. 4170/1104, (Ambasciata d’Italia-Ministero degli Affari 
Esteri)  
 
Oggeto: Viaggio in Italia del Ministro del Coordinamento greco Markezinis 
Atene, 4 Novembre 1953 
 
 Il telegramma di Vostra Eccellenza N. 197 in data 1° Novembre, è qui 
pervenuto dopo la partenza del Ministro Markezinis per Bonn e non mi è stato quindi 
possibile comunicargli l‘assenso di Vostra Eccellenza per le date da lui proposte. 
Suppongo tuttavia che l‘Ambasciatore Arghyropoulos abbia concordato la data del 30 
Novembre con Notarangeli dopo aver ricevuto istruzioni da Markezinis, transitato per 
Roma durante il suo viaggio. 
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 La composizione del seguito del Ministro potrà essere conosciuta solo al suo 
ritorno da Bonn, cioè verso il 16 Novembre. 
 Al riguardo desidero comunque attirare l‘attenzione di Vostra Eccellenza su 
quanto segue: 
 Il Ministro Markezinis non è solo il supremo regolatore dell‘economia 
ellenica, ma la personalità più spiccata del Governo Papagos. Egli si è proposto di 
rinnovare la struttura economica del paese non solo animato dal sincero desiderio di 
migliorare il tenore di vita della popolazione e di potenziare il suo paese, ma anche e 
soprattutto come base per il rafforzamento del Partito di cui egli è stato fin dall‘inizio 
l‘animatore. 
 Come è noto egli ha predisposto un piano quadriennale di sviluppo 
dell‘economia ellenica e si è dedicato alla sua realizzazione con ogni energia e 
decisione, comprendendo che dal successo o dall‘insuccesso di tale piano dipendeva 
anche il suo avvenire personale. 
 L‘energia con cui ha realizzato le prime riforme della struttura interna del 
Paese ed i risultati, sebbene non ancora definitivi, finora raggiunti hanno attirato su di 
lui l‘attenzione internazionale. 
 Con senso realistico il Ministro Markezinis si è reso subito conto che la Grecia 
non avrebbe potuto con i soli suoi mezzi compiere rapidamente l‘evoluzione o 
rivoluzione economica prevista dal suo piano. Dopo aver quindi dato il via alle prime 
riforme interne (riforma del credito, svalutazione, pareggio del bilancio, 
liberalizzazione del commercio, riforma amministrativa, garanzie per gli investimenti 
esteri) per procurare al paese credito internazionale, Markezinis ha iniziato una serie 
di viaggi all‘estero recandosi innanzitutto negli Stati Uniti, poi in Inghilterra, indi in 
Francia e ora in Germania. Egli dovrebbe concludere in Italia le sue ricerche di 
collaborazione. 
 Se i risultati dei viaggi negli Stati Uniti ed in Gran Bretagna non hanno dato 
apparentemente un immediato, tangibile risultato ciò è dovuto probabilmente al fatto 
che le riforme interne non avevano ancora, al momento in cui tali viaggi venivano 
effettuati dato i risultati, ripeto provvisori, che si possono ora constatare. Molte 
personalità del mondo economico anglo-sassone che si erano in un primo momento 
mostrate scettiche circa la politica economica ed i sistemi adottati da Markezinis, 
riconoscono ora tali risultati. 
 Il viaggio di Markezinis in Francia ha portato un primo concreto successo: la 
garanzia del Governo francese per forniture alla Grecia a lungo termine per un 
ammontare di 5,5 miliardi di franchi. 
 Il viaggio in Germania porterà versosimilmente a risultati ancora più 
sostanziali per lo sviluppo dell‘economia ellenica, che potrà contare non solo su 
finanziamenti ma anche sulla collaborazione tecnica di gruppi come la Krupp per lo 
sviluppo delle industrie elleniche della metallurgia e della chimica. 
 Persino la ultra prudente Svizzera sembra interessarsi allo sviluppo economico 
della Grecia e offerte per il finanziamento di costruzioni idroelettriche sarebbero state 
fatte da holding elvetiche. 
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Tutto ciò premesso, ritengo mio dovere attirare l‘attenzione di Vostra 
Eccellenza sul fatto che, data la personalità di Markezinis, l‘eventuale successo od 
insuccesso della sua progettata visita in Italia avrà un riflesso non solo sui rapporti 
economici fra i due Paesi, ma anche su quelli politici. 
Tale successo può però essere assicurato solo se da parte nostra si è disposti a 
fare delle concessioni. 
Non sembra necessario prevedere da parte nostra sacrifici della nostra 
economia, poichè non si tratta di aumentare l‘importazione di prodotti ellenici atti a 
disturbare il nostro mercato (naturalmente Markezinis insisterà anche su aumento 
delle nostre importazioni dalla Grecia specie per il tabacco). E‘ invece nel settore 
finanziario che Markezinis cercherà di avere anche da noi speciali concessioni. 
Il Governo ellenico sa perfettamente che il Governo italiano non è in grado di 
fornire un credito diretto all‘economia ellenica ma esso spera, con il viaggio di 
Markezinis, di riuscire ad incoraggiare ed a facilitare un eventuale interessamento del 
capitale privato con garanzia statale per gli investimenti che potrebbero essere qui 
effettuati. 
Non si può naturalmente affermare che gli investimenti in Grecia siano essenti 
da rischi. Poichè però non si tratta di veri e propri finanziamenti all‘economia 
ellenica, ma piuttosto di finanziamenti all‘industria italiana per consentire di 
effettuare forniture a medio e lungo termine, il rischio sembra bilanciato o almeno 
attenuato dall‘aumento della produttività italiana. 
Il piano economico ellenico è già conosciuto dal Ministero a seguito delle mie 
precedenti comunicazioni. Unisco comunque una pubblicazione in lingua inglese di 
questo Ministero del Coordinamento, relativa al programma di sviluppo industriale. 
Oltre il settore industriale il piano Markezinis prevede sviluppi per l‘economia 
agricola (bonifica e meccanizzazione) e nel settore dell‘energia (in specie 
idroelettrica). In tali settori una nostra collaborazione può particolarmente svilupparsi. 
Malgrado gli impegni già presi nel settore della distribuzione dell‘energia 
elettrica con la Francia e quelli nei settori metallurgico, chimico e probabilmente altri 
che verranno presi con la Germania, ritengo che esistano ancora occasioni favorevoli 
ed interessanti per l‘economia italiana. Però è necessario non perdere tempo, 
altrimenti si corre il rischio di vedere sfruttate da altri le migliori possibilità. 
Per il lato formale ritengo opportuno far presente che il Ministro Markezinis è 
particolarmente sensibile ad ogni manifestazione che lo metta in evidenza, anche 
perchè, per rafforzare il suo prestigio interno, ha bisogno di poter dimostrare che gode 
di considerazione internazionale. 
Adolfo Alessandrini 
ITALIA
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FO 371/107479  
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to Anthony Eden (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Report on the internal political situation during 1952 
Athens, February 4, 1953 
Sir, 
The most important event of the year 1952 in Greece was the general election 
in November which brought Field Marshal Papagos and his Greek Rally into power 
with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. The inexorable trend throughout the 
first half of the year towards a change of government, the protracted political crisis at 
the height of an already hot summer, which culminated in the proclamation of fresh 
elections, and the first results of the Field Marshal‘s administration will be the theme 
of the annual review which I have the honour to submit in the present despatch. 
2. The year opened with the liberal-EPEK Centre Coalition Government of
General Plastiras and Monsieur Venizelos in a reasonably confident mood and 
seemingly determined to govern despite the Rally‘s incessant chorus that the previous 
elections had given them no title to office. The new Constitution, on which the Rally 
had refused to vote, was brought into effect on the 1st January, and the Government 
even took the offensive against the Field Marshal by re-opening an enquiry, which 
they hoped would reduce his popularity, into a secret league of anti-Communist army 
officers, called IDEA, with which he had previously been associated, as also into the 
short-lived insurrectionary movement in his favour on the 30th-31th May, 1951, 
which followed his resignation as Commander-in-Chief. But fortunately both The 
King and the Americans intervened to prevent the armed forces from becoming 
involved in an unsavoury political squabble, and an amnesty was granted to all who 
had been connected with either movement. 
3. The political temperature rose rapidly. The Rally were convinced –and not
without reason– that the Palace was in league with the Government to thwart them by 
any means, and although the attitude of the Field Marshal himself towards The King 
was impeccable, the Rally Press gave vent to their feelings in a constant stream of 
abuse against The King‘s entourage. Meanwhile the Field Marshal began a series of 
provincial tours, during which he denounced the Government and all its works (there 
was little enough evidence of these in the neglected country-side) and demanded fresh 
elections immediately on the majority system. The effect of these attacks was 
enhanced by the unedifying spectacle of partisan squabble within the Coalition itself, 
which was further weakened when in the 9th March General Plastiras was 
incapacitated by a stroke. To implement their appeasement programme the 
Government were engaged in drafting legislation providing for the release of large 
numbers of persons who had been in detention or deportation for their part in the 
Communist bandit war. The Liberals were unwilling to go as far or as fast in their 
respect as their EPEK colleagues desired: and their disagreement developed into an 
open crisis when Beloyannis and three other Communist spies were shot on the 30th 
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March, in despite of the known feelings of the rank and file of the EPEK party. The 
Coalition was now straining in all joints, but a breach was avoided and the leniency 
law was finally passed in April. 
4. Meanwhile the Government were in serious trouble with the Americans. 
Profiting by the illness of the Prime Minister, who was known to hold opposite views, 
Monsieur Venizelos and the Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Rendis, tried to secure 
proportional electoral system, to which the Americans were likewise known to have 
the strongest objections. These were somewhat bluntly expressed in a public 
statement by the United States Ambassador, which provoked a tart rejoinder from the 
Government and a series of remarkably vicious anti-American articles in the Greek 
Government‘s press. At this point, in March, the Rally launched their first big 
parliamentary attack against the Government whom they accused of undermining the 
morale and efficiency of the armed forces and of jeopardizing public security by the 
release of unrepentant Communists. Although the Coalition secured a vote of 
confidence the initiative remained with their opponents, as was proved a few days 
later when the Government was forced to accept the Rally‘s demand for the removal 
of the Minister of Defence, who had published an order of the day which contained 
criticism of Field Marshal Papagos. The total abstention of the Rally deputies from 
parliamentary business for three weeks in connection with this incident exacerbated 
political tempers still further besides demonstrating a party discipline which belied the 
rumours being assiduously spread by the Government to the effect that the Rally was 
about to disintegrate. 
5. In the early summer individual defections from the parliamentary ranks of 
both Liberals and EPEK rendered the Government‘s position still more precarious and 
when, at the beginning of August, General Plastiras returned from his treatment in 
France no more capable than before of providing effective leadership, it was widely 
recognised that, since the Field Marshal steadfastly refused all offers of a three-party 
coalition, there was not solution to the deadlock which was paralyzing the life of the 
country but a fresh appeal to the electorate. On the 18th August the Chamber was 
called back from its summer recess at the request of the Opposition, who declared that 
the country was on the brink of disaster. Once again the Government managed to 
secure a vote of confidence, but as their supporters now numbered less than half the 
total of the House, the Opposition demanded their immediate resignation. 
6. The Government did not at once comply but tabled a draft bill providing for 
the introduction of the majority electoral system with certain modifications designed 
to suit their partisan interests in the elections which were now regarded as inevitable. 
This was finally passed on the 3rd October and the Government resigned on the 10th. 
Their primary motive in so doing was undoubtedly their realisation that their narrow 
and fluctuating majority gave them insufficient power to govern in the face of the 
unremitting hostility of the Opposition. An important secondary consideration 
however was their desire to reap the popularity which they thought would accrue to 
them from two recent measures: namely the reduction of the military service term to 
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24 months, and the expropriation of large estates (including the British owned Lake 
Copais property) for the resettlement of landless peasants. 
7. The economic backcloth against which these political events were played
was almost unrelievedly sombre. The announcement at the end of the previous year 
that the ceiling of United States‘ economic aid for the twelve months ending 30th 
January, 1952, had been fixed at $182 million meant that no new reconstruction 
projects could be launched and even that some already under way would have to be 
curtailed. Professor Varvaressos, a distinguished Greek economist on the staff of the 
International Bank, was invited to Greece to advise on the economic situation, but his 
recommendations for a drastic overhaul of the public services and a serious long-term 
economic programme were shelved. Under American pressure the Government 
pursued a policy of severe credit restriction designed to check inflation, to compel the 
hoarders to disgorge their gold sovereigns, and to reduce prices by forcing stocks of 
commodities on to the market. In all this they were only partially successful. After an 
initial run on gold, sales almost ceased and the price of the sovereign dropped 
considerably. Inflation was contained but the cost of living continued to rise and the 
plight of Greek workers and peasants to deteriorate. Unemployment grew and 
demands for wage increases, legitimate enough in themselves, had to be refused for 
fear of increasing inflationary pressure, which gave rise to sporadic strikes. 
Production costs remained exorbitantly high –and especially the all-important tobacco 
crop– were unable to compete on the world market without subsidies which the 
national budget could not stand. Although the Minister of Co-ordination did his able 
best to balance the budget and energetically pursued tax evaders, his efforts were 
constantly being thwarted by his colleagues‘ disinclination to endorse unpopular 
measures when elections were believed to be imminent, and by August the 
exasperated Americans had reached the conclusion that nothing but a change of 
Government could save the country from economic collapse. 
8. In foreign affairs, certain encouraging developments took place, but it must
be recorder that the Coalition‘s dealings with Greece‘s major allies were such that 
Anglo-Greek and Greek-American relations had deteriorated considerably by the time 
Parliament was finally dissolved. 
9. There was a steady improvement in relations with Yugoslavia and an
exchange of parliamentary delegations in July and August was followed a month later 
by the arrival in Athens of a Yugoslav Military Delegation. Trade and tourism 
between the two countries was encouraged and further batches of abducted children 
were repatriated. The rapprochement with Turkey proceeded with the speed and 
exuberance of a first romance. In January Monsieur Venizelos made an official visit 
to Ankara which was returned by the Turkish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in April, while The King and Queen of the Hellenes paid a highly successful 
state visit to Turkey in June. Visas were abolished between the two countries in 
September, and agreement in principle was also reached on a settlement of a 
longstanding dispute about the fishing grounds off the coast of Asia Minor. This was 
unfortunately not ratified and continuing seizure of Greek fishing boats by Turkish 
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patrol vessels, together with occasional tart references to Turkish claims on Cyprus, 
provided the only discordant note in this otherwise harmonious duet. The good-
neighbourly embrace was also extended to Italy. Visas were abolished in August, and 
an Italian Military Delegation paid a good will visit to Greece in October. But there 
was little real warmth in this relationship, and before the creation of General 
Wyman‘s South-East Europe Command the Greek Government had not hesitated to 
state emphatically that they would never accept the placing of their forces under an 
Italian General. 
10. The Greeks were immensely gratified by their formal admission in
February to membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This greatly 
increased their sense of security –as was illustrated by their intemperate reaction to a 
minor Bulgarian provocation on the Evros River frontier in July– and opened up to 
them attractive vistas of additional foreign aid. Although the Greek High Command 
was always in greater or lesser degree involved in internal politics, the re-organisation 
and re-equipment of the Greek armed forces went steadily forward, and about one half 
of the national budget continued to be devoted to defence expenditure.  
11. Throughout the Coalition Government‘s tenure of office their press did not
hesitate at the least provocation to vilify the Americans collectively and individually, 
and to declare them responsible for all the evils which beset present day Greece. 
Relations with the United Kingdom were equally troubled. The decision to dispense 
with the service of the British Police Mission in January and of the Military and Air 
Missions in April, though primarily taken for reasons of economy, had much of 
‗dropping of the pilot‘ about it. In their desire to distract attention from the dismal 
scene on the home front the Government allowed the agitation whipped up by the 
Orthodox Church in favour of the union of Cyprus with Greece to degenerate into 
street demonstrations, though they resisted the insistent demand of Archbishop 
Makarios of Cyprus, who spent nearly two months here in the summer, that they 
should raise the question at the United Nations Assembly. Their recognition in June of 
King Farouk‘s title to the Sudan, as also the expropriation of the Lake Copais 
Company, were further causes of friction between Greece and the United Kingdom. 
The deterioration of Anglo-Greek relations, for which Monsieur Venizelos was to a 
large extent personally responsible, did not, however, reflect any weakening of the 
fundamental bond between the two countries, the strength of which was apparent 
from the spontaneous nation-wide grief with which the news of The King‘s death was 
greeted in February, as also from the great warmth of welcome accorded to Lord 
Halifax and others, who attended the unveiling in April of a Greek Memorial to the 
men of the Commonwealth who felt in defence of this land in 1941. 
12. The elections of the 16th November blew like a fresh wind through a stale
room. The caretaker administration, headed by Monsieur Kioussopoulos, which 
governed during the electoral period, did its job well and the fight was a fair one. The 
Liberal and EPEK parties, who presented a joint list, denounced Papagos as a would-
be dictator, whilst the Rally contended that the choice lay between Papagos and 
Communism, since the Centre were manifestly incapable of governing. The extent of 
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the Rally‘s victory –239 seats out of a total of 300– was primarily attributable to the 
candidature of the crypto-Communist EDA party, which split the left wing vote with 
EPEK: but there is no doubt that the Field Marshal would have secured a majority 
even without this circumstance. 
13. The new Government, which took office on the 19th November, embarked
at once upon a policy of retrenchment and reform. Numerous committees and 
redundant civil servants, thousands of whom clutter the Greek state machine, were 
dismissed and all further appointments forbidden, whilst urgent work was begun on 
plans for the decentralisation of the administration, for the attraction of foreign private 
capital, and for a long overdue reorganisation of the hopelessly inefficient banking 
system. At the same time far reaching changes of personnel took place in the high 
command of the armed forces and of the police, as also in many civilian departments 
of state. Opinions differed about the wisdom of some of these changes, but there was 
no denying that a firm hand was at the helm. 
14. In foreign affairs the new Government continued the policy of good
neighbourliness which they had inherited. The state visit of the Turkish President in 
November was an undoubted success, and a further exchange of military delegations 
between Belgrade and Athens brought Greece and Yugoslavia still closer to the goal 
of joint defence planning. There was a marked improvement in relations with the 
Americans, and it was evident from the anodyne reference to the Cyprus question in 
the Government‘s anxiety to negotiate an amicable settlement of the Lake Copais 
question, that the Prime Minister was sincere in his avowed wish to see the Anglo-
Greek relations restored to their old basis of was friendship. 
15. The year which, save for a few bright interludes, had been so drab and
inglorious, thus ended on a note of sober hopefulness. The impact of the Field 
Marshal‘s personality was considerable and it came at a moment when the Greek 
people had lost faith in the professional politicians. He has promised to create an 
honest and efficient administration, to lift Greece out of the economic slough and to 
restore her prestige abroad. If he succeeds, he will indeed have saved this country for 
the third time. The stakes are high, but so are the risks. For his advent to the political 
scene has completely destroyed the old balance of parties and, should he fail, he 
would leave behind him a dangerous vacuum which Communism would assuredly 
seek and might even seek successfully to fill. 
I have the honour to be 
with the highest respect, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant 
Charles Peake 
_________________________________ 
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FO 286/1341  
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to  Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office)  
 
Subject: The anti-British riots in Athens 
Athens, May 9, 1956 
 
Sir, 
The serious riots in Athens on the 9
th
 of May, on which I reported in my 
telegrams Nos 344 and 353, were brought about as the result of a demonstration 
organized by the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus with Greece. The 
population of the city were informed by handbills and by loudspeaker cars that the 
committee‘s chairman Dorotheos, the recently elected Archbishop of Athens, would 
address a public meeting of protest in the main square of Athens at 3 p.m. that 
afternoon. Some 30,000 people attended and heard a vindictive and rabble-rousing 
speech by the archbishop. His concluding advice that they should go home quietly 
was naturally ignored, as it was probably meant to be by about 5,000 of the crowd 
who moved off in the direction of the embassy in angry mood. At the same time after 
the (polite) telephone call to the Counselor of her Majesty‘s Embassy a small 
delegation handed in to the Head Chancery Messenger a copy of the resolution passed 
by the meeting, of which a translation is enclosed. It will be seen that the Greeks are 
still unable to decide whether Karaolis was innocent of the crime of which he was 
accused or had carried out a fine piece of work.  
2. The crowd of demonstrations came into collision with the police cordons in 
Churchill Street and Academy Street. In the first the shooting was started by the 
demonstrators: they fired first, the police fired back, as they claim over the heads of 
the crowd: at least thirty shots were exchanged. In Academy Street the police 
apparently became rattled and opened fire from the officer in charge. An official 
enquiry is being held about the riot, and a number of demonstrators and a police 
officer have been detained. Three people were killed altogether and a very substantial 
number injured. On the following day, in fact, it proved extremely difficult to secure a 
hospital bed for an emergency case since all places were occupied by casualties from 
the riot.  
3. The Government must, of course, bear a full share of the responsibility for 
having authorized the demonstration. They presumably hoped that this would reduce 
the temperature by giving popular feeling an opportunity to express itself, but after 
their experience of the 10
th
 to 12
th
 of March (my despatch No57) they should have 
known better. The Chief of Police has informed a member of my staff that permission 
for the demonstration was given without the security forces having been consulted. 
There has so far been no further public demonstration, due, I think, to the widespread 
shock at the outcome of that held on the 9
th
 of May.  
4. It is my strong impression, however, that Greek public opinion has been 
deeply embittered by the executions in Cyprus, and that the statements by the Prime 
Minister, the Opposition leaders ant the articles in the press claiming that a century‘s 
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Anglo-Greek friendship is now at an end and expressing horror and outrage at the 
Governor‘s decision, fairly reflect popular feeling. For the first time people in the 
shops and in the street have shown signs of antagonism to individual English, and I 
expect that the social boycott imposed on members of this embassy after the 
September riots and again after the deportation of Makarios will on this occasion last 
somewhat longer than hereto and in unlikely to be completely lifted for a long time to 
come. An example of the depth of feeling is that a Greek couple who were both 
decorated for gallantry during the last war, the husband with the King‘s Medal for 
Gallantry and the wife with the George Medal, have jointly returned these decorations 
to me despite the fact that the woman‘s mother is English and the family has long and 
close connections with the British. (The decorations are being forwarded to you under 
cover of me y despatch No 91). 
5. As to the future, I can only hope that the Government have learned their
lesson from the riot of May 9 and will keep a tighter hand in future in the interest of 
public order. Fortunately, the police force remains sound and we must be thankful for 
the efficient way in which it has carried out its duties. There is however to be a debate 
I the Greek Parliament on the 21
st
 of May in which the Government will be under
attack by the Opposition for having failed to prevent the execution and for their 
responsibility for the rio, which may produce further popular reactions. I should 
nevertheless, expect that, apart from the risk of an odd fanatic, we are now over our 
more pressing difficulties.  
I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Cyprus.  
Charles Peake 
__________________________________ 
FO 371/123850  
Anthony Lambert (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Concerning Greece‘s Foreign policy and what H.M‘s Government‘s policy 
should be towards Greece 
Athens, August 29, 1956 
Sir, 
The account of the circumstances surrounding the Greek Government‘s refusal 
of Her Majesty‘s Government‘s invitation to the Suez Conference, which I had the 
honour to furnish in my despatch No. 153 of the 16th August, raises two important 
questions. Where does Greece stand in the world to-day, and what should be Her 
Majesty‘s Government‘s policy towards her? 
2. To the first of these questions the Greek leaders themselves would no doubt
reply somewhat as follows. Greek relations with the United States of America are 
unaltered, and their loyalty to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is unimpaired. 
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They would be glad to see new life infused into the Balkan Pact, and to restore their 
relations with Turkey. They are also greatly concerned at the deterioration of relations 
with the United Kingdom. They remain firmly Western and anti-Communist in 
outlook. Meanwhile they have ties of ―friendship‖ with Egypt and the other Arab 
States. 
 3. All this look unexceptionable, and conforms to the pattern of foreign 
relations which Greece would be expected to follow in the post-war world. But when 
one comes to examine it a little more closely, one sees ominous cracks in the façade. 
It is true that the Americans have tended to support the present Government as being 
the only alternative to a swing to the left. But at the best United States interest in 
Greece is fragile and the Greeks themselves regard it as impermanent. 
 4. Greece‘s loyalty to N.A.T.O. is now reduced to little more than lip service. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs himself assured me as recently as the 18th of August 
that Greece would abide by any decision N.A.T.O. might take, even if it were hostile 
to Egypt. But I am beginning to doubt if in the present climate of opinion the 
Government would be able to do so. In any case, Greece‘s actual contribution to 
N.A.T.O. is negligible, and is at the mercy of emotional outbursts against the Turks or 
ourselves. As for the Balkan Pact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that 
the Government would be quite glad to exchange it for a bilateral agreement with 
Yugoslavia. It is true that Greece remains anti-Communist. But she is laying herself 
open to Russian penetration, chiefly through her quarrel with the United Kingdom. 
Such developments as her increasing contacts with the satellites, or the recent visit of 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot look re-assuring to outside observers 
–including those who vote U.S. economic aid. Greek ties of friendship with the Arab 
world consist only of the presence of a large Greek colony in Egypt, and a 
coincidence of views on ―colonialism‖. In almost all other respects their interests are 
diametrically opposed. 
 5. The real position is thus much more fluid and uncertain than the Greek 
political leaders would admit publicly. The political climate, like the physical climate, 
seems to be not quite Europe, nor Asia, not Africa. In confidential talk Greek 
Ministers will admit the existence of grave dangers and pitfalls. The only way to 
avoid them, they say, is for Her Majesty‘s Government to hold out a helping hand. By 
not doing so, it is though in Athens and probably also in Washington, we are driving 
Greece into the arms of Russia.  
 6. The thesis is all too familiar and is one which is at present being used by the 
Greek political leaders in conversation with the American Embassy. However, even 
discounting that pact which is designed to make American flesh creep, I believe it is 
true to say that if things go on as they going at present, Greece may find herself 
drifting ever more rapidly either towards the Arab States or the Iron Curtain. 
Neutralism, of which there is so much talk in Athens these days, could, at best, be a 
pressing phase. Greece is too small and too weak a country to maintain herself in 
equilibrium between two or more power blocs for very long. 
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7. It is generally assumed that the Americans would never allow such a
dangerous situation to develop; yet there may be, in certain conditions, a point of no 
return, after which it would become politically impossible for even the Americans to 
draw Greece back into the Western orbit. That point would, no doubt, be reached if 
Greece were to sever her connection with N.A.T.O. The Greek Government are 
therefore faced with a very real and urgent problem, since it is they who must take the 
first step to help themselves. 
8. Meanwhile, I suggest that the time has come when Her Majesty‘s
Government‘s own policy towards Greece should be reviewed in the light of the 
present distinctly fluid situation. 
9. There are, perhaps, three ways of looking as the problem:
(i) We could try and bring the Greeks to their senses by a vigorous exposure of
their misdeeds, or by the threat of exposure. I assume that we have, or will
shortly have, ample material with which to do this.
(ii) We could do what the Greeks would like us to do and work out a political
solution of the Cyprus problem which would satisfy us and the Turks. We
would then endeavour to persuade the Greek Government to associate
themselves with it or, at least, not dissent from it.
(iii) We could press on with the pacification of Cyprus and leave Greece
severely alone with both insofar as open criticism of their policy and any
diplomatic moves were concerned.
10. Of these three courses, the success of the first would depend upon the
emergence in Greece of a statement of the stature of the late Eleftherios Venizelos. 
Failing that –and I see no signs of it at present– I fear that instead of driving the sheep 
into the fold, we should end by scattering them completely. The indictment of 
Archbishop Makarios, which has just been published, goes, in my view, just as far in 
this direction as it is advisable to go at present. That is to say, apart from justifying 
Her Majesty‘s Government‘s policy, it unmistakably points to Greek complicity in the 
activities of EOKA without actually attacking or naming the present government. I 
suspect that the probable existence of later documents of the same nature as Grivas‘ 
diary may at the moment be giving the Greek Government cause for serious 
reflection. 
11. The second course of action open to us is clearly what the Minister for
Foreign Affairs had in mind during the conversation I had with him on the 18th of 
August and which I recorder in my telegram No. 614. It has considerable merits in 
that, if successfully carried out, it might neutralise the Greek Government for some 
considerable time to come. I assume, however, that recent events have ruled it out for 
the moment. Whether we should be able to return to it when violence in Cyprus has 
finally been brought to an end remains to be seen. 
12. The third choice open to us –to leave Greece alone– has all the defects of a
negative policy. Yet I believe it to be the only possible one in present circumstances. I 
suggest that it should be examined under two separate, though related aspects. 
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13. In the first place our principle and most urgent concern is the pacification
of Cyprus and the assurance of a decent future for the islanders. The Greek 
Government‘s part in this has consisted mainly of attacking Her Majesty‘s 
Government on the international plane, and encouraging terrorism, either directly or 
by means of propaganda. The first of these activities has caused us an infinity of 
trouble, but, I suggest, not much actual harm. The Greek Government themselves, 
though resolved still to have recourse to the United Nations, no longer hope to derive 
any advantage out of such an appeal. They seem to realize that it was a mistake ever 
to launch it in the first place, and they only wish they could get out of it now. The 
logical riposte to the encouragement of violence is to counter-attack. A counter-
attack, in the military sense, is presumably designed to destroy or paralyse the 
―enemy‖. I assume that we do not wish to destroy Greece altogether, but only to deter 
her from a certain course of action. As I have suggested above, I doubt whether an 
open attack on the Greek Government would produce this result. It would be met with 
defiance. Nor, I imagine, would we be supported by the United States Government. 
At the same time we may have to defend ourselves against an onslaught at the 
General Assembly. This is something which the Greeks themselves accept –and rather 
dread. What has the undesired effect upon them is what they conceive to be 
unprovoked attacks. 
14. In the second place, we have to consider the whole field of Anglo-Greek
relations, and the future position of Greece in relation to her allies. Our object here is 
presumably to retain Greece as a respectable member of N.A.T.O. manifestations 
culminated in a refusal to participate in the Suez Conference. Delicate as the position 
in Greece had by that time become, the decision was clearly a wrong one. Not that the 
Greeks would have made any helpful contribution to the debate –as the Greek 
Government‘s own reply admits. But, by refusing, the Government have isolated 
Greece from her allies. As a result the press and public opinion in Athens, and often 
the Government-controlled radio, have swung sharply towards, the side of Nasser. I 
doubt if the Government are now strong enough to go against this current. Indeed, by 
their own decision they have almost lost the power to do so. 
15. I understand from my U.S. colleague that the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who had told me a week ago that the Government felt stronger than hitherto, was now 
talking of the possibility of Mr. Karamanlis resigning even before the appeal to the 
General Assembly. Were he to be replaced by a coalition of Centre Parties I do not 
myself think that we need necessarily look for any drastic change in Greece‘s foreign 
policy either as regards Cyprus or as regards Egypt. Only in the event of elections and 
a pronounced swing to the Left would the trend towards neutralism gain any sudden 
impetus. Nevertheless, it is certainly not in our interest that anything should be done 
at the present time which might have the effect of weakening still further the links 
which still bind Greece to the Western Powers. 
16. My conclusion is, therefore, that, until such time as the Governor of
Cyprus is ready for further political or constitutional moves within the island, Her 
Majesty‘s Government should refrain from any diplomatic moves or public statements 
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involving Greece which might be interpreted in Athens as being definitely hostile. 
This would involve leaving Greece alone so far as possible until the time comes for 
the appeal to the General Assembly to be heard. At the same time we should be ready 
to give the Greek Government an opportunity to declare their concurrence in any 
settlement which may be reached. 
17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty‘s Ambassadors at
Paris, Washington, Cairo and to the Political Officer to the Middle East Forces. 
I have the honour to be, 
with the highest respect, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
Anthony Lambert 
__________________________________ 
FO 371/123851  
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to H. Young (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Greece‘s Foreign Policy 
Athens, November 15, 1956 
Dear Hilary, 
I had a long talk with George Allen yesterday, and found him in a robust 
frame of mind. He told me that Cavendish Cannon, his predecessor, was for ever 
impressing upon the Greeks that they must seek to do business with us about Cyprus 
and that the Turkish interest in the island was unimportant. He himself was taking a 
different line and was trying to convince the Greeks that it was for the first 
importance that they should try to come to some understanding with the Turks, since 
if they did so British difficulties would certainly decrease; and that they owed us 
consideration, since without our help they could hardly have established their 
independence. I saw no reason to quarrel with this point of view.  
In talking of Suez, he said that he thought that there was a good deal more 
understanding of our section in America than had as yet appeared in the American 
press. He did not for a moment believe that Anglo-American friendship had been 
seriously shaken; nor did he believe that the President would ever allow it to be 
shaken if he could prevent it. He thought that many people had been mystified by our 
avowed intention to send troops in for no other purpose than keeping the Israeli and 
the Egyptians apart, when it was clear to everybody that our main preoccupation was 
(and quite rightly in his view) to safeguard the Canal, and perhaps also to deal with 
Nasser once and for all. The American Government loathed Nasser and were almost 
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morbidly sensitive about Russian influence in the Middle East, and, whatever they 
might have to say in public, they could hardly regret the turn which events had taken.  
I sail that, while our conversation was necessarily on a personal and informal 
level, I could not resist the conclusion that Mr. Dulles must bear a very large share of 
any blame which was going about for our action over Suez. Whether or not it was his 
fault, he had succeeded in inspiring the deepest distrust in many British hearts, and, 
though of course I was not speaking for my Government, I was sure that among the 
British public there had seldom been an American Secretary of State who had inspired 
such dislike in his handling of public affairs.  
Before I left, Allen told me that Karamanlis had asked him whether he could 
arrange for him to be received by the President during his visit to the United Nations. 
He had replied that he could take no steps whatever, but that Karamanlis could after 
all try his luck once he had arrived to New York. He had reported this conversation to 
the State Department, who had mildly reproached him for giving Karamanlis any 
encouragement at all to think that the President would see him. The fact that 
Karamanlis has now, according to the press , been invited to the White House seems 
rather odd, but I should suppose that it was arranged by an American Greek, perhaps 
Spiro Skouras, who is known to have a good deal of influence in American 
government circles.  
I am sending copies of this letter to Harold Caccia at Washington and Bob 
Dixon at New York. 
 Yours ever 
 Charles Peake 
_________________________________ 
FO 371/130027  
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to  Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Causes of decline in Anglo-Greek relations 
Athens, April 4, 1957 
Sir, 
In this my farewell despatch from Athens I have the honour to review the 
causes of the sad decline in Anglo-Greek relations during my term here. 
2. The day before I left Belgrade to assume my duties as Her Majesty‘s
Ambassador in Athens, I had luncheon alone with Marshal Tito, who addressed me at 
some length about Yugoslav-Greek relations and the necessity, in view of certain 
dangers which he did not specify, of creating some kind of entente between 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece which might in its way be complementary to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and help to safeguard the interests of those Powers 
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which were, as he described it, dependent upon the West. Since I was unacquainted 
with Greece, a country which I had never previously had the opportunity to visit, I 
contented myself with remarking that it might be best to try to persuade the Greek 
Government to let bygones be bygones. I was thinking, I explained, of the recent civil 
war in Greece, in which the Communists, who proved to be the losing side, got a good 
deal of encouragement by the Yugoslav Government, which had shown itself only too 
ready to harbour any of the Greek rebels who could get over the frontier. Moreover, 
there were still some thousands of Greek children in Yugoslavia and in neighbouring 
countries. If I could announce to the Greek Government, or if better still he could 
instruct the Yugoslav representative in Athens to announce, that his Government was 
prepared to return such of these children as were in Yugoslavia as soon as it was 
convenient for the Greek Government to receive them, I thought this might 
conceivably lay a foundation on which some durable political arrangement could be 
built. Marshal Tito took all this quite well and said that he was determined to reshape 
his Government‘s foreign policy so that it would be adequate to meeting Yugoslav 
necessities, which had of course completely changed since the expulsion of his 
country from the Cominform in 1948. He hoped that I would take whatever 
opportunity came my way to impress upon the Greek Government his desire for a 
durable friendship between the two countries. It was then with this chiefly in mind 
that I left Belgrade on the following day and flew into Athens at about half past five 
on an October evening, to get my first view of the Parthenon in the fading light of the 
evening sun and to meet my new staff. 
3. At this period, although we had handed over responsibility for the financial 
support of the Greek Government to the United States Government, His Majesty‘s 
Government still maintained Naval, Military, Air Force and Police Missions in 
Athens, and it became clear to me, partly from the deference with which I was treated 
upon my arrival by Government and Opposition alike and partly from the respect with 
which the Heads of these respective Missions were treated, that British prestige had 
not suffered as a result of the transference from London to Washington of financial 
responsibility for the welfare of Greece. This state of affairs was not, alas, to continue 
for long. 
4. Mr. Moore Crosthwaite, at that time Chargé d‘ Affaires at His Majesty‘s 
Embassy, in his Annual Review of Greece for 1951, remarked that a fresh impetus 
had been given during that year to the dangerous issue of Cyprus, and anticipated that, 
of the Greek Government pursued this issue, which of course Greek Governments 
would always be tempted to do on account of the favour they could curry with the 
Greek press, serious difficulties might arise. This could, not seriously significant on 
my arrival, became larger and more lowering during 1952. Street demonstrations in 
favour of Enosis began to take place, though it is right to say that Archbishop 
Makarios‘ insistent demand, maintained during a two-month-long stay here in the 
summer of that year, to raise the matter at the United Nations was, for the time being, 
successfully resisted. Against this background, the economic condition of the country 
continued sombre, though the election of Field Marshal Papagos and the Greek Rally 
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assembled under his leadership by an overwhelming majority in the same year gave 
some hope that progress in economic rehabilitation would be made during this 
Government‘s lifetime. 
5. The following year was, save in one respect, rather brighter all round. Field 
Marshal Papagos and his ―Rally‖ Government could be credited with a considerable 
measure of success on the home front. The devastating earthquakes in the Ionian 
Islands, as a consequence of which Her Majesty‘s Government and the British public 
at once came forward with generous measures of assistance, were on the whole dealt 
with creditably by the Greek Government. It was during this year that the Tripartite 
Balkan Friendship Pact was signed at Ankara; ministerial meetings of the three 
Powers concerned took place in Athens, and in November a parallel series of tripartite 
military talks was held, which went a good way to producing an agreed defence plan 
against any attack from the North. Economic relations with Germany developed and 
some progress was made towards improving Greek relations with Italy. 
Unfortunately, while all this was happening the Greek press devoted its efforts ever 
more and more blatantly to its campaign of slander against the Government of 
Cyprus. For this I have not yet found any rational explanation. The Greek 
Government had an unassailable majority in the Chamber and had frequently 
expressed its gratitude to the United Kingdom as one of its principle allies in the fight 
against Communism. Why therefore the opportunity should have been taken at that 
particular moment to press the claim for Enosis it is hard to decide. But this is a 
problem which will fall to be discussed somewhat later in the course of this despatch. 
6. The clouds which gathered in 1954 and which are recorded in my review 
for that year, closed down heavily in 1955; it was then that Filed Marshal Papagos 
died. His powers had been failing for more than a year before his decease, but in spite 
of that and in spite of his faults he had shown the qualities of a leader and enjoyed a 
prestige which no-one in Greece has been able to command since his passing. Touchy 
as he had been on the subject of Enosis, he well knew the value to Greece of her 
traditional friendship with the United Kingdom and with his death the more violent 
and unruly elements which had in some sense been kept in leash while he was alive 
got their liberty. Moreover, the so-called Greek Rally which he had created came to 
an end. 
7. It is unnecessary that I should recount here the particular events which since 
1955 have so corroded Anglo-Greek relations. Once again the annual review 
furnished by this Embassy to the Department provides the calendar of events and a 
commentary on them. What it now falls to me to do is to make some assessment of 
Greek mentality and to attempt what must necessarily be a superficial enquiry into the 
reasons which have made the Greeks both irresponsible and next impossible to deal 
with in international affairs. 
8. Greece, it will be remembered, has historically depended for her 
independence, security and continued existence upon the protection of a great Power 
or of an association of several Powers. In the past, however, this protection has on the 
whole been exercised only in a general way leaving to the Greeks a reasonable 
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responsibility for their own affairs; and in return for it Greece has been expected and, 
from time to time, obliged to conform to the wishes of the dominant Power in matters 
of import. 
9. In Greece‘s present situation neither of these two conditions seem to apply: 
since the last world war the defence of Greece has been largely organised and paid for 
from outside, first and foremost by ourselves and later by the Americans, and more 
recently her admission to N.A.T.O. has come to provide her with a guarantee of her 
security. And though the United States are now exercising the role of a protecting 
Power more toughly than their predecessors both in their preponderance of force and 
in the extent of economic and military assistance, and consequent penetration of 
Greece‘s affairs, which they provide, they do not exercise any proportionate degree of 
authority or control over Greek policy. For example in the matters of whole-hearted 
Greek cooperation in N.A.T.O., particularly in service exercises by that organisation, 
and of Greek participation in the first Suez Conference, the Greeks have successfully 
flouted American wishes. 
10. The consequence of this situation has been to demoralise Greek political 
life and to include a mood of irresponsibility, in the present Greek Government and in 
Greek political circles generally. They are demoralised because they are no longer 
compelled to rely upon their own judgment and efforts to achieve national security 
and solvency and they are irresponsible because they think that, no matter what they 
do, the United States and N.A.T.O. will keep them out of trouble; they are therefore 
not concerned to consider seriously the consequences of their present actions. Since, 
like the Poles, they are romantics at heart these grave responsibilities do not bother 
them unduly. 
11. The way in which the Greek Government have allowed the Cyprus 
question to develop to the point where it excludes all other considerations in Greek 
thinking about foreign affairs and their cavalier rejections of the Colonial Secretary‘s 
approach seem to be consistent with the above hypothesis, and in fact the principal 
demonstration of its effects. 
12. Because the United States is not a principal in the Cyprus question, the 
Greek Government has so far succeeded in avoiding any important differences with 
their American friends about it, but if as a result of the Suez crisis the United States 
are going to concern themselves more directly with the security of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East they will presumably show more immediate 
concern to bring about a settlement of the Cyprus problem. It would seem that the first 
essential is for the United States Government to recognise that Greek policy can only 
be kept on the right lines if the protecting Power for the time being is ready to use its 
position in a positive way. The Greeks have got into the way of thinking that the 
Americans will allow them free rein and until they are disabused we shall get nowhere 
towards any settlement about Cyprus which is not Enosis. And Enosis, if by our 
inertia or weariness with the persistent and relentless propaganda of the Hierarchy of 
Greek and Cypriot bishops it comes to pass, may well so embitter Greece‘s relations 
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with Turkey that all hope of a lasting reconciliation may recede yet further, with all 
the attendant risks of serious incidents and even armed conflict. 
I have the honour to be, 
with the highest respect, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
Charles Peake.  
________________________________ 
FO 371/130014  
Sir Roger Allen (Embassy Athens) to  Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Sir Roger Allen‘s first impressions of Greece 
Athens, September 26, 1957 
Sir, 
I have the honour to send you in this despatch some of my first impressions of 
Greece. I have been in this country for over four months, and it seems time now, if 
ever, to make an attempt to gather together some thoughts on Greece and the Greeks 
as they appear to a newcomer, but in doing so, I am only too conscious of the fact that 
the more dogmatic one‘s generalisations appear to be, the less likely they to be 
founded on anything concrete. Apart from the normal difficulty of generalising on the 
basis of insufficient knowledge, the situation in Greece to-day is in some ways 
exceptional, and so inevitably one sees everything through a lens which destroys to 
some extent. 
2. At the outset I must admit that I have not, for various reasons, had occasion
yet to see nearly as much of the country as I should have liked. Nevertheless, perhaps 
the first impression of a newcomer is that Greece is in appearance and way of life at 
least halfway to the Levant. There is nothing really surprising in this, since after all 
Greece lies geographically right on the south-east fringe of Europe, cut off on the 
landward side by high and until recently almost impenetrable mountains. On the other 
hand, the sea routes to the Levant have always been open. Athens to-day is a curious 
mixture of East and West, a huge, narrow, sprawling city, stretching from the modern 
residential suburb of Ekali in the north-east for some 20 miles to the jumble of old 
houses and the commercial port of Piraeus in the south-east. One does not have to go 
far from the new and comparatively well-built centre of the town to find the squalid, 
dust-blown settlements originally put up by the refugees from Asia Minor and still 
looking like the suburbs of almost any Middle Eastern city. In the country, too, 
conditions are generally primitive; the sanitation except in the main centres is strictly 
limited; though the main trunk roads have been greatly improved in the last few years, 
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other roads vary from bad to almost impassable; the climate in summer in Attica is 
scorching; and the general air of dilapidation and the signs of a primitive standard of 
life are unmistakable. Although one knows very well that there is nothing unexpected 
in all this, yet to many people it does come with a faint shock of surprise. Greece, for 
the average educated West European, has for so long been regarded as the ―cradle of 
European civilisation‖ that it is perhaps natural for him to imagine her, almost 
involuntarily, as a kind of Keatsian paradise, a pillar‘d and portico‘d Arcadia, 
inhabited by warrior-shepherds, nymphs and sages, and surrounded by verdant islands 
set in a blue sea. In reality, the country varies greatly from one area to another, and 
preconceived ideas are sometimes disappointed. 
3. The second impression, and one connected with the first, is that modern
Greece seems to have nothing in common with the Greece of classical times. True, 
there are the ruins of antiquity scattered over the stony hills and plains of Attica, in 
the Peloponnese, in Crete, in Boeotia, and elsewhere, and one is perhaps inclined to 
build too much on this. No one, however, expects the modern Englishman to have 
much in common with the ancient Briton on the strength of the existence of 
Stonehenge and a few tumbledown cromlechs. No one expects to find traces of a 
Druidical civilisation in the customs of Chelsea to-day. Why therefore should we 
expect modern Greeks to behave like Socrates or Pericles? Perhaps again the answer 
is that the ancient Greeks have left memorials of themselves, literary, sculptural, 
architectural, which have been familiar to us for so many generations; even the place 
names in Greece carry so many associations for us; and the Greeks themselves have 
taken such pains to cultivate the myth of their spiritual descent from their classical 
ancestors, that sometimes we tend to overlook the intervening centuries. The fact is 
that the historical influences which count most in modern Greece seem to be 
Byzantine and Turkish. The power of the Orthodox Church is still considerable. The 
vast majority of Greeks are peasants and their way of life does not seem to have 
changed much since the Turkish occupation. The pashas have gone, but the donkeys 
and the goats remain. 
4. It is true that there is, in Athens at any rate, a veneer of modern European
civilisation. Athenian society may be stratified roughly as follows: the monarchy, 
polite society, the political world, and the rest. The monarchy, of course, is West 
European in origin, and for that reason alone, alien. Apart from this, however, and 
despite the great efforts made by their Majesties in all fields open to them, and 
especially through such institutions as the King‘s and the Queen‘s Funds, and despite 
their considerable personal qualities, I fear that the average Greek still does not feel 
that monarchy itself is a native and natural institution. One does not actually come 
across many traces of strong republican sentiment, but equally one does not gain the 
impression that the monarchy is very deeply rooted in the lives of the people. Even 
Athenian society does not seem to care very much. It is true that there is a certain 
number of ladies who devote time to good works, mostly under royal patronage, but 
society does not appear to centre round the Court and Royal Family to any marked 
degree. Athenian society indeed seems preoccupied, first, with money-making; 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
109 
second, with feminine fashions and parties; and third, with politics. The political 
world impinges of course on the social. But the professional politician is above all a 
professional. He cares little for the opinion of the people as such, a good deal for 
newspaper opinion, but most of all for the opinion of his fellow-politicians because it 
is on this that he chances of advancement so largely depend. As for the rest of the 
population of Athens, doubtless they exist, but the professional or artisan classes do 
seem to have less standing than in most Western European countries. 
5. Athens to-day has something of the look of the boom town, with new blocks
of flats going up, new streets being laid, large American cars, and comparatively well-
stocked shops. Even outside Athens considerable efforts are being made to attract the 
tourist trade. But the actual Greek trading deficit in 1956 was £86 millions on a total 
figure for imports of £161 millions including £4-5 millions of surplus agricultural 
commodities provided free by United States welfare organisations; in other words, the 
value of imports was rather more than double that of exports. The difference is mostly 
made up by invisible earnings, including remittances from Greeks overseas, to the 
amount of £53 millions, and United States aid to the amount of £28 millions. 
Unemployment is heavy, though the actual figures are not known. Taking into 
account underemployment and seasonal unemployment, which are particularly wide-
spread among the agricultural population, it is estimated that, in addition to about 
150,000 urban unemployed, there are some 900,000 agricultural workers, who are 
employed for less than 100 days in each year. Thus, for more than two-thirds of the 
year, over one-eighth of the total population of Greece is unemployed. No actual 
figures of average wages are available, but the national statistical services have 
calculated the annual per capita income in Greece as £65, which is said to be the 
lowest in Europe and compares with £121 per annum in Italy and £215 per annum in 
France (and £644 in the United States). The emigration figures, which are only 
available since 1951, show that in the last six years no few than 120,000 indigent 
Greeks have left Greece to seek their fortunes abroad. Greece therefore is, by Western 
standards, a very poor country. The present Greek Government are making efforts to 
improve economic conditions and to attract foreign capital investment, but it will take 
many years at best before they can effect a radical improvement. 
6. The picture, then, seen by the newcomer is one of a busy, intensely self-
centred urban society based in sub-structure of a more or less unchanging peasantry. 
The two sections may be less remote from one another than might appear. Greece has 
never had an hereditary aristocracy. The so-called ―older families‖ who emerged into 
political prominence during and after the War of Independence can hardly be 
described as such, and in any case many of them have now lost a great part of their 
capital in the inflations which followed the first and second world wars, or in the land 
reforms, especially that of 1952, which limited individual estates to about 120 acres. 
The rich Greek of to-day has probably made his money comparatively recently, and 
indeed his father or grandfather may well have been illiterate. Often you have only to 
scratch the millionaire to find the peasant. Fortunes may be here to-morrow and gone 
the day after, so enjoy them while you may and do not be afraid of taking risks in 
UNITED KINGDOM
110 
order to get on (otherwise it is certain that you never will get on). All this accords well 
enough with the Greek temperament, which seems to combine what may almost be 
called a genius for gambling and a passionate individualism with the peasant 
characteristics of toughness, cunning and suspiciousness. 
7. The tradition of friendship for England is an old one, as such things go, and
I believe a deep-rooted one. Greece is more used to living under British protection 
than under that of anyone else. Estrangement from us makes her feel lonely and the 
Americans do not fill the gap. The political changes that have taken place here in the 
last ten years can, however, hardly be exaggerated. In 1947, we had just saved Greece 
from a bitter civil war and probable Communist domination. It is true that fighting 
was then still continuing, but the immediate threat had receded, and Britain had 
established such a stake in the country that confidence was already returning. Material 
conditions were very bad, but British prestige could hardly have stood higher. As a 
result of the Truman doctrine, we handed over responsibility gradually from that point 
to the Americans. The British Missions, naval, military, Royal Air Force, and police, 
were one by one withdrawn. The British Embassy ceased to make and unmake Greek 
Governments. The American era had begun. We might nevertheless have maintained 
for many years a specially favoured position, second in influence only to the 
American and far ahead of that of any other country, had it not been for the Cyprus 
issue. Once Greek pride was engaged on that issue, however, the Greeks could not 
give up and Cyprus came to overshadow everything else. The existence of the Cyprus 
issue has ensured a passionate Greek interest in everything we do or say that remotely 
concerns Greece, but it has, of course, shaken Greek faith in us. Britain, from being 
the old and loved friend whose past services must never be forgotten, became almost 
overnight the friend who had wounded Greece so cruelly, the friend therefore who 
was more to be hated that an enemy. The modern Greek, unlike his classical 
predecessor, is not particularly conscious of the virtues of moderation and balance. He 
rushes off at a tangent; and one reason why he is a ―bad‖ enemy is that his reactions 
often defy common sense. 
8. To-day, the Cyprus problem looms so large as to obscure all other aspects
of our relations with Greece. No settlement that gives Greece what she wants seems 
possible, but any settlement which the Greeks feel they can accept, faute de mieuu, 
should in time cease to cloud Anglo-Greek relations. The Greek is, I should say, a 
cheerful soul, not much given to keeping up rancor or brooding on this wrongs. I 
know that the vendetta still exists in parts of Greece, but it is a local phenomenon, 
limited in scope and playing little or no part in normal life. It is perhaps of some 
interest that, according to a recent number of the Economist, the homicide rate in 
Greece is less than that in Finland, for instance, and the suicide rate is less than one-
fifth of the Finnish. The Greek is not, perhaps, easy to manage; but on the other hand 
he rather likes to be managed if it is done in the right way. As my predecessor pointed 
out in his valedictory despatch, Greece has never stood alone. The Greek‘s love of 
intrigue, his love of forms and devices for their own sake, make him more amenable 
to diplomacy than to force; his sense of drama and his egotism lay him open to 
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persuasion and flattery. While it is probably true that our material position in Greece 
will never again be what it once was, still the sentimental bonds between us and the 
Greeks may one day, at least on the Greek side, be as strong as before, if the Cyprus 
question can be settled in such a way that it ceases to be a burning issue for Greece. 
Then we should draw what advantage we can from this sentiment. We could perhaps 
step into a vacant place, that of the European leader. We should not and could not 
attempt to rival the United States, but Greece may respond to the suggestion (which is 
indeed somewhat flattering to her) that she is a ―Western‖ and therefore a European 
country, that she need to put all her eggs in the American basket, politically or 
economically, and that it is to her interest to show that she does belong in fact as well 
as in name to the European comity of nations. Her ties with the United States, where 
there is always likely to be a large and wealthy Greek colony, will remain, but the 
Greek in Greece has for the United States a feeling of resentment and impatience 
mixed with his admiration. The ordinary Greek is not easily going to be fully 
Americanised (any more that he has in fact been Europeanised, if it comes to that); his 
natural inclination is to cling in o the skirts of Europe, and provided he sees some 
material advantage in doing so, and provided he is not divided from Europe by some 
temporary emotional gulf such as that created by Cyprus at present, he will probably 
follow his inclination. At the same time, Greece is more than merely a minor Balkan 
country. She plays a larger part in world affairs than one might expect merely from 
her physical aspect. The Greeks, after all, are a restless people with wide-ranging 
interests, as shown by their reputation as traders, their large overseas communities and 
their great shipping interests. It is their paradox that, with all this, they still physically 
come back, and mentally look back, always to Greece; and this is also their strength. 
It is useless to expect them to be well-behaved, well-disciplined, or neatly integrated 
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Middle East pacts, Balkan alliances, or 
anything else; but if it is worth taking trouble to gain and keep Greek friendship, then 
eventually the way to do it may be for us to show Greece that there is a path along 
which she can follow us towards membership of a more united Western Europe. 
 
I have, &c. 
R. ALLEN. 
 
__________________________________
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FO 371/144519  
Sir Roger Allen (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) 
 
Subject: Greek political troubles 
Athens, December 5, 1959 
 
Sir, 
In my immediately preceding despatch I have described the present economic 
difficulties which beset Greece as a result of the creation of large and unsaleable 
agricultural surpluses. There are political difficulties also in this situation. It will 
readily be imagined that in a poor country like Greece, primarily dependent on 
agricultural products and with large peasant population, any fall in agricultural 
incomes is bound to be most unsettling. In many of the villages, people exist at little 
above the subsistence level, while in richer areas, Government propaganda, the 
creation of new roads and the slight improvements of recent years have led the 
population to expect a steady if slow improvement in their way of life. Wider horisons 
have been opened and new needs created so that any set-back appears intolerable. 
2. I find it hard to say to what extent village incomes have fallen or discontent 
is rife. The Government are constantly publishing figures to suggest that the farmers 
are better off, whilst on the other hand one hears many tales of hardship and 
desperation. The United States Embassy is at present engaged in a careful filed survey 
of the problem and I shall be interested to learn the result. But it is undeniable that 
something is wrong and that agrarian distress, together with continuing 
unemployment it the towns, has made the economic state of the country the central 
political problem of the day. This is especially so because the Cyprus question has 
now almost vanished from the scene and distracts comparatively little attention from 
domestic troubles. During the debate on a vote of confidence which has been taking 
place in Parliament (my despatch No. 121 of yesterday‘s date) the economic state of 
the country was chosen as the main ground for the Opposition attack because it is so 
clearly the Government‘s most vulnerable front. In fact, economic troubles have 
brought about a change of political climate in the last month or so; whereas in the 
summer the position of the Prime Minister and his Government seemed unassailable 
(except for a possible onslaught by Grivas), there is now widespread and rather 
exaggerated speculation that the tide of mounting economic difficulties might 
conceivably overwhelm them. This is, of course, just what most Greek politicians 
who do not at present enjoy office are hoping for, and the agitation in such circles, the 
constant combining and dissolving of unstable elements, the statements of intention 
and denials have all been very noticeable in recent weeks. 
3. The Government‘s first reaction to attack on economic grounds has been for 
Ministers to publish a lot of misleading statistics to show increases in the national 
income, earnings per head of the population, industrial output, etc. Monsieur 
Karamanlis himself has made a number of boastful speeches claiming that Greece‘s 
economic progress over the last few years has been better than that of many other 
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countries. This is dangerous because the Government risk convincing themselves that 
they speak the truth. Yet the Prime Minister does seem to have a vision of the need for 
an all-out economic effort. Unfortunately it is not a very practical vision and his 
tireless efforts have resulted mostly in a paper flood of social and economic 
legislation, plans and schemes, most of which are unlikely ever to turn into sound 
achievement. The truth is that the administration and the experience simply do not 
exist in Greece to bring about all these revolutionary and other contradictory aims. 
This is shown by the behaviour of the Prime Minister himself who, despairing of the 
abilities of his Ministers, progresses around like an assize judge, sitting one day in the 
Ministry of Agriculture to decide on a scheme for diversifying crops, the next day 
presiding in the Ministries of Labour or Social Welfare on some scheme for insurance 
and spending the whole of the day after in the Ministry of Commerce discussing trade 
problems. Progress, if there is any, will be very slow under such a régime. There is 
plenty to complain about, the opposition are constantly drawing attention to it and the 
country knows it. 
4. There is a second problem beside the economic one, but closely united to it, 
which is of great political import at the moment and which formed a companion 
theme in the recent Parliamentary debate. This is the question of Greece‘s relations 
with the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist Bloc. In my preceding 
despatch I have described how the Russians are in a position to relieve Greece of a 
good part of her agricultural surpluses and the determination of the Government to 
accept this only so far as they feel they safely can without being drawn into the Soviet 
economic orbit. Obviously this puts them in a different position at home. The 
Communist dominated E.D.A. ate suggesting that the Government have turned down 
offers of inestimable benefit to the community at the behest of the Americans, while 
the nationalist opposition parties have also been urging the benefits of Soviet Trade. 
The public are well aware of what is going ion and if the economic situation worsens 
they may well turn away from a Government which refuses assistance, even though 
this were preferred by the Devil himself. 
5. The dispute extends to the whole field of Greek-Soviet relations. It is lucky 
for the Russians that they find themselves in a position to bring commercial pressure 
to bear on Greece just at a time when they want to bring her into line with their plans 
for denuclearisation of the Balkans. With the rest of the Western world eagerly 
welcoming the relaxation in international tension, the Government here find 
themselves obliged to pick political quarrels with the Soviet Union in order to create 
excuses for rejecting advantageous trade offers, and the opposition are continuously 
calling attention to this anomalous position. The Russians are well aware of the 
difficulties of the Greeks and are now subjecting them to heavy fire. On the one hand 
Soviet and satellite propaganda has continued to press on the Greeks the advantages 
of the proposals both for regional denuclearisation and a meeting of Balkan Heads of 
Government, while on the other hand it has attacked the Greek Government as out of 
step with the spirit of the times. Mr. Khruschev‘s reference to the suppression of the 
Greek revolution in his speech at Budapest on December 2 was clearly of a 
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threatening nature. Whether it was well-judged is another matter, but the Russians 
must hope that all of this will sooner or later weaken the position of the Greek 
Government. 
6. It is hard to say to what extent these Soviet manoeuvres have been
successful. On the question of denuclearisation the Government have a good answer, 
which is that they are not interested in removing missile bases or atomic bombs from 
the Balkans if they can still be bombed from Soviet territory. This argument seems to 
be more or less accepted by a public which has shown little interest in the subject. The 
Government have also sought to avoid getting into unnecessary trouble on this front 
by avoiding acceptance, for instance, of the proposal to set up American guided 
missile bases on Greek soil or of candidature for the Security Council. It is only very 
recently, however, that they have been led into exacerbating their political relations 
with the U.S.S.R. in order to avoid the economic danger, as I have explained. The 
Glezos stamp and Mr. Khruachev‘s Budapest speech have, it is true, been grist to their 
mill, and they may succeed in working up a wave of popular indignation against the 
Soviet Union, but it is a dangerous game and nearly all the opposition leaders are 
banking on a failure. 
7. In such circumstances, it is natural that everyone should be watching
Grivas, the great unknown on the political stage, to see what he is going to do and 
what use can be made of him for the advancement of personal fortune. In my despatch 
No. 90 of the 23rd of September (15113/218/59) I reported that, on his return to 
Greece from Cyprus, Grivas had first of all chosen to attack the Government with 
criticism of the London and Zurich Agreements, and that this had not proved very 
successful. Since his meeting with Archbishop Makarios on Rhodes in early October 
he has become almost completely silent about Cyprus. It was extraordinary that he did 
not even open his mouth at the time when the Turks were caught smuggling arms into 
Cyprus in the fishing vessel Deniz, although this caused such a stir both among the 
Greek-Cypriots and the Greeks. It is difficult to be sure of his reasons. Undoubtedly 
Makarios, who seems to have an ascendency over him when the two men are together, 
will have shown good reason at Rhodes why Grivas should not interfere publicly in 
the conduct of affairs. It is also known that the Greek politicians who are constantly 
giving their advice to Grivas have been trying to prevent him from making any more 
of his invariably ill-chosen public statement and to convince him that Cyprus is not an 
issue which can bring him to power. But he is not an easy man to ménage and he must 
have had reasons of his own. One of several possibilities is that he has genuinely 
reached the conclusion that it is better to let the Cyprus Agreements go through 
provided that there is nothing too shocking in the final arrangements. His eyes have 
been fixed on the achievement of power in Greece and he would hardly wish to be 
diverted from this by a breakdown in Cyprus and the reopening of EOKA guerilla 
activity. It would be hard to have to resume leadership of the struggle and might be 
equally hard to refuse. Once he has achieved power or once he has abandoned the 
hope of it he might begin to make trouble again, but for the moment there is bigger 
game. Nevertheless, it may, of course, be that the nature of our requirements for the 
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Sovereign Areas may prove too much for him to swallow at the last moment. If, for 
instance, it proved impossible for us to reach agreement in the London Committee on 
our military requirements, so that a postponement of the Cyprus independence date 
became inevitable, this might give Grivas the kind of excuse for which he may be 
looking. At least, it is not to anyone‘s interest to risk it. Indeed, so long as we warn 
the Greek Government in good time of the danger of postponement, they should in 
their own interest try to avoid it, since they cannot be sure that such a postponement 
would not cause Grivas to explode into activity again. But for two months now he has 
seemed content to let matters rest. 
8. Grivas‘ experience during these last months must have been discouraging.
At first he said that he was not willing to enter into combinations with the old gang of 
politicians and that he would only come to power in answer to a call from the people. 
There is no sign of such a call yet. The general impression in Greece is that his 
prestige stands higher in the villages than in the towns. If true, this may partly be due 
to the simpler cast of the peasant mind, with its tradition of popular heroes, and partly 
to agrarian distress. By contrast, Mr. Consul-General Fish has informed me that the 
visit to Salonica was a conspicuous failure and I have reported in may despatch No. 
115 of the 26th November that I found no enthusiasm at all in the wake of his visit to 
Crete. The general opinion seems to be that Grivas has lost support in the country, and 
that unless he does something soon he will be finished. It is probably true that he 
cannot afford to wait indefinitely. How, then, can he stimulate the people‘s call? If it 
comes eventually only as a result of further economic deterioration and of disgust 
with Government corruption and ineptitude, the process may be too slow for him, and 
the call itself too faint. 
9. While waiting for developments, Grivas has belied his earlier statements
and has been in relations with a great number of politicians. If is not that he has 
encouraged them to work with him or made it any easier for them to do so, but his 
associates have been looking for support in every political quarter. The aim has been 
to persuade him to head a movement (which shall not be a political party in deference 
to his wishes) and to be guided by a political general-staff of which they would be 
members. The combinations and groupings of persons offering themselves in this 
capacity have shifted from week to week (and indeed from day to day) and there is no 
point in reporting on them. Or more interest has been the recent half-hearted attempt 
of Monsieur Venizelos to associate himself and his 20 members of the Liberal Party 
with Grivas. Throughout the autumn Monsieur Venizelos had been making common 
cause with Monsieur Markezinis and his Progressive Part. But this alliance collapsed 
at once when the former, in one of his fitful initiatives, suddenly though he saw 
Grivas‘ star in the ascendant and announced that the Liberal Party would give him its 
support, though only while remaining independent and if he looked like winning. 
There has also been the attempt by Grivas‘ admirers to detach twenty or more 
deputies from Monsieur Karamanlis‘ party so as to remove his majority and bring 
about his downfall when required. The key figure required for this manoeuvre 
however, Monsieur Casimatis, has been away at the annual meeting of the World 
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Bank in Washington and has shown no disposition to be lured back to play this 
particular role. Finally, there has been the possibility of an alliance, no matter how 
unnatural, between Grivas and the Communist controlled E.D.A. with their 71 seats in 
Parliament. While there is evidence that the two parties have been in touch, and while 
it is very likely that E.D.A. would lend its votes to Grivas supporters in a 
Parliamentary division to bring Karamanlis down, there are still formidable obstacles 
in the way of any practical working alliance. 
10. Almost all this manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvring, therefore, no
political bloc has emerged in support of Grivas and I doubt if he is doing any better on 
this front than on that of popular mass support. It was noticeable that during the recent 
Parliamentary debate no-one seemed to have Grivas in mind at all. Yet it is hard to 
see how any new group could overthrow the Prime Minister just now without him. 
The main reason for this is that there is no organised nationalist opposition left. The 
small parties of the centre are utterly discredited and scattered and only a saviour 
figure like Grivas could draw a large body of voters away from right and left. 
Everyone deplores this unhealthy fact, for which the word ―polarisation‖ has been 
coined, and it is a theme of constant lamentation in the press, but it explains why, 
although Monsieur Karamanlis and his Government have lost both prestige and 
popularity, they do not look as if they were really endangered as yet. It is significant 
that many people talk in terms of what would happen if the Prime Minister were run 
over by a bus rather than of he fell for political reasons. 
11. My general conclusion is that the present Government is not yet seriously
threatened either by Grivas or from other quarter. But the inter-related problem of 
dealing with economic difficulty and of handling relations with the Soviet Union are 
growing and could in the long run get out of control unless strong measures are taken 
or the Americans increase their help. On the other hand, a crisis of some kind, either 
an economic one or one manufactured by Grivas, could precipitate matters. If the 
Communists and Grivas then combined, there might be a governmental Débâcle. At 
present, however, there seems to be a kind of pause in Greek politics –a slightly 
unease one, perhaps, as is not unusual. If things do get worse, in the time honoured 
tradition of Greek politics, Monsieur Karamanlis might have to be sacrificed; but the 
situation is still too obscure to say how he would be replaced. 
12. I am sending copies of this Despatch to His Majesty‘s Representatives at
Ankara, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia and Washington. 
I have the honour to be, 
with the highest respect, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
Roger Allen 
__________________________________
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FO 371/152972  
Athens Chancery to Southern Department 
Subject: President Eisenhower‘s visit to Athens 
Athens, January 8, 1960  
Dear Department, 
In his despatch No.130 of December 19 about President Eisenhower‘s visit to 
Athens (not copied to all) the Ambassador mentioned the intention of the Greek 
Government to try and convince the President that Greece is at the moment one of the 
main targets of Soviet and communist pressure and that she is in a particularly 
exposed position. This thesis was developed in an article which appeared in the 
December edition of the Government sponsored glossary magazine ―Greek 
Information Bulletin‖ entitled ―The Triptych of new aggression of the Eastern 
Coalition against Greece‖. 
2. The article declared that since the end of the Second World War Greece and
Turkey had become the main target of Soviet aggressiveness. Greece was the first to 
suffer an indirect communist attack when E.A.M and E.L.A.S attempted to seize 
power in December 1944. This attempt was defeated by the moral resistance of the 
Greek people, the intervention of the small free Greek forces from abroad and the aid 
of the very small British forces. After a short interval, the same anti-national forces, 
with the open aid of all neighbouring countries, attempted to overthrow the lawful 
government again. This rebellion, which was rightly called the ―bandit war‖ was 
suppressed after three years struggle of the entire Greek people and after a great part 
of the countryside had been destroyed. The suppression of the rebellion and the 
regrouping of national, political and social forces through free elections, consolidated 
the home front of the country while the Atlantic Alliance ensured its external security. 
In these circumstances, it was possible to re-establish peaceful relations not only with 
Russia but also with some of her Balkan satellites. 
3. The next move of Soviet diplomacy was to adopt a policy of psychological
pressure. This peace offensive was exemplified by the Stoika proposals, the open 
threats which Mr. Khruschev uttered near the Greek-Albanian border and the 
systematic efforts to undermine Greek morale. These efforts were encouraged by the 
Greek elections of 1958 which, through the weakness of the nationalist opposition, 
returned subversive elements as the second parliamentary force. The Stoika proposals 
were revived, the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments deluged Greece with notes 
and the recent statements of the Roumanian Vice-President, Mr. Zoza, and of the 
Soviet Ambassador in Athens, kept up the pressure. The failure of all these direct 
political attacks led to a Soviet attempt to put pressure on Greece by three new 
methods. 
4. The first was the suggestion that the Soviet Union would make a new and
spectacular gesture to Greece in the economic field by offering to buy all Greek 
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agricultural surpluses up to a limit of U.S. $100,000,000. The article recalled that the 
Minister of Commerce, Monsieur Dertilis, had denied these unconfirmed reports 
about the Soviet offer. Monsieur Dertilis had said that it was no mention of it in the 
trade negotiations between Greek and Soviet delegations in Moscow in November. He 
had pointed out that the Greek market would be unable to absorb industrial products 
of the Soviet Union up to anything like the figure of U.S. $100,000,000 because there 
was a consumers‘ preference in Greece for products of the free exchange countries. 
He said that the Soviet Union could not pay in terms of large technical projects 
because they did not take part in competitive international bidding, without which 
Greece would be uncertain whether the project was being done on the most economic 
basis. Greece had already taken measures to increase trade with Soviet Russia and 
with other countries of Eastern Europe. Trade with the Soviet Union in particular had 
increased from $2.3 million in 1955 to $17 million in 1958. Despite all these efforts, 
however, Greece‘s exports of tobacco to the communist bloc represented only 13.9% 
of her total tobacco exports. The article recalled that during the recent negotiations the 
Soviet delegation had persistently refused to increase their purchases of Greek 
tobacco. 
5. The second new method of Soviet pressure was the issue of the Soviet 
stamp bearing the picture of Manolis Glezos with the inscription ―Freedom of the 
hero of the Greek peoples‖. This was an astonishing piece of insolence on the part of 
those who were responsible for innumerable crimes and for the cold-blooded 
assassination of the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy. 
6. The third example of Soviet pressure was Mr. Khrushchev‘s attempt in his 
speech in Budapest to press the perpetrators of the December 1944 rising and to 
describe the immolators of the innocent population as the ―best sons of Greece‖. This 
unprecedented provocation which was made on the eve of the 15th anniversary of the 
frightful massacres of December 1944 had morally revolted the entire Greek people. 
7. The article concluded that this ―sad triptych‖ coming at a time when there 
was much talk of international appeasement and Summit meetings proved that the 
Soviet Union and her satellites did not intend in any way to desist from their 
objectives and provocative methods. Greece, however, had no intention of striking her 
colours and capitulating before the multitude of her opponents, even if it became 
necessary to repeat the heroic acts which in the thousands of years of her history had 
made her the pride of the civilised world. 
8. We are copying this letter to the Chanceries at Belgrade, Moscow, 
Washington, Bucharest and Sofia. 
Yours ever, 
Chancery 
 
_________________________________ 
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FO 371/160407  
Sir Roger Allen to the Earl of Home (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Valedictory dispatch 
Athens, November 6, 1961 
My Lord, 
Anyone who has walked –as I have scores of times during the last four and a 
half years – on the slopes if Lycabettus, that crag rising almost like a lighthouse from 
the confused breakers of the city at its foot, must surely have been struck by the 
contrast between the turmoil of modern Athens in the foreground and the strength and 
serenity of the Acropolis in the middle distance. You look south-westwards over the 
welter of recently built flats and office blocks with their neon signs, and busy streets, 
across to where the Parthenon, perhaps the noblest architectural expression of human 
endeavour in the world, floats majestically on its hill, with the sea shining in the 
distance behind it. The Parthenon symbolises a world of order, restraint, and dignity, 
but still on a human scale; the city around represents current activities, the confusion, 
intrigue, and pre-occupation with the little things which make up daily life. One can 
hardly help thinking how strange that in one and the same country people were 
capable, nearly two and a half millenniums ago, of conceiving and executing the 
Parthenon, and that to-day they are capable of making such a muddle. 
2. Now that I come to write my valedictory despatch, I think (as I thought
when I wrote my first impressions) that one of the most obvious natural 
characteristics of modern Greece, to our eyes, is disorderliness. The Greek is intensely 
individualistic. He puts his house down where he feels like it, regardless of the lack of 
a road, drainage or lighting system. His country is a jumble of mountains in which 
each peasant carries on a one-man struggle against the elements and the soil. 
Standardisation, co-operation, planning are alien to him. He is a brilliant improviser. 
Usually, at the last moment, by superhuman efforts, everything will come off with 
splendid success. The Greek prefers it this way. He then feels that he, the particular 
human being, had made his special contribution to the event, whatever it may be. And 
he hates to feel he is committed beforehand to an irrevocable something, that he is 
caught up in some impersonal machine. He hates above all to be driven into a corner 
and obliged to take a decision. If this happens, he very often takes the wrong decision. 
Let him have his freedom of manoeuvre, appeal to his sense of human dignity and 
propriety, make him see that his voluntary collaboration with you is necessary if the 
right result is to be achieved, and you may get the right answer. Of course, this is not 
always so, because self-interest or other factors may be too strong, as they often are 
with all of us, but the chances are at least as good with a Greek, with his string feeling 
of amour-propre, as they are with anyone else. 
3. Writing just a century ago, George Finlay, the historian and philhellene
who took part in the War of Independence, complained about the disappointments of 
the generation which followed the Liberation. ―In the Greek Kingdom‖, he wrote, 
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―with every element of social and political improvement at hand, the agricultural 
population and the native industry of the country have remained almost stationary. 
The towns, it is true, are increasing and merchants are gaining money; but the brave 
peasantry who formed the nation‘s strength grows neither richer nor more numerous; 
the produce of their labour is of the rudest kind; whole districts remain uncultivated; 
the wealthy Greeks who pick up money in foreign traffic do not invest the capital they 
accumulate in the land which they pretend to call their country; and no stream of 
Greek emigrants flows from the millions who live enslaved in Turkey, to enjoy liberty 
by settling in liberated Greece.‖ Since then, the stream of emigrants from Turkey has 
arrived in the form of refugees after the Asia Minor disaster, and parts of what were 
once Turkey have been added to Greece, but in other respects the picture remains still 
all too true. The modern Greek, in fact, is still in many ways a century behind the 
times. His natural atmosphere is still one of nineteenth century laissez-faire, devil-
take-the-hindmost, and rugged individualism. All this creates a rather old-fashioned 
impression in a world of technocracy, vast international enterprises, and streamlined 
salesmanship. But, of course, even the Greeks are at least beginning to move. In the 
last few years the country has indeed begun to enter a stage of transition. 
Industrialisation is starting on a small scale. Contracts are being put out to 
international tender, even if the rules are something modified in a rather peculiar way. 
There is growing awareness of social problems, and even a (still rather rudimentary) 
system, of social insurance. New ideas are coming in with the new hordes of tourists. 
Greece is becoming conscious that she is tied to the West, and if she is to be part of 
Western Europe, in spirit if not in geography, she must bring herself into line with 
Western methods and be able to compete with Western techniques. 
4. The process is a painful one anywhere, and for Greece it is particularly 
hard. In the first place, she has a great deal of leeway to make up. She is starting very 
late in the race. How can new industries, in a country of eight million people, compete 
with the already well-established industries of Western Europe, with their 
comparatively large capital resources and advanced ‗know-how‘? In the second place, 
Greece is naturally a poor country, her main exports being agricultural surpluses 
which she finds it hard to sell; her standard of living is almost the lowest in Europe 
outside the Iron Curtain; and her rapacious neighbours impose on her a defence effort 
disproportionate to her strength. In the third place, she has a long tradition of muddle 
and corruption in public and business life, she lacks a competent civil service, or a 
properly organised trade union movement. Nevertheless, despite these handicaps, for 
the first time in her history she has had during the last six years a Government which 
was really trying to play politics. The late Government was not free from criticism, 
some of it justified, on the score broadly that it was too tender towards the rich. Its 
handling of individual projects and cases was sometimes inept. It may be thought to 
have paid insufficient attention to sociological requirements and to administrative 
reforms. But it had a vision of the Greece of the future, and it was trying to find the 
way there. 
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5. Greece has recently signed an association agreement with the Common
Market countries, but the Government did so not without misgivings; as Monsieur 
Averoff said to the Lord Privy Seal during the latter‘s visit last July, it will be 
necessary to re-orientate Greece‘s whole economy if she is not to be swamped by 
goods which she cannot pay for. Greek imports, according to the latest official 
figures, are still more than two and a half times her exports in value. The adverse 
balance is made up by invisibles: American aid, remittances from the very important 
Greek communities overseas, tourism, and the earnings of her merchant marine, the 
sixth largest in the world (or the third if Greek ships under flags of convenience are 
counted). Some of her main agricultural exports compete with those of other countries 
in the Six, notably Italy. Her five-year programme of industrialisation is still largely a 
blueprint. Her trade with the Soviet bloc countries is still an important feature of her 
economic life, and it gives those countries a powerful political level. The future of 
Greece depends too much on the stability hitherto provided by one man: if his hand 
were to be withdrawn from the helm, one could not have much confidence that the 
ship would continue to move forward. Fortunately, it appears that the Greek electorate 
are conscious of this too, and the fact that they have returned Monsieur Karamanlis to 
power again after six years justifies the faith of those who thought that there had been 
a change in the Greek attitude towards the traditional game of politics. The Greeks 
have shown that they appreciate the advantages of stability and a settled purpose, and 
have abandoned, at any rate for the time being, the notion that politics is merely a 
kind of kaleidoscope. On the economic side, however, one has the impression that 
they are only just beginning to face their difficulties. They to not yet realise the 
inevitable slowness of industrial development, or the disappointments that await them. 
They seem not yet to realise their shortcomings. Their congenital inability to plan 
methodically and exactly, the corruption and inadequacy of their civil service, their 
lack of a foreman class, of technical skills, of international marketing ability, all have 
to be overcome if they are ever to hope to compete with Western nations. One 
obvious example of their failure to plan is the growth of the cities of Athens, Piraeus 
and to a lesser extent Salonika. The population of Athens and Piraeus has increased 
by 33 per cent during the last ten years. Comparatively few of these people who have 
drifted in from the countryside or islands have found useful full-time jobs. Nor is 
there much prospect that they will do so. The projected industries will absorb only a 
few. Meanwhile, though efforts are made to site new industries in the provinces and to 
develop agriculture, no effective steps have yet been taken to stop the inflow, the 
housing conditions except in the centre deteriorate, and the people are an obvious 
target for communist propaganda. Spectacular improvements in the tourist part of the 
city cannot conceal this. At the moment many people are pinning their hopes on 
Monsieur Karamanlis, but something concrete must be done for them in the next few 
years if there is not to be a reaction. Greece, in fact, needs economic help, and it is to 
be hoped that if Britain signs the Treaty of Rome she will not overlook her traditional 
rôle of friend and protector here. After all, in these days protection is as often an 
economic as political or military function. 
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6. Meanwhile, the twin factors of Greek political and strategic value, based on
her geographical position, have certainly not diminished. Greece still blocks the 
physical expansion of the Soviet empire to the Eastern Mediterranean. And she is at 
present the only democracy in Eastern Europe. The interest of Greece to the West lies 
in whether or not she can demonstrate, and that near home, that a small under-
developed country can turn herself into a modern viable state while remaining a 
democracy. 
7. I am conscious that these reflections are very general in character, and they
suffer from the usual drawbacks of such reflections. Looking back over four and a 
half years, I am struck by the changes which have occurred. It is true that in some 
ways they may be called superficial. But it is almost impossible to-day to imagine, for 
example, the extent to which the Cyprus question overshadowed everything else three 
years ago. Then, the whole national effort of Greece seemed to be absorbed by this 
one issue. Now, as I have mentioned, the Greeks are pre-occupied by very different 
problems. The Greek character, I suppose, does not change basically, but the Greeks 
can adapt themselves to a changing situation. Their parochial outlook is being 
broadened and the changes come fast. They are emotional people, and whatever they 
undertake they do with an intensity of feeling which Anglo-Saxons sometimes find 
hard to comprehend. They have escaped altogether that Puritan influence which 
imposes on the Anglo-Saxon world a certain subservience to laboriously worked out 
principle. The Greek morality is of a different order: if they obey a code at all they do 
so in the Byzantine tradition simply because it is a code, and for the rest they follow 
their emotions. One result of this is that they can operate quite happily on two 
different levels at the same time. They can have a public face and a private one. They 
are not plagued by the bugbear of consistency. In public, at any rate truth is not 
something to be sought objectively: rather it is that which corresponds most nearly to 
the picture one would like to see. In private, however, the Greek will often admit by 
his actions, if not by his words, that there is a gap between the real and the ideal. This 
can be useful, since he may be prepared to do privately that which he would not 
acknowledge publicly, as we saw on occasions during the Cyprus affair. Naturally, 
the public face must always be respected if results are to be obtained. Once this is 
understood, it is seen that the Greeks have great qualities. They are brave and 
generous. They are capable on occasions of great endurance, subject always to their 
changes of mood. Outside Athens social and political circles, at any rate, they are not 
yet corrupted by materialism nor softened by too much comfort. Perhaps indeed, the 
apparent contrast between the ancient and the modern, symbolised by the Acropolis 
and the modern city, is not quite fair to them. Even on the architectural plane it is not 
quite so marked as it appears. Time has dealt kindly with the Acropolis and the clutter 
of buildings and statues which it once contained probably detracted from the 
simplicity of the site as we know it to-day. And then, the ancient Greeks themselves 
were probably not so very orderly in their daily lives. Variety, activity and struggle 
are elements that go to make up most worthwhile human characters. The modern 
Greeks may be all too human, but at least they are not prigs. And, finally, of all 
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nations they must be among those who are friendliest to foreigners. It has been a great 
pleasure as well as a privilege to have spent four and a half years in this country, 
where we have received an infinity of kindnesses from people in all walks of life, and 
I have indeed been lucky that the political clouds of the first years gave place to the 
clearer skies of steadily improving Anglo-Greek relations. To quote the motto of the 
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, founded in the Ionian Islands in 1818, it is 
permissible to see in this improvement ―Auspicium melioris aevi‖. 
I have the honour to be, 
with the highest respect, 
My Lord, 
Your Lordship‘s obedient Servant, 
Roger Allen  
___________________________________ 
FO 371/163444  
J.N.O. Curle (Embassy Athens) to K. D. Jamieson (Foreign Office) 
Subject: Present political life in Greece 
Athens, August 30, 1962 
Dear Kenneth, 
Political life in Greece is in the doldrums, but the Centre Union and the 
Government continue to snarl at each other in spite of the heat and the holidays. 
Papandreou and Co. make speeches from time to time in the provinces. They and the 
Opposition newspapers seize in any pretext for attacking the Government or the 
monarchy. The main recent themes against the Government have been their 
inefficiency over American aid, the concessions made by Mr. Averoff to the Turks 
and the exorbitant profits being made on medicines. The monarchy are being attacked 
for the alleged construction of expensive new royal residences in various parts of the 
country (these usually turn out to be mares‘ nests) and for abuses over the importation 
of duty-free cars. (It is being rumoured that Papandreou in his vanity no longer has his 
eye on the office of Prime Minister but in that of President if he can bring the 
monarchy down; this however is significant rather of the lengths to which rumour 
goes here than of the seriousness of Papandreou‘s attack on the monarchy). 
Papandreou and Venizelos have announced that they will not attend the Government‘s 
reception for the United States Vice-President, on the ground that they have not been 
invited to the dinner party before-hand at which serious talk might be possible. The 
Government accuse them of hoping to involve the Americans in their own political 
campaign. 
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2. The Centre Union have applied to hold a public meeting in Athens on
October 29 (the anniversary of the ―fraudulent‖ elections and the after Oxi Day, a 
national holiday) at which their campaign will come to a head. 
3. We have the impression that this ―unending struggle‖ against the alleged
illegality of the Government leaves the population as whole apathetic. Allowing for 
Mediterranean hyperbole, all the foregoing does not amount to much more in Greek 
political life than stock Opposition tactics at home. 
4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Ankara and
Washington. 
Yours ever, 
J.N.O. Curle 
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NARA, RG 59, 781.00/6-1755 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Schnee) to the Department of 
State 
Subject: Domestic Political Situation 
Athens, June 17, 1955 
Rally 
The Rally Government continues to exercise its mandate more efficiently than 
any Greek Government in the post-war period, but it is the Embassy‘s opinion that the 
prospects of its receiving a fresh mandate – or even continuing s a cohesive political 
factor – after the present Parliament completes its term are not very strong. The Rally 
has never lost its original character, for which it gets its name, of a grouping of 
diverse political elements; it has not evolved into a political party. The union is bound 
mainly by the loyalty of the various elements to Field Marshal Papagos personally 
and by the fact that only he is acceptable as a leader to a substantial majority of the 
group. As there is little evidence that the Rally leadership will be able in the coming 
months to develop that homogeneity which they have failed to achieve during the past 
thirty months we must reckon with the probability that the Rally will remain an 
effective force only so long as the Marshal continues to play an active role. We hope 
that the Marshal will be willing to carry on at least until May or June of next year. 
Some of his close associates, however, are apparently still hopeful that he will head 
the Rally ticket in the next election, if only as titular leader.  
Present Opposition 
The Opposition continues to be divided into small factions which give little 
indication of being able to combine into larger groupings with the capacity for 
political leadership. However, two essential factors which will dictate the future 
course of the Opposition parties are not as yet established. First is the system under 
which the next election will take place. The majority system and, to a lesser extent, 
the reinforced proportional system will require the Opposition to combine into two or 
three major groupings. The simple proportional system would encourage parties to 
enter the elections under their own banners with perhaps some combinations being 
created for the elections. The second factor bearing upon the regrouping of the 
Opposition is that there is no clear concept as to when the next general elections will 
take place. It is characteristic in Greece that political deals which result in parties 
joining forces for the elections are rarely effected before the eleventh hour.  
While it is to be anticipated that the various elements in the Opposition will 
join forces, before the election if the majority system is followed or after the election 
in order to form a government f the simple proportional system is followed, there is 
little or no probability of large segments of the current Opposition joining forces in a 
cooperative effort which would be based on agreed positions concerning major 
political, economic and defense policies and political tactics. Thus, if depended upon 
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their own resources, the Opposition could probably not produce anything substantially 
better than the uneasy and superficial coalitions characteristic of Greek post-war 
politics and which by their incompetence encourage subversive or other extremist 
movements.  
Probable Future Developments 
Political Combinations 
If the majority system is used in the next general elections, it is very likely that 
something akin to the Popular Front will be organized from out of the present 
Opposition. The recently announced program of the Liberal Democratic Union led by 
Mr. Venizelos is compatible with the programs espoused by the extreme left although 
a breach has developed between Venizelos and EDA over the form in which 
cooperation is to be achieved. A popular Front may well attract elements, such as 
some followers of Venizelos, who are clearly anti-Communist, but it may also attract 
and be strengthened by others such as Mayor Katsotas who, while personally strongly 
nationalistic, are susceptible of being exploited by the Communists. The Democratic 
Party led by Svolos and Kartalis would in all probability play a leading role in such a 
combination and one would anticipate that the EPEK leaders would also effect at least 
some measure of cooperation with any strong Leftist coalition.  
Papandreou would probably continue to refuse to join any movement which 
strongly resembled a Popular Front and so would many other Opposition leaders 
including Tsaldaris and probably Markezinis, but it is doubtful whether they would 
receive sufficient public support to offer the prospect of providing an effective 
government.  
Whether or not a Popular Front is formed, and regardless of the electoral 
system to be used, there is a definite sentiment, the strength of which cannot at this 
time be judged, in favor of forming a political party which would offer new 
personalities and a program responsive to current problems. Supporters of the new-
party concept believe that the personalities leading the current Greek parties are 
discredited and that the parties themselves have only an artificial basis, which formed 
the basis of Greek politics from 1910 onwards but which ceased to have current 
validity before the war and which is completely divorced from the issues which 
Greece has been called upon to face in the post-war period. It is anticipated that this 
new party would appeal to both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists and therefore to both 
the Rally and elements of the current Opposition. It would make a very strong effort 
to attrack men who have not heretofore been associated with the leadership of the 
older parties.  
The Embassy finds considerable merit in this idea of a new political party 
outing across older political lines, but it is too early to tell whether such a group 
would be successful. Supporters of such a development include, among other present 
members of the Opposition, George Mavros, Panayotis Pipinelis and Gregory 
Kassimatis. Constantine Karamanlis of the Rally is known to strongly favor this thesis 
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and Constantine Rodopoulos, President of the current Parliament appears to have 
views which are compatible with a development along these lines. This possibility is 
believed to have been discussed by the aforementioned in rather general terms. 
Karamanlis might fill the role of titular leader of the new party. Insofar as the public 
is concerned he is the most popular man in the Rally Government, would probably be 
acceptable to most of the ―new party‖ supporters including Kassimatis and 
Ropopoulos, and probably Mavros, and is known to be intent upon playing a more 
prominent role in the political life of the country. Karamanlis is also known to have 
made a very favorable impression upon the Palace. In the event Field Marshal 
Papagos leads the Rally in the next election, Rodopoulos and Karamanlis will 
probably remain with the Rally and it would be more difficult to find an effective 
leader for a new party.  
The disadvantages of dispersal are, of course, clear to the Rally, many of 
whom undoubtedly desire a solution along the lines of a collective leadership, 
Papaligouras, the Minister of Coordination, in accelerating the investment program 
and apportioning the FY‘56 budget is clearly endeavoring to establish a record upon 
which the Rally could base a political campaign. The ineffectiveness of Papandreou 
as an Opposition leader is due, in part, to the fact that has deliberately kept himself 
available for draft as a successor to the Marshal as leader of the Rally. Markezinis 
must also find it difficult to give up the hope of leading the organization which he 
created and which has given Greece its first protracted period of comparative stability. 
Despite the pressure to unite, the potential adherence of blocs now in the Opposition 
and its good record, the fact is that without the Marshal, the Rally is only an 
association of individual leaders offering a dependable nationalist program but little 
hope of continuity of policy or leadership.  
Probable sequence of Events 
In the event the Marshal withdraws from politics before the full four years of 
his government have expired, the probable reaction of most party leaders, the deputies 
and the Palace will be to gain time during which the political forces can recover from 
their present state of disorganization in order to present the electorate with political 
alternatives which at least on the surface offer the prospect of effective government. 
To gain this time, the Rally deputies would probably unite to support a government 
headed by current Rally leadership or any other government which would be proposed 
by the King. It is also probable that this government would not be a service 
government but would be a transitional government (i.e., political government). 
Under these circumstances it will be noted that a considerable amount of political 
influence is necessarily gravitating towards the Palace. The choice of a transitional 
government might have an important bearing on the subsequent elections. For 
example, were His Majesty to select someone like Karamanlis, who in turn would 
pick for his cabinet other men who share his views regarding the development of a 
new political party, such a government could effectively use the intervening three or 
four months to strengthen its position before electorate.  
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There are of course numerous other alternatives from which His Majesty could 
make a choice. It is believed that there remains in the Palace a large residue of 
goodwill towards Sophocles Venizelos, and there is of course the alternative of the 
continuation of the Rally.  
In the period immediately following a withdrawal by Marshal Papagos, the 
Rally deputies would probably support any leadership continuing the Rally 
Government. The various conflicting elements, Stephanopoulos, Karamanlis, 
Kanellopoulos, etc., would agree to work together in a transitional government. 
Whether a reorganized Rally could win another election is less clear. The Rally would 
have its best opportunity under conditions in which it alone provided a rallying point 
for the nationalist elements of the older parties. Once elected, the centrifugal force 
governing the path of the older political leaders would probably soon be exerted. The 
ensuing crisis might then provide the occasion for the development of a new party as 
the Palace would be called upon to choose a new government or successive 
governments.  
IDEA, at this time, remains a potential political force. Despite the fact that it 
includes a few hotheads who readily talk about taking action under this or that 
condition, it is the Embassy‘s opinion that under present circumstances, including the 
reserved attitude of the Palace, the absence of a strong political leader and the 
divisions within the IDEA organization, it will not have the capability of moving 
effectively except under conditions in which there is an apparent and immediate 
danger to the national security. Even under such conditions, many people in authority 
would prefer to have the necessary measures taken in a manner which places credit 
and responsibility on the Army as such, and other security forces, rather than the 
IDEA group.  
Role of the Embassy 
The basic interests of the United States could be jeopardized if a Popular Front 
were elected. There is a real danger that the Popular Front would legalize the KKE – 
move favored be many politicians on the Opposition and Rally – and would permit 
the release of Communists under procedures which would heap substantial additional 
durdens upon the already strained Greek internal security forces. However as a 
Popular Front would undoubtedly include some nationalist elements, the U.S. 
objectives would be to counter the Communist and extreme Leftist elements while 
maintaining a relationship with the nationalist personalities which would permit them 
to strengthen their influence within the Popular Front if it were elected. The Embassy 
believes that it has during the past year had some success in pursuing such a line by 
directing attention to the dangers which are inherent in the re-emergence of the 
Communists as a ―respectable‖ political force.  
A government made up of the older parties along lines characteristic of the 
post-war period would not immediately threaten U.S. objectives in Greece but would 
undoubtedly herald the return of political instability which would soon have its 
economic and other repercussions. It would be in the interest of the U.S. Government 
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actively to support the idea of a coalition of this type only if it were a principal 
alternative to a Popular Front government.  
Whether it would be in the interest of the U.S. to support a new party would 
depend upon the form it took and the personalities it involved. A party headed be 
some of the present Rally leaders and supported by competent members of the 
Opposition and which had the prospect of gaining substantial popular support would 
be a healthy contribution to the political development of Greece. It would be unwise 
for the Embassy to become too closely identified with such a group although our 
appreciation for the past accomplishments of the individuals involved might be 
expressed on appropriate occasions. In the event that such a party would be an 
alternative to a Popular Front government, U.S. support might be somewhat stronger 
although limited by the requirement that the Embassy retain a position which would 
leave it the possibility of influencing the course of a Popular Front government.   
As regards the IDEA, the Embassy usually avoids any discussion of the 
subject, limiting its remarks to observations about the importance of strengthening 
Democratic institutions and procedures.  
In any event, not excepting the participation of the Rally in the next election, it 
would not be in the interests of the U.S. to lend public support to one nationalist group 
against another.  The fact that the Greek people look towards the United States for 
leadership in the struggle against Communism would however require us to take a 
stand, preferably in private conversations, should we find there is a danger of 
Communist penetration of nationalist organizations to a degree which threatens the 
national security. 
For the Ambassador 
Alexander Schnee 
First Secretary of Embassy 
_________________________________ 
NARA, RG 59, 611.81/11-457 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Penfield) to the Department of 
State 
Subject: Greece‘s Disengagement from United States Policy 
Athens, November 4, 1957 
In recent weeks and months the Embassy has reported to the Department a 
series of increasingly frequent instances wherein Greece and the United States have 
found themselves, primarily in the political and psychological spheres, at odds on 
major and minor matters of policy. For several weeks officers of the Embassy have 
studied these instances in the contexts and believe that they are of sufficient 
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importance to constitute a trend which, if it continues, will prove inimical to the 
accomplishments of American foreign policy objectives in Greece, in the Balkans and 
in the Middle East. The trend, for lack of a better label, may be described as a 
―disengagement‖ on the part of Greece from the essentially ―American‖ policy which 
she has followed since the end of the Second World War. 
This recently accelerated disengagement has become manifest in three fields: 
(1) in Greek domestic politics and the Greek national psychology; (2) in matters
affecting the Middle East; and (3) in Greece‘s attitude toward Communists,
Communism and the Communist Bloc of states.
It should be said at the outset that this dispatch is considered to be chiefly an 
analysis of a trend which the Embassy considers to be of major importance to United 
States and Western interests in this part of the world; it is not intended to be a 
balanced report of the entire picture of Greece and her domestic and foreign policies 
of the moment. Furthermore, in order to identify for the Department in the clearest 
and briefest manner possible the factors which constitute this now recognizable trend, 
no attempt has been made to provide bulky documentation to substantiate the thesis. 
However, few items will be mentioned in this despatch which are not already to be 
found in the Department‘s files among previous telegrams and reports submitted to 
Washington by the Embassy and by other United States agencies operating in Greece. 
Here it is our purpose to tie together all the factors of this trend primarily to identify 
and assess them, so that having once been recognized they may be dealt with by the 
Embassy and the Department. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Greece today remains formally and officially tied to the United States and her 
NAT Allies and will continue to be so tied for the foreseeable future. The United 
States is – and for some time to come will probably remain – the paramount foreign 
power in this country, as it has for the past ten years. But we are passing through a 
period when our influence and prestige among the Greek people and with the Greek 
Government are undergoing a reassessment and readjustment in a changed world 
situation. We can no longer be as certain as we have been in the past that we shall 
have Greece‘s support in foreign policy matters that are critical to us. In the Middle 
East our policies and our actions in the past few years, with very few exceptions, have 
been the contrary of what Greece has considered to be her own best interests. In the 
Cyprus issue most of all we have failed in Greek eyes to support the Greek position, 
and to the Greeks there is no more important problem in this decade. Toward the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc Greece‘s attitude has undergone an accelerated 
process of softening in the past year and a half and she less frequently asks for or 
accepts our advice in her dealings with the Bloc. She feels that we have ignored what 
she considers to be her special position in the Middle East and that we have supported 
more strongly her ancient enemy, Turkey, instead. The other reasons for this drift 
toward divergence and disengagement are manifold; some are of a minor and 
transitory nature, but other are deep, permanent, even normal and natural, and will be 
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difficult to correct. Unless they are corrected, however, there is a distinct possibility 
that Greece will find herself ultimately in the neutral bloc or in a ―non-bloc‖ 
alignment where, we have reason to fear, a growing number of Greeks today already 
feel themselves psychologically. 
 
DOMESTIC SCENE 
 For ten years we have been much in evidence in Greece. The American 
presence in the Athens area in particular has been a solid and inescapable fact of life 
for the Greeks. Despite a great amount of retrenchment since 1953 and despite 
reductions which are still being made in some of our activities in Athens, other 
functions are increasing in scope simultaneously. We number now almost 4,000 in the 
official American community, including dependents. Many of us live an hermetically 
sealed American existence, blessed with commissary, post exchange, medical, dental 
and schooling facilities of our own. Our hundreds of brightly colored, late model cars 
with their distinctive license tags are seen at all hours on all the main thoroughfares of 
Athens and its sprawling environs. We can afford to rent some of the best homes and 
to employ servants. Most of us have studied enough Greek to make our simplest 
wants known, pidgin fashion, to shopkeepers and to our servants; but, counting a fair 
number of Greek-Americans among us, not more than a few dozen or so can speak 
Greek well enough to carry on more than the simplest conversation with the average 
Athenian. 
 At a conservative estimate at least 20,000 Americans must have been stationed 
in Greece in the past ten or twelve years, yet in the recent USIS public opinion poll 65 
percent of those interviewed claimed never to have met an American. Certainly we 
have been seen by a far greater percentage than this, but this is illustrative of our 
belief that we are seen from afar; that we have not succeeded in ―getting through‖ to 
the Greek people. In recent years it has served the interests of virtually all papers to 
ridicule the Americans in Greece in their humor and gossip columns and in their 
cartoons. The mild envy and jealousy which might be expected toward us from a man 
in the street who is continually been told that he has one of the lowest per capita 
incomes in Europe has been fanned into smouldering resentment in recent years by 
the press which sets us even further apart from the Greek people by emphasizing, 
exaggerating and distorting the extraterritorial aura which surrounds us here. 
Although the normal Athenian accident rate is about ten times the magnitude of the 
American rate, press space given to each accident involving an American is in an 
inverse proportion. This ―iniquitous extraterritoriality‖ is a popular theme in Athens 
which even the normally pro-American papers occasionally feel they can play on to 
prove that they are not American lackeys and because they know that it pleases their 
readers. The Department will recall, for example, that the Government waited for nine 
months after the signing of the 1956 Status of Forces Agreement before it felt 
sufficiently sure of its ability to ask for its ratification by the Recess Committee of 
Parliament instead of by the full body, and then the vote was on straight party lines, 
with the entire Opposition membership voting against ratification of the Agreement 
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and mumbling threats to raise the issue again in the current session. In the past few 
days EDA has formally moved to reopen debate on the Agreement. 
 Our conspicuously special position in Greece has thus become a source of 
resentment besides constituting a gap which militates against finding a practical 
common denominator between ourselves and the average Greek citizen, who is 
undoubtedly bored with constant reference to how the Americans with their Truman 
Doctrine ―saved Greece from the Communists‖. Even an American official traveling 
in the provinces finds it a relief when the local nomarch, mayor or metropolitan 
neglects to include his thanks for American aid in his speech of welcome. In any case, 
the welcoming ritual has now come to include a hope that (a) more American aid will 
be forthcoming; and that (b) the American people, with their known dedication to the 
principles of democracy and self-determination, will help liberate their oppressed 
brothers on Cyprus from the tyrannical yoke of British colonialism. In recent years, as 
the Department will appreciate, a direct and satisfying response to such traditional 
opening gambits has been impossible. Representatives of the United States Mission 
find themselves in such circumstances on scores of occasions each year. These two 
points are, on the one hand, the most natural in the world for any Greek to mention at 
a public event at which Americans are present, the first being required by Greek 
devotion to the tradition of philoxenia and the second being almost the sine qua non 
for retention of governmental or ecclesiastical office in the Cyprus-minded Greece of 
today. On the other hand, the American official can hold out no hope of United States 
cooperation in meeting either desideratum. 
 On the first count, there is the overall question of the amount of our defense 
support and economic assistance to Greece, which will probably begin to decrease 
now from year to year. Here, however, it might be well to reiterate the view recently 
framed by the Country Team that there is a level of economic aid below which we 
fear that the Government of Greece will find it less and less advisable to continue its 
policy of identification with that of the ―American factor‖, or to out it crassly, as the 
Opposition does daily, to dance to our tune. If this is an indication that Greece may at 
some time in the future place a dollars-and-cents value upon her cooperation with us, 
it is an indication which we believe warranted and worthy of careful consideration. 
 On the second count, the question of Cyprus, little need to be said here except 
to express our conviction that, despite a few instances of general public satisfaction 
with specific evidences of American charity toward Greek policy, there is a net 
feeling that we have let Greece down on what has been to her the most important 
single issue of this critical decade. Cyprus is the key to much of our troubles with 
Greece. When the Greek public sees its desires with respect to Cyprus supported 
without sting in the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Bloc, by Tito, and, however 
tardily and hypocritically, by the Soviet Bloc, and sees the United States and each of 
its partners in NATO either thwart those desires or remain indifferent or neutral 
toward them, it lends an ever more receptive ear to those who in public speeches and 
in the daily press ask what Greece‘s ties with the West have gained her and why she 
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should continue to maintain them. To many Greeks, and to an increasing number of 
them, this seems a logical question. 
 One is entitled to wonder how the Greek people – after being finally rescued 
as short a time as eight years ago from inclusion in the Soviet bloc of states 
themselves – could possibly forget the lessons they learned. It must be said that while 
almost no Greek yearns to see his country become another satellite, many thousands 
of them have already forgotten. For almost all of them the memories of the bitter days 
of the Civil War are dimming. Human nature, the struggle for a bare livelihood, 
preoccupation with other political matters, a confident feeling that ―it couldn‘t happen 
again‖, a supreme national confidence in their ultimate ability to best anyone in a 
battle, a business deal or in diplomatic negotiations, all play a part on various levels in 
causing Greeks to concern themselves less and less with the Communist danger. The 
events in Hungary last year, admittedly because of their coincidence with the more 
immediately important Suez issue, made little impression upon the Greeks. Even the 
Greek Government, on the rare occasions when it has seen fit to mention the Soviet 
subjugation of Hungary, feels obliged to draw comparisons between Cyprus and 
Hungary. The lesson was lost on the Greeks to all intents and purposes.  
 Then there is the fact of sheer boredom. The Greek public, in common 
apparently with much of the rest of the West, has gradually become suffused with 
preachments about the dangers of international Communism. It is perhaps only an 
evidence of human nature that a people can become as bored by constant repetition of 
the ―big truth‖ as of the ―big lie‖. There is no vivid consciousness of a clear and 
present danger any longer except the specter which haunts all of us, that of a Third 
World War fought with nuclear weapons. In this respect the Greeks are perhaps 
neither more nor less prone to burying their heads in the sand than are other Allies of 
ours. There is also undoubtedly a feeling that if it comes to a question of a local war 
with Albania or Bulgaria she would have the support of at least Yugoslavia and, in the 
case of Bulgaria, possibly of Turkey, through the now all but dead Balkan Pact. 
 Another consideration which should be borne in mind is that the conditions 
which made mutually desirable the almost unprecedented closeness and intimacy of 
the Greek-American relationship in the years following the promulgation of the 
Truman Doctrine no longer exist, either in Greece or in the Balkans at large. It is to a 
large extent a measure of the success of our policy here that Greece has been 
increasingly able to exercise her reborn sense of independence in the world‘s 
councils. It is also natural and normal that a proud nation of self-respecting 
individualists like the Greeks would want to do so. Thus much of the current process 
of readjustment appears to be a rather natural and unsurprising reaction against United 
States tutelage, over the past ten years. Our future relationship with Greece will 
probably tend to be more on a plane with our relationship with other NATO countries. 
It is hoped that it will not be less. 
 To state the matter briefly, we and our policies have become less popular with 
the Greeks in recent years and months and we see no evidence of the existence of any 
force which will reverse this trend in the immediate future, barring an immediate 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
  
135 
 
settlement of the Cyprus issue in a manner satisfactory to Greece or a very large 
increase in the amount of American economic assistance. 
 
GREECE, THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
 For more than two millennia the Greeks have been accustomed to rather close 
relations with the Middle East. There have been sizeable Greek colonies in Egypt and 
other Arab countries since ancient times. Today the Greek community in Egypt 
numbers about 70,000 (of whom 50-55,000 are actual Greek nationals), making it by 
far the largest overseas colony next to that in the United States. Held together by an 
innate consciousness of its Hellenism, by language and by the ties of Otrthodox 
Christianity, its existence has been a source of considerable pride as well as profit to 
Greece through the years. The existence of this community has been also perhaps the 
most significant determinant in the shaping of Greece‘s Middle Eastern policy since 
the end of the war. No Greek government could remain long in office if it took any 
step which resulted in injury to the Greek community in Egypt, from which have 
come some of Greece‘s wealthiest and most influential families and which has been 
an important source of the immigrants‘ remittances without which Greece‘s balance 
of payments picture would be even more unfavorable. 
 During the Suez crisis a year ago, no doubt remained that the sentiments of the 
Greeks were almost unanimously pro-Egyptian. Our condemnation of the Anglo-
French-Israeli aggression against Egypt was for the Greeks one of the most popular 
acts of United States foreign policy and measurably strengthened our prestige here. 
Yet on the question of Nasser‘s seizure of the Canal, Greece hardly dared speak out 
for fear of retribution upon the Greek community in Egypt. Greek pilots filled the 
breech when the old Canal pilots walked out, yet numerous Greek employees of 
European firms lost their positions when the sequestration decrees were enacted. 
 The ―Egyptianization decrees‖ of January 14, 1957 could, if strictly enforced, 
result eventually in most of the Greek community leaving Egypt. Hundreds have 
already done so, and the current rate of departure is reliably reported to be about 500 
per month. Greek holdings are affected in a material way. Yet the protests of the 
Greek Ambassador and the entreaties of the Prime Minister during the visit in August 
have failed to elicit any concrete promise from Nasser that the Greeks of Egypt will 
be spared the effects of Egyptianization except for a vague commitment that he will 
consider the Greek position carefully. 
 Greece holds Egyptian credits to the extent of about $12 million as a favorable 
balance on its clearing agreement with Egypt, an account which Egypt is not in a 
position to settle unless the United States, as Nasser rather cleverly proposed to 
Karamanlis, would be willing to release to Greece a portion of Egypt‘s frozen 
American assets. This, the Department has already expressed our willingness to do. 
The sum involved is a large one for Greece. As long as there is a hope that the balance 
can be recovered, Greece will think twice before doing anything to offend Egypt. 
 There are also the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in Alexandria, Jerusalem and 
Antioch (Damascus), the remaining symbols of a period of even greater Hellenic 
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prestige in the Middle East. Greece will not willingly engage in any international 
political acts which would result either in the expulsion of these three patriarchates or 
in the complete loss of Greek influence over them. The modern Greek consciousness 
of the concepts of Hellenism and national honor come into play. This is not the place 
perhaps to expatiate upon what the Embassy believes to be the growing influence of 
Moscow on the Patriarchates of Antioch and Alexandria. 
We have learned lately from usually reliable sources that, during his August 
talks with Nasser, Karamanlis was asked to consider Greece‘s becoming a partner in a 
―Belgrade-Athens-Cairo Axis‖. Karamanlis is reported not to have rejected the 
concept outwright, but to have promised to have his Government consider the 
proposition. When a newsman who accompanied the Prime Minister‘s party to Egypt 
asked him on board the plane on the return flight to comment on whether he had 
discussed such a matter with Nasser, Karamanlis is said to have exploded indignantly 
and denied that there had been any such conversation. Since Nasser has accepted an 
invitation to make a state visit to Greece, although no date has yet been set, it is 
expected that this subject will recur. If, as seems probable, a prospective state visit to 
Greece by Nasser were tied in with a visit to Yugoslavia, his reported proposition 
might well receive serious consideration by all three governments. The effect of such 
an alignment upon Greece‘s commitments to the West through NATO provides a 
fertile field for speculation. 
Chief among Greece‘s complaints with our policy in the Middle East has been 
our attitude toward the Baghdad Pact, and alliance which the Greeks unanimously 
consider a British apparatus thinly disguised to save what is left of British influence in 
the area. When discussing the Baghdad Pact most intelligent Greeks are kind enough 
to attribute United States involvement in it to undue British influence upon us. In the 
Greek mind, however, the Baghdad Pact rests upon the keystone of Turkish military 
power and is ―directed against Egypt‖, two perfectly sound reasons to the Greek mind 
why nothing good can come of it and why every indication by the United States of 
greater interest and participation in the Pact can be expected to bring forth a spate of 
editorials and speeches in Athens which are not pleasant for us to hear.  
Whether Greece does or does not in fact occupy a position of prestige and 
influence in the Middle East may be debated, but the fact of the matter, in so far as the 
United States is concerned, is that Greece deeply and sincerely feels that she does 
have a special position vis-à-vis the Arab states, all of whom have consistently 
supported Greece‘s Cyprus policy. At the time of the visit to Athens of the Richards 
Mission last May Greek officials, at high and low level, who spoke with the Mission 
hammered at the thesis that Greece has a unique position and role to play in the 
Middle East. Greece considers herself the ―bridge‖ between the West and the Arab 
world. Greece offered herself to the United States as an intermediary through which 
many of the aims of the American Doctrine could be fostered on the ground that, 
while the United States might be widely suspect by the Arabs as aspiring to the power 
and position of the departed ―Anglo-French colonialists‖, Greece was under no such 
suspicion. Serious proposals were made by cabinet ministers who met with the 
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Mission that the United States should channel some of the economic measures it 
proposed to take under the Doctrine through Greece. A Middle Eastern type of OEEC 
based in Athens was mentioned. It was obvious from the enthusiastic way in which 
this prospect was raised that it had been under consideration for some time. Minister 
Without Portfolio, Gregory Kassimatis, restated this serious Greek view of Greece‘s 
role in the Middle East to Department officers while in Washington recently and 
again asked what Greece could do to act as a ―bridge‖ for at least the economic 
aspects of our Middle Eastern policy. The Embassy regrets that it has yet received no 
indication that the Department has given any consideration to acknowledging 
Greece‘s role in the Middle Eastern scheme of things, beyond a line in a recent OCB 
paper suggesting that we should not encourage Greece to take any initiative in the 
Middle East on our behalf. This is the sort of principle which bulks large to little 
Greece; it is one of the cornerstones of her self-respect. 
It may be worth remembering the pride with which the Greeks showed off 
their military establishment to a visiting Jordanian military mission just a few weeks 
before the critical events of the past summer. Many Greek Government and military 
officials have expressed their conviction to us that the same Jordanian officers 
returned home convinced that a small country could afford to get along with the 
United States without losing its independence. Whether or not the visit to Greece 
made any such impression upon the Jordanian officers is not the question; the 
significant fact for us is that many influential friends of the United States here 
sincerely believe that it helped and they are willing to engage in similar efforts again, 
to assist us with their concept of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
To revert again to the question of the Doctrine it can be said that the 
Governments feels that it has received nothing but trouble from the ungrudging 
adherence it gave last May. It was one of the major points of attack by the Opposition 
parties on the Government during a special session of Parliament in late May. 
Although it cannot honestly be said that Greece – or any but the most leftist of the 
political parties – is opposed to the announced principles of the Doctrine, the 
Opposition felt obliged to attack the Government‘s adherence because it was given 
without prior consultation with the main leaders of the Opposition and, if some 
reports can be credited, even over the objections of some of the members of the 
Cabinet. One does not have to be a seer to predict that the Doctrine will again become 
a political football when it suits the purposes of the Opposition. For one thing Greece 
neither asked for nor received a single penny for her adherence and within a few 
months saw the Sixth Fleet rushed to the coast of Syria and Israel in a flamboyant 
show of force against Syria and saw the spectacular airlift of arms to Jordan. The 
latter was an occasion for almost unanimous condemnation of our tactics in the 
Middle East as well as for another extensive public soul-searching about the wisdom 
of Greece‘s following our lead in the Middle East.  
It will also be recalled that in September, when both the President and the 
Secretary of State had made public statements of our fear that Syria was becoming a 
country under Soviet domination, the Prime Minister of Greece told a group of 
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foreign journalists in effect that Greek took nowhere so serious a view of the Syrian 
situation. He attributed Syria‘s recent behavior chiefly to reasons of ―nationalism‖. 
Now, as the despatch is being drafted, the Greek press, in commenting upon the 
Secretary‘s remarks in his press conference of October 16 in which he warned the 
Soviet Union that the United States would retaliate at once by attacking the Soviet 
Union if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, is unanimous in declaring that Greece will 
not enter any war to come to the defense of Turkey, regardless of her commitments 
under the North Atlantic and the Balkan Pact. 
 The Department is aware that the Government of Greece has in effect refused 
to honor a Greek agreement to permit us to establish a econd land-based VOA 
transmitter in Greece – on Rhodes, in this instance out of fear that we would be 
broadcasting material distasteful to the Arabs. Greece‘s open support of the Syrian 
position in the United Nations during the past week has placed her in what has been 
termed a position of ―conspicuous divergence‖ not only from United States but from 
united NATO policy. The Foreign Minister‘s assurances to the Ambassador that the 
Greek spokesman, Stratos, had been chastised for exceeding his instructions by the 
warmth of his support, are in reality only a slight variation in degree to an otherwise 
clear indication of Greece‘s true attitude on Middle Eastern problems today. The latter 
instance is also perhaps illustrative of the existence of a certain amount of 
schizophrenia in Government circles regarding Greece‘s ultimate role in the world 
scene. 
 With allowances for possible inaccuracies it is still perhaps worthwhile 
recording here that in the recent USIS public opinion poll in Greece 55 percent of 
those interviewed favored Egypt‘s behavior in recent times and 40 percent gave their 
opinion of Nasser as ―very good‖. In the same poll 62 percent of those interviewed 
said that they had never even heard of the Eisenhower Doctrine and only 25 percent 
of those who had heard of it had even an approximate idea of its aims. 
 A search of the horizon reveals almost no instance in the past year to 
encourage us in the belief that we shall have Greece‘s support in our policies in the 
Middle East until a solution reasonably satisfactory to Greece of the Cyprus question 
is found; until concrete proof of our concentration on economic rather than military 
measures for the accomplishment of our aims can be demonstrated, and until Greece 
feels that she can work alongside the United States as a self-respecting equal who will 
be consulted from time to time in advance of our moves. The alternative, we fear, is a 
progressive disengagement from what Greece considers to be an amateurish and 
clumsy policy based upon panic and patch-work. 
 
ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST BLOC 
 The number of Communist Party members in Greece is very small. The 
number of fellow-travelers who will follow the party line quite regularly and slavishly 
is also very small. Still, as in other Western countries, the Communists have an 
influence far beyond their numbers. Although the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) 
is outlawed and most of its leaders in exile, its interests are fostered openly in Greece 
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today by EDA, the United Democratic Left, which controls 16 seats in Parliament, 
about 5% of the total. This percentage is misleading, however, since EDA candidates 
in the last (1956) elections polled approximately ten percent of the total ballots cast. 
While this was a larger percentage of the popular vote than they had received in any 
previous election since the Civil War, it did not represent their greatest victory; their 
real victory was that pro-Communist candidates stood for election on a popular front 
ticket with all the other parties at present comprising the Opposition. Communism 
was thus returned to respectability in 1956, seven short years after the end of the 
bloody Civil War, which had set Greece back a generation. 
 While the formation of the popular front – however limited its objectives – 
was perhaps the greatest milestone on the KKE‘s road back, it is by no means the only 
significant indication of a growing tolerance for Communism and things Communist 
in modern Greece. The Embassy has had reason for concern in steadily and 
increasingly frequent evidences of Communist infiltration in virtually all sectors of 
Greece‘s political, economic and social life. This phenomenon does not appear to be 
accompanied by any growth in the influence and power of the KKE as such; it is 
rather a growth in Soviet influence fostered by the Soviet Embassy in this country. 
The KKE remains quite split and shaken as a result of ideological disputes and 
personality clashes which have rent it since the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. It seems probable, however, that the KKE (or at least its 
―legal arm‖, EDA) may be the ultimate beneficiary of the softening attitude toward 
Communism which has become quite generally discernible. Whereas the KKE‘s 
scope for action is limited by its bloodstained record and by the appeal it has to 
limited segments of society, the Soviet influence is not directed toward any one class, 
but runs the entire gamut of the political, commercial, labor, academic, cultural, 
scientific, athletic and even the religious aspects of life in Greece today. 
 There has been a great increase in the number of Communist publications in 
circulation with an entire network of salesmen and promoters who engage in door-to-
door canvassing and who offer attractive installment terms to their subscribers. At the 
beginning of this campaign the Russian works circulated were of the pre-
revolutionary variety to which the Kremlin has not objected. These were gradually 
replaced by works on history, finance and social problems and finally by translations 
of the significant works of such personalities as Lenin, Stalin and Mao-Tse-tung. One 
source reports that Soviet historical works alone in circulation in Greece since 1953 
have totaled fifteen separate publications in twenty-one volumes, comprising 8,204 
pages. In addition to the above, the Soviet Embassy and those of the other Communist 
nations maintaining relations with Greece are issuing periodical ―news‖ bulletins in 
hundreds of copies each month and the full, unadulterated Moscow line is available to 
the general public in Avghi, a well edited paper in a city not renowed[sic] for the 
quality of its press. 
 Since 1954 Greeks have been joining new and ever more numerous ―front‖ 
societies, clubs, leagues and institutes, such as the ―Greek Union for the Rights of the 
Individual and the Citizen‖, ―Greek Committee for International Appeasement and 
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Peace‖, ―Greek-Soviet League‖, ―Greek-Czechoslovak League‖ and the ―Friends of 
New China‖. The Embassy has reported only in recent months the extent to which 
these and similar organizations have effectively sponsored campaigns and positions in 
support of Soviet policy such as those for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, protests 
against the Government‘s reported willingness to have NATO nuclear weapons on 
Greek soil and campaigns for the repeal of the Government‘s ―exile‖ policy for active 
Communists. A roster of the non-Communist public figures who have been beguiled 
into signing such petitions would contain the names of many prominent personages in 
the arts, sciences, labor, education and religion. In each of such cases the aim was in 
clear opposition to known United States policy or interest.  
 Today visits of Greek politicians, newspapermen, scientists, trade union 
leaders, musicians and other artists to the Soviet Union and its satellites occur with an 
alarming lack of adverse comment, whereas until 1953 it would have been 
unthinkable for any nationally-minded Greek to even mention a desire to visit any 
Communist state save Yugoslavia. The impressions of such visitors on guided tours of 
Russia and its satellites are carried serially in most of the Athens papers, regardless of 
their political orientation. During the present calendar year the average has reached 
about one delegation per month leaving for Communist lands. The largest was the 
Greek delegation of eighty-three who attended the Moscow Youth Festival and who 
traveled in the USSR for eighteen days at a cost of about $35 per capita. The 
impressions of Soviet Union and the satellites with which these people return are 
frequently very favorable, if only because of the fact that Moscow is the largest city 
that most of them have ever seen, a cleaner, more modern city than Athens, with 
higher buildings and a fine subway system and better transportation, bigger factories, 
etc. Materially and superficially the lot of the average Russian farmer or factory hand 
is probably at least as good as that of his counterpart in this impoverished land, one of 
whose chief distinctions is the possession of one of the lowest per capita incomes 
among the members of NATO. The naively favorable impressions of what these 
Greek travelers have seen are also due perhaps to their ignorance of actual conditions 
in the West, to their gratitude for having been invited – with all expenses paid in most 
cases – and to a feeling of indebtedness for the hospitality and friendly treatment 
which they received everywhere.  
 The traffic is a two-way street. In the past year and a half groups headed by 
such personages as Dimitri Shepilov and Llya Ehrenburg, through delegations of 
municipal councillors, mayors, dancers, and circus performers, for the Soviet Union 
have visited Greece. Athletes from all the Balkan countries except Albania have been 
competing in the Athens Stadium in the past few years and this year witnessed the 
largest group of Russian tourists to be seen in Greece since the end of the War. Such 
cultural exchanges can be expected to increase in frequency next year.  
 In the commercial field each passing year sees an increase in the volume of 
trade between Greece and the Eastern Bloc and, on the part of the Greek businessmen, 
an increasing desire for more and more trade contacts. (See Embassy‘s Despatch No. 
293, dated October 30, 1957.) it is not necessary here to treat at length the methods 
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used by the Soviet and satellite trade missions to entice potential importers into 
dealings with them. The prices of their products are non-competitive and the profit 
percentages for Greek importers and distributors can be arranged conveniently 
beforehand. One has only to stand on a street corner in Athens to see the scores of 
new and cheap Skoda cars and trucks now in circulation or windowshop for 
increasing quantities of East German tools, fabrics, and cameras and for ―Bohemian‖ 
crystal. The temporary dislocation of normal trade channels due to the Suez affair 
appears to have been a critical turning point and marked a period of accelerated 
commercial contacts with the Soviet orbit. It has recently been reported in an 
Athenian paper that businessmen who have been assisted to make profitable trade 
deals with the Soviet Union are being visited afterwards by representatives of the 
Soviet Embassy who suggest that they should make a ―voluntary‖ contribution to such 
organizations as the ―Greek-Soviet Friendship League‖, the implication being that 
there will be no more business with Russia unless a contribution is forthcoming. In 
this way, pro-Soviet organizations are able to boast that they are completely supported 
from Greek sources.  
It is not desired to overemphasize the extent of Soviet economic penetration in 
Greece since the Embassy believes that Greece‘s foreign trade, which is still 90% 
with the West, will remain largely unchanged for some time to come. Nor has there 
been any Soviet effort to engage in capital investment so far in Greece, although this 
is a possibility that may one day have to be faced and one that most politicians here 
would find rather difficult to resist. As it is, other foreign capital investment, chiefly 
West German, is beginning to increase and with it there is created a diffusion of 
Greek economic dependence upon outside capital formerly directed almost 
exclusively toward American sources. One danger sign however is that the 
Communists are currently engaged in efforts to buy the Greek Bank of Chios in order 
to assist them in their endeavor to infiltrate the Greek agricultural cooperatives. 
In the psychological field, one of the outstanding Greek national 
characteristics, which even astute Greek observers have discerned and documented, is 
their ―short memory‖, a tendency to forgetfulness and consequent tolerance. Despite a 
remarkable economic recovery, the problem of ―under-employment‖ remains largely 
unsolved. The diet is somewhat better than it was ten years ago, yet the increased 
income which the majority of farm families get still goes for more food, not, as in 
most other countries of the West, for home appliances, better housing or an 
automobile. The average Greek is still too preoccupied with this struggle for a decent 
living to bear constantly in mind the lessons we thought he should have learned from 
four years of war and occupation and from five years of intermittent civil war. He 
searches and hopes for something better and will listen in his coffee-shop to anyone 
who will even promise him something better.  
We have rather substantial reasons for believing, for example, that the average 
Greek has looked favorably on the numerous conspicuous anti-Western moves of 
Nasser since our refusal to help him build the Aswan Dam; that he was so engrossed 
in the Suez affair that he had little interest in what was going on in Poland and 
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Hungary at the same time; that while he may have read something in the paper about 
the ―Eisenhower Doctrine‖ he does not understand what it is all about; that Western 
Germany is not a ―more popular‖ country with him than are Britain and France; that 
his opinion concerning Yugoslavia – which provided a supply pipeline for years to his 
Communist compatriots – ranges from ―good‖ to ―no strong feelings one way or the 
other‖; that US lack of support for Greece‘s Cyprus policy probably influences his 
attitude toward us today more than does his gratitude for nearly two billion dollars 
worth of economic aid; that his opinion for Tito and Khrushchev is about equal, 
ranging from ―good‖ to ―no strong feeling‖; that he considers that the Russian films 
he sees – in ever increasing frequency – do no particular harm to Greece. Such 
indications of his thinking have been made available to us recently through the public 
opinion poll conducted under USIS auspices. While allowances must be made for 
errors and for the inexperience of the personnel engaged, it would be trite to say that 
we cannot afford to ignore any evidence which indicates that in 1957 the average 
Greek holds opinions on many important international matters which are not shared 
by Americans.  
 More startling to read than any other figure taken from the USIS public 
opinion poll is that about 47 percent of the population feel that Greece should be 
aligned with neither the East or the West. The proportion so inclined rose to 50 
percent among those having higher education. There is small comfort when we read 
that 37.5 percent of all those interviewed  thought that Greece‘s best interests are 
served by continuing her Western alignment and that only 4 percent felt that Greece 
should transfer her allegiance to the Communist Bloc. Stated baldly, this means, if 
true, that we are not winning the battle for the Greek mind; that those who are devils 
on the international scene to us are not devils to the Greek; that increasingly frequent 
approaches by the Greek Government and by individuals to the Soviet Bloc would not 
be unpopular with two out of three Greeks. It could mean that many Greeks today are 
already ideologically and philosophically in the neutral bloc. It could also mean that 
he either has forgotten the lesson that ended only seven years ago or that he never 
learned a lesson at all.  
 One of the most encouraging results of the USIS poll was an indication that 
aming the members of the Greek armed forces pro-Western sentiment remains 
relatively high, and pro-Communist sentiment is lowest. It is our belief that the armed 
forces will remain as perhaps the greatest bulwark of the West in the changing Greek 
scene. In the event of any real ganger of Communist subversion they would 
undoubtedly again play a role in the domestic scene. It is hoped that they will also 
prove to be a counterweight in the trend toward neutralism. 
 What all the foregoing means to the United States opens an extremely wide 
realm for speculation. While it is not desired to overemphasize the results of the 
recent public opinion poll on which most of the immediately preceding paragraphs 
were based, it is well to state that most of the observations in this despatch have not 
been based on the public opinion poll, but rather on a feeling of awareness of late that 
the United States has been losing ground in Greece, that our position here has been 
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gradually weakening for a variety of reasons, some documentable and others hard to 
assess or come to grips with. The total picture is not, of course, one of unmitigated 
gloom as Greece is still committed to her Western allies and, in any showdown with 
the Soviet Bloc, she would today – and undoubtedly tomorrow – be one the side of 
the United States and the West. But there have lately become evident trends which 
should give the United States concern for Greece‘s position the day after tomorrow. 
THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 
By the nature of its subject this despatch has had to paint a rather dark picture 
of the current state of Greek-American relations. While it treats admittedly of only 
one side of the whole story it is a side which, until recent weeks, had been of very 
small significance and which was not an important factor in our relations with Greece. 
The trend toward disengagement – or, as Liberal Leader George Papandreou has 
phrased it, ―psychological dis-association‖ – of Greece from American policy has 
recently become a fact, recognized and deplored by the Embassy as well as by 
responsible figures in public life in Greece. We are certain from remarks made by the 
Prime Minister to the Ambassador that no one deplores this drift more than 
Constantine Karamanlis, himself, who assures us that regardless of the prominence of 
the present trend Greece will remain loyal to her NATO commitments. Similar 
sentiments have been expressed to us privately by other high Government personages 
and by members of the Opposition as well. Unfortunately the latter will undoubtedly 
proceed as usual in the current session of Parliament to berate the Government 
publicly for being ―American lackeys‖. Politics in Greece is like that. The unfortunate 
thing about this whole matter is that no one in public life, with the exception of the 
King, has expressed any strong feelings of late that Greece must resist a drift away 
from her NATO ties and toward of softening attitude on Communism. 
On the economic side, the Embassy feels that there do not exist the same 
grounds for concern as on the political. Greece‘s volume of trade is 90 percent with 
the Free World and cannot be easily or abruptly changed. The economic ministers of 
the present Government are realistically aware of Greece‘s continuing dependence on 
the West as a market for her exports and as a source for the investment capital which 
she needs. Also realistically (and privately) they are willing to face up to a gradual 
tapering off of American economic aid, knowing that less aid is in itself a measure of 
Greece‘s growing economic prosperity, as its capacity to absorb US surpluses 
decreases. Their sense of duty to their country will, however, require them to protest 
loudly at any mention of decreased assistance. 
The Greek tendency toward forgetfulness and tolerance will undoubtedly act 
in the United States‘ favor once the Cyprus issue has been solved. Just as the Greeks 
already seem to have forgotten what they suffered under the Germans, the Italians and 
their own Communists, they will, after a time, begin to forget that we have not 
followed a pro-Greek policy on the Cyprus question. Also, as long as Greece has 
Slavs on her northern borders she is not likely to cut all ties with those who will be 
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willing to defend her against attack from that quarter, regardless of how much hot-
and-cold blowing she does on other matters.  
Indeed a similar report could be compiled containing counter-indications to 
many of the factors treated in this despatch. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the 
Department will give careful and thoughtful study to the contents of the present 
despatch  which, represents the serious and well considered view of the Embassy that 
we have reached a new stage in Greek-American relations in which many of our 
decade-old assumptions and rules-of-thumb are no longer valid. During the current 
process of Greek readjustment every move on our part which affects Greece assumes 
a double importance. 
For the Ambassador: 
James K. Penfield 
Counselor of Embassy 
________________________________ 
NARA, RG 59, 781.00/4-858 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Horner) to the Department of 
State 
Subject: The Missile Base Question: A Political Shadow Play 
Athens, April 8, 1958 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Missile Base Question is the 
continued ambiguity of its role in the current political campaign in Greece. While 
missile bases are commonly agreed to be a major campaign issue, few Greek 
politicians, aside from the Communists, appear to have formulated clear position on 
the question, which remains a potentially embarrassing one both for the non-
Communist parties and for the West. The resulting situation has been curious and 
surely, to the politicians, profoundly dissatisfying. The Missile Bases Question 
remains for the time being in a twilight atmosphere, politically luminous but not yet 
incandescent.  
There are a variety of reasons for this. In the first place, Greece has not yet 
been asked to accept missile bases. How best to answer a hypothetical question taxes 
even the ingenuity of Greek politicians. There is, furthermore, a furtive assumption 
shared by a growing number of Greeks that NATO does not intent to request Greek 
base sites even after the election, having decided for both political and military 
reasons (most of them unflattering to Greece) to establish bases in neighboring 
Turkey and Italy. This assumption is two-edged, for if correct the establishment of 
missile bases in Turkey but not in Greece might arouse Greek jealousies and fears to 
the point that a current of pro-base sentiment could be set in motion. In these terms 
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the straightforward condemnation of bases could have long-range disadvantages of 
which most Greek politicians are acutely aware.  
 Still another inhibiting influence is exerted by the fact that the first and, to 
date, the only party to adopt a completely unequivocal stand on the missile bases issue 
is the Communist-line EDA which has been flatly opposed ever since the question 
was raised at the Paris NATO meeting in December. EDA‘s early and extremely 
vocal preemption of an anti-base position has complicated the issue for the nationalist 
parties of the Center and forced them to search for formulae which will permit 
exploitation of the issue without aligning them with the Communists.  
 A final and by no means negligible consideration has been the intensive 
political maneuvering in which missile bases, along with other issues, have been 
embroiled. The Markezinis Progressive and to a lesser extent the other splinter parties 
have apparently regarded the missile bases question as an important element in their 
negotiations with EDA for the formation of an electoral front. While Markezinis 
appears to have decided independently to oppose bases, it is likely that he hoped that 
his stand would gain from the Communists certain concessions on other aspects of the 
platform. At this writing, however, the projected coalition appears to have collapsed, 
leaving Markezinis and the other small parties to work out whatever position on 
missile bases they may think profitable.  
 The net result of all this has been to shroud the bases question in a film of 
unreality. The parties have sparred with the issue but except for EDA have not really 
come to grips with it. Alone among the major non Communist parties the Liberals 
have spelled out their position (see below), which seeks to link bases with the Cyprus 
problem, but while the Liberal policy is clever it may be transparently so and criticism 
of the Liberal formula is already being voiced in the press. The central problem for 
the non-Communist is how to formulate a policy that does justice to the merits of a 
complicated issue, without, on the one hand, losing votes to EDA, or, on the other, 
adopting a pale carbon of the Communist plank. Whether other non-Communist 
parties can find a better solution than the Liberals remains to be seen as their 
platforms are announced.  
 
The Yugoslav Interpolation 
 A measure of the present uncertainty over bases can be seen in the amount of 
partisan press speculation that purports to reveal the ―real‖ American position on 
bases and in the small tempest caused by Yugoslavia‘s announced opposition to 
missile bases in Italy. Regarding the latter, reports were current for days that a 
Yugoslav note opposing Greek bases was en route to the Foreign Office, or had 
already been delivered, and speculation along these lines continued even after the 
Prime Minister stated publicly on March 28 that he had no knowledge of reported 
Yugoslav proposals for an ―atom-free‖ zone, including Greece.   
 Certainly the Yugoslav attitude has been a source of concern to ERE. On 
March 17, ex-Foreign Minister Averoff informed the Counselor of Embassy that the 
Yugoslavs had privately expressed their opposition to Greek missile bases, both to the 
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Greek Ambassador in Belgrade and to President of Parliament Rodopoulos during the 
latter‘s visit to Yugoslavia. According to Averoff he had thereafter called the 
Yugoslav Ambassador and let him know that continued Yugoslav comments on 
Greek defense policy were both inappropriate and embarrassing to Greece. While 
public expressions of Yugoslav opposition to bases in ―neighboring countries‖ have 
continued, reports of a note on the subject from Belgrade to Athens appear 
unfounded.  
On April 1 Anghelos HORAFAS, Oficcer in Charge of Balkan Affairs in the 
Greek Foreign Office, informed Embassy representatives that the Yugoslav 
Ambassador, Micho PAVITCHEVITCH, in conversation with Permanent Under 
Secretary SKEFERIS, had discounted completely reports of an imminent Yugoslav 
note. None of this, however has stilled the anxieties of the Greek nationalist 
politicians who fear that further Yugoslav demarche would help mobilize anti-base 
sentiment in Greece to the consequent advantage of the Left. The continued 
deterioration of relations with Turkey has served in Greek eyes to emphasize the 
value of Yugoslav friendship, and Yugoslav pronouncements are given added weight 
in Greece both because of a certain admiration among Greeks for Tito‘s policy of 
non-alignment and because Yugoslavia is regarded as Greece‘s only Balkan friend.  
Party Positions 
After EDA, which is against bases, and the Liberals, who have their own 
rather evasive formula, the positions of the Parties become increasingly fuzzy. Some 
are ambiguously in favor of bases and some ambiguously opposed.  
In the former category is ERE and its leader, Constantine Karamanlis, who has 
not expressed himself publicly on the bases question since his resignation a month 
ago. As Prime Minister, Karamanlis had gone to the Paris NATO meeting with a 
proposal that the nations of the Atlantic Alliance decide as a group whether to 
establish missile bases on their territory. This principle he termed one of 
―universitality‖ and it was apparently designed to avoid the embarrassment that he 
foresaw for the Greek Government in bilateral discussions. The Greek proposal was, 
however, rejected in favor of bilateral talks between NATO and each of the member 
states.  
Upon his return from Paris Karamanlis stated only that NATO had not 
accepted the principle of universality and that the question of missile bases in Greece 
had not arisen.  
This brief statement is as far as Karamanlis has gone on the subject. 
Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that ERE, whether it says so or not, is essentially 
in favor of missile bases and that impression is unlikely to be shaken even if ERE 
hedges in its platform.  
The Populist Party Union, a motley assortment of dignified but temperamental 
Rightists, is definitely uncommitted on the missile base question. Since it is scarcely 
conceivable that a principled and pro-Western personality like Populist co-leader 
Kanellopoulos would reject bases out of hand, some compromise formula is likely, 
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calling perhaps for a later decision to be made in terms of Greek national interests 
within the context of the Western Alliance.  
 Markezinis and his Progressives, as noted above, have been willing to bargain 
with bases. Markezinis has rationalized his willingness to oppose them by citing the 
positions of Norway and Denmark and reaffirming his party‘s faith in the western 
alliance. Communist EDA has found this policy hard to swallow and disagreement 
over the point has apparently contributed to the breakdown of the coalition talks 
between Markezinis and EDA, which was unwilling to support a platform that 
opposed bases ―from within‖ the western alliance. Among the other small parties, 
DKEL and the Agrarians are known to oppose bases and EPEK seems to have been so 
preoccupied with its struggle for survival that it has not yet formulated any announced 
position.  
 The most interesting and revealing of the party positions is that of the Liberals. 
The Liberal plank on missile bases accurately reflects the dilemma that most non-
Communist politicians face in formulating a ―missile policy‖. These politicians 
believe that categorical support for missile bases would be politically inexpedient; 
they sense an apprehension about the bases among many Greek voters; they know that 
EDA will play on these fears to the best of its ability; and, lastly, they realize that if 
the play is to be taken away from EDA they must do more than echo the Communist 
position.  
 The Liberal plank is an ingenious attempt to resolve this dilemma by making 
the cession of missile bases by Greece contingent on the application of self-
determination to Cyprus. The relevant paragraphs of the plank read as follows: 
―As regards the bases issue the Liberal Party believes that it is no part of 
Greece‘s commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. And this is proved by the refusal of 
many countries to cede bases, while they remain attached to NATO‖. 
 The plank then accuses Karamanlis of having secretly promised Greek bases 
to the NATO allies and promises to invalidate such secret agreements when it comes 
to power. It concludes: ―The Extreme Left refuses the bases not in order to protect 
Greece but in order to serve its masters…Only the Liberal Party is in a position to 
apply a Greek foreign policy while the Right-wing and the Extreme Left are applying 
a serving policy‖. 
 Whether the Liberal position on missile bases will satisfy Greek voters 
remains to be seen. The Liberal leadership has sometimes out-foxed itself in the past 
and its critics are already pointing out that if missile bases are good for Greece they 
should be accepted and if bad rejected, not hitched with political twine to the Cyprus 
question.  
 
Conclusion 
 The real meaning of these intricate maneuvers may be that missile bases will 
remain a difficult issue for the non-Communist parties to handle on its merits. How it 
will affect their chances in the election is problematic. The fact that no one has yet 
asked Greece to cede bases; the fact that no party including ERE, unequivocally 
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supports them; the fact that the Communists have seized the standard of outright 
opposition, but, unaided by other parties, may not be able to generate intense inter-
party rivalry over the question; these factors imply that the May 11 election will be 
won or lost on other issues.  
 While the U.S. can expect to be clouted right and left over missile bases in the 
coming weeks, the real danger may be a future one, for it is evident that if the bases 
question does not figure as an explosive element in the current election, neither will it 
be disarmed. The Embassy cannot say how widely shared is the concern over missile 
bases which has been voiced in recent months by educated and articulate segments of 
Greek opinion. It is apparent that most Greek political leaders believe it to be 
widespread and that none, however well-disposed to the West, is willing to come out 
flatly in favor of missile bases in Greece.  
 Whatever Government is installed in the May elections, this unchallenged 
assumption by the country‘s political leadership that public opinion is opposed to 
missile bases could pose grave problems for the west should it be determined later 
that bases were necessary in Greece.  
 
For the Ambassador 
John Evarts Horner 
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
NARA, RG 59, 611.00/4-2558 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Penfield) to the Department of 
State 
 
Subject: Greek Foreign Policy During the Last Year of the Karamanlis Government 
and Prospects for the Future 
Athens, April 25, 1958 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The culmination of Greek foreign policy in 1957, as in all recent years, was 
the Government‘s presentation of the Cyprus Question at the United Nations. The 
results were gratifying to most Greeks. Their delegation – led once more by Foreign 
Minister Averoff and with the somewhat disquieting presence of Archbishop 
Makarios hovering in the background – succeeded in pushing through the Political 
Committee a resolution specifically endorsing the application of self-determination to 
Cyprus. Although the resolution failed of a two-thirds majority in the Plenary Session 
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was thus technically defeated, the vote was generally interpreted in Greece as a moral 
victory and vindication of the Greek position. 
The United Nations debate highlighted what for Greeks is a deepening 
psychological dilemma. They found themselves once again supported on the Cyprus 
question by the Soviet Bloc and opposed by the overwhelming majority of their 
western allies. Their frustration was compounded by the fact that most non-
Communist Greeks realized that, however painful their disappointment with the allied 
attitude toward Cyprus, Greece could not, in the last analysis, afford to cut itself loose 
from the West. Greece was still receiving substantial, if reduced, amounts of 
economic and military assistance from the United States and the post-war 
development of the Greek economy continued to be gratifying. Greece‘s trade pattern, 
although reflecting increasing commercial intercourse with the Soviet bloc, continued 
to rely heavily on western goods and markets. At the end of 1957 Greek credits to the 
bloc were in most cases above agreed swing limits and there was a limited demand in 
Greece for bloc products except for petroleum. Beyond these factors were Greece‘s 
cultural and ideological affinity for the west and the harsh memories of Soviet and 
satellite intervention in the Bandit War. 
Thus Greek frustrations over protracted failure to achieve a Cyprus settlement 
chafed against the obstinate advantages of the western alliance. The result was a 
marked querulousness in Greece‘s attitude toward its western allies; considerable 
wishful discussion of a new ―national policy‖ of non-alignment; a tendency to 
magnify irritations consequent to the American presence in Greece; and, generally, a 
controlled but perceptible disengagement from the West.  
The Soviet Union, seeking to profit from this disaffected mood, exerted steady 
pressure throughout 1957 to expand and multiply its contacts with Greece, whether 
political, economic or cultural, and to improve Greek relations with the satellites. 
Greco-Bulgarian talks on border delineation, reparations and the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations continued through the year, successfully in the first category, 
unsuccessfully in the others. Albania, with evident Soviet prompting, made repeated 
overtures to improve relations with Greece. Although these overtures were rebuffed, 
Greece assumed the initiative in reaching an agreement with Albania to undertake a 
joint mine-sweeping operation of the Corfu Channel, to begin in March 1958 and 
continue through the mid-summer. The Roumanians were likewise active and their 
proposal for a Balkan Conference, although rejected by the Karamanlis Government, 
was favorably discussed by some Greeks as a means of reasserting Greece‘s former 
role in the Balkans. 
The anomalies of the Greek position will figure prominently in the general 
elections scheduled for May 11, 1958. While the resignation of the Karamanlis 
Government was precipitated by domestic political factors (see Embassy Despatch 
No. 712, dated March 24, 1958), some of the major issues of the campaign, notably 
Cyprus and the missile base question, are likely to be in the general area of foreign 
policy. These problems, real enough in themselves, make somewhat synthetic 
campaign issues. No Greek Government, of whatever political coloration, will be able 
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to solve the Cyprus problem unilaterally and Greece has not yet been asked to cede 
missile bases. In this sense the issues are national rather than electoral and signify a 
crisis in Greek values and loyalties which, until it is resolved, will aggravate internal 
instability in Greece and complicate, though not necessarily damage materially, its 
relations with the West. 
 
I. THE RECORD: Developments from January 1957 to March 1958 
 
A. Suez and Hungary 
 The opening of 1957 found Greece, like the rest of the world, still under the 
shadow of events in Hungary and Suez. It was clear even then that of the two Suez 
loomed as the most important in the Greek mind. Primarily as a result of Anglo-Greek 
antagonism resulting from Cyprus, the average Greek was infinitely outraged by 
Anglo-French moves in Suez than by Soviet repression in Hungary. The Karamanlis 
Government was mindful of prevailing sentiment. In addition, the Government‘s 
preoccupation with the Greek community in Egypt and its overall relations with the 
Arab world made it hard for the Government to share – at least publicly – the West‘s 
growing concern over Communist penetration in the Middle East and the 
irresponsible behavior of President Nasser.  
 In an effort to offset what it realized was an unfavorable reaction in the West 
to the Greek attitude in this period, the Government expressed support for the 
principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine shortly after its proclamation. It soon became 
apparent that this move had been made without adequate political preparation. 
Opposition criticism increased in volume. In May the Richards Mission came to 
Athens to discuss the American doctrine. (Foreign Minister Averoff was absent 
attending the NATO Council meetings in Bonn.) The Opposition was now calling for 
an all-out debate on Greek foreign policy, a development that Karamanlis was eager 
to avoid. Acting hastily, he recessed Parliament, only to reverse himself immediately 
thereafter under pressure from the Opposition and the King. In the ensuing debate, 
however, the Opposition was unable to press home its advantage and Karamanlis 
emerged stronger than before. 
 
 B. Cyprus 
 In the early spring of 1957 there were hopes that the steady deterioration of the 
situation on Cyprus might be arrested. In March Archbishop Makarios was released 
by the British from his year-long exile in the Seychelles. EOKA, the Cypriot terrorist 
organization, issued a declaration of truce. These developments, coupled with the fact 
that the Greek delegation at the United Nations earlier in the year had lent its support 
to an innocuous resolution calling for a ―peaceful, democratic and just‖ solution of the 
Cyprus problem, suggested that progress was possible. At this apparently propitious 
moment the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, offered NATO‘s good offices 
to mediate the dispute. While the offer may have appeared logical to the West it did 
not to the Greeks. They doubted Lord Ismay‘s impartiality and, almost as much, the 
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impartiality of NATO itself, where the allied strength of Britain and Turkey could 
block any settlement favorable to Greece. The Karamanlis Government rejected the 
NATO offer in polite terms and then, to balance the ledger, made a series of gestures 
designed to reaffirm Greece‘s ties with the West. These gestures, which may have 
seemed more significant in Greece than in the countries they were meant to mollify, 
were the following: 
(1) Greek Ambassador Mostras was returned to London after a year‘s absence. 
In a warm message delivered on his arrival he expressed hope for the amicable 
settlement of Anglo-Greek problems and optimism about the chances for a Cyprus 
solution. 
(2) Outgoing British Ambassador Peake was officially entertained by the King 
and Foreign Minister and was awarded a high decoration. 
(3) Greece withdrew its opposition to the appointment of British Admiral 
Edwards as NATO CINCMED. 
(4) The Government withdrew objections to Turkish and British participation 
in NATO War College visits to Greece. 
 In truth, these were small gestures, though well-meant. A more significant 
move, as noted above, was prompt Greek endorsement of the American Doctrine for 
the Middle East. Viewed together, these actions indicated that Karamanlis was 
seeking to keep abreast of Greek public opinion while at the same time reassure the 
West that Greece was not slipping into neutralism. 
 As the year unfolded the pressures on Karamanlis to ―do‖ something about 
Cyprus mounted again. His circumstances were rendered more precarious than ever 
by the presence in Athens of Archbishop Makarios, elegantly quartered in the Hotel 
Grande Bretagne and with offices almost next door to the Foreign Ministry. It soon 
became clear that Makarios intended to maintain a psychological initiative on the 
Cyprus problem vis a vis the Government. His headquarters were the scene of 
constant comings and goings; he received innumerable delegations; made many 
speeches and issued countless statements. Some of the latter took the form of 
comments on actions of the Greek Government and posed the awkward question of 
who was running Greek foreign policy. While the Government succeeded in avoiding 
an open breach with Makarios, it is apparent that Karamanlis and his Foreign 
Minister, Evanghelos Averoff, became increasingly exasperated by this state of 
affairs, the more so because until the Archbishop could return to Cyprus there was 
little that could be done about it.  
 During the summer and fall there were many rumors that Makarios was 
planning extensive trips outside Greece to promote world-wide support for Cypriot 
self-determination. When at length it was announced that he intended to visit United 
States in September the Greek Government regarded it as a mixed blessing. The 12th 
Session of the General Assembly was ready to convene and the Archbishop‘s 
presence in New York at that time could only add to the responsibilities of the Greek 
delegation during the Cyprus debate. Makarios‘ departure occurred in a somewhat 
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strained atmosphere, reports having been received from Washington that he was 
unlikely to be received by the President or the Secretary of State. 
 In December the General Assembly came nearer to meeting Greek wishes 
with respect to Cyprus than it ever had before. After much in-fighting and some rather 
acrimonious debate in the Political Committee, the Greek delegation succeeded in 
engineering the Committee‘s approval of a resolution containing the following 
operative paragraph: 
 ―The General Assembly … expresses its earnest hope that further negotiations 
and discussions will be undertaken in a spirit of cooperation with a view to have the 
right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus‖. 
 The vote was 33 in favor; 20 opposed; and 25 abstaining. Prominent among 
those in favor of the Greek resolution were the members of the Soviet Bloc. Equally 
prominent among those opposed were the majority of Greece‘s NATO allies. The 
United States abstained. 
 While the Greek resolution likewise obtained majority support in the Plenary 
Session it did not receive a two-thirds majority vote and consequently failed of 
adoption. Nevertheless, the results were interpreted in Greece as a moral victory and 
tended to increase the prestige of Prime Minister Karamanlis and his beleaguered 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Averoff. 
 
C. Missile Bases 
 The question of Greek missile bases was first raised in Greece at the time of 
the Bonn NATO meeting in the spring. The matter was disposed of temporarily in the 
ensuing Parliamentary debate when the Opposition proved itself unable to mount an 
effective attack against the Government on this or any other issue. There remained 
however an undercurrent of speculation about missile bases, founded on a generally-
shared assumption that NATO planned to request nuclear base rights from Greece and 
that Karamanlis planned to cede them. 
 At the NATO ―summit meeting‖ in Paris in December the Greek Prime 
Minister seemed mindful of this speculation. He went to Paris with a formula which 
he termed one of ―universality‖ – i.e. the NATO powers would accept or reject 
missile bases as a bloc. By this means he hoped to avoid the embarrassments of 
bilateral negotiation of base rights which he felt would be subject to partisan 
exploitation, especially by the Extreme Left. The Greek formula was not accepted, 
however – a development that cannot have greatly surprised Karamanlis, who 
returned to Athens with a laconic announcement of the results of the meeting and a 
statement that the question of Greek missile bases had not arisen. 
 Since then the Communist-line EDA has done its best to bring the pot to a 
boil. Early in 1958 a series of protest meetings were scheduled. Two of the first 
meetings, one in Piraeus and one in the Island of Mytiline where the Extreme Left has 
considerable strength, failed badly due to effective counter-measures by the Interior 
Ministry and the police and this took much of the steam out of the Communist 
campaign. According to CAS, the Communists then decided to change their tactics, 
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working more through Front groups, circulating petitions and playing on the fears of 
non-Communist Greeks. After the resignation of Karamanlis in March EDA‘s 
objective became one of turning missile bases into a key electoral issue. During this 
period EDA‘s newspaper, Avghi, began to feature a daily missile column, decorated 
with dark, sausage-shaped missiles and devoted entirely to anti-base propaganda. 
 While at this writing the Communists have not succeeded in making missiles 
bases appear to be an urgent national issue, the nationalist parties have handled the 
subject with extreme caution and it is evident that Greece‘s political leadership 
believes that a significant under-current of anti-base feeling exists in the country. This 
assumption poses obvious problems for the West whether or not the missile bases 
issue plays an important role in the May elections. (See Embassy Despatch No. 750, 
dated April 8, 1958.) 
 
D. Relations with the Arab World 
 Throughout 1957 Greece followed a policy of undeviating support for Arab 
aspirations. Decidedly opposed to the Baghdad Pact, both because of British and 
Turkish membership and because of the anti-Pact sentiments of the southern tier of 
Arab states, Greece has tended to regard with favor, or at least sympathy, the 
activities of the uncommitted Arab states. Obviously, the existence of influential 
Greek communities in the Arab world, notably in Egypt, has played a dominant part 
in the formulation of the Greek attitude.  
 Greece‘s objective of maintaining cordial relations with the Arabs has led to 
such actions as Greek support of Syria in the United Nations at the time of the 
Turkish-Syrian dispute. The visit of Karamanlis and Averoff to Cairo; the visit of 
Averoff to the Sudan; the visits of the Lebanese President, the Libyan Foreign 
Minister and the Egyptian Finance Minister to Greece; all these were in furtherance of 
the same objective.  
 In rationalizing their courtship of the Arabs, Greek officials emphasize their 
belief that Greece can serve as a bridge between the West and the Arab world, a point 
that they stressed with especial vigor to the Richards Mission. In support of this they 
contend that the Orthodox communities in the Arab world represent an effective lever 
on Arab policies. There has been no indication so far, however, that Greek influence 
has been significant in the formulation of any major Arab decision. In the case of 
Egypt, the Greek Government has even had indifferent success in protecting the 
interests of the wealthy and deeply-rooted Orthodox community in Alexandria which, 
under the pressure of Nasser‘s ―Egyptianization‖ policies, has been steadily whittled 
down in size and influence. 
 
E. Relations with the West 
 Throughout 1957 the Greek Government continued to view its relations with 
the West at least partially through the range-finders of the Cyprus question. In these 
terms the Greeks found the western attitude disappointing. While, as noted above, 
Greek relations with the United Kingdom were somewhat improved during the course 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
154 
of the year the changes were little more than skin-deep. The release of the 
Archbishop; the conciliatory policies of Cyprus Governor General[sic] Sir Hugh Foot; 
and Greece‘s qualified victory in the United Nations; all contributed to a moderation 
in the intensity of Greek feelings which was gratifying but, in each case, temporary. 
The visit to Athens in January, 1958, of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd 
raised some hopes in Greece that the British had dismissed once and for all the 
Turkish-supported scheme of partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem and that a 
new British initiative would be forthcoming. Nothing materialized, however, and in 
the first quarter of 1958 it was evident that pressures were building up again which 
would be brought squarely to bear on whatever Government was installed in the May 
elections. 
If there was intermittent relaxation in the Greek attitude toward the United 
Kingdom during the year the same could not be said of relations with Turkey. 
Whereas in the past there had been a tendency to label Turkey the stooge of Britain 
and to attribute Turkish views on Cyprus to British provocation, it became harder and 
harder to discount the depth of Turkish feeling as animosity between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities increased and Ankara became louder and more insistent 
in its sponsorship of partition. While this realization may have introduced a note of 
realism into Greek thinking it did nothing to improve relations with Turkey. 
The United States caught its own share of brick-bats on the Cyprus issue. The 
American attitude of friendly impartiality fell far short of what the Greeks wanted 
from their closest ally. Greek resentment carried over into other areas. In May the 
unfortunate killing of left-wing Deputy Sarafis by an automobile driven by an 
American airman raised new protests against the ―extraterritorial privileges‖ of 
American personnel in Greece. The speedy action of the American Ambassador in 
accepting Greek jurisdiction over the case removed some of its sting however. In the 
summer the Parliamentary Recess Committee ratified the amended Status of Forces 
Agreement, Government deputies and one Independent voting in favor of ratification, 
the Opposition against.  
There were other signs of Greek restlessness. In the fall a USIS-sponsored 
public opinion poll showed a significant amount of neutralist feeling among the cross-
section of Greeks interviewed. The controversy over missile bases (see above) 
reflected some of the same sentiments. As the elections approached these 
dissatisfactions were translated by the political leadership into ringing declarations of 
national independence and increased sensitivity to any implication of U.S. 
interference in the campaign. 
In effect, Greece was experiencing a psychological rather than an actual 
disengagement from the United States and its other western allies. A combination of 
circumstances encouraged the process. For a decade Greek-American relations had 
been very close, closer, it may be argued than the relations between any two countries 
can or should be for long. It was neither to be expected nor hoped that Greece‘s 
dependence on the United States would be permanent. The Cyprus problem 
dramatized this fact to the Greeks by posing a situation in which they could not act in 
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concert with their western allies and could not act independently of them. It forced the 
Greeks to tote up, as they had not done before, the ―price‖ of the western alliance. In 
this sense the process of redressing Greece‘s relations with the west may be a healthy 
one in the end, for it scarcely possible to appraise accurately the advantages of an 
alliance without at the same time realizing its disadvantages. During the Bandit War 
and in the years of internal reconstruction that followed, no such appraisal was 
possible. What is going on in Greece today may be regarded as a somewhat delayed 
regularization of Greece‘s relations with the West. 
 If a danger exists it is simply that the Greeks may over-correct the balabce in 
their foreign relations. It is a risk to be carefully watched but not yet, in the Embassy‘s 
judgement, to be feared unduly. For the present, Greece‘s readjustment may be 
primarily important in the effect it exerts on the country‘s internal stability. In the 
conduct of its external affairs, Greece may be expected to exercise its independence 
on marginal issues but there is no present reason to believe that any non-Communist 
Government would wish to go further.  
 
F. Relations with Yugoslavia 
 Greece‘s relations with Yugoslavia were conspicuously cordial during the 
period under review. In July the King and Queen paid an informal visit to Tito at 
Brioni. Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj visited Athens in October. There were three 
reciprocal visits of Greek and Yugoslav military delegations, the same number that 
had occurred the previous year. The Greek press, almost without exception, reserved 
its most complimentary adjectives for President Tito and his chief lieutenants and 
accorded respectful treatment to Yugoslav policies of non-alignment that bordered on 
outright admiration. 
 Several factors served to promote Greek-Yugoslav friendship. One was 
Yugoslavia‘s steady support for the Greek position in Cyprus. Another was the 
deterioration of Greek relations with Turkey, which tended, in the Greek eyes, to 
emphasize that Yugoslavia was Greece‘s ―only Balkan friend‖. A third was the 
genuine, if latent admiration felt by many Greeks for Tito‘s neutralism, a feeling that 
was encouraged by their conviction that Greece was being let down by its western 
allies. As long as these elements continued to exert their influence, Yugoslavia could 
be expected to occupy an especially favored place among Greece‘s friends. 
 
G. Relations with Soviet Bloc  
A significant factor affecting Greece‘s attitude toward the Soviet Bloc in 1957 
was the vocal and unqualified support that the Bloc continued to give to the Greek 
position on the Cyprus problem by its votes and speeches at the United Nations. That 
the Soviet attitude had some psychological effect on the Greek public is probable and 
the noticeable improvement that occurred in Greece‘s relations with the Soviet Union 
and its satellites, an improvement taking pace only seven years after the termination 
of the Bandit War, can best be understood in the context of Cyprus and the general 
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process of readjustment in Greek foreign relations which the Cyprus problem has 
catalyzed. 
There was a general increase in contacts between Greece and the Soviet Bloc 
during the past year. It has been noticeable at almost all levels of activity, ranging 
from the cultural through the commercial and political. Numerous Greek delegations 
have visited the Soviet Union and the satellites, including labor groups, journalists, 
politicians, scientists and artists and there has been a reciprocal flow of Soviet 
delegations into Greece. The largest group of Greeks to visit the Soviet Union in 1957 
were the eighty-three who attended the Moscow Youth Festival in July. This 
delegation, which was carefully screened by the Greek Government, returned with 
generally favorable reactions to what they had seen – a response that was echoed by 
other Greeks to whom the Embassy talked after visits to the Soviet Union. 
In the commercial field there has been an increase in trade between Greece 
and the Bloc, although in an overall context the level continues to be relatively low. 
An inhibiting influence on trade relations has been exerted by the limited demandthat 
exists in Greece for Bloc products except for petroleum although this may not remain 
true in the future. By the end of the year Greek credits to Bloc were in most instances 
above agreed swing limits. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Soviet Union to 
absorb increased amounts of Greek exports, such as tobacco, and the ability of the 
Bloc to offer its own manufactured goods at non-competitive prices imply that trade 
relations between Greece and the Bloc will continue to expand. 
From a political standpoint, the year was characterized by prolific Soviet 
efforts to promote the regularization of Greek relations with the Balkan satellites. 
Bulgaria pushed hard to achieve normal diplomatic relations through a series of talks 
on border delineation and the long-standing problem of reparations. Discussions 
between Greek and Bulgarian military negotiators were reasonably successful on the 
subject of border demarcation. There was little or no success on reparations, however, 
and Greece has made no move to designate an Ambassador in Sofia. 
On September 10 the Roumanian Prime Minister, Chivu Stoica, proposed the 
convocation of a Balkan conference to consider a six-nation non-aggression and 
cooperation pact among Greece, Turkey, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and 
Roumania. The bid was rejected by the Greeks on the basis of their existing problems 
with Albania and Bulgaria. While the Government‘s refusal seemed to accord with 
the feeling of most non-Communist Greeks  that the time was not ripe for such a 
conference, the Roumanian proposal raised once more the question of Greece‘s proper 
role in the Balkans and whether indefinite insulation of the Balkan satellites is either 
possible or desirable. 
Albania continued to press both publicly  and privately for the restoration of 
normal relations with Greece. Greek claims to Northern Epirus were as usual an 
important deterrent to the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, agreement 
was reached on a joint mine-sweeping operation in the Corfu Channel which began on 
March 15, 1958, and was expected to continue through the middle of July. During the 
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course of the year the Albanians permitted the repatriation of several groups of Greek 
hostages abducted during the Bandit War.  
The Soviet Union itself adopted a generally mild and conciliatory tone toward 
Greece throughout the year. One exception occurred in April 1957, when Soviet 
Ambassador Sergueev, under instructions, admonished Foreign Minister Averoff 
strongly against permitting nuclear bases on Greek soil. A week later Moscow Radio 
repeated the warning. The result was flare up of popular resentment among Greeks 
against Soviet interference in Greek internal affairs. Popular feeling subsided when 
the Soviets did not press the argument further. 
In general, it may be said that by the end of March 1958, Greek relations with 
the Soviet Union had improved all along the line. In good measure this improvement 
could be attributed to the ―readjustment‖ of Greece‘s foreign relations to which 
reference was made above. More specifically, in the continued absence of a Cyprus 
settlement satisfactory to Greece and assuming continued Soviet Bloc support for the 
Greek position, the improvement was likely to proceed and conceivably to accelerate 
in the coming year. 
II. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Certain conclusions can be drawn from the record of Greek foreign policy in 
the year under review. Following are the Embassy‘s conclusions, together with 
indications of what the United States may expect from Greece in the coming year: 
(1) Greek preoccupation with the Cyprus problem has encouraged a qualified
and somewhat belated readjustment in Greece‘s relations with the West, including the 
United States. Greece‘s ―disengagement‖ from the West is at present more 
psychological than actual. Greece still needs its close ties with the West and most 
non-Communist Greeks realize that it does. 
(2) Concurrently there has been a shift toward more ―normal‖ relations with
the Soviet Bloc. 
(3) As long as the Cyprus problem remains unsettled it will have an abrasive
effect on Greece‘s relations with the West, creating a progressively deeper 
psychological dilemma for the Greeks. While there is presently no evidence to 
suggest that Greek disaffection over Cyprus could swing the country into the arms of 
the Soviets it can, and doubtless will, have an unsettling effect on the country‘s 
internal stability. 
(4) Under almost any non-Communist Government Greece can be expected to
steer an increasingly ―independent‖ course in its international relations. This may be 
especially true of Greek actions on marginal issues – i.e. issues that do not imply a 
shift in basic loyalties – notably in the Middle East where Greece will continue to 
criticize U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact and promote an American rapprochement 
with the uncommitted Arab states. 
(5) Greece‘s period of readjustment will make relations with the United States
more complicated and sensitive but there is no reason to suppose that they will 
thereby become unsatisfactory. Given a certain amount of patience, mixed with 
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firmness on important issues, the United States may find that shifts in the emphasis of 
Greek foreign policy lead to a more normal Greek-US relationship – a development 
that would be in the American interest as well as that of Greece. 
For the Ambassador: 
James K. Penfield 
Counselor of Embassy 
__________________________________ 
NARA, RG 59, 781.00/5-2158 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Horner) to the Department of 
State 
Subject: Foreign Minister Evangelos AVEROFF Addresses National War College 
Athens, May 21, 1958 
A fairly lengthy address given yesterday to a visiting group of the National 
War College, and the ensuing question period, provided an opportunity for the 
Ambassador and certain Embassy officers to obtain the views of Greek Foreign 
Minister Evanghelos AVEROFF on both Foreign and domestic matters. While many 
of the theses developed by Mr. Averoff may already be known to the Department, or 
perhaps could be logically deduced, they are reported here for their general 
background interest. 
Mr. Averoff began by analyzing the principal pivots of Greek external policy 
as dictated by Greece‘s geographical position and historic past. He described these as: 
1. The abiding need for friendship with Turkey;
2. The requirement that Greece also have the support of stronger nations in the
age-old effort to hold back the Slav tide; 
3. The desirability of ―neutralizing‖ some part of Greece‘s 1,200 km land
frontier; 
4. Greece‘s imperative need for a backdrop or rear echelon.
With respect to Turkey, Me. Averoff stressed his belief that, despite the long
Ottoman domination of Greece, there is no basic animosity between the two countries 
and peoples, and he referred to various events, including talks he and Prime Minister 
Karamanlis have had with Turkish leaders, to show that there is a strong emperical 
element leading these two countries to collaboration. In referring to the dispute over 
Cyprus as a major cause of current less cordial relations, the Foreign Minister seemed 
to be confident that if and when this dispute is settled there will be no deeply-rooted 
reason impeding the restoration of cordial Greco-Turkish relations. 
Greece‘s foreign policy, declared Mr. Averoff, is founded on its membership 
in NATO. Despite dissatisfaction with lack of support from its NATO allies on its 
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Cyprus claims, there is no possibility of Greece‘s faith in NATO being weakened. In 
this regard, possibly or even probably catering to his audience, Mr. Averoff asserted 
that only the presence of the United States in NATO mitigated against much stronger 
resentment of NATO neutrality on Cyprus. 
 The third point made by the Foreign Minister refers of course to Yugoslavia. 
He expressed faith in the Greek policy of friendship towards Yugoslavia on largely 
pragmatic grounds, and, while indicating Greece does not take Yugoslav friendship 
for granted, he thought Yugoslavia had long ceased to be a ―communist‖ nation and 
was evolving in the ideological direction of a new amalgam of state socialism coupled 
with certain capitalistic elements. 
 Greece‘s rear echelon is North Africa and the rest of the Arab world. Mr. 
Averoff stressed the necessity for Greek friendship with the Arab nations on both 
political and economic grounds. Only with Iraq is Greece on less than cordial terms. 
Responding to a question, he indicated little faith in the Baghdad Pact, but thought 
Greece now is more or less impelled to give it support as it is in existence and even an 
imperfect instrument must be used to meet the most important danger facing us all – 
the Soviet menace. Significantly, however, Mr. Averoff implied that Greece‘s policy 
toward the Arab world will continue to be an independent one, not necessarily on the 
same lines as our own. This, he thought, was perhaps in the common interest of the 
West, and Greece could serve a useful role vis-à-vis Nasser and others by projecting 
the Western viewpoint. 
 In analyzing the May 11th Greek national elections, the Foreign Minister did 
not exhibit any complacency, and his remarks were chiefly interesting as reflecting 
future ERE policy to curb communism. Since, as he said, the abnormal population 
bulge of the 1925-50 period is now coming of voting age, it behooves the 
Government to take seriously the prospect of EDA actually improving on its 25 
percent share of the Greek electorate. Concrete measures ―decided upon‖ by the 
Greek Government are reported by separate despatch. To complement these, Mr. 
Averoff stated the Government will take prompt and energetic measures to curb 
subversion, including propaganda, and will resume sending offenders to detention 
camps on the islands. 
 
For the Ambassador: 
John Evarts Horner 
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs 
 
________________________________ 
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NARA, RG59, 781.00/4-1261 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Berger) to the Department of 
State 
Subject: Greece under Caramanlis: April, 1961 
Athens, April 12, 1961 
1. On the eve of Prime Minister Caramanlis‘ visit to the United States it may
be useful toy survey briefly the Greek political scene and the position of the 
Caramanlis Government as it begins the fourth and final year of its present term. 
Greece in 1961 is in mid-passage. Politically, the old ways of doing things are 
breaking down. The Greek way of life is changing and the question is whether 
Greece‘s institutions – its political leadership, its business, its schools and its Church 
– are flexible enough to meet the change, whether they will have to be propped up by
authoritarian supports (as under Metaxas), or whether they will be the first causalities
in a social revolution.
2. The by-now familiar picture of an enlightened conservative government
leading the Greeks toward political stability (more or less against their will) while it 
builds prosperity with hard drachmas is true in a limited sense. Caramanlis has 
survived politically for over five years, a remarkable achievement in Greece, and the 
economic outlook has continued to improve, although many basic problems remain to 
be dealt with. It is no exaggeration to say that more Greeks lead a better life today 
than at any time in modern Greek history. But the problem is that at the very time 
when the country is straining to close the gap between rising expectations and an 
economy severely handicapped by nature and nepotism, it has to face the competition 
of more highly developed countries if it is to survive as a free democracy allied with 
the West. And all this with little experience, few models, and only the dimmest 
insight into European ways of doing business.  
3. Greece‘s social and political administration is out of touch with the changes
occurring in Greek life. Seen against the backdrop of the international competition 
Greece faces it is hopelessly inefficient. Athens University continues to grind out law 
students at the rate of several hundred a year but has no faculty of economic or public 
administration. The business community operates with a code of ethics more 
Byzantine than European. The labor movement is divided into warring factions whose 
leadership exploits the grievances of the workers for personal privilege and power. 
The Church quietly decays and the Crown searches not too intelligently for its place 
in Greek society.  
4. It is however the political leadership of Greece which is most at fault. At a
time when half the Labor force is unemployed or underemployed; when urbanization 
is breaking down the family unit around which Greek society has been structured for 
generations; when new ideas and new hopes are spreading into distant mountain 
villages; when roughly one-fourth of the Greek electorate votes Communist; at such a 
time too many of Greece‘s political leaders seem to have no better answer to Greece‘s 
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problems than to play the game of political charades with which they have diverted 
themselves for years. The nationalist opposition leaders in particular behave as though 
there were no national problem that cannot be solved by a new electoral law.  
 5. The strength of Caramanlis lies not only in his political astuteness but in the 
fact that he, better than his rivals, better even than the leaders of Communist-
controlled EDA, realizes the need for a program of social, political and economic 
reform. His dilemma is that his deficient administrative talents have not been 
sufficient to build out of the generally poor material at hand an organization capable 
of carrying through his program. The Prime Minister is a one-man band. On Fridays 
he thumps his drum in the Commerce Ministry. On Mondays he clashes cymbals in 
Agriculture. There is no real orchestration of the Government because there is no 
orchestra.  
 6. This is certainly nothing new. In modern times Greek governments have 
either been impotent or authoritarian. Political parties have been nonexistent in the 
western sense. The electorate has traditionally gravitated toward individual political 
leaders whose appeal was magnetic rather than rational and whose careers constituted 
the plot of Greek political life. This old way of political life, galvanized as it has been 
to some extent by Caramanlis‘ will and industry, might still be adequate to squeak 
Greece through the accelerating basic changes in Greek society, and even perhaps 
past the dangers of a strong Communist party, but it is hardly adequate to meet 
present challenges plus the new competition which Greece faces from abroad.  
 7. The next Greek election is bound to be an important one. For the older 
generation of Greek politicians, notably for Papandreou and Venizelos, it will 
probably be the last election. Caramanlis faces a different kind of challenge. He will 
go to the country stronger than his individual opponents but weaker than in 1958. The 
situation has obvious dangers for him and for Greece. His problem is that, recognizing 
himself to be the best hope, and possibly the only satisfactory hope for Greece at the 
moment, he is inhibited by that knowledge form taking the political risks which alone 
can produce the moral and practical leadership Greece now needs. Caramanlis has 
demonstrated in the past a measure of political courage, but the present stakes are 
such that the temptation is strong to regard compromise with the old way of doing 
things as the only safe course.  
 8. How Caramanlis intends to meet his challenge as well as his opportunity 
will be demonstrated by his decisions in the matter of an electoral law and possibly a 
Government reshuffle. For the public the choice is between a new deal or a patched-
up version of the old model. If Caramanlis should choose a course which has even the 
appearance of having been dictated only by partisan expediency, he will have missed 
the opportunity to build the strong moral, psychological and practical base for the 
social and economic program he envisages for Greece. In a very real sense the next 
two or three years will see Greek democracy and the monarchy put to a very 
fundamental test.  
Samuel D. Berger, Charge d‘ Affaires ad interim 
_________________________________
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NARA, RG 59, 781.00/3-2662 
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Brewster) to the Department 
of State 
Subject: A Winter of Discontent, some implications on the current political 
maneuvering in Greece 
Athens, March 26, 1962 
1. It is apparent that the Center Union's campaign to nullify the results of the October
29, 1961, elections is turning into a broader and more fundamental attack on several
of the governing institutions of Greece; what started four months ago as a disgruntled
effort on the part of the defeated opposition to challenge the legitimacy of the
elections, and therefore of the Caramanlis Government, is becoming an effort to
challenge the legitimacy of certain Greek institutions, such as the Palace, the military
leadership, and the internal security forces which, in the minds of the opposition,
exerted undue influence on the conduct of the elections. To understand the
significance of this challenge, and to estimate the lines of its probable development, it
is useful to consider briefly the electoral debate itself and to see what, if anything, the
opposition has proved by its campaign.
2. The general charge advanced by the Center Union against the Dovas Service
Government is that the conduct of the elections was characterized by force and
fraudulence (―via kai nothia‖ in the euphonic Greek phrase). The evidence adduced
by the opposition to support the charge falls into two categories: (a) evidence
designed to show that many voters, especially in the Athens area, were illegally
registered, and that military voting registers were not made available to party repre-
sentatives for inspection within the time specified by law; and (b) evidence of police
pressure on individual voters in some provincial areas.
3. While the Center Union, for purposes of its campaign, has tended to lump the
evidence together, and to draw from it extravagant conclusions about a ―master plan‖
to rig the elections in favor of ERE, objective examination of the evidence makes
clear that much of what the opposition has been talking about is not malfeasance but
nonfeasance. That is, with respect to the civilian vote the opposition has proved
numerous technical violations of the law, especially as it affects the registration of
voters, but has failed notably to prove that the elections as a whole were rigged. Thus,
despite all the time that the opposition has spent rooting through the registers, not a
single case of double voting has so far been proved and the Government has been able
to show that a number of illegally registered voters were in fact supporters of the
opposition.
4. With respect to the military vote and the activities of the police and para-military
TEA forces in the provinces the evidence, while scattered, is somewhat more
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persuasive. Numerous [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports tend to 
confirm that the Army high command bent every effort to deliver a heavy vote for 
Caramanlis and that General Kardamakis, the Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Army and 
a long-time associate of the Prime Minister, was deeply involved in the 
electioneering. The pre-electoral activities of TEA and the gendarmerie do not appear 
to have been so explicitly pro-ERE; the mission of the internal security forces was to 
hold down the vote of the extreme left. Nonetheless, in at least one instance, that of 
the Police Chief in Methoni, the Courts have found evidence of strong-arm methods 
employed against a non-Communist, and it is permissible to question the wisdom of 
allowing provincial constabulary to intervene in free elections even when motivated 
by anti-Communism. 
5. The conclusions to be drawn from these observations are the following: (a) while
there was no widespread adulteration of the civilian vote, the administration of the
elections was poor and open to abuse by all parties; (b) the Army leadership was
overly involved in the campaign and inadequate restraints were placed on the
activities of the internal security forces in the pre-electoral period.
6. It is probable, as some Government spokesmen have said, that similar conclusions
could have been drawn from any Greek election, including those conducted by the
present opposition leaders. However, what was acceptable, or at any rate accepted,
practice in 1951 or 1956 may not be so today. The Center Union, under the purple
banner of Papandreou's oratory, has ridden off in all directions and in so doing has
created much confusion about the real issues raised by its attack on the election
results. These issues do not, as the Center Union would have us believe, pose the
question, ―who should govern Greece?‖ They do, however, raise important questions
about the way Greece should be governed.
7. If we accept this line of reasoning, it becomes easier to see why the Greek public's
response to the Center Union campaign has been mixed and why the campaign itself
has shifted emphasis so markedly in recent weeks. There has from the beginning been
a measure of reserve and skepticism in the public's attitude toward the Center Union
and especially toward its leadership. No serious observer of the Greek political scene
believes that Papandreou and his ill-assorted coalition command as much popular
confidence as Caramanlis, and once this is admitted the most extreme of the
opposition charges become transparently ridiculous. Many people believe, however,
that the Palace, the Army leadership and the internal security forces intervene too
much in the political life of Greece, and that the sluggishness of government
administration, its apparent unresponsiveness to individual needs, has created a
potentially dangerous gap between the governing class and the governed.
8. For this reason public opinion, which was apathetic about the Center Union's attack
on the election results, has appeared more receptive to its attacks on the Palace. It
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explains why many intellectuals who have little or no use for the leadership of the 
Center Union nevertheless feel that in questioning the impartiality of the Army 
leadership and the gendarmerie the opposition is performing a useful service. Finally, 
it indicates how, almost without realizing what they are doing, the Center Union 
leaders find themselves conducting a very different campaign from the one they began 
four months ago. In recent weeks the implicit issues have simply become explicit. 
9. Greece, it is often said, is in mid-passage, but the phrase is usually used to describe 
a stage in the country's economic development. It is less widely understood that 
Greece is also in mid-passage socially and politically. Methods of administration 
appropriate to the conditions of prewar Greece; habits of thought suitable to the 
period of the Bandit War; royal prerogatives which survived in the atmosphere of an 
earlier and less enlightened time; these are a few of the anachronisms whose 
continued existence vexes the public and will trouble the Government until they are 
resolved. These are real issues, as opposed to the synthetic ones which the Center 
Union introduced at the beginning of its campaign. The apathetic response of the 
Greek public to Papandreou's attempt to discredit the elections (which the public 
correctly identified as political opportunism) has, in effect, forced the Center Union 
leadership to change the focus of its attack. 
10. In these somewhat changed circumstances the danger to Caramanlis does not 
appear to be especially serious at the moment. The immediate threat was diminished 
as soon as it became clear that a majority of the Greek public were extremely 
skeptical about the most violent and politically-motivated of Papandreou's charges. 
When the Prime Minister was able to ascertain that public confidence in the 
Government had not been shaken, his position became simpler and his principal 
concern one of holding together the versatile but high-strung group of men who 
compose his present cabinet. So far, he has managed to do this with consummate skill. 
Ministers whose personal loyalty he has reason to doubt—Finance Minister Theotokis 
and Interior Minister Rallis, in particular—have been those to whom he has assigned 
responsibility for conducting the Government's defense in Parliament. This strategy 
has enabled the Prime Minister to avoid direct participation in the election debate and 
has forced ministers of untested reliability to commit themselves publicly on a subject 
they might have preferred to finesse. The total effect has probably been to strengthen 
the cohesiveness of the Government and to lessen the danger that it can be brought 
down from within, as it was in 1958. 
11. The Prime Minister's success in holding together his cabinet also strengthens his 
position with the Palace. An important objective of the Center Union has been to 
convince the Royal Family and, to a lesser extent, the American Embassy that the 
Caramanlis Government is ―irregular‖ and therefore a source of political instability in 
Greece. When the opposition leaders call for a ―transitional‖ government they are 
appealing to the Palace to replace Caramanlis with some compromise candidate 
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whom they would support until new elections were held. Given the well-known lack 
of personal rapport between Caramanlis and the Palace, the Center Union reasons that 
this scheme might be acceptable to the Royal Family if they become convinced (a) 
that the Prime Minister was not giving them adequate protection from political attack, 
and (b) that a compromise candidate of their own choice would receive widespread 
bipartisan support in Parliament. In such a situation the likeliest candidate would be 
Theotokis, who enjoys close personal relations with the Royal Family, is well 
regarded by backbenchers of both Government and center opposition, and has no 
great affection for Caramanlis. Other, more remote possibilities would be Rallis, 
Minister of Coordination Papaligouras, or Minister of Commerce Pipinelis. It is 
perfectly clear, however, that this strategy has little chance of succeeding as long as 
Caramanlis remains in full command of his cabinet and his party. In recent events, 
there is no sign that his grip is relaxing or that rumored anxieties of the Royal Family 
are being exploited to his political disadvantage. 
12. Indeed, at present it is the Center Union leaders who seem to be in trouble. 
Papandreou has become enmeshed in a tiresome debate with ex-Liberal members of 
the cabinet about who is entitled to wear the mantle of the elder Venizelos; the Center 
Union rank-and-file are deeply divided on how to phrase their criticism of the military 
leadership and an open letter which the party recently addressed to the Armed Forces, 
denouncing their present leaders as ―unworthy‖, was revised so often that its eventual 
release was anticlimactic; lastly, at a time when public interest is centered on Princess 
Sophie's dowry, the financing of the Queen's Fund and other matters involving the 
Royal Family, the Center Union finds itself half in, half out of Parliament and created 
a further impression of confusion by rushing off to Crete on March 18 for a mass rally 
on the elections. 
13. Assuming that public confidence in Caramanlis remains unshaken, we are 
justified in concluding that the Government will ride out the present agitation. In its 
fumbling way, the Center Union has found in the Palace and in some questionable 
political activities of the military and internal security forces valid issues with which 
to attack Caramanlis. Its confused handling of these issues, however, provided the 
Prime Minister with the time he needs to fashion at least temporary solutions to the 
most pressing of his problems. It is to be hoped that he will do more than that. Basic 
reforms are long overdue in Greece's internal security legislation, in the way the 
country conducts its elections and in the way the Royal Family comport themselves. 
The changing character of the election debate has clearly demonstrated that it is in 
these areas that the Greek public is looking for effective action from the Government. 
For the Ambassador 
H. Daniel Brewster 
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs 
________________________________
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NARA, RG 59, 781.5/ 4-2062 
From: NEA – Howard R. Cottam 
AID – William S. Gaud 
To: The Secretary  
Subject: Financing the Greek Defense Effort 
Washington, April 20, 1962 
The Greek Government feels that its needs for special assistance for its 
defense effort are not fully recognized by the United States Government and other 
NATO members. They have not fully accepted that United States grant aid is to be 
terminated on June 30, 1962 and are further disturbed by the recommendations of the 
NATO Wisemen that grant aid is no longer required although some soft balance of 
payments loans should be made in 1963 and 1964 to assist Greece in maintaining its 
current levels of defense expenditure without grant aid. Unless action is taken to 
reassure the Greeks of continued United States and NATO recognition of their 
contribution to NATO defense and indications of willingness to assist in meeting their 
problems, there could be a serious loss of confidence by the Greeks in NATO and 
potentially embarrassing situation at the Ministerial meeting in Athens.  
Background 
The Greek Government is currently in a mood of depression because of its 
assessment that the United States Government and other NATO countries have not 
fully realized the problem arising from the impact of its defense effort upon the 
economy of Greece. Two recent events have given rise to a feeling of insecurity and 
questioning of the value of the NATO alliance on the part of the Greeks. The first 
event was the termination of the United States grant aid to Greece as of June 30, 1962. 
The other event has been the submission of the NATO Wisemen report to the North 
Atlantic Council which recommends that no further grant aid need be given to Greece 
but that long term, low interest rate loans in the amount of $60 million for 1963 and 
1964 be available to Greece through a special consortium arrangement under OECD.  
The Greek Government contends that it cannot carry the present defense 
burden, which is around 4.6% percent of GNP, without grant assistance to cover local 
currency expenses. The Greeks have therefore indicated to General Norstad that they 
are contemplating a reduction of military forces in 1963 to levels which General 
Norstad informs us are unacceptable in light of NATO defense needs. The Greek 
Government has taken strong exception to the Wisemen report and initially threatened 
to reject it outright. It now appears that the Greeks may be persuaded to accept the 
report in principle provided the North Atlantic Council agrees to a statement prepared 
by Secretary General Stikker which would establish a special study group of certain 
NATO countries to make a further examination of Greek defense needs and consider 
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ways and means of raising additional resources which Greece would need to maintain 
a satisfactory defense effort.   
 
Discussion  
 We have informed the Greeks that they cannot expect further grant aid from 
the United States and that we will view sympathetically applications for foreign 
exchange costs of projects or programs which meet current AID criteria.  
 The Greek Government contends that their basic problem is a shortage of local 
currency which they require to help cover the defense budget as well as the 
investment budget. Our Embassy and Mission have made some preliminary estimates 
of how much an internal financing gap may exist and these differ widely from Greek 
assumptions. However, we do not consider the budget ―gap‖ of deficit to be an 
appropriate basis for determining the amount of assistance for Greece. We are trying 
to move into a position where we all be financing exchange cost of projects and 
programs in the future.  
 We are in the process of considering several applications for specific projects 
totaling $69 million (three development banks - $45 million; second Acheloos 
hydroelectric project - $21 million; and private loan for Piraiki-Patraiki textile plant - 
$3.5 million). These applications have been in process for almost one year and an 
AID loan officer was recently in Athens to discuss further details concerning these 
loans. It is hoped that action may be taken on some of these loan applications within 
the near future.  
 Ambassador Labouisse has recommended that consideration be given to 
project or program loans amounting to possibly $30 million in FY 1963. The Embassy 
is collaborating with the Greek Government in attempting to identify the dollar import 
component of the public investment budget which might provide the basis for such 
loans. This is well within the limits we have been considering for Greece.  
 The extent to which we might be prepared to consider a general program loan 
not tied to specific projects or development programs would depend on a complete 
analysis of total resources available to the Greeks and their projected budgetary 
expenditures including maintenance of a defense effort at current levels and increased 
proportionately with the growth of the economy.  
 We do not feel that we can make a realistic assessment at this point of Greek 
needs for balance of payments support in FY 1963 pending the results of the study 
now going on in Athens to identify activities that we might finance as well as the size 
of the balance of payments deficit in 1963. Before the Greeks formulate the 1963 
budget, it will be necessary to discuss with them the level of defense expenditures we 
would like to see them maintain in 1963, and at that time we will probably have to be 
more specific about the kind of assistance we are prepared to extend. Greece will be 
presenting its development program to the OECD in June, and this should provide a 
basis for OECD action to mobilize external assistance for Greece. There is no 
problem in financing of the Greek budget in FY 1962.  
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 There is a clear necessity, however, for reassurance of the Greeks at this 
particular point in light of their reaction to the termination of supporting assistance 
and their dissatisfaction with the Wisemen‘s report. This is of special significance 
because of the consideration of the Wisemen‘s report at Athens and the fact that 
considerable pressures will be placed on the United States delegation at the Athens 
Ministerial meeting. It appears that Secretary General Stikker has reached a 
compromise on the Wisemen‘s report whereby Greek requirements for defense will 
be subject of further study. This may avoid embarrassment to the United States at the 
Athens meeting.  
 We do feel, however, that it would be desirable if you could again reassure the 
Greeks of our continuing commitment to their security and state that, although our aid 
will now assume a different form, we are prepared to continue our economic 
assistance to Greece and will give sympathetic attention to sound loan applications on 
a project basis and when the Greek plan is further refined and developed to consider a 
program loan. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
NARA, RG 59, 611.81/7-1762 
Memorandum of Conversation  
 
Participants 
The Secretary of State 
His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece 
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs   
 
Subject: Greek-American Relations 
Washington, July 17, 1962 
 
The Secretary, noting recent suggestions that Prime Minister Caramanlis 
seemed a little discouraged and anxious that American attitudes toward Greece had 
changed, welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm to the Ambassador our steady 
friendship for his country. The Secretary recalled his talks with Prime Minister during 
the NATO meeting in Athens. After those talks he had thought, despite some 
differences of perspective, that the two sides had understood each other. As the Greek 
Government knew, patterns of United States foreign assistance have been changed by 
Congressional actions to give more flexibility for development lending and at the 
same time to cut back defense support. The new arrangement reflected the need to use 
our foreign aid funds most effectively; it was also related to serious gold-flow 
problems here. Unless our customary export surplus were maintained we would be 
hard pressed to continue our overseas military and economic assistance programs on 
which rest the hopes of the free world. These adjustments have in no way affected our 
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attitude toward Greece, with whom our relations have been close and strong since the 
difficult days of 1947.   
The Secretary added that we have great respect for the contribution that 
Greece has been making to its defense and its development. Nor were we in any sense 
negligent of the Greek situation. Our strong fleet based in the Mediterranean 
underscored our calculations of the importance of the southern flank of NATO. Even 
though the Berlin problem attracted attention to the central front, our view has always 
been that the security of NATO was indivisible.  
The Secretary noted the multilateral efforts to assist Greece currently being 
made in the NATO working Group and in the OECD. He did not know whether or 
how we could help speed up their work, but had the impression that the NATO 
countries wanted to be helpful to their Greek ally. It would be advantageous for 
Greece to press its own case in the NATO capitals since many countries were now 
seeking assistance in Europe and we have had to urge many causes.  
The Ambassador, expressing gratitude to the Secretary for discussing these 
matters with him, said his Government would find the Secretary‘s comments very 
helpful. The Greek people had a great and profound appreciation for United States‘ 
help. At the same time, the process of adjustments of the American aid program, 
which the Secretary had described, happened to coincide with an extremely critical 
period for Greece. The anxiety and even some sort of anguish which had become 
evident in Athens arose because the Greeks feared they might find themselves in a 
gap in which older forms of aid would not be replaced immediately by newer forms. 
As he had previously said to Mr. Talbot, the Ambassador pointed out to the Secretary 
that his Government feared a tendency in NATO Working Group to cut down the 
specification of Greek needs in order to bring them within visible resources, rather 
than to judge the essential Greek problem and how to meet it.  
The Secretary observed that the United States was not asking Greece to reduce 
its defenses. We were all likely to go through some very nervous weeks and months 
ahead. This was true because we saw no willingness by the Soviet Union to respect 
our vital interests in Berlin nor have we reached agreement on any central issue.  
The Ambassador spoke of very strong pressures on Greece, for example 
30.000 former Communist bandits currently assembled in the region of Skopje. 
Greece was the only non-Slavic and non-Communist nation in its area. Its people 
were not militaristic but they were extremely conscious of their defense needs. Should 
the Government have to reduce defenses expenditures, it would be a terrible blow. 
Indeed, it would mean the amputation of the northern provinces. This was the 
background of what at times must seem to Americans to be Greek obsessions with 
their parochial problems.  
The Secretary asked if there might also be a psychological element in the 
picture. In the late 1940s we had the stimulation of fighting together to restore order 
to Greece. Later came the rather invigorating task of building up NATO. Recently, in 
contrast, we have been setting down to the long haul. The alliance was now soundly 
based. It had a great task to go forward with and Greece was part of that as in the 
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Common Market, etc. With fewer exciting developments in the immediate area of 
Greece, other issues had come to preoccupy our minds. However, he wished to make 
it clear that if other countries caught the headlines this was not evidence that we cared 
less for Greece.  
The Ambassador responded that the Greeks were realistic in seeing the center 
of NATO leadership as the United States. Nothing would succeed if the United States 
failed. Nevertheless, in looking at the progress that has been made it would be a great 
mistake not to see the real weaknesses and dangers that remain, such as the regional 
dangers in the area of Greece.  
The Secretary replied that surely there could be no misunderstanding on that 
matter in Greece. The Sixth Fleet was not around as tourists. Agreeing with this, the 
Ambassador said that nevertheless demoralization and great danger could result if the 
Greeks should come to the point of having to cut down their defenses.  
The Secretary suggested that there might be another reason for the concerns to 
which the Ambassador had referred. It might be that the Kennedy Administration had 
not spoken enough encouraging word about one specific country or another. There 
was a reason for this, but perhaps we had not sufficiently explained that reason in our 
private talks with our friends. We did not want to dilute the meaning of words. When 
we have spoken of what the NATO Alliance means to us we meant the whole NATO 
Alliance. This obviously included Greece. The Ambassador should know that when 
Prime Minister Caramanlis visited President Kennedy he had made a deep impression 
on the President and this had remained, even though perhaps we had not reiterated 
this fact frequently.  
The Ambassador said that these words were gratifying. The real answer, 
however, would be in substance rather than in words. The NATO Resolutions in 
Athens had been welcome but implementation was the important thing. Could the 
Secretary‘s interest be invoked, therefore, in getting the Paris discussions forward? 
Agreeing that this was important, the Secretary instructed Mr. Talbot to see 
whether a way could be found to press the groups in Paris toward an early conclusion 
of their efforts. Mr. Talbot explained that thinks were moving forward but that there 
were some difficulties, including the British position on Greek bonds. Taking up this 
topic, the Ambassador described it as another area of concern. The Greeks were 
worried that others might get more favorable terms. Any international or domestic 
good that Greece might attain from setting its debts would overcome should 
Communist debtor countries then get more favorable terms.  
In conclusion the Ambassador observed that all the preoccupations he had 
brought to the Secretary‘s attention stemmed from the Greek Government‘s anxiety 
that the public should wholeheartedly support the Alliance. The Secretary asked the 
Ambassador to give his warm regards to the Prime Minister and to tell him that we 
would renew our efforts to advance the NATO and OECD actions to a conclusion. 
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M.C. 27
Military Committee. Association of the Turkish and Greek Governments with
the Military Planning of NATO
23 October 1950
REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP 
to the MILITARY COMMITTEE 
on 
ASSOCIATION OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK 
GOVERNMENTS WITH THE MILITARY PLANNING OF NATO 
1. The Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council considered the request of the
Turkish Government for admission into the North Atlantic Treaty. They were of the
opinion that at the present stage of development of NATO it was not feasible to
extend the Treaty to either Turkey or Greece, but that arrangements might be made to
permit these two countries to be associated, as appropriate, with such phases of the
military planning work of the NATO as are concerned with the defense of the
Mediterranean.
2. On 9 October 1950, the North Atlantic Defense Committee requested the Standing
Group to consider this matter and take such steps as are necessary to provide for the
appropriate inclusion of Turkey and Greece in North Atlantic Defense Planning in the
Mediterranean Area.
3. M.C. 22/2 states that a practical solution in the Mediterranean area is ―to make a
separate overall Naval Command directly responsible to the Standing Group, which is
the authority responsible for coordinating the requirements of all Fronts. This
Command, however, should not be established at this time.‖
4. Those Allied objectives in the Mediterranean which it is desired to accomplish
prior to the outbreak of hostilities and those sought through Greek and Turkish
military efforts in the event of war might be enhanced if Turkey and Greece were
associated with the NATO planning now.
5. In view of their announced interest in NATO it should be acceptable and desirable
from the point of view of the Greek and Turkish Governments to participate in any
discussions concerning those areas and phases of military planning with which it
would be appropriate for them to be associated.
6. The following steps should be taken at present to associate Turkey and Greece with
appropriate phases of NATO planning as are concerned with the defense of the
Mediterranean.
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(a) The Turkish and Greek Governments each should be invited at an early date to
send a military representative to discuss with the Standing Group the problem of
associating Turkey and Greece, where appropriate, in North Atlantic Defense
Planning in the Mediterranean.
(b) These military representatives of the Turkish and Greek Governments should
discuss with members of the Standing Group those areas wherein participation and
planning would be mutually advantageous to NATO and the Turkish (Greek)
Government and the machinery through which this planning might be achieved.
7. At a conference on 23 October 1950 the Standing Group discussed the above
proposals with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Turkish Army, and these
proposals appeared to be satisfactory to him.
RECOMMENDATION 
8. It is recommended that the Military Committee note the proposal outlined in
paragraph 6 above and advise the Defense Committee at their forthcoming meetings.
________________________________ 
M.C. 38/2 (FINAL)
Military Committee. Command Arrangements Regarding Greece and Turkey
21 February 1952
NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE 
DECISION ON M.C. 38/2 
A Report by the Standing Group on 
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING GREECE AND TURKEY 
Note by the Secretaries 
1. At the First Meeting of their Sixth Session on 11 February 1952, the North
Atlantic Military Committee amended M.C. 38/2 and then approved the 
recommendations in paragraph 4 of the amended report. 
2. At the Meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic
Council held at 1030, 21 February 1952, M.C. 38/2 was further amended with respect 
to the title and to paragraph 3 and it was agreed to recommend approval of the report 
by the North Atlantic Council. 
3. Holders of M.C. 38/2 are requested to replace the decision sheet on page 1
with the enclosed corresponding pages and to destroy the removed pages by burning. 
Subparagraphs 3 c, d, e and f on page 2 should be renumbered as b, c, d and e. 
4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet
of M.C. 38/2. 
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REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP 
to the NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE 
on COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING GREECE AND TURKEY 
1. Since the meeting of the Council in Rome, at which the Standing Group
were instructed to submit their recommendations for the Command Arrangements 
when Greece and Turkey became members of NATO, the Standing Group has 
conducted a wide series of discussions and examinations. 
2. A complete solution of this problem has not proved possible within the time
available and further study is required, notably on the over-all naval command 
arrangements in the Mediterranean. On other points, however, a wide measure of 
agreement has been reached and the Standing Group accordingly submits the 
following proposals to the Military Committee for their consideration as a partial and 
interim solution of this problem. 
3. On the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO:
a. The Ground Forces and Air Forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to
NATO will operate under the over-all command of SACEUR through Commander-in-
Chief, Southern Europe. 
b. The Naval Forces of Greece and Turkey will remain under their National
Chiefs of Staff. The operations of these forces will be closely coordinated with those 
of all other naval forces in the Mediterranean. 
c. Detailed command arrangements of SACEUR‘s Southern Command, as
required by the foregoing, will be worked out by SACEUR in agreement with national 
authorities and submitted to the Standing Group for approval by the Military 
Committee. 
d. With the proposals at subparagraphs a, b, c and d above, the only
organizational change to existing NATO command structure in the Mediterranean 
would be the addition of the Turkish and Greek land and air force commands under 
the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe. 
e. The position as regards the system of command of naval forces in the
Mediterranean area and their coordination with land and air forces will be postponed 
for further consideration, with the object of submitting an agreed report to the Council 
at its next meeting. Progress on the organization of the Middle East Command will be 
reported to the Council at its next meeting. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
4. It is recommended that the Military Committee:
a. Approve this solution as an interim measure.
b. Direct the Standing Group to continue its study of command of naval forces
in the Mediterranean Area and their coordination with land and air forces and to 
submit a definitive report on this to the Council at its next meeting. 
c. To transmit this report to the North Atlantic Council for approval in order
that the recommendations herein may be implemented. 
__________________________________ 
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SGM-1204-53 
Standing Group Memorandum. The NATO Military Command Structure 
11 August 1953 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE 
THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC 
CHANNEL COMMITTEE 
SUBJECT: The NATO Military Command Structure 
1. The Standing Group has under consideration the promulgation of a
document listing the major NATO Military Commands and the first echelon of the 
subordinate commands and the broad areas of functional and geographical 
responsibility of these commands. This document will be strictly factual. It is intended 
only as a handy reference to existing terms of reference and not as a medium for 
amending these. 
2. Copies of the draft publication on the subject are contained at Enclosure. It
is requested that: 
a. SACEUR review this publication and supply the material for
Appendix ―B‖ to Enclosure ―B‖, and copies of ―General Instructions for 
SHAPE Major Subordinate Commanders‖.  
b. SACLANT review this publication and supply the material for
Appendixes ―G‖, ―H‖, and ―I‖ to Enclosure ―B‖. 
c. CHANCOM review this publication.
{……….} 
APPENDIX ―D‖ 
SUPREME HEADQUERTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 
PARIS, FRANCE 
SHAPE/376/53 
30 March 1953 
SUBJECT: Directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 
TO: Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy 
1. You are hereby designated Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe (CINCSOUTH), and this directive hereby cancels the 19 June 1951 letter of 
General Eisenhower to you. 
2. As Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, your primary
mission in the event of war will be the defense of the territories of the NATO nations 
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within the area of your command responsibility. Your plans and operations will be in 
accord with Strategic and Operational Guidance furnished you by this headquarters. 
3. In peace, your responsibilities will include the development of plans and the
necessary preparations for the execution of your wartime responsibilities, and for 
international combined training of assigned national units, and such earmarked forces 
as may be made available for that purpose. 
4. a. In peace, you will have operational control, to the extent necessary for the
discharge of your assigned responsibilities (paragraph 3 above), over all the forces 
assigned to your command. 
b. In war, you will have operational control over all forces assigned and
attached to your command. 
c. The extent of your responsibility in both peace and war for the
coordination of their logistic support and for provision of base facilities will be 
covered by separate instructions. 
5. You will effect close and continuous cooperation with adjacent Allied
Commands and with NATO national authorities as appropriate. 
6. The Southern European area of your command responsibility will, subject
to the limitations indicated in this paragraph, comprise: 
Italy, Greece (including Crete), Turkey and the islands of the Aegean. 
National Coastal Waters will be a national responsibility. The division of 
responsibility in war between the National Territorial Commanders and the Allied 
Commanders, including the planning and preparation therefor in peace, will be as 
prescribed in M.C. 36. 
NOTE 1. French North Africa and Corsica which, although included in the 
Southern European area, are French zones of the Interior. 
The control and the defense of these zones is the direct responsibility of the 
French, who will grant the Allied Commanders under the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of 
their operations. Requests for such facilities will be made through SACEUR. 
SACEUR shall have authority to conduct such combat operations in these zones, 
including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defense of Western 
Europe. 
NOTE 2. The Islands of Sardinia and Sicily are also included in the Southern 
European area, but remain an Italian responsibility under conditions parallel to those 
above. 
7. There will be within your command two land sectors:
a. An Italian sector under an Italian Army officer, Commander, Allied
Land Forces Southern Europe (COMLANDSOUTH). 
b. A Greek/Turkish sector under an American Army officer,
Commander, Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (COMLANDSOUTHEAST). 
8. The commander of the Greek/Turkish sector (COMLANDSOUTHEAST):
a. Will be responsible under CINCSOUTH for the over-all conduct and
coordination of land operations from the Caucasus to the Balkans, both inclusive. 
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b. Will locate his headquarters at IZMIR. This headquarters will be of
a level comparable to an army group headquarters. The staff will be international. 
c. Will exercise command through separate army commands in Greece
and Turkey under Greek and Turkish officers, respectively. 
9. Located with the headquarters of COMLANDSOUTHEAST there will be a
tactical air force headquarters, responsible to Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern 
Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). 
10. You will have subordinate to you on a covert basis for war planning and
formally under operational command in event of war, or earlier if so directed by the 
Standing Group: 
a. The Commander, Allied Forces, Austria.
b. The Commander, Anglo-United States Forces, Trieste.
11. In addition to the land and air forces assigned to your command, the heavy
carriers, amphibious and support forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, referred to hereafter as 
the Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) remain 
assigned to your command. 
12. A Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) has
been appointed, directly subordinate and responsible to SACEUR. In war, 
CINCAFMED is charged with the conduct of naval operations, other than those of the 
STRIKFORSOUTH, in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. He is charged with the 
responsibility of mine warfare, submarine, and anti-submarine operations in this area, 
and with the support of adjacent commands. 
13. In the interest of the safety of all concerned, and to enable
STRIKFORSOUTH to execute to the best advantage the missions assigned to it by 
you, there must be coordination of the movements of the STRIKFORSOUTH with 
those of other submarine, surface and air forces operating in the area. CINCAFMED 
will exercise this coordination on my behalf with respect to surface forces and 
submarines operating in the area and also with respect to such air components as may 
be under his operational control or may at the time be subject to his coordination. This 
does not authorize CINCAFMED to change missions of forces of other commands 
passing through his area, although he may request Commander, Naval Striking and 
Support Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFOKSOUTH) to deal with a sudden 
emergency when this is all important, repeating his request to CINCSOUTH. 
14. Necessary coordination of naval operations in the Black Sea with land and
air operations conducted by CINCSOUTH and other Allied Commanders in the Black 
Sea/Turkey area will be as directed by SACEUR. 
15. With respect to air operations, there will be air units from many different
commands operating over the Mediterranean and the countries bordering it, and the 
closest coordination of these activities between the commanders concerned will be 
essential. It is not envisaged that the commander of any one of these forces will be 
singly responsible for effecting the over-all coordination necessary. The manner of 
this coordination will be the subject of separate instructions. You will thus collaborate 
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with other commanders concerned in the development of the necessary arrangements 
to establish an efficient air information and movement control organization. 
16. The coordination in war of air defense measures of land-based aircraft in
the air defense of NATO nations bordering the Mediterranean, and within agreements 
concluded between national authorities, will be the responsibility of CINCSOUTH. 
17. Your responsibilities for the defense of an extensive and varied area and
CINCAFMED‘s naval responsibilities in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, which 
include the security of your sea lines of communication, make it essential that the 
closest coordination and cooperation should exist between your two commands. To 
this end, your organization will include the means for maintaining close day-to-day 
contact with CINCAFMED. Similar instructions have been issued to CINCAFMED. 
[SIGNED] M. B. RIDGWAY 
General, United States Army 
APPENDIX ―E‖ 
SUPREME HEADQUERTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 
PARIS, FRANCE 
SHAPE/377/53 
30 March 1953 
SUBJECT: Directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean. 
TO: Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, Malta 
1. You are hereby designated Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces
Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) and as such you will be directly subordinate and 
responsible to SACEUR. 
2. The area of your command responsibility will be:
a. The whole Mediterranean and Black Sea, excluding the islands
therein. 
b. Such naval and air bases as are assigned to you.
3. As used herein, the term ―Mediterranean‖ shall be understood to include the
Black Sea. 
4. Your responsibilities in war include:
a. The security of sea communications in the entire Mediterranean.
b. Support of adjacent commands.
c. Coordination of logistic support and base facilities for all forces
assigned to you, within the framework of agreements arrived at with national 
authorities. 
d. Coordination of mine warfare.
e. Submarine operations.
f. Anti-submarine operations.
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g. Organization for the naval control of shipping. The exact
organization will be prescribed later because of the important national interest 
involved. 
h. The coordination of certain air operations over the Mediterranean.
This will be covered by separate instructions. 
i. Conduct of Maritime Air Operations. This will be covered by
separate instructions. 
5. Your peacetime responsibilities will include:
a. The development of plans and the preparations necessary for the
execution of your missions. 
b. The organization for and conduct of international combined training
of national units earmarked for your command in war which can be made available 
for such training during peace. 
6. a. In war, you will have operational control over all forces assigned to
your command. 
b. The extent of your responsibility in both peace and war for the
coordination of their logistic support for provision of base facilities will be covered by 
separate instructions. 
7. The heavy carriers, amphibious and support forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet,
referred to hereafter as the Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe 
(STRIKFORSOUTH), remain assigned to Commander-In-Chief, Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). 
8. In the interests of the safety of all concerned, and to enable
STRIKFORSOUTH to execute to the best advantage the missions assigned to it by 
CINCSOUTH, there must be coordination of the movements of STRIKFORSOUTH 
with those of other submarine, surface, and air forces operating in the area. You will 
exercise this coordination on my behalf with respect to surface forces and submarines 
operating in the area and also with respect to such air components as may be under 
your operational control or which may at the time be subject to your coordination. 
This does not authorize you to change missions of forces of other commands passing 
through your area, although you may request the Commander Naval Striking and 
Support Forces Southern Europe to deal with a sudden emergency when this is all 
important, repeating your request to CINCSOUTH. 
9. You will establish an integrated staff, comprised of officers from all nations
concerned, in a headquarters ashore. 
10. a. The Mediterranean will be divided into areas for the exercise of
those functions which are of either local or national nature. The Commanders of 
national areas will be responsible to you for the Allied tasks but will be under their 
own national authorities for those tasks which are strictly national in character, 
subject to the necessary coordination by you. I shall consult with you and the national 
authorities concerned, in the development of my recommendations to the Standing 
Group for the delineation of those areas. 
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b. The current agreements concerning the establishment of a French
area in the Western Mediterranean and an Italian area covering the approaches to Italy 
will remain valid, except that the commander to whom these area commanders will be 
responsible will be you instead of CINCSOUTH. 
c. The primary responsibilities for the French area commander will be
as defined in the current agreement, including, inside the French area, the security and 
protection of all LOC‘s. 
d. In addition to the French and Italian areas, a Gibraltar area will be
established and an area or areas in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. The 
Gibraltar area commander will be responsible both to you and to the appropriate 
commander in the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic's (SACLANT‘s) command. 
The boundary between SACLANT's and your command will be as mutually agreed 
between SACEUR and SACLANT, subject to Standing Group approval. 
Recommendations as to the new area or areas in the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean will be submitted to SACEUR for approval in accordance with 
paragraph 10a, above. 
11. You will effect close and continuous cooperation with adjacent Allied
Commands and with NATO national authorities as appropriate. 
12. National Coastal waters will be a national responsibility. The division of
responsibility in war between the National Territorial Commanders and Allied 
Commanders, including the planning and preparation therefor in peace, will be as 
prescribed in M.C. 36. 
13. Necessary coordination of naval operations in the Black Sea with land and
air operations conducted by CINCSOUTH and other Allied Commanders in the Black 
Sea/Turkey area will be as directed by SACEUR. 
14. Your organization will provide for the command of the air components
assigned to you, and for the coordination of air operations as between your area 
commanders and with those of other commanders who will be conducting operations 
over the Mediterranean, e.g. Strategic Air Command; R.A.F. Bomber Command; 
Middle East Air Force; and Southern European Command, as well as national air 
units and transit aircraft. It is not envisaged that the commander of any of the above 
forces will be singly responsible for effecting the over-all coordination necessary. The 
manner of this coordination will be the subject of separate instructions. To this end 
you will collaborate with other commanders concerned in the development of the 
necessary arrangements to establish an efficient air information and movement control 
organization. 
15. The extensive and varied nature of Allied operations in the Mediterranean
and Southern Europe makes it essential that the closest coordination and cooperation 
should exist between your command and Allied Command Southern Europe. To this 
end, your organization will include the means for maintaining close day-to-day 
contact with CINCSOUTH. Similar instructions have been issued to CINCSOUTH. 
[SIGNED] M. B. RIDGWAY, General, United States Army 
___________________________________ 
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SGM-600-54 
Standing Group Memorandum. Capabilities Plan Allied Command Europe 1957 
10 September 1954 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES 
SUBJECT: Capabilities Plan Allied Command Europe 1957 
(Standing Group Modified) 
1. Attached, for your information, is a synthesized copy of SHAPE 330/54.
The original document has been modified by deleting all references to numbers of 
atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the size of the atomic delivery capability. No 
other changes were made. 
2. Since knowledge of the number of weapons and atomic delivery capability
is not needed to evaluate SACEUR‘s study, it was decided, for security reasons, to 
limit this knowledge to a few individuals. I can assure you that SACEUR used 
realistic assumptions on the number of weapons and atomic delivery capability. I can 
further assure you that they are ample to carry out the operations SACEUR outlines in 
his study. 
[SIGNED] J. LAWTON COLLINS 
General, U.S. Army 
Chairman 
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS 
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 
Paris, France 
SHAPE/330/54 (SG Modified) 
1 July 1954 
PREFACE 
1. The enclosed Capabilities Plan, 1957, A.C.E., has been prepared in
accordance with the Standing Group directive SGM-53-54. 
2. This is a capabilities plan only insofar as numbers of major force units are
concerned. Specifically, it is based upon the employment of major force units in the 
numbers estimated to be available in mid-1957. 
3. This plan, and the assessments therein, are not dependent for their execution
upon the provision of additional major force units. They are dependent, however, 
upon the satisfactory completion of an important series of measures and corrective 
actions to develop the necessary state of operating effectiveness and readiness, and 
the capability of supporting the major forces shown. Re-phasing of certain units, and 
the improvement of manning, training and equipping are envisaged in, and essential to 
the plan. 
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4. The original intelligence estimate on which this plan was based was
prepared by the Intelligence Division, SHAPE, and based on all information available 
to SHAPE from national sources as well as NATO sources. Subsequently, SG 161/6 
(The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities 1954 – 1958) was received, and the 
estimate was amended accordingly. Certain information recently reported concerning 
Soviet air preparations – new type jet bombers, improved fighter and fighter/bomber 
performance, use of improved natural surface landing fields – has been taken into 
account generally, but specific revision of the intelligence estimate has not been 
made. 
{…………….} 
ENCLOSURE ―H‖ TO 
SHAPE 330/4 
(Pages 1 – 9) 
MAJOR CAMPAIGN NO. 8 
TO COMBAT THE SOVIET LAND ADVANCE IN GREECE 
I. ALLIED OBJECTIVES
1. The initial operational mission set forth in the basic paper, para. 25, leads to
the following Allied objectives for this Campaign: 
a. To prevent any Soviet land advance into a position capable of
severing the Mediterranean. 
b. Delay a Soviet advance in Northern Greece so that planned
mobilization can be carried out. 
c. To hold Northern Greece and Thrace maintaining, to the extent
possible, a continuous front in this sector to the maximum extent available forces and 
circumstances will permit. 
II. THE CAMPAIGN OUTLINE
2. With a view to retarding the advance of Soviet bloc forces, and limiting the
extent of this advance to a minimum, operations will be conducted in the threatened 
sectors of Greece, employing land, air and naval forces available. Maximum 
advantage will be taken of the support provided incident to the operations of 
Yugoslav forces. Air and naval air support available from forces outside the Greek 
area will be employed in coordination with these operations; plans and preparations 
will be made for delivery of atomic strikes against any major Soviet concentrations 
which may develop, the destruction of which would be of major effect against Soviet 
operations in the Greek area. Minimum essential preparations will be made to hold 
positions which will prevent Soviet penetration in force to the Northern or Eastern 
shores of the Mediterranean. Where such penetrations threaten to severance of the 
Mediterranean LOC, a maximum Allied effort employing land, air, naval and 
amphibious forces, with all forms of atomic support, will be made to oppose this 
action. 
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III. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
3. The defense of Greece, in addition to its inherent importance for the
protection of the people and the territory of that country, has a further major influence 
on the collective defense effort. The Greek mainland occupies a position which, if 
occupied by the enemy, would gravely affect the outcome of operations in Southern 
Europe. 
4. In order to cover Greek mobilization which will take place largely in the
Larisa area, protection must be provided through D / 30 when all mobilization 
arrangements should be complete. Such protection can best be accomplished by 
holding the enemy as far to the North as possible. 
5. The Greek coastal Islands would be possible areas for submarine support. It
can be assumed that by the time that such areas could fall into enemy hands, their 
submarines would be operating and would be in need of re-fueling. The problem of 
finding suitable bases for this purpose would be of prime importance to the enemy. 
The denial of the Greek Coast and islands should materially contribute to protecting 
the Mediterranean LOC. 
6. It does not appear that Greek airfields could be used effectively by the
Soviets against the Mediterranean LOC so long as an air threat exists from 
neighboring theaters and the Soviets do not produce a LOC through the Bosporus 
and/or the Adriatic to support these fields. 
7. The Greek and Turkish defence positions in Thrace, although adjacent, are
not dependent on one another for land support. Nevertheless, the destruction of one 
would allow for decisive forces to be deployed against the other. However, the 
support which Greek forces would obtain from Yugoslavia is vital. Yugoslavia by 
denying the Monastir and Vardar approaches allows Greece to hold on the Struma 
without undue concern for her flank and rear. Should, however, Greece have to watch 
and hold these three historical lines of attack unaided, it is doubtful if she could 
prevent a determined enemy from penetrating her defences and eventually destroying 
her power to resist. Therefore, it is essential that the approaches to Greece should be 
held by the combined efforts of Yugoslavia and Greece and that plans and operations 
for this must be closely coordinated. 
8. The approaches to Greece from the North are limited and restricted and
enemy forces using them, would be vulnerable to atomic attacks, particularly if the 
Southern exits were blocked as a preliminary to such attacks. 
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IV. SOVIET FORCES AND RESOURCES
Land Forces 
9. It is estimated that the Soviets will provide ground forces as follows for the
campaign in this area: 
Main Attack from S.W. Bulgaria In Albania 
Total Divs:                  15 (9 Soviet, 6 Bulgarian)   3 
Rifle   11 - 
Mecz 2 - 
Tank 2 - 
10. The major threats are estimated to be: (a) through Greek Thrace against the
Struma position with 6 divisions; (b) through Yugoslavia south of Vranje and attack 
through the Vardar Valley and Monastir Gap with 9 divisions. The Albanian units are 
considered to pose only a limited guerilla threat. There are at the present time no 
Soviet divisions in Bulgaria, therefore, should the enemy decide to ignore surprise and 
build up his forces in Bulgaria for a D-day attack, ample warning would be given of 
his intentions and the necessary precautions could be taken. 
Air Forces 
11. Soviet bloc tactical aircraft facing Allied forces in Italy, Greece, Turkey
and the Eastern Mediterranean area estimated to consist of: 
Total 
Soviet – Tactical 2420 
   Naval 570 
Bulgaria 575 
Hungary 690 
Romania 545 
Note: In addition to above there will be 15 Ftrs and 5 Tpt located in Albania. 
12. It is not considered realistic to estimate the portion of the above forces
which might be allocated against Greece since nearly all are in range of all four 
southern sectors and their use will depend upon circumstances and enemy intentions, 
however intelligence estimates forces of the following general order of magnitude 
might be specifically used in this effort: 
Ftr: 250 
GA: 150 
LB: 150 
Tpt: 25 
Recce: 25 
Total: 600 
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Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Weapons 
13. An initial estimate of reasonable Soviet use of their assumed atomic and
thermo-nuclear stockpile included allotments of atomic weapons against NATO troop 
concentrations in Allied Command Europe. 
14. Considering possible reasonable employment of these weapons against
NATO forces in the area of this campaign, taking into account the importance to the 
Soviets of an early outlet on the Mediterranean, it is estimated that they might utilize a 
small number of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons against NATO land forces and 
supporting supply installations in this area. 
15. Actual and potential Allied air facilities in Greece which might be
worthwhile atomic targets, consist of 5 fields suitable for bombers (8000 /) and 4 
fields suitable for fighter bombers (6000 /). It may be assumed, therefore, that the 
Soviets might expend a small number of atomic weapons against the Allied air 
complex in Greece. In addition, there are two major ports (Athens and Salonika) 
which might warrant Soviet atomic attack. 
16. It is felt that the Soviets would deem the above ports and airfields of
greater use to them if seized in an undestroyed state. Accordingly, it is questionable if 
they would attempt to destroy them at least initially. If Allied operations from these 
facilities endangered the Soviet plan of action however, or if the Soviet campaign in 
Greece were to fail, it is to be expected that the Soviets would employ such offensive 
means still at their disposal to attack certain of these facilities. 
V. ALLIED FORCES AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THIS CAMPAIGN
Land Forces
17. Major ground force units available to the Allies in this area include:
a. National Time Phasing
M / 3: 3 Inf. Divs, 6 Border Regts 
M / 15: 5 Inf. Divs 
M / 30: 4 Inf. Divs 
b. Operational Effectiveness rates (SHAPE estimate)
M: 3 Inf. Divs, 3 Border Regts 
M / 15: 3 Border Regts 
M / 30: 7 Inf. Divs 
M / 45: 2 Inf. Divs 
Note: The composition of the Greek Army is under review at the present time. 
18. Allied tactical air forces available for use in the area of this campaign
include: 
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Type 
FB (D / 1): 50 *2 Squadrons 
FB: 150 
TR: 18 
TC: 32 
IDF: 75 
AWF: 12 
* Note: These two FB Squadrons (US) are to redeploy from peacetime bases in
France on D / 1 to the Eastern Med area.
Naval Forces 
19. The naval contribution to this campaign is discussed in Campaigns 2 and
4. 
Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Weapons 
20. The allocation of Allied atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons against troop
targets has been made based upon an estimate of reasonable Allied utilization of the 
assumed Allied inventory of such weapons through D / 30. 
21. Planned additional uses of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, at least a
part of which would tend to contribute indirectly to this campaign include substantial 
effort against airfields, interdiction targets, dumps, ports, depots, and Soviet 
Command Headquarters (See Campaigns 1, 2 and 4). 
22. One or more guided missile units should be allocated to the support of this
campaign when these can be made available, in order to provide a close support all 
weather capability and additional depth and flexibility to the system. 
23. To conduct operations to contain and destroy the threat in the area on or
forward of the Greek/Yugoslav frontier, and along the Struma River. The form of 
operations will depend upon closely integrated Greek - Yugoslav planning and 
cooperation and Allied ability to protect vital supply lines in the area. The aim will be 
to destroy the enemy forces with atomic weapons as far to the North as possible and 
preferably prior to penetrating Greek or Yugoslav territory. 
VII. PLANNED OPERATIONS
24. The accomplishment of the objective set forth in para. 1 of this paper in
light of the above concept will require: 
a. Delaying action North and East of the Struma.
b. Denial of the Greek coastline in furtherance of the anti-submarine
campaign. 
c. A major effort to hold the Struma area to enable mobilization to be
completed. 
d. Close coordination of operations in Northern Greece with Yugoslavia.
e. Preparation for the neutralization, if necessary, of Albania.
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25. The three main threats are across the Struma, down the Vardar Valley and
through the Monastir Gap. Greek Thrace could not be held against determined enemy 
attack with the forces likely to be available to NATO in mid-1957. A forward defence 
position including the Struma and Vardar approaches can and should be established, 
taking full advantage of the difficult, coverless terrain over which any attack on the 
Struma would have to be conducted. The timing and extent of the threat through the 
Monastir Gap would be dependent upon the planning and preparations between 
Greece and Yugoslavia. A defensive position on this gap should be established. 
26. To the rear, a ―backstop‖ position should be established by reserve units in
the Larissa area, which should conduct their post D-day training on that position. 
27. Struma-Strumitsa Position. One D-day infantry division should be
deployed on this position. Reconnaissance forward should be carried out. One D-day 
division supported by armour should be deployed on the Vardar approach to hold this 
position and, at the same time, give depth to the Struma position by serving as a 
reserve and counter-attack force. 
28. Monastir Gap. One D-day infantry division should be deployed in this
position at the outset to meet any sudden Soviet thrust through Southern Yugoslavia. 
29. Reserve Forces. The Greek post-D-day divisions should be moved forward
into reserve, where training should continue until committed. 
30. Albania. Plans and preparations must be made for the possible
participation of Greek forces in the neutralization of enemy activities based in 
Albania. 
Atomic and Thermo-nuclear attack 
31. Soviet bloc forces advancing from Bulgaria into Southern Yugoslavia and
Greek Thrace would be exposed to atomic and thermonuclear attack which should 
create a substantial amount of destruction. These attacks would be carried out in 
conjunction with delaying operations. Additional attacks would be made against 
Soviet Bloc forces in strength in the Struma area, or in the Vardar and Monastir areas 
if they are able to advance through Southern Yugoslavia. 
32. The atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons estimated to be available for this
campaign (paragraph 20 above) are considered sufficient to cope with the estimated 
Soviet capability thru D / 30. Taking into account the total width of sectors in which 
operations might take place, and the estimated Soviet force which might be employed, 
it is considered that the operations in this area might approximate one ―typical‖ corps 
sector (See Encl ―J‖). 
Operations of Greek Naval Forces 
33. Greek Naval Forces will be engaged in the protection of sea LOC‘s and
interdiction operations, both tasks being covered in detail in Campaign Nos. 2 and 4. 
NATO
188 
Allied Air Operations 
34. Offensive strikes by fighter bomber forces will aim at locating and
destroying Soviet forces threatening or attacking this area. Since the Soviet air threat 
will be dealt with primarily by atomic strike forces allocated to this task in Campaign 
No. 1, the main objective of the forces paragraph l above, will be to delay, disrupt and 
destroy the land formations facing Allied defensive positions. Atomic weapons will 
be used whenever suitable targets can be spotted or generated. 
35. At the outset of hostilities Allied tactical air forces in this sector will assist,
when and where practical, SACEUR‘s initial air atomic delivery effort against the 
target complexes selected for immediate attack on the outbreak of hostilities. See 
Campaigns 1, 2 and 4. The fighter bomber effort on this task will consist of sweeps 
and escort missions to saturate Soviet air defenses so as to better the chances of 
delivery vehicles penetrating to their objectives. 
36. The conventional fighter bomber effort required for this campaign versus
that obtainable from Allied resources estimated as available in mid-1957 is assessed 
as follows: 
{table with f/b sorties etc.} [….] 
In addition, periodic conventional support may be provided by 6th Fleet carrier forces 
when and at such times as it does not impede their primary assignments. 
37. The estimated Soviet tank strength on which conventional sortie
requirements are primarily based (See Encl ―J‖) is approximately 1,500 of which 1/2 
might be in forward echelons at any time. 
38. Allied air reconnaissance forces will strive to locate and identify Soviet
forces and movements, while concurrently conducting such pre-strike, weather, and 
BDA operations as allocated to them, per pre-D-Day plans, in support of the overall 
atomic delivery effort. An analysis of the reconnaissance estimated as required, and 
that available for allocation from mid-1957 resources indicates: (See Encl ―A‖ for 
factors). 
{table with reconnaissance sorties} [….] 
39. Adequate transport and troop carrier forces are essential to the effective
conduct of this campaign due to the paucity of overland LOC‘s, the relative 
vulnerability of these, and the need for communications with the Greek Isles, Italy, 
and Turkey. The only forces for this task are those set forth in para 18 above (2 TC 
Sqns of 32 A/C U.S.). Some additional support will also be derived from mobilized 
civil air resources. 
Coastal LOC Operations 
40. Special consideration must be given to the security of coastal sea LOC‘s in
this campaign area. In wartime 40% of the support for forces in Northern Greece must 
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use coastal sea lift, because of the limited road and rail capacity, notwithstanding the 
unsatisfactory air defence situation in this area. (See Campaign No. 1). A possible 
means of providing an element of support may be the maintenance, on a stand-by 
basis in peacetime, of an adequate number of LST‘s in the Eastern Mediterranean 
available for utilization in wartime for logistic purposes. 
VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Land Situation 
41. The maximum Soviet threat against Northern Greece is estimated at 15
divisions, 6 into Greek Thrace and 9 through Southern Yugoslavia. The full weight of 
these forces, on the assumption that their initial attack in strength is as indicated in the 
Intelligence Estimate, would probably not be felt before D / 15 in Thrace and 
somewhat later to the west. Greek forces available to oppose the Soviet offensives 
include 3 divisions and 3 border regiments initially available, and 7 additional 
divisions phased in through D / 30. The initial Soviet preponderance would thus be of 
the order of 4 to 1, decreasing to approximately 2 to 1 after M / 30. 
42. This preponderance of Soviet forces to Greek forces would, in the absence
of other factors, create a strong presumption that the Soviets would be able to conduct 
successful offensives in this area. However, the nature of the terrain, the likelihood 
that a considerable part of the Soviet forces will be delayed in Yugoslavia, and the 
Allied ability to attack sizeable Soviet concentrations with atomic and thermo-nuclear 
weapons make it unlikely that the Soviets could -successfully concentrate and 
manoeuvre forces exceeding the defensive forces by more than a ratio of 2 to 1. 
Air Situation 
43. Campaign No. 1 discusses the air defense situation, and provides for the
necessary measures aimed to neutralize Soviet air capability, so that the tactical air 
forces in Greece can concentrate on operations against the Soviet land threat. The 
conventional air forces available for, and allocated to the above task (par l8) are not 
considered adequate by comparison with those available for an equivalent task in 
other areas. The period D / 4 to D / 12 (that of the first major Soviet attack and Allied 
counter-attack) will be critical in that at least 8 FB Squadrons would be needed 
(versus 6 available) during this period even assuming they suffered no serious prior 
losses and their U.E. strength has been maintained. 
44. The air reconnaissance forces available and allocated are quantitatively
and qualitatively inadequate to accomplish the minimum reconnaissance required to 
ensure the effective delivery of the atomic effort envisioned against troop 
concentrations plus that needed by the land and air forces for their normal operations. 
The RT33 A/C programmed cannot reach the north shore of the Black Sea. Due to 
this deficit, these forces cannot be expected to contribute to Campaigns 1, 2 and 4 
which count upon area reconnaissance for their support. This shortcoming is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that the target systems of these latter campaigns are 
within range of reconnaissance based in the Center and in Italy. 
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45. The reconnaissance shortage constitutes a serious weakness since in an
atomic situation as foreseen inadequate intelligence cover, which includes air 
reconnaissance, would lead to wastage of weapons or failure to identify targets, with a 
resulting increased threat to the successful accomplishment of our mission. 
46. In view of the fact that Greek lines of communication are few and
relatively vulnerable the early availability of adequate transport aircraft to re-supply 
land and air forces with critical items, and to assist in the general circulation of 
personnel and logistics, assumes great importance. The 3 Greek squadrons available, 
and allocated, in this area are considered inadequate to provide the above services to 
the other 7 air squadrons and 10 divisions which will be engaged. The shortage of air 
transport constitutes a serious, though not critical weakness in the prosecution of this 
campaign. Special study should be given to augmenting the air lift before, or after, D-
day, either from military or civil transport resources, together with a general study of 
the logistic problem in Greece and Southern Yugoslavia with a special reference to 
the advisability of forward stockpiling. 
Atomic Situation 
47. The Allied allocation of atomic weapons against troop concentrations is
considered adequate to support this campaign, and possibly to offset the Soviet 
numerical superiority in air and land forces in this campaign. The delivery of the 
planned atomic and thermo-nuclear attacks should reduce if not eliminate Soviet 
ability to sustain major offensive pressure in this area. 
48. SACEUR‘s atomic delivery capability will be adequate as planned for this
campaign and to contribute to operations against the fixed target systems in 
Campaigns 1, 2 and 4. 
49. From an operational standpoint it is desirable to provide one or more
guided missile battalions, and several Rocket Batteries (H.J.) in Greece where 
availability and the development of appropriate arrangements for administrative 
support and control will permit. 
Risks and Weaknesses 
50. In light of the above, the following are considered to be major areas of
weakness and risk which require corrective action at an early date: 
a. The lack of firm assurance of adequate military coordination with Yugoslav
operations in this area in the period under consideration. 
b. The extreme vulnerability of the LOC in this area, particularly coastal sea
LOC. 
c. The deficiency in conventional air support and air reconnaissance.
Estimate of Capabilities: 
51. The first area of weakness indicated above is the only one that appears
capable of jeopardising the objective as given in para. 1a. The risk concerning the 
LOC, particularly if combined with a deficiency of conventional air, could jeopardize 
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the objective given in para. 1b. But Yugoslav cooperation can be improved, and the 
air support and air recce shortcomings can be corrected. There remains only the 
weakness resulting from the vulnerable LOC, which can be greatly lessened if steps 
are taken at once to examine all methods of improving the situation and adopting 
those most suitable. 
________________________________ 
CM(58)141 – Part II Greece 
North Atlantic Council Memorandum. Report on the 1958 Annual Review – 
Greece 
6th December 1958 
REPORT ON THE 1958 ANNUAL REVIEW 
COUNTRY CHAPTER ON GREECE 
I. INTRODUCTION
Greece has accepted the requirements of M.C. 70 as a whole and is willing to make all
efforts to increase the combat effectiveness of her forces. In addition, she plans to
maintain and build up a significant number of land forces and naval units which, in
the opinion of the Greek authorities, are essential to the reinforcement of NATO
forces or to fulfil tasks arising from the application of the forward strategy and to
protect sea transport and communications. The NATO military authorities are
concerned that these additional goals appear too extensive for the period under
review. They accordingly welcome the Greek authorities‘ statement that they will do
no more than maintain their additional forces at their present state of readiness in
order to build up as a priority the forces required by M.C. 70.
2. Notwithstanding the exceptional burden imposed on her by the consequences of
war, by the destruction caused by earthquakes and the imperative needs of her
economic development, Greece devotes a substantial part of her national resources to
defence. The high level of Greek defence spending, which approaches the limit of
what the country can afford, is, without doubt, one of the causes of the budgetary
deficit which has hitherto been met only with the help of funds provided under United
States economic assistance. Mutual Aid, American and Canadian, plays an essential
part in the support of the Greek defence effort, covering as it does practically the
whole of Greece's equipment requirements and a significant part of the operating
costs of the armed forces.
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II. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
Army 
3. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961 and the MC 70
requirements for 1961 and 1963 will be as follows:
Country Plans 
end 1958 end 1961 
Div     RCT     Div      RCT 
MC 70 
end 1961 end 1963 
Div RCT        Div      RCT 
MAJOR UNITS 
M-Day
1st Echelon
2nd Echelon
5         1        5          2 
3         - 3 - 
1         7            1          6 
5        2            5 2 
3        - 3 - 
1      6             1 6 
MISSILE UNITS 
Little John 
Lacrosse 
Honest John 
Corporal/Sergeant 
end 1958 end 1961 
       - 1 
       - 1 
       - 2 
       - 1 
end 1961 end 1963 
 1 2 
       1 1 
       2 2 
       1 1 
4. In addition, Greece intends to maintain:
(a) two 2nd echelon divisions as a potential source of reinforcement. This is
envisaged in M.C. 70; 
(b) one further 2nd echelon division under national command, not envisaged
in M.C. 70, as a source of reinforcement for the forces under NATO command; 
(c) five light infantry regiments under national command for security duties in
the communications zone. 
5. Greek army plans are in accordance with the 1963 M.C. 70 requirements from 1961
onwards.
6. The equipment for the first Honest John battalion will not be delivered to Greece
until 1959. This means that Greece will activate only one battalion in 1959 compared
with the requirement for one battalion in 1958 and two battalions in 1959. The Greek
plans for the build-up of nuclear weapons units from 1960 onwards should meet M.C.
70 requirements provided that the equipment, for which delivery dates are not yet
known, is received in time.
7. To increase the striking power of the army, Greece intends to activate the organic
tank battalion in each infantry division, to increase the number of howitzers in the M-
day infantry divisions and to continue to study and conduct tests to decide on a new
infantry divisional structure. The NATO military authorities support these plans. They
cannot, on the other hand, comment on Greek plans for bringing the two M-day and
the six 2nd echelon light infantry regiments to full RCT strength in the absence of
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sufficient details of their reorganization. They consider that first priority should be 
given in any case to the build-up of all M-day and 1st echelon units to minimum 
standards. 
8. The allocation of non-organic support units for M-day and 1st echelon combat
forces, as indicated in the tables of the reply, is not satisfactory.
9. In spite of an increase of the overall strength and percentage of regulars, the
effectiveness of the Greek army is still affected adversely by the low manning level of
M-day and 1st echelon units. Greece hopes to be able to increase it by 1960. Further
increases of regular cadres of assigned units are necessary. The reserve training of 1st
echelon units is not in accordance with NATO standards.
10. Good progress is being made in modernisation and replacement of weapons, but
much remains to be done. Although improvements have been made, critical shortages
still exist in almost all major items of TO&E equipment. Except in a few items, no
reserve of equipment are reported.
11. Stocks of ammunition are unbalanced and, in general, well below the level
recommended by M.C. 55/1. The situation regarding spare parts for MDAP
equipment has improved, but remains critical for other than MDAP equipment. Much
of the signal equipment is obsolete.
Navy 
12. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961, and the M.C. 70
requirements for 1963 will be as follows:
Category (1) Country Plans         MC70 
end          end end 
1958(2)  1959(2)       1963 
Destroyers (DD/DDG) 
Ocean Escorts (DE) 
Submarines (SS/SSG/SSR) 
Coastal Minelayers (CMC) 
Ocean Minesweepers (MSO) 
Landing Ship Tank (LST) 
Landing Craft Tank (LCT) 
A 
A 
B 
A 
A 
A 
A 
B 
A 
   2 6 6 
   9 9 6 
   1 1 - 
   2 2 4 
   2 2 2 
- - 4 
   4 6 9 
   5 5   - 
  10 10 12 
(1) Category A: available between D-day and D+2
Category B: available between D+2 and D+30
(2) All vessels except submarines are under national
command
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13. The 1961 contribution compared with the 1963 requirements of M.C. 70 shows a
shortfall of two submarines and four ocean mine-sweepers and a surplus of three
ocean escorts. Five ocean escorts are becoming obsolete and cannot be economically
modernised.
14. In the view of the Greek authorities, the composition of the Hellenic naval forces,
in order to fulfil, their mission, should exceed the M.C. 70 requirements (plus the
complementary requirements by the NATO military authorities for 1963) by:
2 destroyers (instead of 2 ocean escorts, the total number of which should be 
decreased from 6 to 4) 
1 coastal escort 
26 minesweepers 
The NATO military authorities are not prepared at present to support these increases. 
15. Great effort has been made to improve the D-day readiness of the Greek naval
forces, and the modernisation programme in progress has yielded good results, but
extensive obsolescence problems still exist which will become acute in a few years'
time. While the peacetime personnel ceiling has increased, shortages persist in
specialized officers, engineers and certain specialized petty officers. Important
measures have been taken to overcome these personnel difficulties, including
increased output of naval schools, and lengthening of compulsory service.
16. Maintenance facilities and the dispersal of D-day ready ship continue to improve.
17. Although the general level of ammunition holdings has improved, further action is
required to build up stocks to the level required by M.C. 1.
18. A large part of the communications equipment must be considered as obsolete,
though progress has been made in modernization of ships‘ electronics and
communications equipment. Large deficiencies exist in RATT, TACAN and ECM
equipment.
Air Force 
19. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961, and the M.C. 70
requirements for 1961 and 1963 will be as follows:
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Country Plans 
end 1958 end 1961 
MC 70 
end 1961 end 1963 
SQUADRONS/AIRCRAFT 
LightBomber/Fighter Strike 
(LB/FB Strike) 
Light Bomber/Fighter 
Bomber Attack 
(LB/FB Attack) 
Reconnaissance (Recce) 
LightWeight 
Reconnaissance 
(LW Recce) 
All Weather Fighter 
(AWX(F)) 
Interceptor Day Figher 
(IDF) 
Transport (TC) 
MISSILE UNITS 
Surface-to-Air (SAM) 
1/25 1/25 
5/125 3/75 
1/18        2/36 
- 1/20 
- 2/32 
3/75 2/50 
1/16 1/16 
- 1 
1/25 1/25 
3/75  3/75 
2/36 2/36 
1/20 1/20 
2/32 2/32 
2/50 2/50 
1/16 1/16 
1  2 
20. Equipment for two AWX squadrons will be delivered to Greece in 1959. Subject
to receipt of the other aircraft from MDAP, the planned size of the Greek air force
from the end of 1961 onwards will meet the 1961 M.C. 70 requirements, which
remain the same for 1963.
21. The activation of the first NIKE unit is shown for 1960 instead of 1959, owing to
the delay in the delivery of equipment.
22. While the aircrew/aircraft ratio is above M.C. 55/1 interim standards and the
aircraft combat ready rate is one of the highest in NATO, the pilot combat ready rate
will only be 75% at the end of 1958. Both the overall strength and regular strength
(officers and NCOs) have increased, and efforts are being made by the Royal Hellenic
Air Force to implement plans for further personnel increases.
23. In spite of some improvement, the TO&E requirements for on-base equipment has
in no case been achieved, and difficulties exist in stockpiling consumable supplies. No
war reserve exists in certain items of TO&E equipment, or of rockets and droppable
fuel tanks.
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24. Good progress has been made in equipping the EW and C&R system, and all 
units, with1 one exception, are operational 24 hours per day. The effectiveness of the 
system, however, is hampered at present by shortages in communications. 
 
25. Despite some improvements, M.C. 60 requirements for dispersal of airfields have 
not yet been achieved. 
 
26. The Greek authorities hope to be able to establish a missile training range in 
Crete, which, they would be willing to make available to the member countries. 
 
Military Recommendations 
27. In view of the military considerations detailed above, the NATO military 
authorities recommend that Greece should attain the force requirements at Annex, and 
the standards of readiness laid down in M.C. 55/1, amplified by Commanders‘ 
guidance, and, to that end, should implement the following recommendations: 
 
(a) Give priority in all services to manning, training and equipping the 
minimum essential forces set forth in M.C. 70, with emphasis on M-day Forces. 
(b) Give priority to the build-up of balanced non-organic 
combat and service support units for M-day and 1st echelon forces, and raise the 
readiness status of a portion of 2nd echelon combat support units in the army to 1st 
echelon. 
(c)  Make every effort to provide AWX capability as required by M.C. 70. 
(d) Implement a national long-term- replacement programme in the navy in 
order to solve the obsolescence problem. 
(e) Continue to provide for the army TO&E equipment requirements and to 
replace obsolete and worn out equipment, with priority being given to M-day and 1st 
echelon units. 
(f) Continue to improve the logistic support capability of the air force, giving 
particular attention to providing additional ground support and maintenance 
equipment to fulfil combat units, TO&E requirements and improve the equipping of 
off-base logistic support units. 
(g) Continue efforts to ensure early completion of communications support 
required for effective operations of the EW and C&R system. 
(h) Raise the training of reserve elements of 1st echelon forces to SHAPE 
Recommended Standards. 
(i) Build-up holdings of supplies and ammunition, for all services to the levels 
recommended in M.C. 55/1. 
(j) Continue to increase the ratio of combat readiness of pilots to M.C. 55/1 
standards. 
(k) Continue measures to meet the personnel requirements, particularly with 
regard to increasing the regular content, which are made necessary by phasing in of 
modern equipment in the Royal Hellenic Air Force. 
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(l) Continue efforts to meet requirement of M.C. 60 in the Royal Hellenic Air
Force. 
(These recommendations are in order of importance, without regard to service) 
III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Equipment and Production 
28. Large deficiencies in equipment and ammunition exist in the three forces, but the
situation appears to be the most serious in the army. In many cases there are even
shortages in initial equipment. The large variety of equipment of different origin – in
many cases obsolete – held by the Greek forces increases the cost of maintenance and
repairs.
29. With the exception of very few items, Greece is completely dependent upon the
continuation of external aid. Substantial deliveries of equipment and ammunition have
been received during the last few years and have resulted in some improvement in
holdings, but the situation remains unsatisfactory in many equipment categories.
Some national production facilities exist, but lack of funds prevent the Greek
Government from fully exploiting these resources, particularly as regards
ammunition.
30. Should the Greek Government find it possible to increase the amount of national
funds allotted to the procurement of equipment and ammunition, priority should be
given to the latter, with a view to increasing the level of stocks and to maintaining a
minimum level of activity in the ammunition factories.
Defence Finance 
31. The evolution of the Greek defence budget is evidence of the significant
additional effort made by Greece in 1957:  an increase in the numerical strength of the
forces was, in fact, rendered necessary by the forming of new units issued with
MDAP equipment already delivered and assurances that there would be further
deliveries.
32. The 1958 defence credits are slightly lower. The expected United States' financial
aid (drachmae 400 million) was not received. On the other hand, thanks to special
United States‘ aid in the form of ―common user products‖ (drachmae 195 million),
there was some alleviation of the corresponding budget charges.
33. According to the estimates, the defence budget will be somewhat bigger in 1959.
The Greek authorities state that the Defence Ministry budget will, if necessary,
receive additional funds to enable it to meet the maintenance and operating costs
incurred by deliveries of MDAP material and equipment. Broadly speaking, the bulk
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of the defence budget continues to be applied to maintenance and operating costs. As 
regards capital expenditure, the share allotted to the procurement of major equipment 
is still remarkably small except in the case of the navy. 
34. The Greek defence effort is strongly backed by external aid (United States and
Canada) in the form of deliveries of material and equipment, and is assisted by the
allocation to the general budget of United States aid counterpart funds. MDAP
represents more than one-third of the total resources devoted to the Greek defence
effort, and covers not only practically the whole of capital expenditure but also a
significant part of operating and maintenance costs.
35. To meet the M.C. 70 goals alone, Greece would have to plan for a sharp rise in
personnel strength, particularly in the army (50,000 more men between now and
1963), as well as a substantial increase in maintenance and operating costs to bring its
forces up to NATO standards. The supplementary goals which Greece has set herself,
even if they are only given a lower priority, will place a further strain on limited
resources.
36. In the field of equipment and operational reserves, the many existing deficiencies,
some of them critical, can only be made good if a great deal more external aid is
provided. Furthermore, the constitution of missiles unit is primarily dependent on
Mutual Aid.
37. By and large, even on the assumption of sufficient external aid to cover these
various requirements, the fulfilment of M.C. 70 goals alone (for the period 1958-
1963) would seem to call for an annual increase in defence expenditures (according to
the NATO definition) averaging about 17% as compared with the 1958 level. In order
to do so, the budget of the Defence Ministry, which centralises all the expenditures
entailed by the build-up and improvement of the Greek forces, would have to be
increased by about one quarter in relation to the present level. It is unlikely that the
whole impact of this substantial additional effort could be borne by the Greek budget.
Economic Considerations 
38. Although the defence effort, as a proportion of the national product, declined from
a peak of 8.5% in 1951 to 6.2% in 1957, it is still fairly high as compared with other
NATO countries, and places a heavy burden on the as yet little-developed Greek
economy. From 1951-1957,  allowing for the rise in prices, the national product, in
real terms, has increased by 47%, and it would appear that the increase in the real
value of defence expenditures has been of the order of 15%.
39. Military expenditures in 1950 still absorb one-third of budgetary revenue from
national sources; moreover, the additional revenue provided by the United States
counterpart funds has diminished considerably. As a result of this reduction and of
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increased expenditure, mainly for public investment, the budget, which has been in 
balance over recent years, is likely to show a deficit in 1958. With the tailing-off of 
receipts from offshore orders, military transactions directly entering the balance of 
payments, after providing a net gain in foreign currency up till 1956, have 
subsequently resulted in a deficit. Moreover, the rise in imports, the difficulty of 
selling Greek agricultural products in foreign markets, the slump in merchant 
shipping, and the reduction in United States economic aid, have caused a drop in gold 
and currency reserves since 1957. 
40. Production of military equipment in Greece is very limited; since the cessation of
offshore orders, the principal economic problem in this field is how to keep in
operation the ammunition factories. Expansion of military construction, (two-thirds of
which are under the NATO infrastructure programme) has a favourable economic
effect to the extent that it increases openings for the employment of labour, but also
calls for engineers and skilled workers whose numbers are still small. Similarly,
military personnel, in spite of its increased strength, does not create any problem for
the labour market except in respect of technicians.
41. Although financial stability has been restored and production has risen rapidly
during the last few years, the standard of living is still very low and unemployment is
wide-spread (about a quarter of the total labour force is unemployed or under-
employed). To remedy this situation, the Government has drawn up a long-term
economic development programme which provides for an annual increase in the
national product of 5%. The authorities count on part of the capital required for this
effort being found abroad. Furthermore, the adjustment of the Greek economy, in
particular of its new industries, to the keener competition which will develop in
Europe, raises serious problems. International co-operation in favour of Greece, in the
form of loans, greater opportunities for the marketing of Greek agricultural products
and orders for ammunition, would strengthen the economic basis of defence. It would,
in any case, be difficult to require Greece to spend appreciably more in foreign
currency for defence. However, since the burden of certain essential investments is to
fall on the budget, military expenditures could not be greatly increased without
endangering financial stability.
42. The satisfaction of M.C. 70 requirements and the maintenance of the additional
Greek forces at their present level would require not only a substantial increase in the
national budgetary effort, but also in Mutual Aid deliveries, as well as in United
States‘ economic, aid. However, a national budgetary effort of the necessary scope
would seem to be beyond the financial and economic capabilities of Greece. Taking
into account the present comparatively high level of military spending and the burden
represented by the programme of economic expansion which is designed to raise
living standards, the defence effort of Greece can at best only be increased in step
with the expansion of the nation's resources. It would, therefore, be unrealistic to
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count on the possibility of raising the proportion of the national product at present 
devoted to defence. Even if they were sealed down to the M.C. 70 goals alone, 
Greece‘s military plans appear difficult to implement, at least in their entirety and 
within the time limits envisaged. 
 
43. Partial achievements, greatly desirable in the interests of the Alliance, are 
nevertheless feasible. Although the Greek authorities are not yet in a position to 
indicate the extent to which the defence budget could be increased in future, they have 
stated that they would endeavour to maintain at its present level the share of national 
resources devoted to defence. The Greek Government has always expressed 
willingness to increase its financial effort, in order at least to increase military 
personnel, on condition, however, that the necessary weapons and equipment are 
supplied through external aid and that the Greek economy receives the necessary 
support from the Atlantic allies. 
 
International Staff Recommendations 
44. Taking into account the vital need for continued economic developments, the 
International Staff recommend that the Greek Government should: 
 
(a) pursue its efforts to increase defence expenditures progressively and in 
relation with the growth of the national product and at least ensure full use of the 
equipment received under external aid; 
(b) give priority, in allocating financial resources available for defence, to the 
build-up of the minimum forces required by the NATO military authorities, in order 
to enable Greece to meet, as far as possible, the quantitative and qualitative 
requirements of M.C. 70. 
[…] {An Annex of two pages follows} 
 
_________________________________ 
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PO/60/166 
Private Office of the Secretary General. Preparation of the Summit Meeting. 
Enquiry in the NATO Countries on East/West Contacts and Exchanges. Text of 
Reply by Greece 
10 February 1960 
SECRETARY GENERAL [PAUL-HENRI SPAAK] TO PERMANENT 
REPRESENTATIVES 
SUBJECT: PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT MEETING. ENQUIRY IN THE 
NATO COUNTRIES ON EAST/WEST CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. TEXT 
OF REPLY BY GREECE 
I am forwarding herewith the text of the reply by the Greek Government to the 
questions set out in document PO/60/30 on East/West contacts and exchanges. 
2. The Greek Delegation has informed me that the reply to the financial section of this
document will be forthcoming at a later date.
P.-H. Spaak 
Reply by the Greek Government to Document PO/60/30 
Before replying point by point to the questionnaire in document PO/60/30, the Greek 
Delegation would like to explain, as briefly as possible, how it envisages the tactical 
conduct of East-West negotiations. 
There are two schools of thought in the West. One maintains that negotiations 
with Russia should not differ in any way from similar negotiations with a Western 
State, i.e., that from the outset, clear evidence should be given of a spirit of 
conciliation, any gesture avoided which might be construed as even slightly 
unfriendly, the greatest possible meekness displayed in the face of provocation, 
slander or mere boorishness. 
The second school maintains that, while of course avoiding all unnecessary 
disgressions of speech, the attitude of the Western diplomats should be modelled on 
that of the Russians, i.e., that a very firm line should be adopted, care taken not to 
give the slightest impression that one-sided concessions might be obtainable, no insult 
or libel allowed to pass unchallenged. 
The Soviets would obviously much prefer the West to adopt the tactics 
advocated by the first school. The ability to rant and rail without any risk of 
disagreeable truths being flung back and to be inflexible with a more malleable 
adversary, greatly increases their self-confidence, enhances their prestige abroad and 
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– last but not least – eventually even succeeds in giving some sectors of Western 
opinion a guilt complex. 
 The Soviet Government therefore does – and will do – everything in its power 
to discredit the most unyielding of the Western diplomats in the eyes of their 
compatriots by calling them warmongers, or at least belated advocates of the cold 
war, and to set against them all the simpletons, wishful thinkers and defeatists. It does 
this in the hope of creating an atmosphere which, in the ensuing confusion, will 
enable it to obtain concessions without having to make any itself. 
 The Greek Government – and this statement surely needs no further repetition 
– believes that everything is to be gained by a sincere détente between East and West 
and it will continue its efforts to bring it about, but it holds that only the tactics of the 
second school of thought can prevent potentially dangerous misunderstandings and 
lead to a balanced easing of tensions. The fact that it was due to the firm attitude 
adopted by the West that, not so long ago, the Berlin blockade was lifted, and, in 
1959, the Soviet ultimatum regarding the same city was withdrawn, naturally 
increases our conviction that we are right. 
 
1. Propaganda and Non-Interference in Domestic Affairs 
It is common knowledge that the Greek Government maintains that East-West 
negotiations cannot even be relatively successful unless they can at least put a curb on 
Soviet attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Western countries. If the 
outcome of the Summit negotiations still left the Soviets a free hand in the 
propaganda field, whatever other concessions the Kremlin might make with respect to 
East-West relations would prove to be illusory. 
 There is no getting away from the fact that the Kremlin only has one idea – 
and Mr. Khrushchev has proclaimed it without beating about the bush – namely, to 
pursue the war by every means except recourse to arms, until our democratic 
institutions are swept away and power in our countries is vested in a minority at the 
service of Moscow. Apart from specifically military action, the most effective weapon 
at the disposal of the Soviets for the attainment of this goal is subversive propaganda 
in all its forms, including, naturally, the fomenting of sedition, presented to the world 
as spontaneous internal movements. There is all the more reason to hope for the 
cessation of this propaganda, because, viewing it objectively, we are forced to the 
conclusion that, even if the West wished to do so, it could never equal the Soviets in 
this field.  
 The freedom of the press and the control which parliaments exercise over 
State expenditure – to say nothing of the respect for the individual taught in our 
countries – would make it impossible for any democratic government ever to have the 
use of a propaganda machine so efficient, so freely financed, and so profoundly 
amoral as that of the Soviets.  
 There will probably be no difficulty during the forthcoming East-West 
negotiations in getting Soviet Russia to accept the principle of non-interference. The 
Communists, knowing that world opinion regards acceptance of this principle as a 
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prerequisite for a détente, have been clever enough to take the lead and to include it in 
their proposals, as they did in May 1958, and have done on other occasions. 
Moreover, this is also how they claim to interpret what they call the ―Camp David 
spirit‖. 
 To show up the Soviet by proving their duplicity is not very difficult either. 
Taking Greece alone, their broadcasts in Greek afford ample evidence of the extent of 
their interference in our domestic affairs. Across the Iron Curtain, there is a secret 
transmitter, at present in the Bucharest area, which, claiming to be ―The Voice of 
Truth‖, gives three broadcasts a day in Greek on the wavelengths 30.2 and 37.2. 
These broadcasts consist of an endless flow of venomous abuse of the Government, 
aimed at undermining national security. 
 Furthermore, all the principal official radio stations beyond the Iron Curtain 
regularly broadcast programmes in Greek, and these, too, are frequently of a 
subversive and libelous character. It is also well known in Greece that the Soviets, at 
the time of the general election in 1958 heavily subsidised the Communist or near-
Communist candidates. It has not been forgotten that, the Soviet Embassy officials, 
especially towards the end of the electoral period, scarcely troubled to conceal the 
confabulations they held with their Greek protégés. However, the most convincing 
evidence of the bad faith of the Soviets when they speak on non-interference is 
furnished by the postage-stamp bearing the likeness of one of the Greek Communist 
leaders at present serving a prison sentence in Athens, which was issued by the Soviet 
postal authorities in November 1959, at a time when the ―spirit of Camp David‖ was 
supposed to permeate the Moscow rulers.  
 To discomfit the Soviets by once again proving their bad faith might help to 
relieve our feelings, but would do little to bring us nearer to the goal now proposed, 
which is a détente in East-West relations if, in spite of such manoeuvres, the Soviets, 
for once, are sincerely desirous of attaining it. 
 All things considered, the best course would appear to consist in issuing a joint 
announcement solemnly condemning all subversive propaganda and interference of 
any kind in the domestic affairs of other countries and at the same time to get Soviet 
endorsement of a very clear and detailed definition of subversive propaganda and 
unwarrantable interference. Even if this move proved successful, it would not of itself 
afford a complete guarantee that the Soviets were about to turn over a new leaf and 
religiously keep their plighted word. However, they would find it far more difficult to 
continue their subversive propaganda activities. The Russians are [much] too shrewd 
not to realise the extent to which world opinion would turn against them if they 
infringed too openly obligations freely and solemnly accepted.  
 It has sometimes been maintained that obligations of this kind, even though 
they are mutual, should not be entered into with the Soviets, since they might act as an 
obstacle in the way of the propaganda which the West sends, or would like to send, 
across the Iron Curtain. This opinion appears to be quite without foundation. The 
West has no use for propaganda as understood and sent out by the Soviets. Free 
comparison of the two systems is all it wants. An attempt to portray without bias the 
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Western way of life to those living behind the Iron Curtain does not constitute 
subversive propaganda, and neither would similar action by the Soviets in respect of 
ourselves. Propaganda can only be held to be subversive if it contains deliberate 
falsehoods. The West has no desire for, or interest in, such propaganda. In our own 
countries, with the freedom of information which is characteristic of the West, it can, 
in any case, not gain credence.  
 
2. Official contacts 
The Greek Government sees no need for increasing the number of official contacts 
with the USSR, since, at least in Greece, the Soviets have so far always managed to 
take advantage of them for propaganda purposes. Our liberal convictions prevent us 
from excluding from an official mission leaving for the Iron Curtain countries 
persons, who, although definitely representative of their trade or profession, are so 
gullible or lacking in judgment as to risk being taken in by Moscow‘s propaganda. 
The same, of course, cannot be said of Communist delegations, for their members 
have been very carefully screened so as to eliminate all but those who are quite 
impervious to all Western influence. Furthermore, and always because of our liberal 
practices, members of Soviet missions in Greece cannot be subjected to vexatious 
surveillance or prevented from making whatever contacts they wish. In view of this, 
Soviet personalities visiting our country openly take advantage of their stay to ―boost‖ 
the prestige of the Greek Communists with the remainder of the population. It is 
difficult to see how members of Greek official missions to Russia could reciprocate.  
 Official visits are, of course, not without their advantages. In spite of the 
precautions taken by the Soviets, it is not inconceivable that they may open the eyes 
of a few East Europeans to the realities of the West. On balance, however, the West 
would appear to derive far less benefit from these contacts than the Soviets. This also 
explains why Moscow and the Satellite Governments are so keen on them.  
 
3. Freedom of movement for persons 
Document PO/60/30 asks to what extent the countries of the Soviet bloc should be 
urged to abandon the restrictions they impose on personal freedom of movement. To 
this question we can reply without hesitation that it would be to our advantage if the 
Soviets applied in this field the liberal policy followed by the NATO Governments in 
regard to the movements within their frontiers of their own nationals or of visiting 
foreigners. 
 We shall deal later, in the paragraph on ―tourism,‖ with the serious problems 
of East/West exchanges of visitors. 
 
4. Freedom of information in all its aspects (the distribution and sale of newspapers 
and periodicals, the creation of reading rooms and libraries, cessation of the jamming 
of broadcasts, the abolition of censorship.) 
Here, there can be no uncertainty. We must not hesitate to do all we can to 
induce the Soviet authorities to recognise all these freedoms. Since on our side there 
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is no question of renouncing the principle of freedom of information, this is the only 
means we can employ to avoid being permanently handicapped in this field by the 
Soviet system of controls. It is also the only effective means whereby those who live 
behind the Iron Curtain can obtain a true picture of our institutions and ideals, so 
shaking their faith in Communist propaganda, which gives them such warped notions 
about life in the Western world. 
 Furthermore, here we stand on very firm ground. ―No hoodwinking of the 
public by curtailing freedom of information‖ is a popular cry everywhere, and with 
everyone. 
 No good purpose would be served by again explaining the difference between 
complete freedom of information and subversive propaganda. 
 
5. Cultural and artistic exchanges 
We believe that in this field we should primarily seek to intensify exchanges in the 
many areas in which Western life maintains a higher standard than is the case in the 
Soviet countries (the applied arts, housing, domestic equipment, cars, women‘s wear, 
hair styles, etc.) always with a view to presenting a true picture of our way of life 
untrammelled by the restrictions imposed upon the inhabitants of Eastern Europe.  
 
6. Exchanges in the fields of tourism and sport 
A Greek statesman has recently said that Western visitors to the countries of the East 
did not see much, but wrote a great deal on their return home, in contra[s]t to 
Communist visitors to our countries, who saw a great deal but did not write much. 
 This ―wisecrack‖ seems to us to sum up the position very neatly. It seems 
likely to remain true until the Soviet system has undergone structural changes which 
there is no reason to believe will take place in the foreseeable future.  
 If exchanges of tourists between the Western and Eastern world increase, the 
majority of Western governments will be disinclined to exercise discrimination in the 
matter of passports or, if they do, they will arouse violent protests in several quarters. 
The Communist governments, on the other hand, are completely free to refuse exit 
visas to prospective tourists of whom they disapprove, whoever they may be. The 
mere idea of unsuccessful applicants daring to raise their voices in protest is 
ludicrous. 
 Although exchanges of tourists may be of some value to the West in certain 
cases, we are convinced that, on the whole, the Soviet bloc countries are the ones 
which derive by far the greatest benefit from such exchanges, which, therefore, should 
not be encouraged. 
 The same is true of exchanges in the field of sports. The pseudo-amateurism of 
certain Western athletes is nothing compared with its counterpart in Russia. When 
there is question of sending representatives abroad to uphold Russia‘s claim to 
supremacy in sports, there is absolutely no room for the disinterested spirit of the 
Olympic tradition. Everything is in the hands of political officials and their efforts are 
directed towards a single aim, namely, to impress foreign countries by a convincing 
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demonstration of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviets in athletic sports. Since 
the masses, in the West, are more interested in sports than in anything else, their use 
by the Soviets for purely political purposes is obviously a very paying proposition. It 
seems pointless to play the Soviet game by giving it our encouragement.  
 
7. Economic Relations 
(a) and (b). The Greek Government is prepared to establish normal economic relations 
between Greece and the Communist countries and in particular to increase the volume 
of mutual trade. Moreover, it has already embarked on this course to the extent 
regarded as possible without incurring political risks.  
The Greek Government sees no need for the West to propose this as a topic for 
discussion at the forthcoming Summit Meeting, but considers that if it came from the 
USSR, the West should not reject it. 
(c) Should economic questions come up for discussion, the Greek Government 
agrees that the proposals set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of document C-M(58)93 should 
still be regarded as valid, with a single exception. This exception is sub-paragraph (b) 
of paragraph 6, which refers to the establishment by foreign firms of permanent 
offices in towns other than Moscow. The Greek Government has had to refuse certain 
recent requests made by Eastern countries for authorisation to open commercial 
offices in Greek provincial towns. By way of an exception, authorisation has been 
granted for the establishment of a small Rumanian mission in Thessalonica. 
The Greek Government is sorry to have to adopt this attitude for reasons of 
internal security, but it knows that the trade missions of Eastern countries in Greece 
have all too frequently afforded cover for clandestine, subversive activities as well as 
carrying on their legitimate activities. It will readily be understood that since the 
Greek Government has withheld consent to the opening of Soviet commercial offices 
in the Greek provinces, it cannot expect the Soviet authorities to grant such facilities 
for Greek firms. 
Turning now to more general considerations, the Greek Government feels that, 
if there are any economic negotiations at the Summit Meeting, the aim should be to 
obtain the Soviet Government‘s solemn assurance that trade will not be used as a 
means of exerting political or economic pressure. It is highly improbable that the 
Soviet authorities would openly refuse to conclude such an agreement and, needless 
to say, they are just as unlikely, after entering into the agreement, to comply 
scrupulously with its provisions. Here again, however, as already stated with 
reference to subversive propaganda, a detailed definition of the practices that cannot 
be countenanced might seriously hinder the freedom of action of the Soviets in this 
field. 
 
8. Financial problems 
The Greek Delegation will let the International Staff have the Greek Government‘s 
comments under this head as soon as they come to hand. 
__________________________________
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C-M(61)114 
North Atlantic Council Memorandum. Principles to Govern Co-operation and 
Assistance to those Member Countries Most Seriously Hurt by the Application of 
Economic Countermeasures against the Soviet Bloc 
 20 November 1961  
 
REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES 
 
The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures, established by decision of the 
Council at its meeting on 23rd August, 1961, was instructed, inter alia, to give 
attention to the effects on individual NATO countries of implementing economic 
countermeasures and means by which adverse effects on these countries could be 
averted or mitigated.(1) 
 
2. As this problem is essentially an economic one the Working Group invited the 
Committee of Economic Advisers to study the principles which could govern: 
(a) exceptional assistance which might prove to be necessary to provide to member 
countries who, given their economic situation and the nature and extent of their trade 
with the Soviet bloc, would be most seriously hurt by the application of economic 
countermeasures to the Soviet bloc; 
(b) the co-operation eventually to be put into operation between member countries 
and, possibly, certain other countries with a view to mitigating as far as possible the 
adverse effects of economic countermeasures on the economies of member countries 
and of the rest of the free world. 
 
The attached interim report by the Committee of Economic Advisers deals with the 
first question only. A report dealing with the second question will be submitted in the 
near future. 
 
3. Although some representatives have not yet received final instructions from their 
authorities, the Working Group on Economic Countermeasures agreed that it should 
be transmitted to the Council. 
 
4. The Council may wish to note the following main comments made by 
representatives during discussion of the report: 
(a) if, as indicated in the report, the decisions of the Steering Board, which 
would control the system of co-operation and assistance, have to be taken by a 
majority, this majority might be weighted so that the number of votes of each member 
country should be proportionate, for instance, to its financial contribution, or to some 
other criteria to be defined; 
(b) the system of co-operation and assistance should be provided as soon as it 
starts to function with the necessary funds in order to enable the Steering Board to 
extend financial assistance to the countries most seriously hurt; 
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(c) efforts made to dispose of certain products now exported to the Soviet bloc
by the countries likely to be most seriously hurt might affect the traditional exports of 
other member countries to the free world; 
(d) in case certain countries have to obtain parliamentary approval to finance
the system of co-operation and assistance, then, with a view to avoiding any publicity 
in accordance with the general rule adopted for economic countermeasures, this 
approval should be sought just before the implementation of the economic 
countermeasures; 
(e) in respect of the system of co-operation and assistance, it has been
indicated that Portugal might find it difficult to make a financial contribution. 
5. The Working Group wishes to make it clear that transmission of this report to the
Council does not in any way pre-judge the basic political issue, which is for decision
by the Council. The Canadian Delegation, which was unable to be represented at the
meeting, reserved its position and requested that this should be so stated.
6. The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures recommends that the Council:
(1) approve the principles set out in this report, subject to the understanding
stated in paragraph 5 above; 
(2) instruct the Committee of Economic Advisers to consider what further
studies could be usefully undertaken, with a view to implementing these principles, 
and to report in due course.  
(Signed) 
R. W. J. Hooper 
A. Vincent
Joint Chairmen of the Working Group
Principles that Could Govern Co-operation and Assistance 
to Those Member Countries Most Seriously Hurt 
by the Application of Economic Countermeasures 
against the Soviet Bloc 
In the spirit of solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty, a system of co-operation and 
assistance, in which all member countries will participate, will be put into operation to 
mitigate the effects of the economic countermeasures taken against the Soviet bloc on 
the economies of those NATO countries which would be most seriously hurt; the 
system will begin to function as soon as countermeasures amounting to an 
interruption of trade relations with the Soviet bloc are applied and will cease as soon 
as trade relations of those member countries most seriously hurt have regained their 
normal level. The need to maintain the system in existence after the termination of the 
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countermeasures should be reviewed on such termination and thereafter, if necessary, 
at intervals of, say, six months. 
2. The purpose of this system will be:
(a) essentially, and in the first instance, to find out and apply means of
securing additional outlets in the free world at normal prices for the principal products 
which those countries most seriously hurt exported to the Soviet bloc before the 
application of economic countermeasures; 
(b) insofar as additional outlets prove inadequate, to compensate as far as
possible and on an equitable basis those countries most seriously hurt. 
3. The system of co-operation and assistance will be placed under the control of a
Steering Board where all members will be represented, decisions being taken by a
majority in conditions to be decided. The Steering Board will maintain close co-
operation between the governments of those countries most seriously hurt and the
governments of the other NATO countries. In taking its decisions, it will take account
of all the factors affecting the situation, particularly the losses suffered by the
countries most seriously hurt and such exceptional advantages as a rise in demand and
an increase in prices which could partially compensate these losses, as well as of new
outlets which the countries most seriously hurt would be able to offer to other NATO
countries to replace the products which they used to import from the Soviet bloc.
4. The Steering Board will provide financial assistance to the countries most seriously
hurt in two distinct forms:
(a) in the form of interest-free loans, to the extent they recognise the need,
taking account of the various factors in the situation, particularly of the financial 
position of the countries most seriously hurt, in order to give them time to seek, with 
the collaboration of their Allies, additional outlets for the products which accounted 
for a substantial portion of their exports to the Soviet bloc; these loans might be used 
for purchase, procurement and storing of these products. 
(b) in the form of once and for all compensatory payments which could
amount, at the most, to a total equivalent to the normal value of the products in 
question which had not found outlets in the countries of the free world; these 
payments could be made through deduction from the sums which the countries most 
seriously hurt has to repay on account of interest-free loans which they had previously 
received. 
5. Only those countries whose exports to the Soviet bloc, in the course of an
appropriate period of reference, have accounted for at least 10% of their total exports
will benefit from financial assistance envisaged in the preceding paragraph. This
financial assistance will only be extended for those products the export of which to
the Soviet bloc is of significance for the economy of those countries.
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6. To permit the financing of the system of co-operation and assistance, all NATO 
countries will make a contribution determined according to a formula to be 
established following the example of the burden-sharing formulae used by 
international organizations, possible taking account of the effects of the 
countermeasures on the economies of the various NATO countries. The contribution 
might take the form of the opening of credits, the Steering Board drawing on these 
credits as the need arises. The sum total of contributions might be fixed provisionally 
at a certain proportion of the value in dollars of the exports of the countries most 
seriously hurt to the Soviet bloc in the course of the agreed period of reference. 
 
 
(1) Addendum to C-R(61)39, Item 1. 
 
Annex: 
Table I: Exports Iceland, Greece and Turkey to the Soviet bloc (1955-1960) 
Table II: Icelandic exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and 
January-September 1960) 
Table III: Greek exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and January-
September 1960) 
Table IV: Turkish exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and January-
September 1960) 
 
TABLE I 
Exports to the Soviet Bloc 
1955-1960 
 
 Iceland Iceland Greece Greece Turkey Turkey 
 Million  
US 
Dollars 
as % of 
world 
exports 
Million  
US 
Dollars 
as % of 
world 
exports 
Million  
US 
Dollars 
as % of 
world 
exports 
(O) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
14.40 
19.00 
20.40 
22.80 
21.84 
15.36 
27.6 
30.1 
33.7 
34.9 
33.7 
23.1 
8.60 
19.60 
24.10 
37.44 
33.48 
44.76 
4.6 
10.3 
11.0 
16.2 
16.4 
22.1 
68.60 
59.90 
63.50 
62.28 
40.80 
39.12 
21.9 
19.6 
18.4 
23.6 
11.5 
12.2 
       
Sources: 
1955-1957: Statistical Papers, Series T, Direction of International Trade (UN 
publication). 
1958-1960: OEEC Statistical Bulletins, Series A, Overall Trade by countries. 
________________________________
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MCM-164-61 
Military Committee Memorandum. Status Report on the Defense of the Balkan 
Area. The Possibilities of Carrying out in a More Active Manner the Defense of 
the Balkan Area  
 
6 December 1961 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE 
IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION 
 
SUBJECT: Status Report on the Defense of the Balkan Area. The Possibilities of 
Carrying out in a More Active Manner the Defense of the Balkan Area. 
 
References: 
a. MCM-196-60 dtd 27 Dec 60 
b. SG 259 (Rev)(Fin. Dec) dtd 13 Apr 61 
c. MCM-151-61dtd 24 Nov 61 
d. SGM-171-61 dtd 4 Apr 61 
e. Record MC/CS 26 dtd 20 Apr 61 
f. SHAPE/221/611dtd 23 Nov 61 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. During the informal discussion of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff 
Session held on 14 December 1960, the Greek Member made a presentation, 
reference a, containing certain ideas related to the ―Defense of the Balkans in 
Accordance with the Forward Strategy Principles‖. The principal subjects that this 
presentation raised for discussion by the Chiefs of Staff were as follows: 
 
a. The question of the responsibilities of member nations of the Alliance in the 
event of hostile local action against one of them, without a clear determination 
whether or not the Soviets are involved in the attack. 
b. The possibilities of carrying out in a more active manner the defense of the 
Balkan area. 
c. The relative importance of local defensive strength in deterring hostile local 
action. 
 
The Standing Group reported to the Military Committee by reference b the results of 
its study at paragraph 1a above. SACEUR‘s report on the relative importance of local 
defensive strength in deterring hostile local action has been distributed by reference c. 
 
2. During the discussions at the 26th Meeting of the Military Committee in April 
1961, an interim report by SACEUR on ―The Possibilities of Carrying out in a more 
Active Manner the Defense of the Balkan Area‖ was promulgated by reference d. 
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SACEUR stated that the Greek authorities were aware of certain interim conclusions 
on this subject raised by his subordinate commanders. However, study of this problem 
will continue in consultation with the Turkish and Greek authorities. In order to 
clarify the position of the Greek Government, the Greek Representative offered the 
following explanations: 
 
a. The Greek proposals were in harmony with the present NATO strategic 
concept but they were intended to represent an application of this concept to 
the Balkan area. 
b. The Greek proposals were put forward to draw attention of the Military 
Committee to the potential value of this NATO area, which, in the opinion of 
the Greek military authorities, could offer more to the Alliance than present 
plans permit. 
c. The proposals were not submitted purely in the Greek national interest, but 
from a sense of duty on the part of a small NATO nation to contribute to the 
development of the collective military thinking of the Alliance. 
 
3. In his interim report at reference d, SACEUR agreed that Greek proposals were in 
consonance with the strategic concept of the Alliance and therefore he was in 
agreement with them. He also stated that his subordinate commanders would continue 
to discuss and consider this subject, working with the Greek and the Turkish General 
Staffs, as it was of equal importance to the latter. He pointed out that that the problem 
was not only one of concept, but one of money, manpower and materiel. 
 
4. After discussion, the Military Committee of Chiefs of Staff session agreed that 
SACEUR should continue to study the Greek proposal with a view to presenting a 
paper to the Standing Group for consideration by the Military Committee in Chiefs of 
Staff Session in December 1961. 
 
DISCUSSION 
5. SACEUR‘s report, SHAPE/221/61 dated 23 November 1961, entitled ―Forward 
Strategy in the Balkan Area,‖ was received by the Standing Group on 1 December 
and is enclosed herewith. There has, therefore, been insufficient time before the 27th 
meeting of the Military Committee for the Standing Group to prepare useful 
comments on SACEUR‘s report; furthermore, it will be necessary to obtain the 
reactions of the Ministries of Defense concerned before the Standing Group can 
complete its report for submission to the Military Committee. 
 
6. The Standing Group feels that in view of the importance of this subject and the 
short time that has been available for the study of SACEUR‘s report, the Chiefs of 
Staff will not be in a position to reach a final decision. Therefore, the Standing Group 
is of the opinion that, subject to any further guidance which may be given by the 
Military Committee, the Standing Group should obtain the reactions of the national 
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authorities concerned before completing a report for final consideration by the 
Military Committee in Permanent Session. 
 
CONCLUSION 
7. The Standing Group concludes that they should prepare a report for final 
consideration by the Military Committee in Permanent Session, taking into account 
the reactions to SACEUR‘s paper of the national authorities concerned and any 
discussion of this subject which may arise at the 27th Meeting of the Military 
Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
8. The Standing Group recommends that the Military Committee use this brief, and 
SACEUR‘s report at Enclosure 1, as bases for any discussion of this subject at their 
27th Meeting, and that they approve the action proposed at paragraph 7 above. 
 
[Signed] 
MAURICE E. KAISER 
Colonel, U.S. Army 
Secretary 
 
ENCLOSURE 1 
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 
Paris, France 
SHAPE/221/61 
1220/20 
23 November 1961 
SUBJECT:  Forward Strategy in the Balkan Area 
TO: Chairman 
 Standing Group 
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 Room 1-E-929, The Pentagon 
 Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A. 
REFERENCES: a. SHAPE/35/61  
  b. Message, SGN, DEF 990169, MILCOM 103, 10 Feb 61 
  c. MCM 196-60, 27 Dec 60 
  
 1. A feasibility study of a forward strategy in the Balkan area has been 
completed. In addition to the capabilities of ground combat forces and the logistic 
system, the overall effects of the Atomic Strike Plan, to include programmed ground 
delivery units, and the availability of conventional air support have been considered. 
Outlined below are SHAPE‘s findings with respect to: the present concept of defense, 
NATO
  
214 
 
an offensive forward strategy, a forward strategy limited to controlling the Bulgarian 
border areas, and general war considerations. 
 
 2. Present Concept of Defense: The objective of the NATO strategy in the 
Balkan area to date has been an aggressive defense consistent with the means 
available. In several border areas the ability to hold the enemy for appreciable periods 
now exists, whereas in other sectors such containment is beyond current capabilities. 
It is estimated that: 
  a. Along the Albanian border, there is a capability sufficient to contain 
the Albanian threat. 
  b. In the event Yugoslavia is hostile, operations on the Yugoslavian 
front would be limited to delaying actions. 
  c. In the event Yugoslavia is friendly or neutral, the effectiveness of 
delay along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier would depend upon the strength of the 
enemy effort. Strong enemy thrusts would necessitate withdrawal to the NESTOS or 
STRUMA defensive lines. 
  d. The importance of Turkish Thrace is well appreciated. Major 
combat elements there are deployed forward of the most favorable terrain in order to 
fight initially as close to the border as possible. 
  e. Construction and improvement of fortifications in Northern Greece 
and forward redisposition of Turkish units in Thrace will improve the combat posture 
for general war and enhance capabilities to resist hostile local actions. Effective 
disposition of forces is under constant review to make maximum use of improvements 
in force and resources. 
  
 3. An Offensive Forward Strategy: Military considerations of an offensive 
forward strategy would require capture and retention of objectives outside Thrace in 
the KYUSTEDIL-PLOVDIV-KASKOVA-AHKTOPOL area in Bulgaria. Within the 
present defensive nature of the NATO Alliance such a strategy is not feasible. It 
would require a force on the order of approximately five extra divisions and 
consequent increases in supporting arms, including ground atomic delivery units. In 
addition, there would have to be major improvements in logistics and road systems. 
The forces necessary for such a strategy are beyond the scope of currently planned 
goals. This concept will, however, be covered in contingency plans to improve our 
posture in the event of hostilities occurring in other areas. 
 
 4. Forward Strategy Limited to Controlling the Bulgarian Border Areas: The 
political and psychological advantages of imposing absolute control of areas in the 
vicinity of the BULGARIAN border are great. However, a sustained defense in this 
area poses certain military disadvantages, including the use of terrain unfavorable to 
the defense in Turkish Thrace and lengthening of supply line in both Greece and 
Turkey. There would be limited depth to the combat zone and it would be supported 
by poor lines of communication. For such a strategy to be sound it would be necessary 
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to deepen the zone by including the Aegean Sea as a support and maneuver area. This 
in turn would require availability at the appropriate time of amphibious and/or 
airborne forces with the necessary air and logistic support. With such increased depth, 
the addition of one Hellenic 1st Echelon division in the Greek Thrace area should be 
sufficient. If the present level of military aid to Greece and Turkey continues, these 
countries will continue to progress towards a defense capable of controlling their 
northern borders. Without the additional depth and strength discussed above, 
however, a serious weakness will continue to exist between the Turkish First Army 
and the Greek First Army. 
5. General War Considerations: Since the same troops would be used for the
entire spectrum of conflict there is, of course, a limit to which general war 
dispositions can be denuded to provide greater strength in forward areas. Increasing 
the capability and readiness of troops in Eastern Greek Thrace would, however, 
contribute greater strength for all types of conflict. SACEUR‘s revised EDP, which 
will shortly be submitted to the Standing Group for approval, requires Major 
Subordinate Commanders to plan for both general war and aggression less than 
general war. This planning will include examination of the defense of Thrace up to 
the Bulgarian frontier together with an estimate of the forces required. Again, 
contingency plans will be, and some already are, prepared for more aggressive 
operations under appropriate circumstances. 
6. Conclusions:
 a. Within the limits imposed by the defensive nature of the NATO Alliance, a
basic strategy in the Balkan area which relies on major operations deep into hostile 
territory is neither politically acceptable nor militarily feasible with presently 
programmed forces and the anticipated level of external military assistance. 
 b. As opposed to such an offensive forwards strategy, the adoption of a
forward posture along the line of the Bulgarian frontier would serve to: 
(1) Impress the Bulgarians with the NATO intention to defend Thrace.
(2) Fill the present gap between the Turkish and Hellenic Armies.
(3) Provide for the conduct of a vigorous offensive-defense, to include
counterattacks to the Bulgarian border. 
(4) Provide a base for possible offensive operations under appropriate
circumstances. 
c. To achieve such a forward strategy would require the conversion of the 31st
Hellenic Military Command into a 1st Echelon division in the Greek Thrace area. 
d. Contingency plans for the provision of amphibious and/or airborne forces to
improve the defensive capabilities of NATO forces in the Balkan area will also be 
required. 
FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE: [SIGNED] J. E. 
MOORE, General, USA Chief of Staff 
_________________________________
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C-M(62)121 
North Atlantic Council Memorandum. Triennial Review – Chapter on Greece: 
Main Features of the Defence Effort of Greece 
11 December 1962 
 
TRIENNIAL REVIEW 1962 
CHAPTER ON GREECE 
 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE EFFORT OF GREECE 
 
I. Summary Military Appreciation of the Greek Force Contribution to NATO 
 
 1. The NATO Military Authorities note the contribution of Greece to NATO 
and its efforts to improve the combat effectiveness of her armed forces. The Greek 
participation in NATO co-ordinated production programmes and the efforts made to 
facilitate the construction of the NATO Missile Firing Installation, Souda Bay, Crete, 
are welcome. 
 2. However, the ability of the Royal Hellenic Armed Forces to carry out their 
assigned missions is adversely affected by the following major weaknesses: 
  a. Vulnerability of Royal Hellenic Air Force units and their command, 
control and logistic system to surprise attack; 
  b. Obsolescence of aircraft and ships; 
  c. Critical shortages of equipment and operational stocks; 
  d. Shortfalls in technicians in the Navy and low manning levels in the 
Air Force; 
  e. Insufficient flying training for pilots. 
 3. During the period under review, provided that the force programmes now 
proposed can be implemented, the Royal Hellenic Armed Forces will have a moderate 
but improving capability to carry out their assigned missions. 
 4. The Standing Group acknowledges the fact that successful achievement of 
SACEUR‘s proposed programme for Greece is largely dependent upon external 
assistance for materiel and for the funds necessary to close the financial gap between 
required defence expenditures and available national funds. Early Council resolution 
of this problem is urged. 
 5. Attention is drawn to the final recommendations of the NATO Military 
Authorities which are set out at Annex I. Annex II shows the planned status of the 
Greek forces at end-1962, 1963 and 1964, comparing these on the one hand with the 
firm goals adopted by the Council for end-1962 and on the other with the NATO 
Military Authorities‘ final programme for 1963-64. Annex III contains statistical data 
in tabular form showing trends in Greece‘s defence effort.   
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II. Summary of main non-military factors affecting Greece‘s defence effort 
 6. The Greek defence effort has been the subject of a special exercise 
conducted for the most part outside the regular framework of the Triennial Review on 
the basis of the Resolution C-M(62)58 on ―the defence problems of Greece‖ adopted 
by the Ministerial meeting at Athens on 5th May, 1962. This exercise has taken the 
form of a detailed examination by a special working group (set up by the Council in 
pursuance of paragraph (1) of Resolution C-M(62)58) of the resources which would 
be needed to enable Greece to fulfil the NATO Military Authorities‘ programme. This 
programme sets out the minimum measures required to maintain the effectiveness of 
the Greek Armed Forces over the 2-year period 1963-1964 and to provide for 
indispensable improvement and modernisation. The Greek authorities‘ own force 
plans show no significant differences as compared with the NATO programme, but 
their implementation is dependent upon the mobilisation of the necessary resources to 
finance the defence budget and to meet the major equipment needs of the forces. 
 7. The extent of the resources required to meet the programme as well as 
Greece‘s own capacity to contribute to them, is set out in the report of the Working 
Group C-M(62)87, which was noted by the Council on 12th September. The main 
features of the situation are as follows: 
 
 Manpower 
 8. The present strength of the Greek Armed Forces is about 163,000 and in 
order to attain the interim manning levels stipulated by the programme, should be 
brought up to about 167,500 by end-1964. The larger part of the increase would fall in 
the Army. Within these limits and owing to the incidence of low conscript age groups 
in the period under review, it will be necessary to recruit nearly 8,000 volunteers in 
addition to the 4,500 regulars which will be needed to raise qualitative standards in 
the Army and Air Force to those required by the NATO Military Authorities. While 
much has been and is being done to overcome shortages of technicians, there will 
remain a problem for some years to come. 
 
 Equipment 
 9. In addition to shortages in unit holdings and a general inadequacy of war 
reserves, a large part of the equipment of all three Services is obsolete. The 
modernisation plans for the Army call inter alia for substantial deliveries of combat 
and transport vehicles: for the Navy, which consists entirely of ships of World War II 
construction, at least 10 new or modernised vessels will be required during the period 
under review: the Air Force conversion programme implies the provision of  F104G 
aircraft (22 All-Weather and 18 Strike) as well as 24 Lightweight Reconnaissance 
aircraft. In the past all such equipment has come from external aid and although only 
limited information is at present available about future deliveries, the Greek plans 
have been made on the assumption that the major equipment needed will be 
forthcoming form the same source. 
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 Finance 
 10. The Greek defence expenditures for 1962 are expected to amount to $172 
million including the equivalent of $18 million represented by counterpart funds of 
United States economic aid. In addition equipment to the value of $40 million, and 
consumable items (POL, spare parts, ammunition, etc.) to a value of $33 million are 
expected from external aid. 
 11. To meet the NATO programmes it is estimated that in addition to 
deliveries from aid of major equipment to an average annual value of some $104 
million and of consumable items on the present scale, expenditures of $207.4 and 
$213.9 million would be necessary in 1963 and 1964 respectively. On the assumption 
that the $18 million of United States counterpart aid will no longer be available after 
end-1962, this would mean that an average of $56 million should be found in each of 
the two years over and above the amounts which Greece herself has devoted to 
defence in the current year. 
 12. The Working Group considered that part of the additional financial 
resources necessary to fulfil the Greek military programme could be provided by 
Greece herself, and that the remaining part would have to be found amongst Greece‘s 
NATO partners. The members of the Working Group, other than Greece, considered 
that ―Greece should be in a position not only to maintain defence expenditures 
financed from resources of national origin at their 1961 level, but also to increase 
these expenditures by 4.5% annually.‖ This would imply that Greece herself should 
provide an additional $13.6 million towards her defence expenditures in 1963 and 
$21.2 million in 1964; on this basis defence aid to be provided to Greece by her Allies 
would amount to $39.3 million in 1963 and $38.2 million in 1964. The Greek 
authorities have so far been unable to commit themselves to any definite figure, but 
have ―expressed their willingness to contribute to the bridging of the gap which will 
arise in 1963 and 1964 to the extreme limit of their capabilities, although they cannot 
envisage unrealistic figures‖. They have also stated on a number of occasions that 
failing the necessary assistance they will be compelled to review the structure of their 
forces. 
 13. The formal reply by Greece to ARQ(62) and the examination held in the 
framework of the Triennial Review have added no new information of a nature to 
alter the conclusions contained in the Working Group‘s report C-M(62)87. 
 
 Latest Developments 
 14. While negotiations initiated in September in implementation of paragraph 
(2) of Resolution C-M(62)58 are not yet concluded, it is already clear that a number 
of Greece‘s partners are ready as a part of a collective operation to provide special aid 
towards a solution of Greece‘s defence problems during the period under review on 
the condition that Greece herself will undertake an additional financial effort. This aid 
might take various forms, detailed arrangements being worked out between Greece 
and each of the member countries concerned, with the Secretary General responsible 
for any co-ordinating action which may be necessary. 
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 15. The Greek authorities have stated that, pending completion of these 
arrangements, they are not in a position to undertake commitments with regard to the 
Greek forces contribution for the period under review and a reservation to this effect 
is noted in the Council‘s Resolution in Defence 1962 (C-M(62)124(Revised)). As 
soon as the Greek authorities are in a position to establish definite force plans, it is 
understood that they will inform the NATO authorities with a view to enabling the 
Council to approve the firm force goals for Greece for 1963 on the basis of a report to 
be submitted by the Annual Review Committee. 
 
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES 
 
 1. The Standing Group endorses SACUER‘s comments on the individual 
services of Greece as contained in SHAPE/128/62, 15th October, 1962. 
 2. The Standing Group urges Greece to implement the following military 
recommendations in order to attain SACEUR‘s proposed programme. These 
recommendations are listed in order of urgency without regard to service: 
  (1) Take every practicable step to improve the survivability of the Air 
Force squadrons and their command, control and logistic systems. 
  (2) Procure modern aircraft. 
  (3) Modernise the provide additional TO&E equipment including non-
combat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and communications and electronic 
equipment for the Army. 
  (4) Overcome obsolescence of ships by a replacement and/or 
modernisation programme. 
  (5) Raise pilot flying time, particularly for STRIKE and All Weather 
Fighter aircrews. 
  (6) Raise manning levels in Air Force and Navy, particularly with 
technicians and communications/electronics personnel in the Navy. 
  (7) Build-up operational stocks of equipment and ammunition for the 
Army. 
  (8) Provide adequate resources of furnace fuel oil and anti-submarine 
ammunition for the Navy. 
  (9) Improve the over-the-beach unloading capability 
 
FORCES TABLES 
{Forces tables on end-1962, end-1963 and 3nd-1964 for the Army, Navy and Air 
Force} […] 
 
________________________________ 
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C-M(64)121
North Atlantic Council Memorandum. Progress Report by the Defence Planning
Committee on the Defence Problems of the South-Eastern Region
4 December 1964
PROGRESS REPORT BY THE DEPENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE ON THE 
DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH- EASTERN REGION 
The present report is intended to complement the Progress Report addressed to 
Ministers on NATO Force Planning (C-M(64)120). The Defence Planning Committee 
considered it appropriate to lay before the Ministers at their meeting of December 
1964, a brief survey of the defence situation of Greece and of Turkey, at the present 
time and for the coming years, as it emerges from the various studies recapitulated 
below, which were initiated following the Ministerial decision of 17th December, 
1963. At this stage of the work, it has not been considered possible to go any further, 
and in particular to make recommendations on the long-term plans to be established 
on a realistic basis for Greece and Turkey within the framework of the review now in 
progress of the long-term plans of the Alliance. 
PART I - PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF STUDIES 
Re-capitulation of the Council‘s Decisions 
2. During 1963, the NATO Military Authorities drew particular attention to
the weaknesses in the fields of tactical mobility, armour and air defence which affect 
the Greek and Turkish forces responsible for the defence of one of the vital section of 
the Alliance, namely Thrace and the Straits area. This situation seemed to them 
particularly serious because, in the light of the disquieting progress being made in 
these same fields by the opposing Soviet forces. 
3. On 17th December, 1963, the Ministers took the following decision on the
military situation as a whole in the South-Eastern region, in relation to the economic 
situation of Greece and Turkey and in the light of the plans of the Alliance for end-
1970.  
―In view of the concern expressed by the NATO Military Authorities in their 
Report on the 1963 Intermediate Review (MC/39/15) regarding the defensive 
capability of the forces in the South-Easter Region, and in the light of the statements 
made during the debate; invited the NATO Defence Planning Committee to give the 
highest priority to the study of the military and economic problems connected with 
the defence of the South-Eastern Region of the NATO area, and to report to the 
Council before the next Ministerial meeting if at al1 possible‖. 
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Adoption of a Special Procedure 
 4. Two Working Parties were established to conduct the study required by the 
Council. They were composed initially only of representatives of the International 
Staff and the NATO Military Authorities, as well as of Greece and Turkey (Restricted 
Groups), but it was understood that at an appropriate time al1 the countries would be 
invited to participate, and particularly in working out the report to be submitted to the 
Defence Planning Committee (Expanded Groups). 
 5. The Defence Planning Committee invited Greece and Turkey, on 31st 
January, 1964, to submit as soon as possible their replies to the questionnaire on long-
term national plans (DPC/D(63)3), as well as any proposals which these two countries 
might have for resolving their defence problems. The Committee was obliged on 6th 
March to take note of the fact that these replies would not be received in time to 
enable it to submit a report to the Council at the forthcoming May Ministerial Meeting 
at the Hague. 
  
Method of Conducting the Studies 
 6. As an introduction to the work, a general briefing on the military situation 
of the Alliance in the South-Eastern Region was presented by the Military Authorities 
to the members of the Annual Review Committee (5) assembled at the SACEUR 
Headquarters on 21st April, 1964. 
 7. When the Greek reply to the questionnaire of the Defence Planning 
Committee had been received, the first meeting of the ―Restricted‖ Working Group 
was held on 22nd and 23rd June at CINCSOUTH Headquarters in Naples, followed 
by a meeting in Paris on 30th July to examine the first replies of the Greek Authorities 
to the questions raised during or after the Naples Meeting. 
 8.  On receipt of the Turkish reply a first meeting was held for this country on 
28th and 29th July at the NATO Headquarters in Paris. During August and 
September, the Turkish Authorities supplied the additional information requested. 
 9. The force goals for end-1970 proposed by SHAPE (ALPHA and BRAVO 
postures) for the Alliance as a whole, including Greece and Turkey, were only made 
known during August. 
 10. Furthermore, the Turkish reply to the 1964 Annual Review Questionnaire 
enabled the current defence situation to be more correctly assessed as well as its 
military and financial plans for 1965. On the other hand, the uncertainties facing the 
Greek Authorities as regards the amount of potential aid available in the immediate 
future from their allies prevent them at the present time from taking a position as 
regards their plans for the coming year. 
 11. In the light of the information gathered and of the exchange of views 
which has taken place, the International Staff  have prepared, in co-operation with 
SHAPE, a first series of working papers and background documents. These were 
submitted in November for study by the delegations called upon to participate in the 
enlarged Working Group and comprised the basic material required for the study of 
the defence problems of Greece and Turkey. These documents were examined for the 
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first time on the 20th and 22th November. The discussion indicated the direction 
which would have to be followed when the enlarged Working Groups resume their 
preliminary studies at the beginning of 1965; they will then be in a position to tackle 
matters of substance with a better knowledge of the issues involved.  
 
PART II – DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF GREECE 
 Importance of External Aid 
 12. Solely to maintain at its present level the Greek military establishment, a 
financial effort is required greatly in excess of the capacity of the Greek national 
budget. Indeed, since her accession to the Alliance in 1952, Greece‘s defence effort 
has always been complemented by external resources in the form of: 
 - deliveries of military equipment and supplies of direct use to the armed 
 forces (aid programmes of the United States and Canada, and recently aid 
 from the Federal Republic of Germany); 
 - financial aid in support of the defence budget. 
Up to 1963, the latter form of aid, took the form of allocations to the defence budget 
of counterpart funds in Drachmae of United States economic aid. This aid having 
been reduced since 1963, several of Greece‘s NATO partners, wishing to avoid a 
reduction in the Greek defence effort which would have jeopardised the security of 
this sector of the NATO area, agreed to grant special defence aid in 1963 and 1964. 
This aid has taken the form, according to the contributing country, either of supplies 
for the civil economy, generating counterpart funds applied to increasing defence 
budget credits, or of deliveries of equipment for the forces. For financial year 1963, 
for example, external aid in all its forms amounted to about one-third of the total 
resources at the disposal of Greece for defence purposes. 
 13. Despite this assistance, and in particular the substantial volume – currently 
running at about $70 million per year – of the supplies delivered by the United States, 
the Greek forces are far from possessing the necessary weapons and equipment: 
 - in the Army, even the M-day units are under-equipped , their modernisation 
 is very incomplete, and the equipment in service is deteriorating at an 
 increasing rate; 
 - the Greek Navy, with the exception of a few small ships recently provided by 
 the United States, is mainly composed of over-age units for whose 
 replacement no plans exist; 
 - some modernisation of the Air Force has been undertaken, but only on a 
 limited scale; 
 - stocks of equipment and supplies are so small that they can be regarded as 
 practically non-existent. 
 14. The prevailing uncertainty regarding the type and volume of military aid 
which may be available in the future for the Greek forces makes any long-term 
planning extremely difficult. Should aid be reduced or terminated, Greece would 
undoubtedly be compelled to make a drastic reduction in its forces. In 1962 and 1963, 
the Greek Government has already informed NATO that a cut in its forces could not 
GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR
223 
be avoided if the aid deemed necessary was not forthcoming. This warning has 
recently been repeated – for 1965 – during the 1964 Annual Review. 
Inadequacy of Budgetary Resources 
15. The distinctive feature of the structure of the Greek defence budget is the
fact that the forces maintenance and operating costs account for over 90% of 
expenditure whereas about 7% is devoted to the military construction and 
infrastructure programmes and only about 2% to equipment. The reasons are that the 
military establishment of the three Services is about 157,000 men, and that the total 
number of military and civilian personnel engaged in national security activities 
represents a high proportion (5,3%) of the active population of the country. However, 
regulars account for only 16% of the strength – an obviously inadequate proportion in 
modern armed forces. 
16. After remaining virtually at the same level i.e. in the region of 5 billion
drachmas, in 1961 and 1962, the defence expenditures of Greece rose to 5.4 billion in 
1963. Of this sum, 450 million drachmas ($15 million) have been financed by special 
advances from the Bank of Greece, in anticipation of the aid which the NATO 
countries are expected to supply this year. The purely national budgetary effort of 
Greece, therefore, amounted to about 4.9 billion drachmas, i.e. 4.3% of the national 
product, which is a very high figure for a country whose standard of living is one of 
the lowest in the Alliance. According to present estimates, this effort is to be 
increased in 1964 to about 5 billion drachmas, showing a rise of 1.7% as compared 
with 1963. The Greek Authorities intend to devote the largest possible share of 
national resources to the economic and social development recognised as essential 
from every point of view, and they have emphasised that they would have to take 
account of this primary need in determining the level of their defence effort during the 
coming years.  
17. The type and volume of aid for defence which Greece is expecting to
receive for 1964 from its NAT0 partners has not yet been decided by the contributing 
countries. Therefore, as in 1963, special advances amounting to date to 400 million 
drachmas have had to be made by the Bank of Greece to the Defence Ministry. 
Long-term Plans 
(i) National Plans
18. The Greek Authorities are fully aware of the need to correct the
weaknesses currently affecting their forces, and in particular of the lack of equipment 
and the inadequate number of regulars and specialists; in reply to the questionnaire of 
the Defence Planning Committee, they have therefore described the structure and size 
of the forces which they consider it necessary to possess in 1970. The implementation 
of national plans would imply total forces exceeding present levels by about 30%. 
Generally speaking, these forces are larger in number of units than those required by 
SHAPE for the ALPHA goals; on the other hand, from the qualitative point of view 
their standard would be appreciably lower than that prescribed by the NATO Military 
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Authorities for that posture. The national plans are based on the two following 
assumptions regarding the resources required for their fulfilment: 
 - that practically all the necessary equipment is supplied under the aid 
 programmes; 
 - that the portion of the forces maintenance and operating costs which the 
 Greek budget is unable to meet is financed with the assistance of the allies of 
 Greece. 
The average figure for equipment requirements, according to the International Staff 
estimate, would be over $230 million per year, i.e. more than three times the present 
volume of United States military aid. In addition, the average amount of financial aid 
would be $80 million per year. The total figure for external aid in al1 its forms would 
thus exceed $300 million per year. 
 
 (ii) Goals proposed by SHAPE 
 19. A preliminary analysis shows that the attainment of the goals proposed by 
SHAPE for end-1970, either under the ALPHA posture or under the BRAVO posture, 
would in general encounter financial difficulties of the same order as those which 
would be raised by the implementation of the national plans. The financial aid 
required to meet the forces maintenance and operating costs would probably be even 
larger than that entailed by the national plans (since the manning strengths 
corresponding to the SHAPE goals are higher than those planned by the Greek 
Authorities). On the other hand, the equipment requirements might be smaller (since 
the national plans provide for a larger number of units than that required by SHAPE) 
they would still be substantial, however, and in any case much larger than those which 
can be satisfied with United States military aid at its present level. 
 
PART III – DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF TURKEY 
 
 Importance of External Aid 
 20. Solely to maintain the Turkish military establishment at its present level – 
considered by the NATO Mi1itary Authorities as clearly insufficient in view of the 
risk – requires both an economic and financial effort beyond that which Turkey can 
furnish in the present state of development of her economy, of her industrial 
production capacity, of her budgetary resources and of her balance of payments 
situation. Indeed, since her accession to the Alliance in 1952, Turkey‘s defence effort 
has always been complemented by external resources in the form of: 
 - deliveries of military equipment and supplies of direct use to the armed 
forces (aid programme of the United States and Canada, and more recently aid from 
the Federal Republic of Germany); 
 - financial aid equivalent to the counterpart funds in Turkish pounds of United 
States economic aid. 
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 21. Despite this assistance, and in particular the substantial volume – at 
present about $120 million per year – of the supplies delivered by the United States, 
the Turkish forces are far from possessing the necessary weapons and equipment; 
 - in the Army, even M-day units are under-equipped, their modernisation is 
very incomplete, and the rate of deterioration of the equipment in service is 
increasing; 
 - the Turkish Navy is almost entirely composed of over-age units  whose 
replacement is not planned; 
 -  some modernisation of the Air Force has been undertaken, but only on a 
limited scale; 
 - stocks of equipment and supplies are so small that they can be regarded as 
practically non-existent.  
The prevailing uncertainty regarding the type and volume of military aid which may 
be available in the future for the Turkish forces makes any long-term planning 
extremely difficult. Should aid be reduced or come to an end, Turkey would 
undoubtedly be compelled to make a drastic cut in its forces.  
  
 Inadequacy of Resources Allocated to Defence 
 22. The distinctive feature of the structure of the Turkish defence budget is the 
fact that the forces maintenance and operating costs account for over nine-tenth of the 
budget, whereas only one-tenth is devoted to capital expenditures (90% of which is 
absorbed by military construction and infrastructure programmes and the balance by 
equipment). The reason is that the total strength of the forces is over 426,000 men for 
the three services; the civilian and military personnel employed for national security 
purposes represent a very high proportion – 3.6% – of the active population. 
However, regulars account for only 17% of the overall strength, and this proportion, 
in spite of the fact that it corresponds to the very low level of equipment in use, is 
obviously inadequate in modern armed forces. 
 23. Turkey‘s defence expenditures have increased rapidly during recent years, 
but the practical effect of such increases has been reduced by the rise in prices and 
wages. In 1963, those expenditures amounted to about T£3.3 billion (i.e. 5.9% of the 
national product). A relatively small portion of these expenditures could be attributed 
to the exceptional source of revenue derived from United States economic aid. Even if 
that small portion is excluded, Turkey‘s own defence effort as a percentage of its 
GNP still accounts to a very high figure for a country whose standard of living, about 
$200 per capita, is one of the lowest in the Alliance. 
 24. In order to devote a larger share of the national resources to the country‘s 
economic and social development, recognised as essential from every point of view, 
the Turkish Government intends in future to slow down the rate of growth of military 
expenditures. For instance, for 1964/65 the defence budget was increased only by 
3.8% (at current prices) as compared with the previous financial year, and it is 
planned to slow down the rate of increase to 2.5% in real terms in the coming years. 
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 Long-term Plans 
 (i) National Plans  
 25. The Turkish Authorities are fully aware of the weaknesses currently 
affecting their forces, and in particular of the lack of equipment; in reply to the 
questionnaire of the Defence Planning Committee, they have therefore proposed a 
choice of three options for 1965/67, the period to which their study is confined. 
 First Option: The existing forces would be raised to the qualitative levels – as 
regards both manpower and equipment – required by NATO but which it has not yet 
been possible to attain. However, foreseeable resources, from the budget or external 
aid, would only cover about one-third of the total cost of this option. The Turkish 
Authorities therefore consider unattainable. 
 Second Option: This would involve maintaining existing forces at their present 
level and adopting qualitative standards which, although lower than those required by 
NATO, are nevertheless considered by the Turkish Authorities as ―acceptable 
minimum standards‖. Even then, foreseeable resources could only cover less than half 
the cost of this option. Its attainment would therefore call for a very sharp increase 
both in the volume of equipment supplied under external aid and in financial aid to 
make good the scarcity of national resources. 
 Third Option: In the absence of help from its allies to provide the additional 
means necessary to implement the second option, Turkey would be compelled to 
make a substantial and speedy reduction in its forces, both those assigned to NATO 
and those maintained under national command. Therefore this third option, the cost of 
which, moreover, could only be covered up to about three-quarters by foreseeable 
resources, would result in considerably increased risks from the point of view of the 
defence of the Alliance and would undoubtedly imply the abandonment of the 
forward strategy. It is, for these reasons, considered unacceptable by the Turkish 
Government. 
 
 (ii) Goals Proposed by SACEUR 
 26. The goals set up by SHAPE under the ALPHA and BRAVO postures, 
which extend to the end of 1970, are difficult to compare with the three national plans 
for end-1967 summarised above. It seems that these goals would encounter financial 
difficulties of the same order as those which would be met in implementing the plans 
prepared by the Turkish Authorities. In fact, the latter‘s first option can be considered 
a first stage towards the ALPHA posture, the second as a stage towards the BRAVO 
posture. 
 
PART IV – FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT 
 
 27. As a conclusion of their recent sessions during which were submitted the 
background documents established by the International Staff and the NATO Military 
Authorities, the expanded groups decided that: 
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 (a) the national military authorities of Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, 
and the NATO Military Authorities, on the other hand, should jointly undertake, with 
the assistance of the International Staff, further studies with a view to harmonising as 
far as possible the various force goals prepared by SACEUR and by each of the two 
countries, taking into account both the threat and the solidarity of NATO member 
countries in the field of defence; 
 (b) the Greek and Turkish Authorities, in co-operation with the International 
Staff, should define, for consideration by the expanded groups, the economic and 
financial assumptions to be adopted with a view to reaching as far as possible a 
common estimate of the resources which Greece and Turkey should be in a position to 
devote to their defence efforts during the period 1966-1970, without compromising 
the necessary development of their economies; 
 (c) at a later stage, the cost of the military plans retained for consideration 
should be estimated in order to determine, by comparing cost with resources, the size 
of the possible gap to be filled and to envisage the means to do so. 
 28. Among the other questions discussed at the restricted meetings of the 
groups, the following for instance should warrant further investigation in the near 
future: 
 (a) reconsideration of the order of priority to be given to the Services and to 
their assigned missions; 
 (b) possibility of some re-deployment of existing forces and the transfer to the 
NATO-assigned forces of units at present under national command, or the possibility 
of drawing on the latter to strengthen the NATO-assigned units; 
 (c) extent of the assistance which the allied forces would be capable of giving, 
in an emergency, for the defence of the sector; nature of such assistance and time 
required for its provision with special reference to the following: 
 (i) extension of the role and resources of the Mobile Force of SACEUR; 
 (ii) assistance of strategic reserves; 
 (iii) recourse to nuclear weapons, and in particular to atomic demolition 
mines. 
It is evident that in due course, the Working Parties will have to take account 
of the results of the work carried out independently with regard to the ―Main Issues‖ 
listed in paragraph 23 of the Defence Planning Committee's Progress Report(C-
M(64)120) and, in particular, those of specific concern to the South-Eastern flank of 
the NATO area (local actions, contingency planning, conventional forces, Mobile 
Force, etc.). 
 
PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
 29. At the present stage of the current studies on the military and economic 
problems concerning the defence of the South-Eastern Region of the NATO area, the 
Defence Planning Committee considers it possible to summarise the provisional 
conclusions it has reached as follows: 
NATO
228 
(a) Any forces plan for Greece and Turkey for end-1970 must necessarily fit
into the framework of the overall long-term plans to be adopted by the Alliance for 
that period; 
(b) The build-up and modernisation of the Greek and Turkish forces to raise
them to the desirable level of effectiveness in view of the risks specific to the NATO 
area for whose defence they are responsible represents, for this period, a burden 
which these two countries are unable to assume unaided. 
[SIGNED] Manlio Brosio 
Chairman 
ANNEX to C-M(64)121 
VIEWS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH AUTHORITIES ON THE 
PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROGRESS REPORT 
The Greek and Turkish Authorities agree with the contents of paragraph 29(a) 
and (b) of C-M(64)121 but consider that the following additional points should be 
reflected in the provisional conclusions of the Progress Report. 
- Firstly, in order for the Greek and Turkish forces to reach the desirable
effectiveness, military assistance above its present level is necessary. 
- Secondly, even if SHAPE‘s ALPHA posture were to be reached, the South-
Eastern flank would still remain relatively vulnerable. If the lower BRAVO posture 
were retained, external aid (in the form of equipment deliveries as well as financial 
and economic aid) should exceed to an appreciable extent the average level of past 
years. 
- Lastly, on account of the overriding necessity to secure adequate protection
for this NATO area, ways and means must still be sought in order both to bring the 
effort needed for this purpose to a level which is more consistent with the national 
resources available to these two countries up to 1970 and to complement it with the 
adequate supplementary material financial assistance to be placed et their disposa1 by 
their allies. 
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